

THE CHANGING PARADIGM OF INDONESIAN JIHADIST MOVEMENTS From *al-`Aduww al-Qarib* to *al-`Aduww al-Ba`id*

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Abstract: Like in any other Muslim countries, an analysis of Islamic space in Indonesia cannot ignore the jihadist movements that took shape there. Since the reformation era, Indonesians have witnessed a number of bloody tragedies, ranging from religious conflicts in Ambon, attacks to the Western embassies offices, to the deadliest suicide bombings in Bali. All aforementioned attacks entails that a terrorist group operating in Southeast Asia called Jama'ah Islamiyyah does exist. The article deals with the historical account of the transformation of Indonesian jihadist movements. It will discuss, first, the intellectual roots of the emergence of transnational jihadist movements and, second, the Indonesian' links to the trend as Jamaah Islamiyyah has demonstrated. The "near enemy" (*al-`aduww al-qarib*) and the "far enemy" (*al-`aduww al-ba`id*) developed by Greges are key notions quoted as analytical tools to deal with diverse acts of jihadist movement in responde to the local and global parties perceived as anti-Islam.

Keywords: Jihadist movement, Jama'ah Islamiyyah, transnational jihadist networks.

Introduction

Since the collapse of Suharto's New Order (1966-1998) and along with the political democratisation of the country, Indonesians have witnessed a number of bloody attacks, suicide bombings, and terrorism. It leads to the condemnation and accusation, including from that of the former prime minister of Singapore who maintained that Indonesia is "a nest for terrorists". The Prime Minister also accused Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the leader of the most dangerous terrorist

organisation operating in Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyyah.¹ However, the attacks and suicide bombings are not peculiar to Indonesia since a number of other Muslim countries and western states were also experiencing similar threat of terrorism.

The article deals with two main issues. *First*, is the issue of the intellectual roots of jihadist movements. To discuss this point, the paper will argue that current Indonesian jihadist movements demonstrated the continuation and change of jihadist ideology transferred from the Middle East. It is the Afghan War and the New Order politics which had paved the way to the rise of transnational jihadist networks in Indonesia. During of the Afghan War, hundreds of Indonesians, mainly those who were in favour of jihad against the denounced heretic rulers of the New Order, made their *hijrah* (fleeing) to neighbouring country, Malaysia, as the station for the next jihad to set Afghanistan free from the Atheist Russian Armies. In addition, the journey was also aimed at strengthening the previous rebellion movement, Darul Islam, militias and to wage jihad in Indonesia as they went home.

Second, is the issue of the backdrop of Indonesian jihadist movements and the emergence of Indonesian transnational jihadist like Jamaah Islamiyyah. The emergence of this allegedly terrorist organisation implies the existence of the global trend of jihadist movements. The late twentieth century, however, has witnessed the shifting paradigm of Indonesian jihadist movements, from *al-'aduwu al-qarib* (near enemies) to *al-'aduwu al-ba'id* (far enemies). This shift in paradigm is something that similar movements in the Middle East have experienced.

Jihadist Movements: an Overview

In the recent debates over Islam, the idea of jihad has been invoked quite regularly. Keppel assumes that jihad is the central topic of contemporary Islamist ideology.² Ahmed Rashid in the meantime

¹ "Mozaik Teror Antar-Bangsa" (the Inter-State Terror Mosaic), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue 30/XXXI/23-29 September 2002 and "Lee Menuding, Jakarta Meradang" (Lee Accusing, Jakarta Inflamed), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue 52/XXX/25 February-03 March 2002.

² Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*, trans. by Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

argues that it refers to radical Islamist groups,³ attachment to local values and resistance against homogenising trends of globalisation⁴. A radical anti-Islam scholar says that it represents as a proof of innate violence and incompatibility of Islam and civilised norms.⁵ Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer however draw their attention on the current aggressive jihadist movements which they identified as revolutionary groups launching jihad or Holy War against the United States, Israel, Europe and anyone else who opposes their vision of a world governed by shari'ah.⁶ Supported by multitude schools, charitable associations, banks, business activities and Islamic world's governments, these revolutionary movements attempt to elevate the status of jihad in Muslim consciousness and make it equal with the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving and pilgrimage). In contrast to consensus (*ijmā'*) of majority of the 'ulamā, they consider jihad as a permanent and personal obligation (*fardh 'ayn*) and a vital pillar of Islam.⁷

These jihadist movements draw their primary inspiration from the twelfth century scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who persuasively argued that Islam requires state power and proclaimed that Mongol-Muslims who had conquered the core of Islamic world as infidels and unbelievers which had to be fought against.⁸ It was in the beginning of the eighteenth century when the Ottoman Empire had entered military and economic crises, a politically ambitious 'ulamā of Arab, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), reinstalled Ibn Taymiyya's spirits for the sake of his ethnic supremacy. He began with making a

³ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

⁴ Benjamin Barber, *Jihad versus McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

⁵ Daniel Pipes, "What Is Jihad?," *New York Post*, December 31, 2002.

⁶ Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, *At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadist, and America's War on Terrorism* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp. 1 -5.

⁷ Fawaz A. Greges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.

⁸ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 45-48; ICG, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix", 13 September 2003; Ibn Taymiyya, *Ibn Taimiyya on Public and Private Law in Islam, or Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence*, transl. from Arabic by Omar A. Farrukh (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 145.

faithful alliance with Muhammad ibn Su'ud and called Muslims to learn and think for themselves (*'ijtihad*), and reject the blind imitation (*taqlid*) by resorting to Qur'an and Sunnah. He prescribed jihad against all wicked heretics (*bid'at*) and called for solution through the purity of *tauhid*.⁹ In politics, Wahhab considered the Turk as a threat to Arab supremacy and called for jihad against the *'ajam* (non-Arab) domination.¹⁰

The next influential Muslim thinker of jihadist movement is Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). Unlike Ibn Taymiyah and Abd al-Wahhab, al-Banna's contribution to jihadist vision is his recognition of Europe (and the West in general) as an intellectual as well as physical threat.¹¹ He called Muslim to fight against Westernisation and the "mental colonisation" of Muslim through Islamic education. The first battlefield, according to him, would be against unbeliever who had occupied Islamic territory and afterward jihad would reach out to include the rest of the world. In 1928, al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) to carry out his plan.¹² Held responsible for the assassination of the prime minister of Egypt in December 1948, he was killed by the Egyptian Police. However, his legacy, the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, still existed as the armed group which has been involved in numerous violent attacks in the Middle East.

Perhaps the greatest influential thinker and activist of the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin is an Egyptian militant, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Qutb began his life as a literary critic, open to ideas and influences from the West. But after his travel to the United States from 1948 to

⁹ Jhon O. Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), pp. 53-56.

¹⁰ Yudian Wahyudi, *Slogan "Kembali ke al-Qur'an dan Sunnah" Sebagai Solusi Ideal Kemunduran Islam di Era Modern* (Yogyakarta: Nawesca Press, 2007)

¹¹ Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in The Modern World Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 90

¹² Though the Muslim Brotherhood did not engage in Egyptian politics and focused on the *da'wa* (missionary) activities through the establishment of Islamic social services, like medical clinics and religious schools, it also said that the Brotherhood run its secret armed factions which were ready to engage in jihad with British and, once the colonial powers left, with the secular Egyptian governments that replaced them. Richard P. Mitchel, *The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969)

1950, he became a strong critic of the West.¹³ Upon his return to Egypt in 1950, Qutb joined al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin.¹⁴ As a consequence of his activism, the Egyptian government sent him to prison in 1954. While in prison, Qutb produced his two important works, exegesis of the Qur'an called *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* (in the Shade of the Qur'an) and *Ma'alim al-Tariq* (Milestone); all of which have become bestseller in jihadist circles and provided much of the ideological and theological foundations for modern jihad.¹⁵ Qutb introduced the concept of ignorance (*jabiliya*) and jihad in his Islamic interpretation. *Jabiliya*, according to Qutb, refers to all man-made practices and ideologies, therefore they are against Islam. Like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, he called for the purification of *tauhid* by calling back to the Qur'an and Sunnah in order to pull out Muslim from ignorance. In politics, he identified all political systems which were not based on the Qur'an and Sunnah as false religion and encouraged Muslims to live under shariah. He supported the idea of fighting against the unbelievers and equally against Muslims whom Qutb accused of refusing to recognise the absolute lordship of God. He called Muslims to commit *jihad* which he thought as an everlasting religious obligation for Muslims in responding to endless adversary of Jews, Christians and unbelievers. Unlike al-Banna, Qutb accused Egyptian 'ulamā, in particular those of al-Azhar University, of selling out Islam by legitimizing their rulers. Thus the most dangerous *bid'ah* (heresy), they spread throughout the Muslim world was, for Qutb, the notion that Islam was not a revolutionary religion. Furthermore, he insisted that struggle against the political domination of the tyranny (*taqhub*) is obligatory.¹⁶

¹³ Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *The Middle East Journal* 17,1 (1983), p. 18.

¹⁴ Ahmad S. Moussali, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: the Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), pp. 24-25.

¹⁵ After the publication of the Milestone, Nasser accused Qutb of having plan to revolt against the state and Muslim leaders. As a consequence, Qutb was prosecuted to death in 1966. See Ahmad S. Moussali, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 52.

¹⁶ Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival," in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 85-86.

In politics, Qutb was inspired by an Indian political activist, Sayyid Abu A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979). Al-Mawdudi believed that the primary duty for every Muslim is to revive Islamic politics and to resist the occupying foreigners. The vision was translated into the belief that God alone is sovereignty as a consequence of the purity of *tauhid*. This sovereignty expands to all human activities, including politics. Therefore, the truthful state, according to him, must take the form of a global Islamic government or *khilafah*. This government runs “theodemocracy” through which the whole representatives of Muslims communities (*majlis shura*) were assigned to interpret the laws of God and to elect the *'amir* (the leader). For this ideal to realise, al-Mawdudi believed, jihad is the only means.

However, it is worthwhile to note, as Fawas A. Greges points out, that all jihadist movements, before the 1990s, intended to strike ultimately against the rulers of their own homelands. Both al-Banna and Qutb struggled against nationalist-secular Egyptian rulers, whereas al-Mawdudi called for jihad against Indian Hindu-rulers. They embattled against their own rulers within national framework in order to create an Islamic state, which encompasses earthly political power. Prior to the mid-1990s, jihadist movements' enemies are their own nationalists and secular rulers to which Greges attributes as “the near enemy” (*al-'adunn al-qarib*).¹⁷ However, since the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Afghan war, there has been a new shift of focus away from localism and toward globalism against the “far enemy” (*al-'adunn al-ba'id*).¹⁸ The Afghan war (1979-1989) was an important event and locus for all jihadits groups, which contained of thousands of

¹⁷ Greges, *The Far Enemy*, pp. 13-14

¹⁸ Greges urged that the shift related to two events: 1) the 1991 Gulf War and the permanent stationing of Americans forces in Saudi Arabia, 2) the defeat of religious nationalist on their home turf by the end of the 1990s. Greges, *The Far Enemy*, p. 30.

militants from different nationalities,¹⁹ to exercise their military capabilities and to establish secure bases for their military trainings.²⁰

The rising global jihad started when, in February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew their military equipments and troops from Afghanistan and large quantities of its military hardware were donated to the newly independent Afghanistan. The end of war against atheist-enemy brought problems within the Afghan war fighters as they debated what had to be done then after their victory in the battle, who should rule Afghanistan and whether the battle would still be continued against other enemies, the West or their homeland rulers. The debate brought further disunity among the Afghan War militias and created various splinter-groups that are divided into three groups.²¹ First group is 'diaporic revolutionary militias' who decided to continue the battle in other Muslim land battlefields, such as in Palestine. They perceived that the coming duty after freeing Afghanistan is to set Palestine freedom. Second is 'retired militias' who decided to stop the battle and prefer to live in their own country and avoided military and political activities. This groups initially was influenced by Saudi-wahhabi factions that during the first Gulf War (1991), in favour of the United States and refrained from being military activated after the end of the Afghan war.²² Contradicted to the two

¹⁹ According to Rasyid, between 1982 and 1992, around 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would pass through baptism under fire with the Afghan mujahidin and more than 100.000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan. See, Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: the Story of the Afghan Warlords* (Basingstoke and Oxford: Pan Books, 2001), p. 130.

²⁰ Kouser J. Azam, "Political Islam and Terrorism in Contemporary Times" in Adluri Subramanyam Raju (ed.), *Terrorism in South Asia: Views from India* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), pp. 84-85 quoted from Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists* (Wesport etc.: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 15-16

²¹ Greges argues that the jihadists, after the end of Afghan War, split into two; first militias were in favour of transnational jihadits through internationalising jihad and exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide, and second, religious nationalist militias whose main objective to make sure that Islamic revolution succeeded at home. Greges, *The Far Enemy*, p. 25.

²² For further explanation on this faction read Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 2006).

aforementioned groups, the former fighters of Afghan war continued their jihad and waged war against “far enemy” or ‘transnational jihadist’. These later jihadist faction perceived westerners as their next enemies and called for committing global jihad against the West and perceived the Saudi government as heretic and the henchman of the enemy of Islam.

It is a Jordanian-Palestinian activist, `Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), who firstly set the ideological base for the coming global jihad. He called for battle against Christian encroachment on former Muslim lands by transcending national identities and backgrounds. He rejected internal Muslim infighting as trial (*fitna*) and supported conflicts on Philippines, Palestine and even Spain. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, Azzam issued a *fatwā*, supported by Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti, ‘Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, rulling that both the Afghan and the Palestinian struggles were jihad and killing infidels (*kuffar*) was a religious duty for all Muslims, otherwise they would fall into a great sin.²³

Another leading figure in the global jihad is the leader of jihad group of Egypt, Ayman al-Zawahiri who arrived in the Afghan battlefield in the 1980s. Through his memoir released after 11 September attacks, he superimposed that the awaited jihad is coming. The present jihad, he stated, is against the superpower states that have dominated the globe, the United States and its allies. He claimed that Afghanistan was no more than a military training ground for the “awaited battle” and invited all trained militias to wage jihad against the United States.²⁴ Furthermore, exceeding Azzam, al-Zawahiri accused the Saudi government of being the henchman of the real enemy of Islam because it allowed the United States to establish the permanent stationing of Americans forces in Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Gulf War.

Osama bin Laden is the main financial donor of the global jihad of al-Zawahiri. In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the United States’ Operation Desert Storm, on 8 August 1996, he proclaimed a declaration of “War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy lands (Expel the Infidels from the Arab

²³ ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, *al-Difa’ an ‘Ard al-Muslimin*, p. 29; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 18.

²⁴ Ayman Zawahiri, *Knights under the Prophet’s Banner*, 3 December 2001.

Peninsula) stating that people should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main unbelievers (*kufri*) who have been controlling the Muslim world. For bin Laden, there was not more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the Two Holy lands. Referring to Ibn Taimiyya, he said “to fight in defence of religion and belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after belief that fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion.” Again on 23 February 1998, bin Laden issued a *fatwā*, under the banner of “World Islamic Front for Jihād against the Jews and Crusaders,” asserting that it is religious duty for all Muslims to wage war against the United States’ citizens, both military and civilians, anywhere in the world.²⁵ Along with these promoted hatred, from 2000 to 2003, 100 of more than 300 suicide attacks were undertaken by bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and killed thousands of people in 17 countries.

The Indonesian Jihadist Movement

Though majority of scholars agreed that the coming and spread of Islam Indonesian is in peaceful manners, unlike that of Persian and India which was mainly by military invasion and political forces,²⁶ according to Ricklefs, the facts sometimes showed the otherwise. The fact is that in the sixteenth century Sumatra, Java and the seventeenth Sulawesi, Islamisation is often followed by conquest and Islam was spread out not only by persuasion and commercial pressure, but also by the sword under the banner of jihād.²⁷ The early nineteenth-century West Sumatra witnessed the emergence of the Muslim militants group, Padri, whose vision is to elevate Islamic laws to a position of pre-eminence. Under the influence of a likely Wahabi movement in Saudi

²⁵ World Islamic Front Statement, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>, issued 23 February 1998; Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” in *The Washington Quarterly*, 27:3: pp. 68-70.

²⁶ Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed; Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968); Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat* (Jakarta, LP3ES, 1987); Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 652.

²⁷ MC. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200* (Third Edition) (California: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 17.

Arabia, the movement was involved in warfare against the traditional custom (*adat*) of Minangkabau which was denounced as *jabili*.²⁸

In 1830, the nineteenth century Java also observed landlord revolt of Diponegoro, a rebellion popularly known as the “Java war.” The war was provoked by the refusal of the royal family of the Yogyakarta sultanate to nominate Diponegoro succeeding his father on the basis of the non-royal origins of his mother, to which the Dutch installed their fear of his Islamic orientation. In 1825, some of his property, including land on which his palace stood, were confiscated and Diponegoro reacted by waging jihad against both the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Dutch.²⁹ The battle in the name of jihad also had an effect on the Acehnese war against Dutch. The war began in 1873 and, in 1881, the Acehnese ‘ulamā declared the war as *jihad fi>sabik Allah* (war in path of God). In addition, a series of peasants’ revolts also occurred along the archipelago, initially in Java and Sumatera islands, under the banner of jihad. The spirit of jihad, highlighted by hatred toward Dutch-collonial that was identified as the infidels, remained the canopy of those struggles.

As the rise of nationalism in the Muslim world in the early twentieth-century, the Indonesian jihadist episodes revealed a major shift. Unlike that of prior to the twentieth-century, establishing an independent nation-state was the popular vision of multitude Indonesian jihadist movements. Unlike that of the Padri, Diponegoro and Acehnese which nuanced in a limited area and locally oriented -if not to mention based on personal/individual interests, the twentieth-century Indonesian jihadist movements had vision to establish an independence national-state as the Nahdlatul Ulama’s case that issued

²⁸ Though the movement was defeated in 1837”, thanks to Dutch military invasion, Padri movement successfully caused an increasing penetration of Islam into Minangkabau society as reflected through the Minangkabau’s principles of “*agama mangato, adat mamakai*” (religion rules, while *adat* practices), a new regulation that categorically condemned *jabili adat* as forbidden. Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950*, translated by Jan Steenbrink and Harry Jansen (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi B.V., 1993), p. 75, Taufik Abdullah, “Adat dan Islam: Tinjauan Konflik di Minangkabau,” in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Sejarah dan Masyarakat: Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia*, 2nd edition (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1987), p. 119.

²⁹ Karel Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), p. 19 and 32.

a fatwa “jihad against the Dutch.”³⁰ A number of paramilitary bodies were founded in responding to the Dutch and put their efforts for creating an independent state, despite the fact that some others were involved in politics. The struggle for a state-regulated country within national frameworks coloured their struggles and still continued in the era of Japanese rules (1942-1945).

The year after the Indonesian independence was the next episode for jihad in Indonesia as it was the political test for Islamic groups to recognise a newly established ‘Indonesia secular-state.’ It had generated a long tough tension and conflict between proponents of Islamic state and nationalists. The tension culminated when the government abrogated –latter known as- “Seven Words formulation,” stating “Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim citizens to carry out the Islamic law/Syari’ah (*Ketuhanan yang maha Esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*)” from the Indonesian constitution.³¹ The first political rebellion against the state was Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII), headed by Kartosurwiryo.³² He was military leader and a product of the Dutch

³⁰ Amiq, *Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia: Study of the Fatwas of Sayyid ‘Uthman (1822-1913) and K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari (1871-1947)* (Unpublished MA thesis at Leiden University, 1998); Yudian Wahyudi, *Slogan “Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan Sunnah”*.

³¹ On 22 June 1945, nine leading Indonesian leaders –known as “Nine Coordinator” (Panitia Sembilan)- collaborating on Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI) successfully had drafted a constitution for new established republic. The draft is the second version of Pancasila –known as Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta)- and a reaction toward the preceding version of Pancasila as well to which the future Indonesian president, Sukarno, promulgated through his speech known as “The Birth of the Pancasila” on 1 June 1945. Due to the objection from some political leaders, mainly those are from Eastern part of Indonesia which are majority Christians, delivered to the next Indonesian vice president, Muhammad Hatta, Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI), on 18 August 1945, changed the formulation of the first sentence of Pancasila by removing the words “with the obligation of its Muslims citizens to carry out the Shariah,” so that the first *sila* sounds “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”. Read, Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behaviour* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 9 and Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, *Islam dan Politik; Teori Belah Bambu, Masa Depan Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p. 29.

³² Cees van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Faisal Ismail, *Pijar-Pijar Islam; Pergumulan Kultur dan*

high school system.³³ His Islamic vision was maintained when he had been a private secretary of Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, president of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/PSII (Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party). In contrast to another of Tjokroaminoto's pupil, Sukarno, one of founding fathers of Indonesia, Kartosuwiryo grew to prefer Islam, instead of nationalism. In 1936, he started to promote the idea of establishing an Islamic state and founded a spiritual training centre, the Suffa Institute, which was transformed as a military training camp in 1942.³⁴ On 7 August 1949, he proclaimed his Indonesian Islamic State, let alone the unrecognised 14 August 1945 declaration of Indonesian Islamic State. Unlike Sukarno who saw communists as the backbone for popular supports for the regime, Kartosuwiryo maintained communism as an atheist threat to the very existence of Islam.³⁵ Kartosuwiryo demanded President Sukarno abandon both Nationalist and Communist and insisted the president to return to Islam and to make the Qur'an and Sunnah as the state constitution. His jihad was a response to Sukarno's ideological amalgamation between Nationalism, Religion and Communism (Nasionalis, Agama dan Komunis/NASAKOM) and started to fight against the government. Through a vigorous anti-guerrilla campaign in the period 1960-1962, Sukarno eventually defeated Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam.

Another military leader of Darul Islam is Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar. As with Kartosuwiryo, Mudzakkar was a military leader who was involved in the struggle for Indonesian independence against the Dutch in Java (1945-1950). Despite his accomplishment, he was passed over for the leadership by then president Soekarno and sent to South Sulawesi, a peripheral locale compared to Java. With the support of his loyal followers, Qahhar established his own command and proclaimed a guerrilla war against the newly-established republic in 1950 and joined Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam. On 7 August 1953, he

Struktur (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama Departemen Agama RI, 2002), p. 49.

³³ Bernard Johan Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 55; Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo* (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964), pp. 27-28.

³⁴ Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 168; Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 55.

³⁵ Wahyudi, *Slogan "Kembali ke al-Qur'an dan Sunnah"*.

formally announced the integration of Sulawesi into Darul Islam and was subsequently named National Deputy Minister of Defence on Darul Islam. In 1957 when communication among Darul Islam members in regions continued to break down, Qahhar declared the outright independence of Sulawesi and, on 14 May 1963, proclaimed Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia/RPII (the Islamic Federated Republic of Indonesia) with its capital in South Sulawesi.³⁶ On 15 December 1963, with the slogan “Selamatkan Sulawesi!” (Save Sulawesi!), he decided to sever all political links with Javanese Indonesia as the only means of saving Sulawesi from Javanese domination or “Majapahitism.”³⁷ However, the government successfully put the armed guerrilla of Qahhar and his militias to an end as, on 3 February 1965, Qahhar was killed in Lasolo.³⁸

The further historical stage of Indonesian jihadist is when Soeharto assumed the political power of the state replacing Sukarno’s Old Order. Tantamount to that of the Old Order, the Islamic rebellions under the banner of *jihād* had still continued during the New Order. They waged *jihād* against the heretic state that implemented the state ideology of Pancasila. The first rebellion was Komando Jihad which, according to the official explanation of the Indonesian government, had a mission to create Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia (the Council for Indonesian Islamic Revolution). Two detained leaders of the movement, Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) and Danu Mohammad Hasan, were the former leaders of Kartosuwiryo’s Darul Islam movement. In 1971, both leaders were approved for amnesty and hired by Badan Koordinasi Intelijen/BAKIN (the Indonesian Intelligence Agency) of Kodam Siliwangi, to join struggle against the coming threat of communists’ activities. In spite of being subjugated by the government, since 1977, Komando Jihad had been in reverse striking against the government and successfully attracted numerous former Darul Islam activists to join in the struggle. In Surakarta, Central Java, Komando Jihad, was

³⁶ Tihami, *Darul Islam di Masserengpulu: Studi Tentang Perubahan Sosial dan Keagamaan di Malua, Enrekang, Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Pusat Latihan dan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu Sosial, Hassanuddin University, 1984), p. 58.

³⁷ Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999 [1960]).

³⁸ Anhar Gonggong, *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak* (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004), p. 339.

headed by Warman who killed the Rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret (the Eleventh March University) in January 1979. According to the official Indonesian court document, the assassination was committed because the victim was accused of being responsible for sending Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to detention and tried to notify the government about the existence of Jamaah Islamiyyah, another wing of Darul Islam activists operating in Central Java. Another Komando Jihad operation was a robbery managed by Warman and Abdullah Umar.³⁹ The robbery was based on the *fa'I* concept or confiscating property of enemies of Islam for the purpose of struggle. On 1 March 1979, Warman's team successfully robbed a car transporting salary for officers of Institute Agama Islam Sunan Kalijaga/IAIN Sunan Kalijaga (the State Islamic Institute of Sunan Kalijaga). In the late 1980s, the Indonesian Police successfully devastated Komando Jihad and Warman was killed in Soreang, West Java, on 23 July 1981.⁴⁰

As with Komando Jihad, Jamaah Imran, founded in 1980 in Cimahi, West Java, was another jihadist movement against the Pancasila state. The Jamaah was headed by Imran bin Muhammad Zein who proclaimed *jihad* against the heretic ruler of the New Order. The Jamaah activities were ended when, in August 1980, the Indonesian police attacked the Jamaah's base activities, Istiqamah mosque. Forty four members of the Jamaah were arrested, whereas the leader, together with some of his followers, successfully escaped from the attack. In 11 March 1981, Imran and his followers fought back as they attacked the Cicendo police office in Bandung. Two weeks later, five of his follower hijacked the Garuda Indonesian Airplane and forced the pilot to land the plane in Don Muang Airport, Bangkok. The drama of hijacking was ended when Komando Pasukan Khusus (the Special Forces Command) killed four of five hijackers and on 7 April 1981, Imran was arrested in Jakarta. In the late of the 1981s, Imran was pronounced to death by the Jakarta Regency Court and executed in May 1983.

³⁹ Born in Lamahala, Flores in 1949, Abdullah Umar was a teacher at Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, Solo. In the 1980, Umar was sentenced to death due to his involvement in the Warman movement and executed in 1989. Read: ICG, *Asia Briefing*, p. i.

⁴⁰ Taufik Adnan Kamal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syariah Islam; Dari Indonesia Hingga Nigeria* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), pp. 68-69.

Another Indonesian jihadist rebellion movement is Jamaah Mujahidin which was founded in May 1989. Anwar Warsidi led the movement in Talangsari, Central Lampung. The movement declared the war against the apostate Indonesian state rulers by waging *jihad fi>sabiq>Allah* against the government. In the 1980s, Indonesian Military Army attacked the region and killed five hundred the movement's followers. Again, on 7 February 1989, Komando Resort Militer 043/Garuda Hitam, led by A.M. Hendro Priyono, attacked the base of Jamaah in Talang Sari, and killed 246 people.⁴¹

Though the New Order government aggressively attacked those Islamic rebellion movements, initially the regime failed to completely prevent their latent political activities as, due to the state aggressive repression, Islamic militants built their clandestine networks which fostered further *jihad* episode in Indonesia. In addition, these militant activists secretly transferred and distributed ideas of Middle Eastern jihadist ideologies, such as of Qutb, al-Mawdu'iy al-Banna' through sermons, *hikmah* (religious study club alike) and *mabit* (literally means staying or extensive study on Islam) and publications. The core targets of those activities are university students, especially in Yogyakarta and Bandung, which eventually created militant-Muslim networks.⁴²

In addition, the aggressive attitudes of the New Order government had also generated the leaders of militant movements to leave the country. However, communication and interaction among leaders kept maintained, initially through *da'wah* activism. When the Afghan War broke up, they sent hundreds militant cadres from Malaysia and Indonesia to participate in the battlefield against Russian armies and to have military trainings. The Afghan War had created fundamental momentum for the next development of jihadist movements in Indonesian. Not only did the Afghan War provide Indonesian jihadist the future expansion of ideologies, networks, linking Indonesia-Afghanistan-Middle East, and financial supports, but also it served as

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 277.

⁴² See, Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai PKS: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Teraju, 2003); Din Syamsuddin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Logos, 2000).

an opportunity to exercise their capabilities in weaponry and war strategies.⁴³

The Emergence of Jamaah Islamiyyah

The Afghan war was seen as a useful training ground for a future *jihad* in Indonesia and other Muslim countries as Indonesians started to witness a major shift among Indonesian jihadits after the war ended.⁴⁴ Hundreds Indonesians were sent to Afghanistan to be military trained in Peshawar and to join coalition with other jihadits from Muslim countries in the battlefield against the atheist-Russian armies.⁴⁵ In addition, as with other global jihad groups, the Afghan war had also transformed the ideological orientation of Indonesian jihadits from national-oriented movement to the global war against *al-'aduw al-ba'id* (the far enemy) as Jamaah Islamiyyah demonstrated.

Jamaah Islamiyyah grew out of the effort of two radical Muslim clerics, Abdullah Sungkar (d. 1999) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Jamaah Islamiyyah is believed as the descendant of earlier Muslim rebellion movement, Darul Islam, and of more recent transnational Islamic networks, particularly individuals who gained practical *jihad* experiences in Afghanistan and fostered close ties with al Qaeda.⁴⁶ The establishment of Jamaah Islamiyyah however would take us to the 1970s Indonesian politics when the New Order' efforts tried to pacify left-wings nationalists and Islamic groups and to campaign Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state (*asas tunggal Pancasila*).⁴⁷ Both Ba'asyir and Sungkar campaigned against the government's policy and accused the

⁴³ David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Berkeley University Press, 2002), p. 18.

⁴⁴ ICG, "Ngruki Network,"; Greges, *The Far Enemy*, p. 3; Blontank Poer, "Tracking the Roots of Jamaah Islamiyah," *The Jakarta Post*, 8 March 2003.

⁴⁵ Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005).

⁴⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia" (July 2002); Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, et al., *Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 2 (Case Studies of Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups)* (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 60.

⁴⁷ For further reading on the New Order government policies on Pancasila and Muslim responses reads Abdul Azis Thaba, *Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996); Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003).

state of intimidating Muslims' leaders and disseminating false religion. They consider recognizing Pancasila is tantamount to violating Islamic norms. To do so, in 1972, they established a *salafi* pesantren of Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java (well-known as Ngruki pesantren) and built clandestine networks of radicals through Jamaah Islamiyyah.⁴⁸ They prohibited their Ngruki' santris (students) to hold any flag-ceremonies (*upacara bendera*) or salute the Indonesian flag which was considered as a part of *bid'ā* (innovation). In the late 1970s, Ba'asyir circulated *Risalah Jibad dan Hijrah (The Path of Jihād and Hijrah)* which was written by his father-in-law, Abdul Qadir Baraja. The Risalah contains the explanation of the legal status of *jihād* in Islam and the obligation for Muslims to wage war on those who are against the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. And in October 1976, Sungkar delivered a speech at the central mosque of Surakarta by which he publicly campaigned against participating in the 1977 election and called for *Golongan Putih*/Golput (not to vote in the election). On 20 January 1978, Sungkar and Ba'asyir, on the occasion of one of their sermons, publicly acknowledged and invited audiences to implement all aspects of the Sharia and to replace both Pancasila and the 1945 Indonesia Constitution with the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.⁴⁹ As consequences of their activism, the Indonesian Police Department seized Sungkar on 10 November 1978 and Ba'asyir eleven days later on three counts: their involvement in the Indonesia Islamic State movement, their campaigns against the Pancasila and for Golput.

In April 1982, the Regional Court (*Pengadilan Negeri*) of Surakarta sentenced both Sungkar and Ba'asyir to nine years of detention. Both appealed to the Provincial Court (*Pengadilan Tinggi*) that then sentenced to three years and ten months detention, equivalent to their pre-trial detention, and were released on 9 September 1982. The Provincial Court's decision left Sungkar and Ba'asyir dissatisfied and they brought another appeal to the Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung/MA*), concerning the Provincial Court's decision. On 2 March 1985, when

⁴⁸ Syaifudin Zuhri, "Transnationalising Jamaah Islamiyyah," *Al-Jami'ah*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2010): pp. 55-56; ICG, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia (Corrected on 10 January 2003)," 8 August 2002.

⁴⁹ Court's exceptions with the title "Idiologi Negara Pancasila, Gerakan Komunisme dan Ajaran Islam" (Ideology of Pancasila State, Communist Movement and Islam), of Sungkar and Ba'asyir in 1982.

the Supreme Court was about to announce its decision, Sungkar and Ba'asyir did not show up in the court and made *hijrah* (fleeing)⁵⁰ to Malaysia. According to Ba'asyir, his *hijrah* was necessary because the government illegitimately forced Indonesians to accept the Pancasila as the sole ideology. As he could not accept the government's programme and initially could not challenge it, Ba'asyir claimed that he had no choice but to make *hijrah*.⁵¹

During their two years of freedom in Central Java prior to fleeing to Malaysia in 1985, Sungkar and Ba'asyir successfully extended Jamaah Islamiyah's network through *usrab* activists of the Sudirman Mosque (*Masjid Sudirman*) in Yogyakarta. The Masjid Sudirman, often known as Masjid Colombo, is well-known for its Islamic preachers (*muballigh*) who were as devoted to opposing the Suharto regime as they were to the strict implementation of Sharia law. Among the leading *muballighs* associated with the Sudirman mosque were Irfan S. Awwas, M. Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin Muqti alias Abu Jibril Abdurahman who later joined Sungkar's and Ba'asyir's *hijrah* in Malaysia and became the instructor of the Abu Sayyaf camp in Afghanistan and Muchliansyah, a Ngruki teacher.⁵²

Once in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'asyir arranged for Darul Islam cadres from Indonesia to have military exercises and trainings in the Jihad Fighters Academy of Afghanistan (Harbiy Pohatun Mujahidin-e-Afghanistan Ittihad-e-Islamiy) camp, headed by the head of Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islamiy Afghanistan, Abdul Robbir Rasul Sayyaf.⁵³ The

⁵⁰ *Hijrah* means "to cut someone off from friendly association" or "to avoid association with". Historically, it is a political concept by which Prophet Muhammad conducted in order to avoid the struggle with the people in Mecca and made his *hijrah* to Medina where he established an Islamic community which eventually was used to attack his homeland. Therefore, *hijrah* is not only a withdrawing action from the surroundings, but also as a strategy to fight back. See, W. Montgomery Watt, "Hidjra," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, volume III (Brill, 2008), p. 366, column 1.

⁵¹ Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, *Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003), pp. 37-38; "Hilangnya Sungkar dan Ba'asyir" (the Disappearance of Sungkar and Ba'asyir), *Tempo Magazine*, 16 March 1985, p. 24; "Ragam Kisah Ba'asyir dan Jaringan Ngruki" (Various Stories About Ba'asyir and his Ngruki Network), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue 36/XXXI/04-10 November 2002; and Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia*, p. 63.

⁵² International Crisis Group, *al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*, p. 9.

⁵³ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, pp. 47-48.

training was aimed at militarily strengthening Darul Islam and to wage *jihad* in Indonesia as they went home. Ajengan Masduki, another Darul Islam leader, was assigned to supply Indonesian cadres for the training.⁵⁴

The first-half of the 1990s, *jihad* fighters in Afghanistan however witnessed a major shift by the rise of a new *jihad* organisation, Taliban, supported by the native Afghans.⁵⁵ This body harshly attacked other factions of *jihad* fighters, including the *Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islami* to which *Jamaah Islamiyyah* took it as shelter in Afghanistan. Avoiding the clash, *Jamaah Islamiyah* cadres managed to leave Afghanistan and, perhaps either because of the harsh political environment in Indonesia or the desire to be closer to their teachers (Sungkar and Ba'asyir), they opted to stay in Malaysia.⁵⁶ In 1991, Sungkar and one of these veterans, Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, later well-known as one of the masterminds of the Bali bombing, decided to establish *Pesantren Lukmanul Hakim* in Johore, Malaysia.⁵⁷ Around the same year, begun with the sermons and routine religious meetings, Sungkar and Ba'asyir established a *jihad* fighters network through the Association of Jihad Fighters of Malaysia (*Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia/KMM*) that was involved in many bombings attacks in the Philippines and the assassination of Malaysian parliamentarian Joe Fernandes in 2000. Through these two institutions, Sungkar and Ba'asyir attracted Malaysians to join *Jamaah Islamiyyah* activism. With a loose alliance with other jihadist movements in Southeast Asia, like MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), Abu Sayyaf and Rabithat al-Mujahidin (the Mujahidin Coalition),⁵⁸ *Jamaah Islamiyyah* had become the hub for

⁵⁴ Ajengan Masduki was born in Ciamis. In 1946, he fought in the Hizbullah unit against the Dutch and attended the 1946 Cisayeung, West Java meeting in which it laid the groundwork for the establishment of Darul Islam three years later. Masduki was arrested in 1982 because of his involvement in Komando Jihad and released in 1984. See ICG, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," 23 February 2003, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁵ Edwards, *Before Taliban*.

⁵⁶ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiya*, p. 78.

⁵⁷ Sidney Jones, "The Changing Nature of *Jamaah Islamiyah*" in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, June 2000: pp. 171-175.

⁵⁸ Rabitalat Mujahidin, or Mujahidin Council, is a loose alliance of guerrilla and jihad fighters groups in Southeast Asia under the leadership of Hambali. Read Jones, "The Changing Nature of *Jamaah Islamiyah*," p. 171; Kumar Ramakrishna, "Delegitimizing

Southeast Asia jihadists and the supporter of jihadists movements and terrorist attacks.⁵⁹

In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyyah had also a direct link to jihadist groups that actively engaged in sectarian conflicts. During the Moluccas Muslim-Christian conflicts, Jamaah Islamiyyah had provided secure training facilities, increased logistical support, and opportunities to undertake joint operations for many jihadits groups, such as Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah. In addition, Jamaah Islamiyyah had also built a strong connection with al Qaeda. The link between the two can be traced back when Abdullah Sungkar travelled to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden in 1993–1994.⁶⁰ Although not a creation of al Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyyah was inspired ideologically by al-Qaeda. In return, al Qaeda gained the advantage of Jamaah Islamiyyah's covert infrastructure to support its attacks. In January 2000, some Jamaah Islamiyyah members, including Hambali, had a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with several high-level al Qaeda operatives, including two 9/11 hijackers and others who were involved in planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.⁶¹ In addition, al Qaeda's plans bomb attacks on U.S. and western interests in Singapore in late 2001, which were eventually blocked, depended heavily on Jamaah Islamiyyah's clandestine infrastructure and local knowledge for surveillance of the targets and for building the truck bombs.⁶²

As an organisation, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists a structured leadership with the 'amir (leader) at the top level of body and the *majlis shura* served as consultative council. Sungkar set as the first 'amir and then was replaced by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir after the former died in 1999. In the operational levels, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists four territorial groups (*mantiq*) with responsibilities for Jamaah Islamiyyah's

Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27, no. 3 (2005), p. 321; Gunaratna, "Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism," p. 20.

⁵⁹ Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁶⁰ Rohan K. Gunaratna, *Political and Security Outlook 2003: Terrorism in Southeast Asia: What to Expect* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003), p. 174.

⁶¹ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 123; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 195-6.

⁶² Jackson and Baker et al., *Aptitude for Destruction*, p. 65.

operations throughout Southeast Asia; *mantiqi* 1 is centred in Malaysia with a branch in Singapore; *mantiqi* 2 covers most of Indonesia and probably becomes the source of many Jamaah Islamiyyah's operatives, *mantiqi* 3 has been important for training Jamaah Islamiyyah personnel and supporting its logistical networks and *mantiqi* 4 centred in Australia, focusing primarily on recruiting and fundraising.⁶³

While *mantiqi* are based on wide-geographical commands, the lowest level of Jamaah Islamiyyah's structure, *fi'rah* (cell), is the ground-level which serves more operational autonomy to take action. It appears that the *fi'rah* has been significantly growing as the leaders were under pressure and arrested by authorities during 1999-2004. In 2003, for instance, *mantiqi* 2 expanded into the district level (*kecamatan*) in their operation. In Central Java, it produced *fi'rah* for 6 regions (Pati, Semarang 1, Semarang 2, Kedu, Pekalongan and Banyumas) and successfully recruited 141 members.⁶⁴ The growth of *fi'rah* is in tandem with the flourishing of Jamaah Islamiyyah's military cell-groups. Zulkarnaen, a former Afghan fighter as well as a Ngruki's teacher, built the so-called Laskar Istimata⁶⁵ and Noordin M. Top (killed in 2009) and Azahari (killed in 2005), established Thoifah Muqatilah;⁶⁶ both are suicide-troops of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. In July 2009, Noordin M. Top transformed the troop into Tadzim al-Qaida and initiated the second Marriot and Ritz hotels suicide bombings.

Apart from the increasing number of Jamaah Islamiyyah's fighters, it is also worthy to speak of the dynamic of its public appearances, particularly after the establishment of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI (the Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters) in 2000 by Ba'asyir. A number of his followers in Jamaah Islamiyyah from the very beginning contested his initiative to establish the Majelis.

⁶³ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*; Jackson and Baker, et al., *Aptitude for Destructio*, p. 63

⁶⁴ "Satu Ton Bom di Kios Sandal" (One Ton Bomb in the Sandal Shop), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue. 33/XXXII/13-19 October 2003.

⁶⁵ "Jenderal Laskar Istimata" (the General of Istimata Paramilitary Force), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue. 33/XXXII/13-19 October 2003.

⁶⁶ "Azahari Diburu, Azahari Merekrut" (the Haunted Azahari, He recruits), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue. 33/XXXIV/10-16 October 2005; "Sayap Garis Keras itu Bernama Thoifah Muqatilah" (That Militant Wing is Named Thoifah Muqatilah), *Tempo Magazine*, Issue 34/XXXIV/17 - 23 October 2005.

However, his legacy was still influential among Jamaah Islamiyyah' cadres although they considered him as having abandoned the basic tenet of Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah/PUPJI (the General Guide for the Struggle of Jamaah Islamiyyah) which defined the Jamaah as *tanẓīm al-sirr* (secret organisation) and put its struggle to counter society, instead of the state.⁶⁷ The establishment had caused a long of tough and tension between moderate and radical factions of Jamaah Islamiyyah. Until, suddenly, on 19 July 2008, Ba'asyir resigned from his position as the *amir* of MMI and established his Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid/JAT (the Council of the Saviour in Muslim belief) on 17 September 2008. It is argued that the resignation is not only caused by the limited control of Ba'asyir within the MMI leadership as the public appearances behind the resignation demonstrated, but also it confirms the turning point of the figure to the PUPJI principles in the struggle.⁶⁸

Conclusion

To conclude, it is argued that the ideology of jihadist is that of Middle Eastern origin and its development demonstrates the continuity and change of radical ideology in the Muslim world. The twentieth century of jihadist movements exemplifies the contemporary development of jihadist ideology as they have been transformed from targeting "the near enemy" (*al-'adunn al-qarib*) to the "far enemy" (*al-'adunn al-ba'id*). In Indonesia, the New Order government's repression had paved a way of mushrooming global jihadist movements whose ideas were transferred from its origin in the Middle East to Indonesia. Sungkar and Ba'asyir are two former Darul Islam leaders who had played important roles in transforming Darul Islam ideology from national-based to transnational movement, and indeed they successfully maintained networks between Indonesia, Afghanistan and the Middle East through Jamaah Islamiyyah that has become the backbone and architect for terrors and bombing attacks in Southeast Asia.[]

⁶⁷ Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah* (Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah), 30 May 1996; Elena Pavlona, "From Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jamaah Islamiyyah According to PUPJI" in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 30/2007

⁶⁸ Zuhri, "Transnationalising Jamaah Islamiyyah," pp. 70-1.

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