JERUSALEM: A TALE OF A CITY

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Abstract

World class cities are few and far between, sometimes referred to as 'global cities' or simply 'world cities'. There are no more than a dozen metropolitan areas in the world that can claim this kind of global status. London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo sit at the top of this world city hierarchy. They have enormous concentrations of economic, political, and cultural clout – measured by such things as the number of corporate headquarters, the size of their stock exchanges, the presence of national and international political bodies, and their role in music, fashion, and other cultural activities. What would it take to make a city claimed by two nations and central to three religions "merely" a city, a place of difference and diversity in which contending ideas and citizenries can co-exist in benign yet creative ways? The intractable conflicts in the Middle East and the cycle of violence among Israelis and Palestinians are deeply embedded in historical struggles over national sovereignty and the right to territory. For this reason, questions about whose state will prevail in what physical location have defined the terms of conflict and negotiation. This also has meant that most proposed solutions to "the Middle East problem" have revolved around competing claims of nation-states, their rights to existence, and their physical and juridically-sanctioned relationships to each other. While true generally, this framing of the problem has been especially dominant in the case of Jerusalem, a city that is geographically and historically an overlay of spaces and artifacts that carry deep meaning for competing peoples and nations. The current struggles of Palestinians and Israelis to each claim this hallowed ground as their capital city has added yet another layer of complexity, conflict, and political division, all of which is reflected in the competing/dual nomenclature Al-Quds/Jerusalem used to refer to the city –as well as the violence and contestation that continues to accelerate unabated.

Keywords: two nations, three religions, Jerusalem

Abstrak

Kota kelas dunia tidak berjumlah banyak, terkadang disebut 'kota global' atau 'kota dunia'. Tidak lebih dari selusin wilayah metropolitan di dunia yang mengklaim status sebagai kota global ini. London, New York, Paris, dan Tokyo berada di posisi atas hirarki kota di dunia ini. Kota-kota ini memiliki konsentrasi yang sangat besar di bidang ekonomi, politik dan budaya -diukur dari beberapa hal seperti jumlah kantor pusat perusahaan, ukuran bursa saham, kehadiran badan politik nasional dan internasional, dan peran mereka dalam musik, fesyen, dan aktivitas budaya lainnya. Apa yang membuat sebuah kota diklaim oleh dua negara dan menjadi pusat untuk tiga agama, tempat dari perbedaan dan keragaman di mana ide-ide bersaing dan warga negara dapat berdampingan dengan cara yang lunak dan kreatif? Konflik keras di Timur Tengah dan siklus kekerasan antara Israel dan Palestina sangat tertanam dalam sejarah perjuangan atas kedaulatan nasional dan hak untuk wilayah. Untuk alasan ini, pertanyaan tentang negara mana yang berdaulat atas lokasi fisik telah menyebabkan munculnya konflik dan negosiasi. Hal ini juga berarti bahwa solusi yang paling sering diusulkan untuk "permasalahan Timur Tengah" berkisar antara persaingan klaim negara-bangsa, hak keberadaan mereka, dan hubungan pengakuan wilayah fisik dan yuridis satu sama lain. Meskipun secara umum benar, bingkai masalah ini telah sangat dominan dalam kasus Jerusalem, sebuah kota yang secara geografis dan historis merupakan lapisan-lapisan ruang dan artefak yang membawa makna mendalam untuk kedua masyarakat dan bangsa yang tengah bersaing. Arus perjuangan Palestina dan Israel untuk setiap klaim tanah suci ini sebagai ibukota mereka telah menambahkan satu lagi lapisan kompleksitas, konflik, dan perpecahan politik, yang semuanya tecermin dalam persaingan dualitas penyebutan Al-Quds/Jerusalem untuk merujuk ke kota ini- layaknya kekerasan dan kontestasi yang berlanjut sama kerasnya dengan sebelumnya.

Kata kunci: tiga agama, Jerusalem, dua negara

Introduction

Still, we must remember that as a city, Jerusalem[1] is also a place in which people live, work, shop, worship, and play. Far more than being merely the contested terrain upon which seemingly contradictory nation-states struggle for power, the

ys ca connect ons, econom c act v t es, and t ca nst tut ons, many of wh ch ex sted ong fore twent eth century efforts to c ass fy ts Opposed terms of part cu ar nat ona dent t es.

city of Jerusalem (Figure 1) has produced its own unique mix of urban cultures, spatial practices, ph i l i i i i i poli i l i i i i i l be i l i i pe l i i l i l i i i

Figure 1. The City of Jerusalem

What would happen if the contending protagonists in the search for harmony in Jerusalem were compelled to recast their understanding of conflicts or tensions, and possible solutions to these prob- lems, not in light of questions about competing nations, but in light of questions about what might make Jerusalem a vibrant, democratic, and A World Class City? What if they cast their eyes towards the types of urban institutions and built environmental patterns that would host a vibrant metropolis, rather than a political arrangement that would sustain some form of state legitimacy and sovereignty? Rather than always being hamstrung by the "national question", might there be constructs of urban place and meaning to be imagined that could lead to peace, and by so doing, perhaps even help reconcile seemingly intractable national claims?

Jerusalem History in Brief

Archaeological findings indicate the existence of a settlement in Jerusalem in the 3rd millennium BCE. The earliest written record of the city to Egyptian records of the Bronze Age (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Ariel view of the Old City of Jerusalem

The city is believed to have been first built and founded by Canaanite peoples. During this Canaanite period, Jerusalem had the name *Urušalim*, meaning "the city of peace". From about 1600 to 1300 BCE, the city came under Egyptian suzerainty and was governed by Canaanite rulers who paid tribute to the Pharaohs. During this period, the city increasingly

came under attacks from the Habiru.[2] According to Midrash[3], Jerusalem was founded by Shem and Eber, ancestors of Abraham. Further, the Bible mentions that the city was controlled by the Jebusites until its conquest by David, at a date subsequently placed at about 1000 BCE. David expanded the city to the south, and declared it the capital city of the united Kingdom of Israel. It thus became the capital of the Jewish kingdoms of Israel, Judah and Judea in the First Temple and Second Temple periods.

In about 960 BCE, Solomon built the First Jewish Temple. For about four centuries after the ten tribes split off to form the northern Kingdom of Israel, Jerusalem served as the capital of the southern Kingdom of Judah. After 70 years of captivity, the Jews were allowed by Cyrus II of Persia to return to Judah and rebuild the city and the Temple. It continued to be the capital of Judah and center of Jewish worship for another four centuries under the Hasmonean Kingdom. By 19 BCE, the Temple Mount was elevated and the Second Temple was expanded under Herod the Great, a Jewish client king under Roman rule. In 6 CE, the city and Iudaea Province came under direct Roman rule. The Great Jewish Revolt resulted in the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. The city served as the national capital again for almost 3 years during the Bar Kokhba's revolt against Rome; it was sacked in 135
CE. For almost two millennia thereafter, Jerusalem did not serve as the national capital of any independent state.

The city remained under Roman and Byzantine rule, until it was taken by the advancing Muslim forces in 638. The rights of the non-Muslims under Islam were governed by the Pact of Umar[4], and Christians and Jews living in the city were granted autonomy in exchange for a required poll tax. Whereas the Byzantine Christian authorities had not tolerated the presence of Jews within the walls of the city, the Muslim rulers allowed the reestablishment of a Jewish community.

In 1099, the city was conquered by the First Crusaders, who slaughtered most of its Muslim and Jewish inhabitants. A series of conquests followed: in 1187 the city was taken from the Crusaders by Saladin. From 1228 to 1244, it was given by Saladin's descendant al-Kamil to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. Jerusalem fell again to the Ayyubids of Egypt in 1244. The Ayyubids were replaced in 1260 by the Mamelukes, and in 1517, Jerusalem and its environs fell to the Ottoman Turks.

During the end of the Ottoman Period, when Jerusalem was a key node in the Islamic imperial orbit, there was no strict correspondence between nationality and place of residence in Jerusalem, a situation that created a delicate social and political equilibrium among the different peoples in the city - but that also prevented extreme violence. Under a governing system known as "capitulations", foreigners could extract concessions that protected other of religio

than an Islam/Ottoman identity were governed by their own laws and differentially represented by relevant local consuls in all city matters.

One of the consequences of this legal arrangement was that no single nation-state was able to establish a religiously or nationalistically-based political monopoly over the territory of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. This rather unique situation prevented the development of large scale social conflict within the city boundaries, in spite of the open antagonism that many groups felt towards each other. Yet it also meant that European nations would need to adopt other means for imposing their imperial claims. One such strategy was to establish themselves as 'protectors' of local non-citizens, a state of affairs which sustained the practice of continuous negotiation within and between local and international forces (mainly Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy/the Vatican, and the Ottoman government).[5] These negotiations generally revolved around which national state's "clients" would be granted rights to occupy particular spaces in the city (especially those with primordial or contested religious significance). However, European nations also used Jerusalem's ambiguous legal and sovereignty status to further justify their rights to intervene on behalf of their preferred clients.

When the Ottoman Empire was not strong enough to fully expulse rival European nations, and imperializing European nations themselves could establish full hegemony over Jerusalem, this system of clientelis tic representation and negotiation kept extremely violent conflict at bay. However, when some of these nations began to feel more militarily empowered or challenged, this fragile diplomatic balanced was lost. At the brink of World War I, when geopolitical conditions on a world scale became unsettled and precarious, these vying nation-states soon sought to use their control over Jerusalem to strengthen their position in the global battle for hegemony. This was especially true with respect to Germans and their alliance with the Ottoman government, and with British military actions in the area (which included the creation of a detailed cartography of the area). The increased imperial and transnational power of certain European nations soon altered the way the space of the city was occupied. These transformations become most notorious in the period when British forces governed Jerusalem and imported their planning techniques, conceived in the European framework of exclusive nationalities. The spatial and ethnical mosaic and mismatch which characterized the previous eras was replaced by a conscious alignment of people's nationalities with specific territorial areas of Jerusalem. It is in precisely this moment that the binary social and spatial understanding of Jerusalem as being com- prised of Arab and Jewish populations (the same logic that later sustained the dividing wall) emerged – a dynamic outcome that can be traced to purposeful state planning action by non-resident forces who had little concern for the city as such.

The Old City of Jerusalem

Jerusalem plays an important role in three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as in a number of smaller religious groups (Figure 3). A large number of places have religious significance for these religions, among which the Temple Mount and its Western Wall (Figure 4) for Jews, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Figure 5) for Christians, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Figure 6) and Dome of the Rock for Muslims. Currently, there are 1204 synagogues, 158 churches (Figure 7), and 73 mosques in Jerusalem.



Figure 3. The Map of Jerusalem

Figure 4. The Western Wall

Figure 5. The Church of The Holy Sepulcher

Figure 6. Al-Aqsa Mosque

Figure 7. One of Church in Jerusalem

Judaization of Jerusalem since 1948 and the segregation of urban communities

Destruction in the Old City directly after the 1967 saw the demolition of the Maghariba Quarter containing 125 houses for a plaza for the Western Wall. Meanwhile, West Jerusalem was cleansed of its Palestinian residents in the first half of 1948. Its Judaization was secured by the forced expulsion of approximately 80,000 Palestinians from their homes and properties.

Thirty eight Palestinian villages in West Jerusalem were destroyed during the 1948 war. Numerous settlements were built on the ruins and occupied lands of these villages. The creation of the "Jewish Quarter" in the Old City came from the transfer of Palestinians from their homes and from the confiscation of property for the benefit of Jews. More settlements sprang up around Jerusalem, on land confiscated from the districts of Ramallah and Bethlehem. Their presence isolated remaining Pales- tinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and formed a physical outer ring around the city. This cuts Palesti- nians in Jerusalem off from the rest of Palestine.

A policy of systematic and deliberate discrimination against the Palestinian population was developed in Jerusalem through land expropriation, planning permission and building laws. Like Apartheid South Africa, the Occupation uses a racist ID card system. In Jerusalem Palestinians hold "temporary residency" ID and are subjugated to discriminatory laws and taxes. Moreover, hundreds of Palestinians have these IDs revoked on a yearly basis, reflecting a common tactic used to drive Palestinians out of the capital. In a rapid amount of time the Occupation constructed an illegal settlement municipality of Jerusalem at odds with international law and the rights of the Palestinian people. Over half of the Occupation municipality today was not part of the city before 1967, but parts of Bethlehem and 28 other West Bank towns.

During the Oslo process new measures were taken to shut Palestinians out of their capital. Checkpoints were placed on the entrances to the city. Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank were refused entry. After the outbreak of the Intifada, Palestinians in Jerusalem have been forbidden to enter West Bank except for Ramallah. A steady exodus of Palestinian organizations and commerce began from the centre of Jerusalem into outlying areas such as Abu Dis, Ezawiya, Beir Naballa and Al-Ram so they could continue to operate.

The Apartheid Wall

Once the wall is finished throughout Jerusalem it will total 181 km (Figure 8). By December 2005, over 130 km of the 8-meter high concrete structure had been constructed. Completion in early 2006 will leave the majority of Palestinians in and around Jerusalem – around 190,000 people - facing two options. To stay in Jerusalem's ghetto neighborhoods, subjected to high Occupation taxes, imprisoned by Walls and a life under siege. Secondly, exile into what remains of he West Bank and Gaza or abroad and permanent loss of the right to live in the Palestinian capital. Given that Palestinians rely on Jerusalem for employment, basic services, and education, the Wall is beginning to depopulate these villages as well as tearing families and communities apart. In the last few months 80% of the population of West Ezawiya village have deserted their homes in order to remain in Jerusalem. Out of a population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this village and with the wall's completion they will be prevented from entering Jerusalem.[6]



Figure 8. The Mapping Area of Jerusalem

The Wall around Jerusalem (Figure 9) ensures the annexation of all the settlement blocs around the city and their expansion on the Palestinian lands stolen by the Wall. A chain of 181 km, the concrete wall forms a series of ghettoized Palestinian neigh- borhood Palestinians are being shut in by the Wall and the settler roads into 4 main ghettos, as follows:

1. Northwest Beit Duqqu, Beit Ijza, Qibia, Beit Sourik and Beit Anaan will be merged into one ghetto. Occupation Forces have confiscated and isolated 14,669 dunums from these villages. The North West ghetto has lost 5 martyrs so far in demonstrations against the Apartheid Wall.
2. North Beit Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir Nabala, al-Jeeb and Jodaira form a ghetto. Between them the villages will lose at least 10635 dunums from the Wall.
3. East where Ar-Ram, Jaba', Hizma, Anata and Shoffat form a ghetto, isolated from 6500 dunums of their lands.
4. Southeast Abu Dis, Anata and Eizarya Ghetto where the 8-meter high concrete wall runs through the school playground sealing off around 13,000 dunums for Maale Adumim.



Figure 9. The Apartheid Wall



Figure 10. Comparating Conflictive Neighbours between Israel Wall (above) and Berlin Wall (below)

Two new settler-only bypass roads planned for Jerusalem, will add to the grid which already exists in the city, connecting the settler roads southeast of Bethlehem to the roads to the north west. They will reach a length of 45 km for which 1070 dunums of land have been confiscated. This road will demolish at least 38 houses in Sawahra, Tour and Abu Dis. The Second Road (#16) will connect between the Ramot Eshkol Settlement to Maale Adumim and the other settlements in East Jerusalem. The length of the road will be 2.8 km (Figure 10).

Religious sites

The city hosts holy sites (Figure 11) for all three monotheistic religions. For Christians there is the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The most contentious area is what is known to Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary (Haram al-Sharif) and to Jews as the Temple Mount. A platform of only 35 acres, it is probably the most contested piece of real estate in the world. For Jews it is the site of the second Temple. Various fanatical groups such as the Temple Mount Faithful have set up organizations to rebuild the temple and destroy the Al Aqsa mosque. For Muslims, this is where the prophet Muhammad made his miraculous night journey to heaven. Huge Ramadan congregations approach 300,000 at Friday prayer times. Jews pray at the Wailing or Western wall. Israel claims to give full access to all to these sites but nearly all of the 3.5 million Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, who live in the Occupied Territories are not allowed to visit Jerusalem or pray at its holy sites.



Figure 11. View of religious site in Jerusalem

Demographic Changes

Since Israel occupied the city in 1967, the Israeli government has aimed to change the demographic balance in their favor. One of its first moves was to demolish the Maghariba quarter in

order to enlarge the prayer area next to the Wailing Wall. 125 Arab houses were destroyed in the process. Palestinian lands (Figure 12) were confiscated, trees uprooted and houses demolished. Settlements were built in East Jerusalem on Palestinian land. In 2003, 217,000 Palestinians share East Jerusalem with 200,000 Jewish settlers. In the Old city, over 1000 settlers have moved into properties outside the Jewish quarter.

On 19 April 1999, an inter-ministerial committee on Jerusalem recommended that, in order to maintain a 70/30 percent Jewish majority in Jeru- salem, Israel needs to build 116,000 new housing units in the city for Jews by 2020, an annual rate of
5,500, far higher than is currently the case. Over half of what we call Jerusalem today was not part of the city pre-1967, but were parts of Bethlehem and
28 other West Bank towns. The Israeli government has succeeded in annexing to the city vast areas that have nothing to do with historic Jerusalem.

Figure 12. Child of Palestinian

Israeli Settlements

Since 1967, Israeli governments have invested significant resources in establishing and expanding the settlements in the Occupied Territories (Figure
13). As a result of this, the Jewish settler population in East Jerusalem is now estimated to be in the region of 200,000. The estimated are divided into:

1. 30% (66,500) of the settlers are in the Greater Jerusalem area in Ma'aleh Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, Betar Elite, Har Adar, Efrat and part of the Etzion Bloc.
2. 35% of the land in East Jerusalem has been expropriated for the construction of illegal Israeli settlements since 1967.
3. The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians did not lead to the evacuation of even one settlement, and the settlements even grew substantially in area and population during this period.

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Figure 13. The view of land use in Jerusalem

Discrimination Against Palestinians

Since the annexation of East Jerusalem, the Israeli government has adopted a policy of systematic and deliberate discrimination against the Palestinian population in Jerusalem through land expropriation and planning and building laws. In July 2003, Israel confiscated hundreds of acres of Palestinian land on the West Bank outside the villages of Beit Iksa and Beit Souriq, north of Jerusalem for the purpose of building settlements - in flagrant breach of commitments under the US-led road map to peace. On 18 August 2003, Israel issued land expropriation orders for its 'Jerusalem envelope' fence in Sur Baher, Sheikh Sa'ad and Abu Dis. Most of the land expropriated since 1967 was privately owned by Arabs yet over 38,500 housing units were built on this land for the Jewish population, but not one for the Palestinians Town Planning schemes were also used to restrict development of Palestinian neighborhoods, limit the area for Palestinian construction and reinforce Jewish control throughout the city, more describing as follows:

1. Palestinian building is only allowed in 7% of East Jerusalem.
2. 54% of East Jerusalem has been purposefully designated as security areas, "green areas", or Jewish residential zones all of which are intended to block Palestinians from building.
3. The housing shortage for the Palestinian population exceeds 20,000 housing units.
4. Nearly a quarter of Palestinian homes are severely overcrowded.
5. In East Jerusalem there are over 43,000 homes in Jewish neighborhoods and only 28,000 in Palestinian neighborhoods. Due to the discriminatory town planning laws and the over-crowding problems, many Palestinians have to resort to building "illegally". In doing so, they live with the threat of having their home demolished. Both Jews and Palestinians build illegall i equal

6. During the Oslo process, the municipality demolished 300 homes in East Jerusalem.
7. Palestinians are responsible for less than 20% of illegal construction in Jerusalem, yet suffer two thirds of the demolition orders.

The Politics of Planning

Israeli planning in Jerusalem is guided by the objective of maintaining a Jewish majority in the city. While the construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem expands the Jewish population, restrictions on Palestinian development limit and reduce the Palestinian population.

Construction Restrictions

In 1999 the average Jewish population density was 1 person per room, the average Palestinian population density 1.8. To meet only existing needs many experts believe that an additional 21,000 units must be built. The Municipality grants an average of 150 - 200 permits a year for Arab housing and demolishes 25-50 units a year. Between 1967-2001, 80,800 units were built in Jerusalem for Jews, most of them with government subsidies and 44,000 of them on land expropriated in East Jerusalem. Some
19,900 homes were built for Palestinians. Only 500 were subsidized. Some 7,000 are deemed illegal by the Municipality. Individual Palestinian families are forced to go through the permit bureaucracy on their own while in the Jewish sector experienced contractors apply for permits for large blocs of houses at one time.[7]

Palestinians are also restricted in the number and size of homes they can build. Between 1980-
1990, 3000 housing units were built in the Israeli
sector per year. Approximately 7000 units were built in the Palestinian sector since 1967 or about 350 per year.In 1995, 60,000 units were planned for Jews while only 500 for Palestinians. Palestinian builders are often limited to 2 story housing units while Jewish housing units have up to 8 stories.

Planning Procedures

Not one new neighborhood for Palestinians has been constructed in East Jerusalem since 1967. There are no comprehensive planning schemes for Palestinian neighborhoods while Spot Zoning reduces the amount of land available for development in Palestinian neighborhoods. Palestinians pay 26% of municipal services cost but receive 5% of those services. Only 2-12% of total municipal budget is invested in East Jerusalem infrastructure in Palestinian areas.[8] "Green Areas" Undeveloped areas are often designated "green" for public or open

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However, these areas are only "green" for Palestinians. In other words, the zone is "green" until the Israeli municipality decides to use the land to build a new Jewish settlement or expand an existing settlement. S. Kaminker, "East Jerusalem." The Wall As is the case throughout the West Bank; the Wall is having dire effects in Jerusalem's Palestinian community. Once the Wall is completed, it will place severe restrictions on Palestinian travel and economic life as it will make permanent the restrictions enforced through the closure policy. In addition, a network of bypass roads will further cut off Palestinian areas from each other. According to B'Tselem, 210,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem.

The "Closure" - Politics & Economics In March 1993, the Israeli government imposed a military "closure" on the West Bank and Gaza in response to several attacks by Palestinians on Israelis in West Jerusalem. All Palestinians who were not Jerusalem residents were barred from entering the city unless they obtained a permit. The closure severed East Jerusalem from its economic hinterland in the West Bank. Palestinians consider E. Jerusalem to be their social, cultural, economic, religious, and political capital. The severe damage to the Palestinian economy has resulted in higher unemployment; some Palestinian retailers in East Jerusalem have closed while others have moved outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem.

The New Visi on

Future Jerusalem was conceived in response to the deteriorating situation in the city (from the building of the wall to the accelerating and ongoing violence) and to the failures of Track I and Track II diplomacy, the latter of which may partly owe to the great inequality in power balances among the negotiating parties. As a strategy for generating peace and understanding, the proposal differs from conventional approaches in several ways:

1. It focuses on the city, not nations, and in so doing emphasizes the uniquely tolerant and cos- mopolitan character of the urban experience;
2. It encourages imagination and vision, not the real politics of negotiation and political trade-offs;
3. It proceeds under the premise that when given an opportunity to voice their desires and dreams about the city, most citizens - be they Muslims, Christians, or Jews, Palestinians or Israelis, residents or not - are likely to find common ground and share similar sentiments about what might make the city of Jerusalem a vibrant, peaceful, tolerant and democratic place;
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space— i.e. they are not to be used for construction. i i i i l i

open alternative, innovative ways for discussing and eventually dealing with urban and political conflict.

Methodological Aims and Assumptions

This proposal is a multi-disciplinary approach because it is certain that the nature of the city, and the way out of its conflicts, cannot be reduced to a single, negotiated view. In making this claim, we are reacting to the "consensus-building" approach to urban policy and problems now predominant in city planning practices, in which a shared commitment to negotiated problem-solving trumps all other approaches. In the case of Jerusalem, such strate- gies are sometimes part of the problem, leading to conflict over the terms and outcomes (not to mention perceived betrayals) of negotiation. Further, given the complex history and character of the city, those involved in negotiations are more often than not selected for their (national) political allegiances, not their urban loyalties, and thus do not fully represent the multiplicity of actors and views existing in the city. Thus, in order to break out of the stalemate that seems to have further reinforced despair and conflict, and that has served to relegate questions of urban livability to the back burner of national political diplomacy, we seek to bypass the standard route of negotiation between "representative" peoples and turn instead to the liberating and regenerative potential of imagination and vision. Rather than aiming for unity or synthesis among the competing parties in their plans for the city's future, the proposal encourages bold and 'non- negotiated' visions of the city, with the assumption that only through such processes can we have a good understanding of the basic urban conditions on which most residents – no matter their religious or ethnic identity – can agree must be met. A second but related ideological pillar of this project is the deep belief in design as a more radical -- and at the same time more subtle – mode of mediating or even transcending urban conflict. Following this logic, then, we do not work under pre-determined or politically motivated assumptions about national sovereignty or ethno-religious power, which then are rendered by urban designers in the service of negotiated political aims. Rather, we seek to encourage "non-negotiable" views of urban life and the city's future, both by its residents and others who might also accept Henri Lefebvre's notion of the "right to the city," views which will then be given life and form through the sensitivity of urban planning and design. As such, this project implies a reversal of the conventional policymaking approach to urban conflict, which is often mimicked by designers. Instead of assuming that design serves as the technical realization of well-defined political

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aims, we solicit the production of designs -- or visions of the city and its built environment -- that will be so imaginative and compelling as to transform or recast current political constraints. This might be accomplished, for example, by using design to re-align or re-mix the social and spatial relations between persons or communities who in the real world of politics have found it necessary to define themselves on the basis of binary identities (be they Muslim vs. Jewish or Palestinian vs. Israeli). The epistemological premise here is that because the city – or the urban built environment and the flows of persons, activities, and spaces that comprise it – lends itself much less easily to binary represen- tation, there are many more possibilities for arriving at democratically "subversive" or socially liberating urban arrangements and shared spaces through design – especially as compared to formal politics. As such, a provocative or bold new design for the urban built environment could be instrumental in producing a reframing of the relations between (binary) political actors, t limit what the city could be.[9]

The approach for Jerusalem is that it can temporarily de-link[10] discussions of the future of the city from discussions of the nation and national balances of power, in ways that might temporarily bracket some of the larger sovereignty questions that have kept political negotiators and urban planners alike from being able to think about what is best for the city and its inhabitants. This can be helpful on several counts, the economic as well as the political among them. After all, it is partly because national sovereignty concerns have over determined most of the policy and planning decisions for Jerusalem that

the city – and the metropolitan region more generally -- has fallen into startling economic decline. Jerusalem is now the most impoverished and economically distressed city in Israel, in addition to being the site of continual violence and attacks. Similar national sovereignty concerns also have played a role in the building of a wall that divides not just peoples but open spaces, and that shatters the longstanding social and spatial patterns of urban life that used to serve as the some of the few ways that Palestinians and Israelis would encounter each other on a daily basis: from use of markets to labor mobility to access to basic health and welfare institutions. But if people were inspired to think about the city in its own terms, and were free to imagine what kind of spatial, social, and economic practices or opportunities would be good for the entire city and all its peoples, not just particular locations, persons, or neighborhoods, they would un l i i allow peo l i i i

space – i.e. they are not to be used for construction. i i i i l i

in this way could lead to a questioning of the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of the "national" logic that is partly responsible for the difficult conditions that now exist.

Conclusion

There is an ample evidence to suggest these types of direct negotiations among Palestinians and Israelis are extremely difficult to mount and manage, at least at the level of the city as a whole, and that consensus is often quite elusive. It took years for the contending parties to agree on the Oslo Accords (and more recently the Geneva Accords were almost as difficult), and here we are, decades into such experiments, with both urban and political conditions in Jerusalem looking more treacherous as time goes on. Moreover, some have argued that such representative but managed negotiations are often a part of the problem, because they raise difficult questions about who is entitled to represent an entire group of people in a negotiation about their future. There also are questions about whether this process really works well when there are serious historical and contemporary power imbalances between the players.[11] For precisely this reason, some even have argued that the 2nd Intifada emerged out of citizen dissatisfaction with the leadership involved in the Oslo Accords, as well as resentment towards these leaders for being compelled to negotiate away or compromise on conditions in the city that residents felt should be non-negotiable.

The purpose is to break out of the impasses of the past, not to yield yet another mirror reflection of the sorry and highly polarized state of Palestinian-Israeli political relations, or yet another round of subtle diplomatic intricacies. One way to do this is to reject the a priori designation of participants only on the base of a binary Palestinian or Israeli identity, something that has been all but required in the participatory, negotiation, and consensus-building strategies for this part of the world. Such an approach has not only served to reinforce a pre- conceived, essentialist separation of actors into two distinct camps, thereby making it even harder for individual participants to find possible venues of collaboration or common interests. Negotiations conducted under this pattern of binary (i.e. Palestinian vs. Israeli or Jewish vs. Muslim) identification are also hampered by problems of legitimacy, since leadership cannot genuinely represent their supposed constituencies. And again, the inequality of power resources between these groups harms the validity of the negotiations in themselves.

Third, we are committed to thinking about the city as the object of discussion and transformation,

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(neighborhood or community on the one hand, or the nation, on the other). In fact, we hope that assessing conditions and developing a project for this inter- mediate scale in itself will constitute some sort of analytical –not to mention procedural– breakthrough in producing new paths for peace in the region. However, when the city is the subject of study and action, it must be recognized to be a multi- disciplinary unit whose future cannot be determined only through political negotiation, and only through the involvement of folks whose identities are set on the basis of religion or ethnicity. Indeed, why wouldn't we invited negotiation "partners" on the basis of economic function, or spatial location, or any other relevant "urban" identity that is meaning- ful in the life of a city's inhabitants? The idea that a political consensus would be 'naturally' translated into the spatial arrangement of the city reveals a deep misunderstanding of the inherently contested nature of urban spaces. Material configurations have their own norms beyond any policy imposed on them. Also, the city is not an abstract space which can be manipulated to follow a political project, but there is an inherent "urban" resistance to transformations.

Last these proposed solutions can themselves be used at later stages for discussion, deliberation, and development of consensus about what is needed to enable either the particular vision or its implicit social justice aims. That is why we are hoping to solicit multiple visions, rather than thinking about what it would take to get a multiplicity of fragmented and competing forces (split within and between the two "sides") to actually negotiate and agree on just one view. The visions that is expected to generate are not likely to be restrained approaches conjured up in light of what is only possible now given the real politics of the current situation. Rather, they are bound to be idealistic if not daring conceptions of what a vibrant, peaceful, and democratic Jerusalem would look like. Rather than shying away from prescriptive, idealistic statements, it sees the value of offering utopian visions for Jerusalem as one way of enabling protagonists to think "outside the box," with the expectation that such an exercise will help produce new or innovative options for the city which may have been overlooked because of prior constraints on framing the problem of negotiating the solution. Then we work "backwards" from these visions to understand and address the political constraints on getting there. By so doing, we hope to reverse the conventional teleology and prevailing practice as applied to the city, in which political negotiations always take priority, with designs or plans always the outcome of politically acceptable 'solutions' rather th i i i

not the usual larger or smaller-scale suspects an i l



Figure 14. Part of Jerusalem

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Notes and References

1 Jerusalem (Hebrew: ירושלים, *Yerushaláyim* or *Yerushalaim*; Muslim Arabic: القدس, *al-Quds* ("the Holy"), Christian Arabic أورشليم Ûrshalîm; official Arabic in Israel: أورشليم القدس, *Urshalim-al-Quds* (combining the Biblical and common usage Arabic names).

2 The Jewish History Resource Center. *Project of the Dinur Center for Research in Jewish History*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

3 Midrash (Hebrew: מדרש: plural *midrashim*) is a Hebrew word referring to a method of exegesis of a Biblical text.

4 Umar ibn al-Khattāb (c. 581 – November 3, 644), sometimes referred as `Umar al-Farūq (*Umar the Distinguisher (between Truth and Falsehood)*), was from the Banu Adi clan of the Quraysh tribe. He was a companion of the Prophet Muhammad and became the second Caliph (634 – 644) following the death of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph.

5 For a fascinating account of the history of struggles over Jerusalem and the current state of affairs, see Bernard Wasserstein. 2002. *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*. Yale University Press.

6 The Israeli information center for human rights in the occupied territories.

7 Amir Cheshin et al. 1999. *From Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem*.

8 Kaminker. *East Jerusalem*. N. Krystall. 1993. *Urgent Issues of Palestinian Residency in Jerusalem*.

9 Diane E. Davis. *Jerusalem/Al-Quds 2050: Vision For A Place Of Peace*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Department of Urban Studies and Planning.

10 For a discussion of this catch-22, see Naomi Chazan. *Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Jerusalem in the Framework of an Israeli-Palestinian Settlement*. For a similar accounting that brings the view up to date from1991 (where Chazan left off) up through the Oslo Accords and into 2001, see Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem, ibid.

11 The position long supported by many pro-Palestinian activists, with Edward Said being among the most high profile spokespersons for this position, was that such efforts were deeply flawed. With respect to the Oslo Accords, in particular, Said saw the problem as resting in the fact that "there were not two `sides' to the negotiations. There was Israel, an established modern state with an awesome military apparatus (by some estimates the fourth-strongest in the world today), occupying land and people seized twenty six years earlier in a war. And there were the Palestinians, a dispersed displaced, disinherited community with neither an army nor a territory of their own." This in turn meant that "having nothing to give up, the Palestinians had nothing to negotiate. To 'deal' with the occupier, after all, is to surrender or collaborate" See Tony Judt, "The Rootless Cosmopolitan," *The Nation*, July 19/26, 2004, p.29.

12 Salah El-Din Quotes when he entered Jerusalem after defeating the crusaders.