National Identity, Multiculturalism and Cinema Melayu

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Abstract

Introduction

Film as medium was invented in the West and is connected to a quasi-industrial form of production that mainly relies on the division of labor and on mass production and distribution. The industrial nations of the northern hemisphere still play the leading role in the technical and artistic development of the medium, and their products have always dominated the world film market, and surely scallion Malaysia film market too, and simultaneously served as a model and rival. In spite of its seventy-year history, and because its existence is based on a Western technique, **Cinema Melayu** is frequently criticized as evidence of Westernization and acculturation. Inconsideration inevitably touches on the relation between Malaysia culture and the West, and raises questions about notions of authenticity and acculturation, tradition, and alienation, and the roots of these relations and ideas and the impacts to the Malaysia cultural building from the beginning of movie industry to today.

The history of the West since the end of the Middle Ages may be seen as a continuous journey of discovery to the *terra incognitio* of other cultures. Once tracked down, these cultures have been either idealized, dominated, or destroyed. The encounter with the alien entailed its (partly symbolic) incorporation, exclusion, or eradication. Apparently objective scientific

disciplines contributed to the recently discovered cultures. Historical and cultural discourses were formulated, based on the construction of the 'other'.[2]

The idea of cinema as an alien cultural element, implanted in an 'authentic', quasi-virgin Malaysia culture, has to be questioned in the same way as the notion of cultural 'authenticity'. A culture can only be authentic if all its features spring from a particular environment and develop according to its specific conditions. Therefore authenticity can only exist within an impermeable cultural environment, cut off from foreign influences. The history of Malaysia is one of polyglot nations, mixing together '*rakyat*' (peoples), '*budaya*' (cultures), '*agama*' (religions), '*adat*' (norms) and '*bahasa*' (languages). The popular cultures as well as the high cultures of Malaysia serve as evidence of this. The culture of Malaysia must be considered as the result of a dynamic relation of power, formed along several axes: first, the relation between syncretic popular culture and elitist high culture; second, between the different '*masyarakat*' (community) 'cultures' of various peoples and ethnic groups, religions, and languages; and third, between the indigenous culture as a whole and the influences that stem from other cultural environments. Even apparently 'authentic' movements like present-day fundamentalism or nationalism do not invalidate this model. Despite the parameters of '*Bahasa Melayu*' (Malay language) and Islam having, since national independence, been pushed increasingly into the foreground to serve, as a starting-point for cultural purification and preservation, the idea of a '*Melayu Tulen*' (pure Malay), or '*Melayu Muslim*' (Malay-Muslim) or '*Malaysia- Malaysian*' (Malaysia-Malaysian) culture is a myth. Nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and racial traditionalism, which may be considered as movements of purification, are rather the product of '*budaya moden massa*' (modern mass culture) and are shaped by mass movements and ideologies.

In the frame of this newly appearing cultural structure, whose development has been decisively supported by the mass media, the cultural model of traditional society has become increasingly invalid, as has the differentiation between high-elitist and popular culture. Malaysia culture is penetrated now by a new dynamic, which has invalidated inherited dialectics and exchange processes. Daily life and living conditions in Malaysia have become increasingly dominated ('en masse') by mass production and mass consumption. Traditional ways of communication and former arts, like '*Penglipur Lara*' (oral narration), '*Wayang Kulit*' (shadow plays), and '*Bangsawan*' (traditional opera), die out and substituted by mass media. The products of culture industry are far removed both from elitist arts, produced, and consumed by only a few, and from syncretic and heterogeneous popular arts. Unlike '*seni popular*' (popular arts) the mass media are characterized by one-way communication that transforms the human being into a passive recipient who only consumes culture.

The spread of '*media massa*' (mass media) in Malaysia, necessarily accompanied by the development of '*budaya pengguna*' (consumer culture), is based on a long process. The first Malay-language newspapers and magazines appeared as early as the middle of the eighteenth century. Record players, radios, and tape recorders were introduced from the beginning of nineteenth century. The radio in particular has played an important role in altering traditional ways of organizing leisure time. Not only was it responsible for the spread of a certain genre of music, but it also replaced in many places the traditional *Penglipur Lara* of the '*Panggung*' (stage).

A media culture has emerged in which images, sounds, and spectacles help produce the fabric of everyday life, dominating leisure time, shaping political views and social behavior, and providing the materials out of

which people forge their very identities. Radio, television, film, and the other products of the culture industries provide the models of what it means to be male or female, successful or a failure, powerful or powerless. Media culture helps shape the prevalent view of the world and deepest values: it defines what is considered good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil.[3]

'**Budaya massa**' (mass culture) is characterized by a tendency to force needs into line, its most urgent goal is consumption. Therefore every expression is transformed into advertising. Means of mass communication dominate more and more every part of culture and what matters is that the mass cultural machine devalues any cultural expression which is not circulated through it. The leading industrial nations still form the driving force of this development. They not only present constantly newer technologies and products, but also create trends and define new market strategies. An example on the international scale is Hollywood's unchallenged monopoly of cinema.

Although the described analysis of acculturation clearly shows the dependency of Malaysia and also asserts the view of passively received and unilateral cultural importation, it would be wrong to assume that acculturation has the effect of cultural 'brainwashing'. '**Budaya Barat**' (western culture), in spite of the consumption of its products, is by no means adopted completely or without any resistance. Rather, the traditional symbolic order of a society, its goods and values are confronted with 'consumer culture' and become demand revalued. This process is in some instances actively furthered by the intellectuals, the new bourgeoisie, and national elites, with the latter using the media and advertising techniques to package and repackage traditional symbols – in effect the national tradition is selectively interpreted and invented to serve the modernizing and nation-integration aims of controlling national elites.

The same kind of revaluation and 'repackaging' has likewise taken place in the filed of cinema. Imagery, technique, and the 'language' of the media have been adopted, but transformed according to the nationally prevalent '**leluhur budaya'** (cultural identity).

This paper sets out to describe and investigate this dynamic process on the case of Cinema Melayu to screen how film's function in Malaysia culture (national cinema) goes beyond that of being, simply, and exhibited '**objek keindahan**' (aesthetic object); or, in other words, how film represents the social process of making images, sounds, signs, stand for something which are ultimately aimed at understanding the nature of the human culture (**'budaya Malaysia'/ Malaysia culture**).

I assume, then, the films are true to the medium to the extent that they penetrate the world before our eyes. This assumption – the premise and axis of my book – gives rise to numerous questions. For instance, how is it possible for films to revive events of the past of project fantasies and yet retain cinematic quality? … All this means that films cling to the surface of things. They seem to be the more cinematic, the less they focus directly on inward life, ideology and spiritual concerns. This explains why many people with strong cultural leanings scorn the cinema.[4]

(Figure 1: Studio Jalan Ampas, a landmark in the advancement of Cinema Malaysia)

Sinema Kebangsaan (Cinema National)

This paper argues that Malaysian film culture can only be satisfactorily understood using analytical approaches quite different from those that have typically been applied to '*sinema kebangsaan'* (national cinema) in a way to understand the questions of national identity.

National cinema has tended to be conceptualized in overtly homogenous terms, with differences constructed primarily through formal categories such as authorship and genre. Cultural difference, on the other hand, is conventionally located on the boundaries of the national cinema by proposing that difference exists primarily between national cinemas, while simultaneously suppressing or erasing internal cultural heterogeneity, for example Brian McFarlane and Geoff Mayer's *New Australian Cinema*, 1992.[5] Since most analyses of national cinema have been of societies with entrenched, dominant cultural communities (and therefore are assumed to have relatively unproblematic and hegemonic cultural identities), this approach to national cinema is not surprising – Noel Burch defines Japanese society and Japanese cinema in just such terms.[6]

The continually negotiated and contested cultural identities in Malaysia instead suggest a form of analysis that stresses cross-cultural and transtextual interactions. This form of analysis does not reject the existence of the 'discourse of nation', which, with respect to the film in Malaysia, is frequently invoked government film policy. The film industry can play a major role in promoting national unity", Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ghafar bin Baba[7] and nationa(list) rhetoric about cultural sovereignty and cultural imperialism: "The Western individuals controlling the media could also influence our thoughts, attitudes and culture. If we are not careful, we too can be influenced to destroy ourselves",[8] Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad. Instead it focuses the debate onto one of the central tenets of '*bangsa*' (nation): the border, which my discussion here not as a line of separation between two distinct cultures, but as the site of interaction of cultural forces.

Through media the Western world is able to shape and control the Eastern mind to such an extent that it is ridden by an inferiority complex and guilt feelings. The Eastern peoples are forced into judging themselves by Western criteria/values and constantly find themselves falling short of the requirements of the Western system.[9]

This paper on Cinema Melayu details the characteristics and complexities of its film industry and film culture. Ravenous to the Cinema Melayu has hardly even been mentioned in studies of national cinemas, regional cinemas, Third World cinemas or international cinemas. This in turn leads to re-conceptualization of the national cinema paradigm away from its fixed categories and towards the application of a range of approaches to a particular film culture: Malaysia. In doing so, it forces a reconsideration of the general applicability of this paradigm, a particular conception that has come to be employed as a universal category, by suggesting that cultural difference is at the (invisible) center of all nationally-constituted cultures; if usually less obviously so than in Malaysia. An important contribution to this reassessment is the adoption of cultural identities pistis as the primary methodology for any explanation on how film as dispositive of national identity. Cultural identity pistis immediately foregrounds my own cultural location in relation to the study's subject matter, while also emphasizing the cultural identity nature of all analysis, diachronically and synchronically. It is also suggests that cultural practices forces that produces (in a given culture, at a given time) a specific set of expressions constructed from available cultural opportunities and resources.

'*Sinema Kebangsaan*' (national cinema) is typically discussed using the '*wacana kebangsaan*' (nationalism discourse) of cultural authenticity, while at the same time confronting the perceived external threats to national sovereignty through legal, ecopocial, aesthetic, and cultural sanctions. Consequently, the films are commonly examined as expressions of unique cultural characteristics, squeezing out the essence of national identity. Studies of national cinema are frequently couched in diachronic terms, constructing narratives origin, adversity, survival and triumph.

As its simplest the terms refers to cinema produced within a particular country, though even here there are often problems of definition: a film might have a Malaysia setting, Director and Cast but major India or Hong Kong investment. However, national cinemas have often been promoted on this level alone as a counter to the 'hegemony of Hollywood', and the USA in general, over world cinema. At various historical moments there have been imperatives promoting both European national cinemas and those of emerging post-colonial countries, and film studies has often used national labels in ways that distort the reality of identity in a given country. Susan Hayward noted that:

In the writing of a national cinema there are two fundamental yet crucial axes of reflection to be considered. First, how is the national enunciated? In other words, what are the texts and what meanings do they mobilise? And, second, how to enunciate the national? That is, what typologies must be traced into a cartography of the national? Or, expressed more simply, what is there, what does it mean and how do we write its meaning? Let us start with the first axis of reflection. Essentially, with regard to the cinema as a 'national' institution, there are three modes of enunciation: the films themselves, the written discourses which surround them and, finally, the archival institutes in which they are housed (cinémathèques and distributors' vaults) and displayed (cinémathèques, ciné-clubs and cinema theatres). This triad in turn generates the question

of which cinema we are addressing, for there is not just one cinema, but several. Here the concern is not simply with art and popular cinemas'cultural production, but with mainstream and peripheral cinemas, with the cinema and the cinemas – that is, with regard to the cinema, that which is at the centre of the nation. This shifts according to which particular nation is being referred to because the concept of a nation's cinema will change according to a nation's ideology. Thus, it could be capital culture or official culture that is at the centre of the hegemony (for example, in America it is capital/ Hollywood culture that is at the centre; in the former Communist countries it was the official culture). Furthermore this cinema of the centre changes in its identity depending on who is canonizing it as central. Mainstream, popular cinema is one that is canonised in distribution catalogues, fanzines, the press, on television, etc. Non-mainstream and avantgarde is canonised in the annals of film institutes or in critical writings. There are, of course, other cinemas still (be they censured, proscribed or cult cinemas) and also the cinema of others (the voices from the margins).[10]

And, within the national cinema concept as the methodology of this analysis assuming that some consensus on the nature of Cinema Malaysia can be reached, are there characteristics of this cinema that draw upon Malaysia deep culture? And how film as imported Western technology has been put to indigenous use and has become an indispensable part of the economy, politic, and social (ecopocial) and cultural life of the Malaysia nation?

Cinema is a medium that refuses boundaries. Filmmakers move between countries; films combine genres; film practices overstep the limits of terms such as documentary, fiction, avant-garde.[11]

The emergence and consolidation of a Malaysia national cinema in the ensuing years must be read against the background of the importation of film as a Western technology, ideology, and medium of art. The life-and-death struggle of Cinema Melayu as national cinema industry is isomorphic with the plight of Malaysia as a nation-state in the twentieth century. Modernity, nation building, nationalism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and new gender identities are among the central themes of such a national cinema. Malaysia national cinema necessarily becomes part and parcel of the forging a new national culture. Amidst the proliferation of '*hiburan murni*' (soft entertainment) films (romance, butterfly fiction, martial arts, ghosts, costume drama), which followed the national aspiration of nation building, and Cinema Melayu as national cinema is the mobiliser of the nation's myth and the myth of the nation. Through the creation of a coherent set of images and meanings, the narration of a collective history, and the enactment of the dramas and lives of ordinary people, cinema gives a symbolic unity to what would otherwise appear to be a quite heterogeneous entity: '*Malaysia Moden*' (A Modern Malaysia).

Identity, Cultural Identity, National Identity (?)

Identity or in Malay word called '*leluhur*' is a complex and even confusing construct and any discussion of the topic is fraught with problematic. The emphasis here is on certain cultural meanings of the term. Even when the discussion is limited and scoped to 'cultural identity', it is not means have a dangers difference between identity and cultural identity because the one is descriptive meanings and the other one is ideological. It is means identity is wholly social and cultural or in the other terms we called it 'cultural identity'.

Kamus Dewan defines '*leluhur*' or identity is about sameness and difference, about the personal and the social, about what we have in common with some people and what differentiates we from others.[12] In a seminal article on the question of cultural identity, Stuart Hall distinguishes between three conceptions of identity:

a. The enlightenment subject, characterized by an unchanging, fixed notion of identity, one that is frequently criticized as essentialist or ontological. "… was based on a conception of the human person as a fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose 'centre' consisted of an inner core… . The essential centre of the self was a person's identity."[13]

b. The sociological subject, representing a less individualistic perspective and proposing a more interactive relationship between self and society, resulting in a notion of identity that is less certain or centered and more influenced by outside forces. These first two categories also represent the rather stereotypical dichotomy between western individualism and the Asian emphasis on community. "… the inner core of the subject was not autonomous and self-sufficient, but was formed in relation to 'significant other', who mediated to the subject the values, meanings and symbols – the culture – of the worlds he/she inhabited."[14]

c. The postmodern subject, which rejects any sense of a fixed or essentialist identity; identity is instead perceived as being fluid, fragmented and even contradictory, so that it may well be preferable to speak of identities rather than identity.

"The subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self'. Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continually being shifted about. If we feel that we have a unified identity from birth to death, it is only because we construct a comforting story or 'narrative of the self' about ourselves."[15]

Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, for instance, editors of a recent collection of essays on the cultural studies and cultural identity comment that: "the embrace of identity, and its excavation from the bedrock of personal history, adds perhaps another mile or two cultural studies' movement away from its own intellectual 'roots', roots once firmly planted in the social and material, not the self-actualising, world."[16] If this is correct, the pairing of 'cultural identity and identity' might seem an odd one, yoking together the new ideology of cultural studies in relation to work on identity and film studies. To begin with, I wish to set out the sorts of claims made by cultural studies methodology about why identity or cultural identity is an important issue today especially in the era of preoccupation by the popular cultures like film. Paul Gilroy claims:

We lived in a world where identity matters. It matters both a concept, theoretically, and as a contested fact of contemporary political life. The world itself has acquired a huge contemporary resonance, inside and outside the academic world.[17]

Back to history, in the ancient times, the Greeks already utilized specific terminology to categorize groups of 'other' who were considered linguistically or politically different. They differentiated themselves, a group (the concept of *In-Group* or *Wir-*

Gruppe in German) of Greek-speaking people who were classified
by city (*polis*), from all non-Greek speaking people (those who spoke 'Barbarian' languages) who were classified by 'nation' and who were related to each other through biology, or '*ethné*' (plural of *ethnos*).[18] This word ethnos was used by the Greeks to name groups of animals, as well, while the word demos was reserved exclusively for the (Greek) population of 'free' individuals. In a similar fashion,
the Romans used the word *ciuitas* or *civitas* (the equivalent of polis in Greek) to refer the Roman life, and they also introduced expressions that represented the identity of the conquered civilizations: *gentes* and especially tribes, referred to particular socio-political factions, either territories with human and animal populations, or group sharing a common 'birth' and biological kinship links, or a
combination of these elements.[19] This idea of a 'common birth' – and therefore of
a biological kinship between the members of the group – is essential to the expression nation (from the Latin word *nascere*: to be born), which was used frequently in the European 'pre-modern' vocabulary to classify a specific ethnic group, either European or not. And on the end of the 18th century in France, this Latin word, '*nation*' was considered to be synonymous with '*race*', which has a Germanic origin.

In 19th century Europe, with the emergence of modern states and academic specializations, an attempt was made to give more precise, and sometimes new, meanings to the current terminology. Also, at that time, theories emerged to describe and explain the unique characteristics of human population and the conscious of the identity questions was begun. The term race initially a synonym
of nation, meaning culturally and morphologically unique populations was

redefined as a result of the 19th century scientific debates about the relationship between 'nature' and 'culture', the innate and the acquired, the biological and the social dimensions. In 1896, French scientist George Vacher de Lapouge proposed
in his book *Les selections sociales* (*The Social Selections*) the use of the word *ethné* or *ethnie* to differentiate the social-cultural specificity of a group from its biological specificity; a biological specific group was called a *race*, and '*heart throb*' the discussion about ethnicity, race, religion, and so on and this situation provoked the beginning of cultural identity and identity cross swords.[20] The debates about the relationship between culture and nature in the scope of ethnicity, race, religions built more sense and form of cultural identity discussion and invented or created a new theories about identity or cultural identity in the
way to understand the specific relation how culture represented human civilization, or in a small way the men daily life and this debates was proposed a new way of knowledge thinking about human beings and their world. Race, ethnic, religion, language, and popular culture became the most important and conflict '*topoi*' (topic) in human *anthropologism*. This proposal was not carried out until 1919, when a physician, Regnault, proposed the use of the word
'*glossethnie*' or '*ethnie*' to highlight and bold the role of language in the formation of the human groups, or nation, and also to provide a concept other than race, which according to Regnault,[21] referred solely to an anatomic category. The development of cultural identity pettifog was not stop although sometime the issues of ethnic and race was abandoned in some academia in Europe but in the
20th century when the popular culture like television and film blanket human life
and formed a mass culture, the issues of identity was started again when all this

media's with politics in the behind promulgate the questions of ethnicity, race and other differences calculated by different country and state borders also post colonialism created a phenomenon of migration and built the questions of 'local people' and 'outsiders'. Locals always claimed that 'outsiders' brought in strange cultures which disturbing local traditional cultures and this is a starter point the conscious to study and solved the conflicts of identity.

The question of 'identity' is being vigorously debated in social theory. In essence, the argument is that the old identities which stabilized the social world for so long are
in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the modern individual as a unified subject. This so-called
'crisis of identity' is seen as part of a wider process of
change which is dislocating the central structures and
processes of   modern societies and
undermining   t   h   e frameworks which gave individuals stable anchorage in the social world.[22]

The idea that identity is important because it is contested or in crisis is commonly invoked as Kobena Mercer remarks: "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by
the experience of doubt and uncertainty"[23].
Beyond the general sense of 'identity
in crisis' it is possible to discern two ways in which the importance of identity is explained. Firstly, academic debates about identity are said to key into and explain broad process of political and cultural change which have problematized traditional understanding of identity. David Morley and Kevin Robins, for example, make this kind of argument in relation to globalization:

Is not the very category of identity itself problematical? Is
it at all possible, in global times, to regain a coherent and integral sense of identity? Continuity and historicity of identity are challenged by the immediacy and intensity of global cultural confrontations?[24]

Comfortable assumptions about identity, a sense of coherence and integrity, are said to be problematized by '*budaya sejagat*' (global culture) changes. As Ferguson and Golding point out, questions and debates of identity – and its corollary, difference – are also raised in relation to numerous other topics like "feminism, ethnicity, sexual orientation, *Eurocentrism*, the diasporic, the post- colonial, and the post-national."[25] And the questions and debates of identity not only raises in Western societies, it is also often seen as important in explaining the new development political landscape in other regions like Asia as Zainal Kling comments "the break-up of established identities and affiliations, the re- emergence of old identities, and the forging of new identities, are frequently seen not just as defining features of post-colonial societies, or the problems of ethnic crisis, but as among the driving forces of change – particularly in the context of supposedly 'nation' building and the new country developments such as those in
Malaysia."[26] He also described that in the process of nation formation, choices

had to be made concerning the objectives, nature, and sources of the Malaysian state and nation.[27] What, in fact, was the attitude of Malaysian nationalist leaders towards European or Western political concepts such as 'state', 'nation', and
'democracy' as the calculation of identity? And Malaysia took the view that ~~Malaysian~~ Malay culture or cultural identity is a culture in its own right and of its own specific nature.[28]

As a consequence, identity formation involves the construction, or in terms of the ontological argument, the fixation of links between particular individuals and groups, based on commonalities and differences. Identity is therefore more persona-based than subject-based, with individuals defining themselves in terms
of a range of 'identity markers' that result in affiliations based on ethnicity, religion, class, language, gender, sexuality and so on, reflects UNESCO definition
of culture as an "aggregate of distinctive, spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional traits, which characterizes the identity of a society or a social group. It includes, alongside with arts and literature, ways of life, basic human rights, systems of values, customs and traditions, and faiths".[29] In other words cultural
identity is the term used to describe the systems of values, norms, beliefs, and practices that is produced by reality; and although cultural identity itself has no material form, we can see its material effects in all ecopocial formations, from class structure to gender relations to our idea of what constitutes an individual. The term is also used to describe the working of language and representation within culture which enable such formations to be reflected and constructed as
'natural'.

The points of this whole discussion has been to argue that we must think of cultural identities in the context of identity concerns both self-identity and social identity. It is about the personal and the social. It has been argued that identity is wholly cultural in character and does not exist outside of its representation in cultural discourses. Identity is not a fixed thing which we possess but a becoming,
as novelist Milan Kundera comments, "We can never know what to want, because, living only one life, we can neither compare it with our previous lives nor perfect it in our

lives to come."[30] Ideally, cultural identity will be open to new experience. It will be possible to confront and modify a shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self', hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves', which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common.

Film as dispositive of cultural identity reflect, **Theodor W. Adorno** wrote the best efforts when he classify film as a pure product of the culture industry without any redeeming value as art, his own insistence on the incommensurability of true
art makes it impossible to enforce such as distinction absolutely. As long as it is possible to produce an analysis, or immanent reading, of the cultural object, a reading that must necessarily contradict the ideology of the culture industry that tries to undermine such a critical reception, then it is possible to locate a redeeming contradiction in the mass-cultural object. This redeeming contradiction
is the baby that should not be thrown out with the *bath-water* which signifies the culture industry itself.

If material reality is called the world of exchange value, and culture whatever refuses to accept the domination of that world, then it is true that such refusal is illusory as long as the existent exists. Since, however, free and honest exchange is itself a lie, to deny it is at the same time to speak for truth: in face of the lie of the commodity world, even the lie that denounces it becomes correct.[31]

Film is seen as reflection of the dominant beliefs and values of its culture. Film does not reflect or even record reality; like any other medium of representation it constructs and 're-presents' its picture of reality by way of the codes, conventions, myths, and ideologies of its culture or identity as well as by way of specific signifying of the

medium. Just as film works on the meaning systems of culture –
to renew, to reproduce, or to review them – it is also produced by those meaning systems. The filmmaker, like the novelist or painters or the '**dalang**' (*wayang kulit* story teller), is a bricoleur – a sort of handyman who does the best he or she can with the materials at hand. The filmmaker uses the representational
conventions and repertoires available within the culture in order to make something fresh but familiar, new but generic, individual but representative.

Example, Malaysia cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide Malaysian, as 'one people', with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes for Malaysia actual history. This 'oneness', underlying
all the other, more superficial differences, is the truth, the essence, of
'Malaysianess' experience. It is the identity which a Malaysian must discover, excavate, bring to light and express through cinematic representation.

Cinema Melayu – A Future Studies!
In the decades following the
'*Rancangan Pembangunan Nasional*' (National
Development Plan - NDP) from 1957 to 1990, Malaysia underwent a period of intense nationalism as the newly emerging state sought to legitimize itself, consolidate its institutions and promote economic growth. As a direct an indirect consequence of this nationalism, these years witnessed an intense search for national self-awareness in the cultural sphere. Responding in part to the identity crisis triggered by the National Development Plan, many artist and intellectuals set out to define what it meant to be Malaysian. They constructed new

articulations of national identity that sought both to satisfy the demand of many Malaysians, and to help the state attain the social control it needed to consolidate itself and implement its ecopocial policies. Among the ways they did this was by:
(1) stressing the notion of a shared or collective identity;
(2) compensating for social and economic inequalities and containing social tensions (above all by glorifying the lower classes as the most virtuous and authentic Malaysians):
(3) emphasizing character traits important to prepare Malaysian for modernity;
(4) and, urging Malaysians to gain self-awareness (to avoid losing their identity as a result of cultural incursions from abroad, particularly the Western).

Before I going further to the issues of Malaysian identity especially to mark how Malaysia accomplished this stasis it is a good way to underline a complete understand of national identity and national culture theoretically. Benedict Anderson argues that national culture are "imagined communities", "imagined" because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion".[32]
Here, Anderson is stressing the creativity involved in this process of imagining in contrast to what he regards as Ernest Gellner's judgmental attitude of equating invention with fabrication and falsity.[33]
Further, in contradiction to Gellner's view that "nationalism… sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures"[34], Anderson asserts that all communities, probably even those having total face-to-face contact, are "imagined".[35]

This is an important point for my purposes since it allows the argument to proceed on the basis of nations being imagined through a process of representation or meaning construction. As the subtitle of his book indicates, Anderson goes on to examine nationalism diachronically by locating its origin in 18th century Europe with the rise of capitalism, in particular print-capitalism and its manifestation in the commodified and mechanized production of books and newspapers, which "made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways".[36] Anderson link nationalism to imperialism and colonialism, and to de-colonialization, there is a strong sense of universalism about his perspective (or rather a Euro-centrism –

paradoxically given his long-term commitment to Southeast Asian studies), which is noted by Partha Chatterjee in his book, *The Nation and Its Fragments*. Chatterjee accepts mush of Anderson's argument, but wants to qualify it by proposing that colonial and postcolonial societies "fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless not Western".[37] This decoupling of the West from the process of modernity is not sought to "emphasize… an 'Indian' (or an 'Oriental') exceptionalism" but to act as "a demonstration that the alleged exceptions actually inhere as forcibly suppressed elements even in the supposedly universal forms of the modern regime of power."[38] In other words myths of national identity are crucial in constructing the idea of nation. Anthony Smith explains that these myths provide "a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world… It is through a shared, unique culture that we are enabled to know 'who

we are' in the world. By rediscovering that culture, we 'rediscover' ourselves".[39]

Smith adds that national identity enables people to feel they have transcended death by providing a "community of history and destiny", thereby saving them from personal oblivion; it offers personal dignity to those deprived of power by promising a status reversal by making individuals part of a community or "family".[40] Based on that we can understand that the national identity is equally discussed as the nation state, and the nation state is a relatively recent invention, for most of the human species have never participated in any kind of state nor identified with one. The nation state, nationalism and national identity as collective forms of organization and identification are not naturally occurring phenomena but contingent historical-cultural formations. The national identity is a political concept which refers to an administrative apparatus deemed to have sovereignty over a specific space or territory within the nation state system. National identity is a form of imaginative identification with the symbols and discourses of the nation state. Thus, nations are not simply political formations but systems of cultural representation through which national identity is continually reproduced as discursive action. The nation state as a political apparatus and a symbolic form has a temporal dimension in that political structure endure and change while the symbolic and discursive dimension of national identity narrates and creates the idea of origins, continuity and tradition.

Of all the collective identities which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive… other types of collective identity – class, gender, race, religion – may overlap or combine with national identity but they rarely succeed in undermining its hold.[41]

Smith believes that the history of a country in the modern world is a matter of continual renegotiation between the nation (the officially designate and sanctioned cultural from embracing all) and the people (the masses, the working classes, the majority segment of the population; between the state (the governing institutions of the country) and the citizenry (the collective membership of the country); between the centre and the localities; between the city and the countryside; between the majority and minorities; between official and unofficial culture. For him, every nation has a set of national values, desirable qualities that derives from the national identity and the national character, phenomena which are linked but not identical.

Powerful institutions function to select particular values from the past and to mobilize them in contemporary practices. Through such mechanism of cultural reproduction, a particular version of the collective memory and thus a particular sense of national and cultural identity, is produced.[42]

Such a perspective coincides with my argument that a '*leluhur nasional*' (national identity) and '*budaya nasional*' (national culture) can only be analyzed in all its complexities by emphasizing these 'forcibly suppressed elements' in relation to, and in the fact of, the powerful tendency to '*kesejagatan budaya*' (cultural centralism or universalism).

Nationalism is supported by the modern international political system because it emphasizes the market, democracy, and secularism, all of which are derive from national identity and a focus on national well-being. However, nationalism is also tied to chauvinism which is supported by modernity as nation-states seek a national identity often on ethnic grounds. Modernity's economic and political conditions foster chauvinism, national self-government, national self-determination and national identity, all factors in nationalism and the nation-state which are unlikely to disappear as political entities.[43]

(Figure 8: *The old image of Malaya, Chinese Rickshaw man and Malay elites as the paradox of new image of Malaysia with a rich Chinese and poor Malay*)

Stuart Hall identifies five primary means by which a national culture is constructed:[44]

1. *The narrative of a nation* ('**Naskah Bangsa**') – how the story of a nation is told in fictional and non-fictional accounts and forms. These become the touchstones of 'nationness' that construct the nation. It is important to note that this narrative encompasses all the stories of a nation, but that some of these stories, at a given time

and in a given community, achieve dominance and even erase some of the other stories. Consequently there is always conflict, with different groups constructing different versions of the narrative
of a nation. Alternatively the same narrative may well be interpreted in radically
different ways by different communities, for example the foundational Malay epic, the **Hikayat Malim Deman** is regarded by the majority of primitive Malays as embodying the ideals of Malayness in its representation of the '*Satria Perkasa*' (super hero) or '*Dewa*' (god), Malim Deman, and his battle with the demon-king Mambang; however, in certain parts of **Tanah Melayu** (Malaya) this same text is read as "a thinly disguised historical account how Muar (one of the district in the state of Johore), led by Malim Deman, subjugated to '*kayangan*' (hidden world), ruled by Mambang
which kidnapped his wife Putri Bongsu or Putri Santan Bertapis."[45]

2. *The emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness* ('***Asal Usul Bangsa***') – national identity is therefore fixed from time immemorial, unaffected by historical change. This can be a troublesome characteristic, not just in colonial and postcolonial societies, but also where there has been a major shift in a society's ecopocial or cultural system, for example, the status
of traditional animistic beliefs in a society converted to Islam, such as Malaysia.

3. *The invention tradition* ('***Tradisi Bangsa***')– a society can overcome the problems referred to in the previous category by fixing "certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with
the past".[46] The construction of
Bangsawan theater as a Malay traditional

practice is an excellent example, which was discussed some in first chapter and will be discussed more later in this chapter.
4. *The foundational myth* ('***Mitos Bangsa***') – often associated with specific oral and written '***karya***' (texts) that construct genealogies back to a "time before time", for example the prologue of the ***Sejarah Melayu / Salatus Salatin*** (*Malay Annals*) discussed later in this chapter.
5. *The idea of pure, original people or 'folk'* ('***Jatidiri Bangsa***') – a very powerful shaper and sovereignty. It is frequently used to assert 'ownership' and 'belonging' and nationhood, as with the Malays in Malaysia employing the term '***bumiputera***', meaning indigenous people or 'son of the soil' or 'the earth belongs to the origins'.
These aspects of national identity formation all function to create a contemporary sense of '***jatibangsa***' (nationness), but, paradoxically, do so through a powerful call upon the past, which then builds, shapes, and defines that sense of nation. Underline this enthymeme national identity erases difference by imposing a set of attributes on all members of the nation – an unwillingness to accept all these attributes threatens identity and
therefore threatens expulsion
from that community. Slavoj Zizek makes this point quite graphically when he writes of the "violent act of abstraction" involved in the preamble to every democratic proclamation "all people without regard to (race, sex, religion, wealth, social status".[47]
Taufik Abdullah in his article "The Formation of Political Tradition in
the Malay World" noted that nations are crossed by those differences and it is the role of nationalism to contain and neutralize those differences.[48] Cheng Jihua in
his book, *The History of the Development of Chinese Film* writes that national cultures are unified only through the exercise of different forms of cultural power.[49] One of the major

rhetorical and administrative or statistical strategies employed in this ideological drive for a cohesive identity formation is to invoke constructs like '*kaum'* (race) and '*etnik*' (ethnicity). Ethnicity, which literally defines as nation, has become confused with race, which has strong biological overtones; even though race has no status in biology, it has remained in the popular imagination as a social definition, including such terms as the human race. Ethnicity is typically aligned with culture, but this is equally problematic as there are no discrete or distinct cultures in existence. So ethnicity has no fixed markers and the crucial issue is how it is constructed and for what purposes because ethnicity has also been linked with minorities, the term '*suku kaum*' (ethnic minorities) is frequently used in Malaysia especially referred to a small group which have some different cultures and languages like '*orang asli'* (aborigines).[50] This is rather tautological since there is no reference to ethnic majorities or majority (like the term used for 'white' which is correlative of 'black'). Perhaps the way out of this problematic is not to use the word 'ethnicity' at all, or to apply it to everyone, in the sense that we are all ethnically located; "acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity",[51] while at the same time "recognizing that an individual or group is not contained or confined by that place hierarchically superior or inferior in relation to another's putative ethnicity".[52]

This conception of ethnicity will operate throughout this research as a statement of principle, but it is also necessary to accept that the term is still used interchangeably with the word race, especially when analyzed a unique and special multiracial country Malaysia, where a clear-cut and self-evident ethnic division is said to exist. It is bewitching a clear argumentation that national cultures cannot erase differences, ethnic or otherwise, and one of the major functions of national identity formation is to bring a semblance of community (to speak with one voice) to this potential fragmentation. That's why the tension between a tendency to uniformity and a tendency to hybridization, which can also be expressed as the conflict between the center and the margin, is at the heart of national culture and its various manifestations such as technologies of literature and language. Anderson linked the rise of the novel in Europe to the rise of nationalism, and Timothy Brennan using Bakhtin's concept of '*heteroglossia*' has examined this relationship in greater detail. "The novel objecti[fies] the nation's composite nature: a hotch potch of the ostensible separate 'levels of style' corresponding to class: a jumble of poetry, drama, newspaper report, memoir and speech".[53] These involve different '*wacana*' (discourses) but the form of the novel and other literature texts strives to contain them and represent a sort of harnessed heterogeneity.[54] Similarly, modern technologies of communication, including film maintain an often-uneasy balance between heterogeneous elements and some form of cohesion – these in turn mimic tensions in broader culture. Language itself undergoes constant changes that check any tendency to homogeneity by a concurrent hybridization or creolization.[55] This happened to any language, even English, which has been labeled the only 'supercentral language' because there are increasing numbers of bilingual speakers competent in this language with the development of indigenous forms of English throughout the world. Only have a few monolingual countries and languages other than the

'national language' are often spoken at home and in local communities.[56] This is particularly the case in Malaysia, where all children learn **Bahasa Melayu** (Malay language), yet take their cultural identity principally from the linguistic community to which they belong. But there have similar tension between homogenization and heterogeneity on a global level where national identity is in crisis in the face of the 'push-pull' forces of globalization and localism.

Appadurai has argued that contemporary global condition was having disjunctive flows of ethnoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes. Globalization was involved in the dynamic movements of ethnic groups, technology, financial transactions, media images, and ideological conflicts which are not neatly determined by one harmonious 'master plan'. Rather, the speed and scope and impact of these flows are fractured and disconnected.[57] In other words, Appadurai explained that the rhetoric if nation is constantly proclaimed in ecopocial and culture as well as in debates about indigenous and immigrant peoples, where such rhetoric is a constant covert whisper that, every now and then, breaks out into a shout, a curse, a song, with the flag, with national values or it the signifiers of an 'essence' of the nation. Nationalism may not be as strongly asserted as it once was, but the attitudes and emotions implicit in the term have certainly not disappeared but voiced differently. This is clear in the exclusive camouflaged by the use of words like 'we', 'the Malaysian people' and 'the Malaysian nation' or 'Malaysianess'.

[In Europe there exists] a strong 'belief system' holding that cultures are both valuable collective properties of nations and places and also very vulnerable to alien influences. The value attributed to a national culture is rooted in ideas developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when national movements connected with the rediscovery of distinctive national cultural traditions (for example, In Greece, Ireland and Finland). The frequent lack of correlation between newly established national boundaries (often invented) and 'natural' cultural divisions of peoples have done little to modify the rhetoric about the intrinsic value of national culture. 'National identity' is thus a different and more questionable concept than cultural identity in general.[58]

But in wider conceptions of national identity and national culture in politics means – the idea of the nation or nation-state, or nationalism is enlisted in achieving and maintaining hegemony. Hegemony is the process by which members of society are persuaded to acquiesce in their own subordination, to abdicate cultural leadership in favor of sets of interests which are represented as identical, but may actually be antithetical, to their own. The subordinated are persuaded by the ideologies on offer rather than the particulars of their material conditions. In simple conclusion hegemony's aim is to resist social change and maintain the status quo.

National identity must be accounted one of those modern political catchwords that have little intellectual or rational meaning, but for that reason are all the more loaded with indeterminate emotional content.[59]

Based on all that we can see how the regulation and control of definitions of art, of literature and of the cinema national are also hegemonic in that the imperative

is always to restrict and limit the proliferation of representations of the nation. Representations of the nation are themselves particularly important since they both produce and reproduce the dominant points of view. This does not

mean that we only have one version of the nation – although ideally that is what hegemony could mean. What is does mean is that the various representations will enjoy a different status and will have different meanings. In effect, they will construct a different nation. For example, the Malaysia constructed in *Semerah Padi* (P. Ramlee) is different to the Malaysia culture constructed in *Perempuan, Isteri, …* (U-Wei Hj Shaari), and have some developments in Jasmine Ahmad, *Sepet*. Such differences can be contradictory and therefore threatening but in such cases, the cultural institutions might attempt to limit or control the multiplicity of representations by depicting some as marginal or crass, for instance. But like other ideological constructions, representations of the nation are not fixed; their ecopocial and cultural importance is such that they are sites of considerable competition. To gain control of the representational agenda for the nation is to gain considerable power over individual's view of themselves and each other. This is one of the reasons why Malaysia like other countries in this only one world so much concern over the domination of film production and distribution by the Hollywood or United States of America. This is because the cultural hegemony facilitated by this domination of the mass media if not controlled maybe one day can removed the national culture and this conflict was brought up the questions of cinema national.

Concepts of nation and national identity, when they are perceived in terms of socio-political processes and the cultural articulations of these processes, inevitably mean that the culture speaks the national and the national speaks the culture.[60]

This brings a full circle, from the context of culture, cultural identity and the issues of national identity and national culture to the film texts themselves as a complete base in my research to make a clear evaluation about the connections between film and cultural identity especially in the case of Cinema Malaysia

CUT TO. To be continue…

'typicality' as depictions of national life.

Credits

[1]   This paper will use this word as 'terminology lantern' for the whole contact of meanings on Malaysia film industry.

[2]   Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (London: SAGE Publications, 1991), page 11

[3]   Douglas Kellner, *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identities and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), page 1

[4]   Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), page xlix

[5]   Brian McFarlane and Geoff Mayer (ed.), *New Australian Cinema: Sources and Parallels in British and American Film*, (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1992), page 10

[6]   Noël Burch, *To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in Japanese Cinema*, (California: California University Press, 1979), page 25

[7]   *Berita Harian*, (26 June 1988), page 9

[8]   Mahathir Mohamad, *The Challenge*, (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1986), page 46

[9]   Ibid., *The Challenge*, page 51

[10]   Ibid., *French National Cinema*, page 21

11   Robert Sklar's, *Film – an International History of the Medium*, (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 1993), page12

12   *Kamus Dewan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980), page 119

13   Stuart Hall, "The Questions of Cultural Identity," in Stuart Hall, D. Held, and T. McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Future*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), page 275

14   Ibid., "The Questions of Cultural Identity", page 277

15   Ibid., page 277

16   Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, "Cultural Studies and Changing Times: An Introduction," in Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding (eds.), *Cultural Studies in Question*, (London: Sage, 1997), page xxvi.

17   Paul Gilroy, "Diaspora and the Detours of Identity", in Kathryn Woodward (ed.), *Identity and Difference*, (London: Sage/ Open University, 1997), page 301.

18   George Elwert, *Nationalismus und Ethinizität: über die Bildung von Wir-gruppen*, (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabishce Buch, 1989), page 10

19   Jean-Loup Amselle, *Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity in Africa and Elsewhere (Mestizo Spaces)*, trans. Claudia Royal, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), page 11

20   Günter Nagel, *Georges Vacher de Lapouge, (1854-1936): e. Beitr. zur Geschichte d. Sozialdarwinismus in Frankreich*, (Munich: Shutz, 1995), page 25

21   Ibid., page 45

22   Ibid., "The Question of Cultural Identity", page 274

23   Ibid., page 274

24   David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity*, (London: Routledge, 1995), page 122

25   Ibid., *Cultural Studies in Question*, page xxvi

26   Zainal Kling, "Malay Identity: A Study of Ethnomethodology," in Wan Abdul Kadir and Zainal Abidin Borhan (eds.), *Fenomena 2*, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Pengajian Melayu, 1993), page 20

27   Ibid., page 20

28   Ibid., page 28

29   UNESCO, "A World Culture", in Ilham Wahyusutra, *The Original Origin*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Aman Press, 1988), page 103

30   Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1984), page 8

31   Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, (London: Verso, 1978), page 25

32   Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition, (London: Verso, 1991), page 6

33   Ibid., page 6

34   Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Basil Bordwell, 1983), page49

35   Ibid., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, page 6

36   Ibid., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, page 36

37   Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), page 6

38   Ibid., page 13

39   Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, (London: Routledge, 1998), page 17

40   Ibid., page 161-162

41   Ibid., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, page 143

42   David Morley and Kevin Robins, "Spaces of Identity: Communication Technologies and the Reconfiguration of Europe", *Screen* 30, Volume 4, (1989), page 10-34

43   Alexander J. Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States, and Nation- States in Contemporary World. (Rethinking Nationalism and Sovereignty)". *Journal of International Affairs*, (Winter 1992), page 307-323

44   Ibid., "The Question of Cultural Identity", page 293-295

45   *Hikayat Malim Deman / Pawang Ana*, (Shah Alam: Penerbitan Fajar Bakti, 1998), page 24-27

46   Eric Hobsbawn, "Introduction: Inventing Tradition", in Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), page 1

47   Slavoj Zizek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*, (Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, 1991), page 163

48   Farish A. Noor, "The Formation of Political Tradition in the Malay World", *Aliran*, (Kuala Lumpur: Aliran Kesedaran Malaysia, 2002), page 6

49   Cheng Jihua, et al., *Zhongguo dianying fazhan shi* (*History of the Development of Chinese Film*), (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 1963), page 34

50   Ronald Provencher, "Popular Malay Culture: Influence of the Village and the City, Especially Those Reflected in Humor Magazines", in Wan Abdul Kadir and Zainal Abidin Borhan (eds.), *Fenomena 2*, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Pengajian Melayu, Universiti Malaya, 1993), page 257-259

51   Stuart Hall, "New Identities", in Kobena Mercer (ed.), *Black Film Black Cinema*, (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1988), page 29

52   Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, "Art, Culture, and Cultural Criticism in Post-New China", *New Literary History* 28, No. 3, (1993), page 12-56

53   Timothy Brennen, "The National Longing for Form", in Homo K. Bhabha (ed.), *Narration and Nation*, (London: Routledge, 1990), page 51

54   A. Samad Said, *Dari Langit Petang ke Hujan Pagi*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1998), page 12

55   In this spirit Ashcroft et al. argue that the hybridization and creolization of language, literature and cultural identities becomes a common theme in postcolonial literature, marking a certain meeting of minds with postmodernism. Neither the colonial

nor colonized cultures and languages can be presented in 'pure' form, nor separated from each other, giving rise to hybridity. This challenges not only the centrality of colonial culture and the marginalization of the colonized but the very idea of 'centre' and
'margin'. Creolization suggests that claims of cultural homogenization are not a strong basis for the argument of cultural imperialism. Much if what is cast as cultural imperialism may be understood instead as the creation of a layer of western capitalist modernity which overlays, but does not necessarily obliterate, pre-existing cultural forms. Modern and postmodern ideas about time, space, rationality, capitalism, consumerism, sexuality, family, gender, etc., are place alongside older discourses, setting up ideological competition between them. The outcome may be both a range of hybrid forms of identity and the production of traditional, 'fundamentalist' and nationalist identities. Nationalism and the nation-state continue to co-exist with cosmopolitanism and the weakening of national identities. The processes of reverse flow, fragmentation and hybridization are quite strong as the push towards homogenization.

See, ibid., *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*, page 118-119

See, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (eds.), *The Empire Writes Back*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), page 60-65

[56]   Abram De Swaan, "Notes on the Emerging Global Language System: Regional,
National and Supranational", *Media, Culture and Society*, 13, page316-320

[57]   Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy",
Public Culture, Volume 2, No. 2, (1990), page 1-24

[58]   Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory*, (New York: Sage Publications, 2000), page 6

[59]   Gerold Schmidt, "Identität: Gebrauch und Geschicte eines modernen Begriffs",
Muttersprache 86, (1976), page 333-354

[60]   Susan Hayward, "Questions of National Cinema", in Keith Cameron (ed.),
National Identity, (Exeter, England: Intellect Books, 1999), page 93