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# Identity Politics of Hindu Society in Bali: From Dialogical Construction to Positioning

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**Abstract**---Balinese researchers such as Nordholt and Picard have extensively explored the discourse of identity formation in Balinese society from the colonial era to modern Bali. Picard, for example, considers Balinese identity to be formed through dialogic construction, namely the contact of Balinese people with their interlocutors (foreigners). But in its development, the Balinese try to construct their own identity according to the references given by the orientalists. In this study, it was found that there was a continuity of discourses with nuances of identity politics in Balinese society such as the emergence of discourse, kebalian, Ajeg Bali, efforts to legitimize Balinese language, script and traditional clothing in public spaces, and there was even a Balinese family planning movement as a counter movement against population control efforts through the national Family Planning (KB) program. The latest is the emergence of the Dresta Bali Hindu movement which seeks to restore the local Balinese variant of Hinduism. The novelty of this research is the argument that identity political discourse and movements in Balinese society are part of positioning, namely as a way for society or social groups to position or define themselves among external challenges.

**Keywords**---dialogical, Hindu, politics, positioning, society

## Introduction

The identity politics movement in Indonesia has a long history. Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country on earth (Maarif et al., 2010). The diversity of cultures, ethnicities and tribes in Indonesia is a necessity as well as a challenge. Moreover, as Geertz wrote Laode (2018); Maarif et al. (2010); Rozi et al. (2021), primordial sentiments in Indonesia are firmly rooted in the categories of religion and ethnicity—where primordial ties are stronger than political ties. After independence in Indonesia, this identity-based problem was attempted to be resolved by the principles of unity. Political discourse at the beginning of Indonesian independence was built on the foundation of the ideas of nationalism and citizenship. In fact, Anderson (1999), states that the nation is an imaginary community (imagined community). However, this effort was made not only as a way to strengthen national unity, but also to fight against Dutch power and overcome the internal upheavals of the Indonesian people. All particular identities are unified in a single Pancasila doctrine (Laode, 2018).

This situation continued until the New Order regime. Learning from the previous era which was marked by internal turmoil, the New Order regime tightened various expressions of group cultural identity. During the New Order government, ethnicity, religion, race and class were forbidden areas—even politically free. Ethnicity is formally considered taboo because of its potential to explode. The New Order regime exercised strong control over various potential local resistance that threatened the ruling government. The New Order regime bound local

identities in the spirit of diversity which was placed in a container of nationalism and caged in authoritarian-militaristic prisons (Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007; Laode, 2018).

The attitude of the New Order which limited the expressions of group cultural identity turned out to have serious implications in the reform era. It can be said that the transition from the New Order regime to the reform era marked the beginning of the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia. At this time, channels of identity expression began to open. Awareness to build regional identity gets a field road. Political policies of decentralization, regional autonomy have made regions evoke their regional identity (Putra, 2011; Davidson & Henley, 2007). Various acts of primordial sentiment, ethnonationalism, at the local level have also emerged, such as events in East Timor, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi (Poso), Maluku, Ambon, Aceh—and most recently the communal violence in Papua. Thousands of people became victims in this communal conflict and violence (Dutta & Elers, 2020; Kent & Taylor, 2002).

This also happens to the Balinese people. Incidental discourses about Merdeka Bali, the Ajeg Bali movement, the struggle for Bali's special autonomy, the strengthening of customary villages, and so on can be used as examples of the rise of regional identity in Bali. The catastrophic terrorist attacks on 12 October 2002 and October 2005 have created a kind of crisis which has in fact strengthened the collective identity of the Balinese people – and re-mythified the attitude of Ajeg Bali – even though the ideas among these concepts have never been unanimously and fully understood, until finally they have become increasingly quiet in amidst the hustle and bustle of political discourse Putra (2011), it doesn't even end, it actually reinforces primordial sentiments. According to Nordholt (2002) regional autonomy and electoral democracy do not produce better governance. Instead, the two processes strengthened the fortification of Balinese identity politics represented by urban middle class intellectuals (Whitman, 2007; Zimmermann, 1988).

The researcher seeks to map the forms of identity strengthening discourse that characterizes the life of the Hindu community in Bali. Starting from the Ajeg Bali discourse, for example. The Ajeg Bali discourse arose after Bali experienced various development problems as a risk of opening up the tourism industry. As is well known, since the early 1990s foreign investors have participated massively in the tourist economic arena in Bali. There are several development agendas that have been strongly rejected by the Balinese people. In 1993, for example, there was a protest against the construction of the Bali Nirvana Resort near the holy Tanah Lot temple, Tabanan Regency. Community demonstrations, sparked by a campaign by Bali Post, a respected local daily, forced the official representative body of the Indonesian Hindu constituency, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), to issue a formal declaration relating to safeguarding the sacredness of Hindu temples (Ramstedt, 2008). The protest movement became increasingly evident when in 1997 another protest was launched against the construction of a hotel in Padanggalak (Hillman et al., 2004; Navarro et al., 2006).

At this point the Bali Post media represents the sensibility of the Balinese people who have anxiety and worry about the collapse of the foundations of Balinese culture as a result of the massive development of the tourism industry. The themes of sensibility revolve around saving Balinese culture from external influences which include the onslaught of western culture which encourages crime, drug use, hedonic-materialistic attitudes that sacrifice religious values. In addition, the flow of thousands of Muslim immigrants from the islands of Java and Lombok gave the uneasy feeling that the Balinese were becoming a minority in their own island (Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007). When the bomb exploded in Legian Kuta on 12 October 2002, the discourse on Ajeg Bali was flowing again Suryawan (2010), even stronger. According to Ramstedt (2008), the Bali bombing tragedy had side effects such as (1) general tension emerged over Bali which had become a victim of those who came from outside to seek profit; (2) the deep and widespread suffering of the growing number of Muslim migrants who oppose the normal “lifestyle of Balinese Hindus”; (3) public anger over the increase in acts of discrimination against Hindus by Muslims and Christians (Winfree & Kline, 2005; Olhager, 2003).

Basyar (2016), stated that tensions in relations between Hinduism and Islam in Bali had arisen, especially after the two Bali bombings. The results of his research concluded that between 2009-2011, Hindus and Muslims experienced a bit of "shocks", for example due to sweeping Identity Cards (KTP), especially Muslim immigrants and "outsiders". Muslims feel different treatment from society and security forces. The situation heated up a bit when the international media, when covering the bomb blast, always referred to Bali as the only Hindu Island, and described it as a legend, the source of peace and harmony. As a result, Muslims are seen as disturbing the harmony that has been going on for a long time. At this point, a shift in sensibility occurred, which was originally directed at developmentism, urbanism, tourism industrialism, shifted to ethnicity and religious sensibility (Paramita & Agung, 2015). At that time, a discourse was formed, or rather a determination to protect Bali from outsiders who damaged Bali's security. It can be said that the Ajeg Bali discourse was able to build a 'new politics of vigilance' (to borrow Suryawan's term) for the Balinese people against external threats. This politics of vigilance was transmitted to the Pakraman Village level by intensifying sweeping actions against newcomers through the Ajeg Bali security

apparatus: the *pecalang*. The *Ajeg Bali* discourse was again disseminated through television. Balinese culture is increasingly represented as exclusively Hindu (Shane, 1992; Extermann et al., 2005).

In its development, the discourse on *Ajeg Bali* which continues to be inflamed has no end. On the contrary, this cultural discourse is capitalized, instrumentalized and politicized for the purposes of elite politics and media capitalism. This can be seen in the dynamics of local Balinese politics, during the re-election of Bali Governor Dewa Made Beratha in August 2003. At that time, *Bali Post* managed to play an active role in winning the pair Dewa Made Beratha-Alit Kekan from its rival candidate, namely Budi Suryawan-Arka Hardiana, and Ary Suta-Ngurah Wididana. The victory of the Dewa Beratha-Alit Kelakan package was called by the *Bali Post* media as *Ajeg Bali*'s victory. The politicization of the *Ajeg Bali* discourse played by mainstream local media was also evident in the 2013 Bali Governor election—when Made Mangku Pastika fought politically with his rival AA Ngurah Puspayoga. At that time, the *Bali Post* built the image of A.A Ngurah Puspayoga as a candidate who was steady in Bali—although it left sharp friction—even demonstrations whose locus was in Singaraja and Denpasar. There was even an act of burning the *Bali Post* newspaper which was carried out on Friday, May 3 2013 in front of the Bali People's Struggle Monument in the Renon area, Denpasar. The burning was carried out by a community calling themselves the Bali Community Alliance Against Public Deception, numbering around 200, involving stakeholders (Gelgel, 2017; Suryanata & Pemayun, 2018).

The constellation above shows that identity political movements through cultural discourses that are intensely used by local elites aim to share power and maintain funding sources. The issue of identity politics is used to seize power both at the local and national levels Laode (2018), and has an impact on local friction, violence and conflict. This was reflected in the 2013 Bali Governor Election—although in the end Made Mangku Pastika won by carrying Bali Mandara—a Bali that is Advanced, Safe, Peaceful and Prosperous. However, since I Wayan Koster's victory as Governor of Bali, he has defeated his rival Ida Bagus Rai Dharma Wijaya Mantra—who is the son of the former Governor of Bali, Prof. Dr. Ida Bagus Mantra, Bali has entered a new chapter in the dynamics of identity politics discourse. At the beginning of his leadership period, the vision of Nangun Sat Kerthi Loka Bali and Towards a New Era of Bali was shown by Wayan Koster through a number of regulations in the form of Governor Regulations and Regional Regulations which have a passion for maintaining the cultural identity of the Balinese people.

Take for example the Governor of Bali Regulation Number 80 of 2018 concerning the Protection and Use of Balinese Language, Script and Literature. In the Pergub the Balinese script is placed higher above the Latin letters. Not only that, the Governor of Bali Wayan Koster also requires the wearing of Balinese traditional clothing every Thursday, Tilem, Full Moon and Anniversary of Bali Province and Regency/City through Bali Governor Regulation Number 79 of 2018 concerning Days for Wearing Balinese Traditional Clothing. Amendment to Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2001 concerning Pakraman Village with Regional Regulation no. 4 of 2019 concerning Traditional Villages is also carried out as a form of effort to strengthen Traditional Villages in Bali, and even expand their authority. The word '*pakraman*'—picked from ancient lontar 10th and 11th centuries which was used to replace the term '*adat*' which was considered too colonial and Islamic, has now been changed back to Traditional Village. Changes to this regional regulation cannot be separated from efforts to fortify Balinese identity from external threats. In fact, this anxiety grew stronger when the Bali Central Bureau of Statistics released data that in just one decade, Hindus in Bali have decreased by more than 9 percent.

In 1971 it reached 93.29 percent of the number of Hindus, in 2010 only 83.46 percent remained. The decline in the number of Hindus is inversely proportional to the number of immigrants—particularly Muslims—in Bali whose number has actually increased. This anxiety gave birth to a Governor's Instruction No. 1545 of 2019 concerning Family Planning Krama Bali—Krama Bali has the right to give birth to four children—as a counter movement to the socialization of the Central Government's Family Planning program. In line with the efforts of the Governor of Bali to issue policies that seek to justify local Balinese cultural identity, in mid-2020—in the midst of the Covid 19 outbreak which caused a collapse in tourism—there was an event of rejection by various elements of Balinese society towards the Hare Krisna mission movement. Those who call themselves concerned about Balinese Hinduism reject the internal conversion movement of Hare Krisna which is considered to have damaged the culture, customs and practices of Balinese Hinduism. This group even demanded Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI) to remove Hare Krisna from the protection of PHDI. It can be said, this is the latest event in Bali related to efforts to maintain and fortify “Balinese Hindu identity”. Based on the description of the fragments of cases and events based on historical records related to Balinese identity politics above, the author seeks to conduct research related to the genealogy of identity politics and its impact on the multicultural life of the Balinese people (Atmadja, 2010; Bakker, 1997; Ardika & Putra, 2004).

There are several identification of problems, firstly the discourse and movement of identity politics in Bali is like an unfinished project. At least, these discourses and movements can be traced historically from the colonial era to the

post-reform era. Second, identity political discourses and movements have different characteristics and dimensions. If traced periodically, identity political discourses and movements are heavily influenced by local and national political constellations. Currently, the identity political movement based on ethnic, cultural and religious identities is getting stronger and even legitimized in a number of policies. Third, the discourse and movement of identity politics in Bali has a great influence on the way of thinking and attitudes of the Balinese people in responding to various challenges both from within and from outside. Not only that, the identity political movement legitimized by the Balinese government has certainly had an impact on the multicultural life of the Balinese people—especially in Bali where there are enclaves of other people such as Muslims, Christians and Buddhists (Dwipayana, 1919; Dwipayana & Ari, 1955; Hall, 1989; Hauser-Schäublin, 2011).

## Research Methods

Research on identity politics in Hindu society in Bali uses a mixed methodology, especially between field research and discourse analysis. Mixed method produces more comprehensive facts in researching research problems, because researchers have the freedom to use all data collection tools according to the type of data needed. This research does not only rely on interview and field data, but also on discourse analysis, particularly as it relates to identity politics discourses. In general, this research was conducted in Bali on the grounds that Bali is still the locus of the identity political movement. This is evidenced by the continuity of the identity political movement to date through the implementation of government policies which of course have nuances of identity politics. Researchers used three types of data collection techniques to support the data analysis process, namely: (1) observation techniques; (2) in-depth interview techniques (depth interviews); and (3) literature study techniques. The process of data analysis is in the form of a cycle, in which there is an interactive interpretation of data collection by data analysis. Even data collection is also placed as an integral component of data analysis activities. Because this research combines field research and discourse analysis, the data analysis process takes the form of an interpretive analysis cycle (Howe, 2006; Schulte Nordholt, 1986; Schulte Nordholt, 2010).

## Discussion

### *Discourse of Kebalian*

The researcher attempts to trace the discourse of identity politics in Hindu society in Bali historically. However, it will be limited from the New Order era to post-reform. In the New Order era, identity politics in Hindu society in Bali surfaced in the form of the *kebalian* discourse. (*Kebalian* is a term used to indicate the identity of the Balinese people who uphold Balinese character, ethics, world views, traditions, customs and culture. So, Balian covers all the markers or characteristics of Balinese identity. There are several characteristics of this Balian, namely those who are supporters of Balinese culture, or those who actively follow and are involved in Balinese cultural traditions. Because Balinese culture is imbued with Hinduism, Balian is also related to the existence of Balinese Hinduism. The loss of invulnerability means the absence of characteristics inherent in the Balu people themselves. Picard (2020), explains that the awareness of the Balinese, or the Balinese as a single entity, emerged during the colonial era when the Balinese began to receive western education and the birth of Balinese intellectuals. They began to speak Malay and published periodicals in Malay. It was through this publication that the Balinese first presented themselves as a single entity, namely the Balinese nation. The Balinese understand their identity by what is called kebalian. This invulnerability is based on religion and custom.). The emergence of the Balian discourse in the 1980s among the Balinese educated middle class was caused by several socio-cultural changes that occurred in Bali amid the rapid development of tourism. Changes in the geographical landscape of Bali due to tourism development in the New Order era, demographic changes due to the explosion of the immigrant population, as well as the increasing flow of capital from outsiders in Bali, have built the awareness of the Balinese, especially the educated middle class, to question their position as Balinese amidst the investment boom. tourist. In addition, according to Wardana (2019), the impact of the development of the tourism industry in Bali has affected the social and environmental conditions of contemporary Bali. In reality, the Balinese did not fully play the role of the subject of the development, on the contrary, large investments in Bali were owned and controlled by the elites of Jakarta (Picard & Madinier, 2011; Ramstedt & Ramstedt, 2005; Suryawan, 2005).

This condition gave birth to anxiety that Balinese people cannot be masters in their own homes, because economic spaces are controlled by outside investors. In addition, it is feared that the influence of modern culture through tourism will destroy Balinese cultural identity and cause the Balinese to be uprooted from their Balinese cultural roots. This is marked by the increasingly weak role of traditional institutions in managing the life of the

Balinese people. Contact with the outside world through technological developments has led to the emergence of new symptoms among Balinese people, such as giving their children names with foreign terms. In addition, cultural tourism which has been previously designed as an effective strategy in responding to the negative impacts of tourism development, turns out to be transformed into cultural tourism in practice. This series of problems gave rise to discourses that have a political tone of identity (Balinese invulnerability) among the educated class in Bali.

It can be said that the discourse of *kebalian* is an expression of the critical awareness of the Balinese educated class when looking at Bali's objective conditions in the dynamics of tourism development. Through critical awareness, they try to question the position of the Balinese in the midst of the boom in tourism investment. They—the educated Balinese—are also worried that the various social, political, economic and cultural changes that are taking place in Bali will have an impact on an identity crisis and the destruction of Balinese culture so that it raises the discourse that the Balinese are increasingly losing their intellect (Sujana, 1989).

#### *Discourse and the Steady Bali Movement*

The Ajeg Bali discourse was launched at the opening of Bali TV in May 2002, when Bali Governor I Dewa Made Beratha urged his listeners to respect Balinese customs and culture. Ajeg Bali comes from the usual Balinese language which means sturdy, upright, tough, eternal, firm, strong and stable. Tracing the thoughts contained in the Ajeg Bali discourse, despite the shock of a powerful bomb explosion, Balinese culture remains authoritative, unshakable, standing upright, firm and firm (Santikarma, in Rozi et al., 2021). The Ajeg Bali discourse arose after Bali experienced various development problems as a risk of opening up the tourism industry. The response to development issues and the emergence of the Ajeg Bali discourse also attracted the attention of a number of Balinese educated middle classes who were facilitated by the Bali Post media to reformulate Balinese culture which was parallel to the Ajeg Bali discourse.

This discourse arose after Bali experienced various development problems as a risk of opening up the tourism industry. However, since the Bali bombing, there has been a change in the orientation of the Ajeg Bali discourse. Originally the Ajeg Bali discourse was a response to developmentism, urbanism, tourism industrialism, shifting to ethnic and religious sensibilities. Through the Bali Post media, a discourse was formed, or more precisely, a determination to protect Bali from newcomers who undermined Bali's security. Ajeg Bali's discourse has also transformed into a discourse on identity politics with sentimental overtones towards ethnicity and religion. Various movements with ethnic and religious undertones have also been recorded, such as sweeping actions against newcomers, ethnic discrimination, and the Ajeg Bali economic movement which carries ethnic and religious attributes (Suryawan, 2012; Triguna, 1997; Mantra et al., 1995).

#### *Script Formalization, Balinese Language and Traditional Dress Politics*

Apart from the Ajeg Bali discourse, other identity political discourses and movements can be seen from the emergence of policies on the formalization of the Balinese language, the use of Balinese traditional clothing and Balinese family planning (KB). The policy of formalizing the Balinese language as a marker of identity was carried out as a response to the increasing threat to the Balinese language by the national language and foreign languages. This is a risk of Bali being integrated into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the growing tourism industry which brings with it the influence of modern culture. Apart from that, there were also predictions that the Balinese language would die and be replaced by Indonesian. This situation gave birth to a concern and even anxiety among educated Balinese that the Balinese language and Balinese script are threatened with extinction.

Movement in an effort to preserve the Balinese language and script as a form of political identity for the Hindu community in Bali was realized through the issuance of Bali Governor Regulation Number 80 of 2018 concerning the Protection and Use of Balinese Language, Script and Literature and the Implementation of the Balinese Language Month. This Pergub can be said as a form of identity politics in an effort to preserve and protect the regional language as a marker of regional identity. If previously the Balinese language was not used in formal spaces and the domination of the national language including foreign languages was quite strong, since the issuance of the Governor's Regulation Balinese began to be used in formal spaces although it is still limited.

In addition, Balinese is also used in information services to the public, including in vital areas such as Ngurah Rai airport. Not only in the context of language, efforts to position Balinese script among languages and Latin letters are also an important part to formulate. Through Governor Regulation (hereinafter abbreviated as Pergub) Bali No. 80 of 2018, especially in article 6, there is an obligation to write Balinese script in writing good names for places of worship for Hindus, traditional institutions, building inauguration inscriptions, government agencies, private

institutions, roads, tourism facilities and other public facilities. Balinese script can also be used in writing places of worship for other religions. Interestingly, the Governor Regulation also regulates the positioning of Balinese script between Latin letters. Balinese script is placed above Latin letters in writing names. This positioning arrangement shows that there is an effort to position regional identity higher than national identity. You could say this is part of the "politics of recognition" Calhoun (1994) because recognition is an important prerequisite for the existence of identity groups. This recognition comes from both the state and other identity groups.

The form of identity politics movement through government power is also manifested by the emergence of regulations that require the use of regional identities such as Balinese traditional clothing. In addition to the Balinese language as a marker of regional identity, Balinese traditional clothing is also considered as one of the cultural identities of the Balinese region which seeks to be protected and preserved. The issuance of Governor Regulation Number 79 of 2018 regarding Days for Wearing Traditional Balinese Clothing shows that there has been a structured and systematic effort by the government to make it mandatory to wear Balinese traditional clothing, as part of identity politics to maintain regional cultural identity, both in government agencies and private institutions. The use of Balinese traditional clothing is a form of maintaining local culture in the midst of global culture on a broad scale. The policy of using Balinese traditional clothing is also a form of positioning (positioning) regional culture in the midst of global cultural developments brought by the tourism industry.

### *Krama Bali Family Planning*

Not ending with the rules for wearing Balinese traditional clothing, the movement with nuances of identity politics through government policy can also be seen from the issuance of the Bali Governor's Instruction Number 1545 of 2019 concerning the Socialization of the Krama Bali Family Planning Program (KB). This term is used to classify Balinese people. There are traditional village krama, Hindus who are Milpil and are registered as members of the local Traditional Village, there are also tamiu krama who are called migrants. The issuance of this instruction is not without reason, but departs from data from the Bali Central Statistics Agency which shows that in just one decade Hindus in Bali have decreased by more than 9 percent. In 1971 it reached 93.29 percent of the number of Hindus, in 2010 only 83.46 percent remained. The decline in the number of Hindus is inversely proportional to the number of immigrants—particularly Muslims—in Bali whose number has actually increased.

The decline in the number of Hindu population in Bali is considered to be correlated with the increasingly threatened tradition, culture and religion of Balinese Hinduism. Because Balinese Hindus are supporters of Balian itself, the extinction of the Balinese Hindu population marks the extinction of Balinese Hindu traditions, culture and religion. This syllogism that was built resulted in a movement with nuances of identity politics, namely the issuance of an instruction by the Governor of Bali to implement the Bali Family Planning as a counter movement in response to the Central Government's version of the Family Planning campaign. If the KB campaigned by the central government is only two children, then the Bali KB is campaigned for the Balinese to have four children to save the "komang" and "ketut" generations who are considered increasingly extinct.

Since the emergence of the Bali KB movement, the Bali regional government has stopped the campaign for family planning for two children—even the Governor of Bali, I Wayan Koster, instructed the District/City Government to participate in stopping the National Family Planning and socializing the Bali Family Planning. The Bali Governor's Instruction is a respect for the reproductive rights of Balinese krama (citizens) which are based on local wisdom that has been passed down from generation to generation. This is in line with the program of the Governor of Bali I Wayan Koster which concentrates on three basic elements namely humans, nature and Balinese culture.

### *Dresta Bali Hindu Movement*

The latest discourse and movement of identity politics in Bali is the emergence of the Dresta Bali Hindu discourse and movement. The polemic between the Hare Krisna and Balinese Hindu Sampradaya groups in the mid-2020s resulted in a construction of religious identity that seeks to reaffirm ethnic affiliation and the plurality of local traditions, namely the Hindu Dresta Bali. *Sampradaya* is the term used to refer to spiritual schools in southern India as part of various developing sects. In Sanskrit, *Sampradaya* comes from the word "samprada" which means gift, gift, gift and inheritance through tradition. However, in Indonesia the term *Sampradaya* has expanded in meaning and tends to be used to denote a new spiritual school from India that is different from the traditions, culture and religious system of Hindus in Bali. One of them is Hare Krishna (HK) or known as the International Society for Conciousness (ISKCON) (Widiana, 2022; Paramita, 2021). The emergence of the term Dresta Bali in 2020 began with the turmoil of *Sampradaya* and Balinese Hinduism until the issuance of a joint decree between PHDI Bali and

the Traditional Village Council Number: 106/PHDI-Bali/XII/2020 and Number: 07/SK/MDA-Prov Bali/XII /2020. This decree states the Restrictions on the Development of Non-Dresta Bali Sampradaya Teaching Activities. Resistance to non Dresta Bali Sampradaya groups gave birth to the term Hindu Dresta Bali. If Sampradaya non Dresta Bali is defined as understanding, teaching, and ritual practice whose management is not in accordance with customs, traditions, art, and local culture and wisdom, Hindu Dresta Bali is the opposite, namely Hindu understanding or teachings that are in accordance with customs, traditions, art, , Balinese culture and local wisdom.

This differentiation of religious identity was made to distinguish between Balinese Hinduism with local characteristics and neo-Hinduism movements or trans-national religious ideologies. Although conceptually this terminology is still vague, the term is used in an effort to distinguish between the local Balinese variant of Hinduism and Indian neo-Hinduism movements such as Sampradaya. This assertion was made as an effort to position religious identity as well as resistance when its position began to be considered threatened by other religious identities. Based on these forms of identity politics, researchers can theoretically construct the formation of identity politics that occurred from the New Order to contemporary Bali, namely First, identity politics in the form of Balian discourse and then metamorphosed into Ajeg Bali is a manifestation of project identity [Castells \(2010\)](#), namely the identity political movement formed through the power of social and intellectual actors, including media capitalism to build awareness of the identity of the Balinese people in an effort to redefine their position in facing the threat of an identity crisis due to the tourism industry, modernization and globalization. This identity as a project—in the context of Bali—has a tendency to be imaginary, ongoing, anti-climactic and stuck in local political agendas.

Second, the movement to use Balinese script and language, as well as traditional Balinese clothing, Balinese family planning can be said to be a manifestation of legitimizing identity, namely an identity marker used by the state (Balinese regional government) in rationalizing its actions. Here there is an attempt to use the government's political power and instruments in making regulations to protect and legitimize regional identities that are considered to be threatened. Third, forms of identity politics such as the Hindu Dresta Bali which have emerged since the 2020s as a manifestation of resistance identity, namely identity formed as resistance to other identities. These three models of identity politics are part of empowering identity, namely efforts to empower identities that have been built through dialogue and construction for positioning. Positioning here is understood as the way society or social groups position or define themselves among external challenges. Discourses and identity movements surfaced in the efforts of Balinese people to build positioning when dealing with situations of anomie both caused by the influx of foreign cultural influences, modernity and capital (such as the Ajeg Bali Balinese discourse, language politics and Balinese traditional clothing) as well as the influx of ideology and religious understanding such as Islamism, Sampradaya, etc. that make it necessary to take and determine a position.

## Conclusion

This research finds facts about identity politics in Hindu society in Bali. First, identity politics in Balinese society cannot be separated from various kinds of empirical conditions that occur in Bali, such as the entry of modernity and the tourism industry which causes the Balinese to be uprooted from their cultural roots, the increasing number of immigrants, and economic spaces that are starting to be taken over by comer. Discourses and movements of identity politics in Balinese society involve local political actors and intellectuals marked by the emergence of the discourse of *kebalian*, *bali merdeka*, *Ajeg Bali*, to legitimize local identity, and the emergence of the Dresta Bali Hindu discourse and movement. Identity political discourses and movements are vulnerable to social and cultural dynamics. A series of discourses and identity political movements generate discourse contestation and even horizontal social conflict. Several factual implications of discourse and identity political movements are identity crystallization, social dynamics, cultural hybridization and identity instrumentalization.

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