

Pancasila and Rukun Negara: A Relation of Identity, State, and Nationalism in Indonesia and Malaysia

Arik Dwijayanto

Institut Agama Islam Sunan Giri (INSURI), Ponorogo
muharrik@insuriponorogo.ac.id

Dawam M. Rohmatulloh

Utrecht University, the Netherlands
d.m.rohmatulloh@uu.nl

Abstract

This article will elaborate on Indonesia's Pancasila and Malaysia's Rukun Negara, the state base for both neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. Concerning the relation between identity, State, and nationalism through a literature study approach, this article found that the socio-historical setting of the birth of Pancasila and Rukun Negara influences the process of identity formation and the spirit of nationalism in both countries. Besides, the success of the two ideologies of the State in shaping the identity and spirit of nationalism is supported by the representation of structural and cultural elites. Furthermore, the manifestation of Pancasila and Rukun Negara is done in various fields to become the way of life of Indonesian and Malaysian society, which finally become the amplifier of awareness in shaping nationalism identity and spirit of nationalism in both countries. Finally, taking into account a wide range of issues to be faced by both countries, this article suggests that Pancasila and Rukun Negara can eventually become a national identity and a spirit in shaping the nationalism of citizens in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Keywords: pancasila, rukun negara, identity, nationalism, indonesia, malaysia

Introduction

Indonesia and Malaysia are the right images of diversity where ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity might be united in ideal form. This diversity inevitably shows that no single community group ignored its political existence. Diversity does not mean that all become mixed and lose their identity. The diversity of Indonesian and Malaysian countries allows and should require that each community group can maintain its own identity while at the same time being able to coexist harmoniously with other groups of people. Their commitment to building a social, political, and cultural coexistence peacefully and respectfully as a compatriot is highly recognizable.¹

In Indonesia, diversity eventually becomes the materialist cause of the birth of the state base (Pancasila). Not only the official birth of Pancasila in 1945 is placed as the foundation of the state philosophy but also as a nation ideology format that functions to maintain balance and ensure diversity. Pancasila is not an ordinary ideology but a consensual ideology in which the nation's founders constructed from the archipelago's living value. That is why Pancasila is an ideological construction that became the meeting point for all political groups at that time. All political groups contribute to upholding the nation's ideology.²

Pancasila, in its development, can shape the identity and nationalism of Indonesian society amid the threat of separatism and contestation of a state ideology that became polemic since the beginning of independence. The benefits of Pancasila make it a big umbrella or protector of the diversity of Indonesian identity. Without diminishing the identity of origin (tribe, religion, and race) that is already inherent in every citizen, Pancasila strengthens it like glue and part of the national identity. Pancasila as the national identity is certainly not present in an instant process but through a long process with all the debates. There are even efforts of some groups who intend to replace it with other ideologies.

Likewise, in Malaysia, *Rukun Negara* is formulated by agreement in the Majlis Gerakan Negara (MAGERAN) after referring to Pancasila's ideology. Like Pancasila, Rukun Negara is all Malaysians' ideology and identity binding with ethnic, racial, and religious diversity. Rukun Negara is present as an effort to strengthen the integration and bring citizen nationalism to the State. Besides Rukun Negara, *Dasar Ekonomi Baru* (New Economic Base) was also produced as a policy to promote the economy of the Malaysian people and build the stability of the country.

Therefore, from the brief explanation above, this article will elaborate on Pancasila and Rukun Negara, especially the relation between identity, State, and

¹ Hasyim Muzadi, "Keindonesiaan Dan Keberagaman: Merumuskan Kembali Konsep Pembangunan Politik Bangsa," in *Reaktualisasi Pancasila: Menyoal Identitas, Globalisasi Dan Diskursus Negara-Bangsa*, ed. Akhmad Taufiq (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2015).

² Hariyono, *Ideologi Pancasila: Roh Progresif Nasionalisme Indonesia* (Malang: Intrans Publishing, 2014).

nationalism in Indonesia and Malaysia. The State becomes an essential buffer in the formation of identity (nation-building) and nationalism of every citizen through the foundation of the State without facing the concern on the sense of belonging to the country. This article also sees the durability and continuity of existing support systems in Pancasila and Rukun Negara with all its dynamics to strengthen the nationalist identity and spirit of nationalism in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Genealogy of Pancasila and Rukun Negara as National Identity

Since its forming years, Indonesia experienced heated debates on its ideological foundation long before proclaiming the independence in 1945. During the meetings of the independence preparation committee (*Dokuritsu Junbi Cosakai/The Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence*) between May 28 and July 17, 1945, two large groups were arguing for their fundamental differences of opinion regarding what *weltanschauung* would be the constitution of the state.³ The larger group was a secular nationalist group that wanted to base the state ideology not on a particular religion, even though the spokespersons of this group are also religious figures, adhering to Islam, Christianity, and others. Among the leaders of this group was Sukarno, who later became the proclaimer of Indonesian independence. The smaller group consisted of Muslim nationalist groups who aspire to Islam to be the state's spirit, represented among others by Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo.

On June 1, 1945, Sukarno persuasively delivered his idea on the state philosophical principle, which he called Pancasila (Five Pillars). Sukarno's Pancasila consists of nationalism, internationalism-humanitarianism, representative government, social justice, and belief in God.⁴ The monumental speech itself remarked the day as the birthday of Pancasila (Hari Lahirnya Pancasila). As the committee accepted it as the foundation of the state, there were still debates regarding one of the five principles of the Pancasila, especially relating to the belief principle.⁵ The dispute eventually made its breakthrough through what so-called a compromise solution in the form of the Jakarta Charter.⁶ One of the crucial points in the charter is the Pancasila draft mentioning the first principle namely "*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in One Supreme Being)" supplemented by seven words "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi*

³ Muhammad Latif Fauzi, "Konsep Negara Dalam Perspektif Piagam Madinah Dan Piagam Jakarta," *Al-Mawarid Journal of Islamic Law* 13 (2005): 26029.

⁴ Justus M. Van der Kroef, "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," *Asian Survey*, 1962, 24-30.

⁵ Bernard Dahm, *Soekarno Dan Perjuangan Kemerdekaan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987).

⁶ Michael S. Densmoor, "The Control and Management of Religion in Post-Independence, Pancasila Indonesia" (MA Thesis, Washington D.C., Georgetown University, 2013).

pemeluknya (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow sharia or Islamic law)". Since Panitia Sembilan (nine committee members charged to formulate the meeting draft) signed the charter on June 22, until the proclamation day on August 17, 1945, its existence can accommodate the aspirations of Muslim nationalist groups who were indeed fighting for Islamic sharia.

Nevertheless, the charter did not go further undisputed as a Christian minority group from Eastern Indonesia, disagreeing with the charter, would not join the Republic of Indonesia and preferably form their own country. Sukarno, Hatta, and Soebardjo, three commission members, therefore proposed to erase the seven words.⁷ The issue remains on a dispute in the relationship of religion and state in Indonesia, up to now.

Despite the political intrigues in composing the foundation of the state, Indonesia, a country with almost 90 percent of the population being Muslim, still able to accommodate all religions with equal treatment. By respecting Pancasila's values, the life of the Indonesian plural society might create a harmonious atmosphere. Although there are reports of religious discrimination, both vertically by the government against minorities and horizontally in the community, this misconduct, still, outrages the law.

As a means that able to unite the life of the nation consisting of various religions and tribes, the very existence of Pancasila becomes pivotal. Promoted by its teaching "discoverer", Sukarno, as filosofische grondslag to form the *nationaal staat*,⁸ it was also adopted by many groups. Like the New Order government, who used the terminology of Pancasila Democracy and regulated Pancasila as the sole principal in public life.⁹ The existence of Pancasila, which is so vital for the Indonesian people, is seen by scholars as a phenomenon of public or civil religion,¹⁰ in short, Pancasila is an umbrella for cultural harmony in Indonesia.¹¹ Such a harmonious situation could be seen in Indonesia, where religious aspects enter the state domain. There are also aspects of the state that are included in or require religious legitimacy. Therefore, we can say that Indonesia is neither a

⁷ Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (1945-1959)* (Gema Insani, 1997).

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 8 (1981): 838-51.

¹⁰ Susan S. Purdy, "The Civil Religion Thesis as It Applies to a Pluralistic Society: Pancasila Democracy in Indonesia (1945-1965)," *Journal of International Affairs*, 1982, 307-16; Karel A. Steenbrink, "The Pancasila Ideology and an Indonesian Muslim Theology of Religions," in *Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey*, ed. Jacques Waardenburg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 280-96.

¹¹ Robert M. Fitch and Sheila Anne Webb, "Cultural Immersion in Indonesia through Pancasila: State Ideology," *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET)/Revue de La Pensée Educative*, 1989, 44-51.

religious state nor a secular state. Ichwan,¹² citing Abdurrahman Wahid (2001), pointed out that the situation constitutes mild secularism. Unlike Casanova's elements of secularism, in Pancasila state, and consequently, any aspects of life in Indonesia, there has always been some degree of religiousness present.

At the grassroots level, even though there was a noticeable process of political secularization by the Soeharto administration,¹³ the lay community seemed to have not experienced it. Religious people, especially Muslims, continued to have a religious orientation and habituated the youth and children according to Islam's teachings. In addition to the fact that the Muslims widely respected Pancasila as not a secular one,¹⁴ even though it was utilized as a depoliticization means, the government was not going to make it real such practice of Turkey's secularization. When it went to the political field, the government even issued such policies that accommodate some aspirations of Muslims, such as Law No. 2 of 1989 on National Education System that accommodates religious education, Law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court, and Law No. 7 of 1991¹⁵ facilitating sharia banking systems, as quoted by Nurcholis Madjid.¹⁶

The end of the New Order regime and the emergence of the Reform Era in 1998, which supported freedom and democracy, served as a momentum for Islamic leaders to promote Islam's politics by establishing Islamic parties or mass-based organizations. The most noticeable newborn groups are the Justice Party (currently the Prosperous Justice Party) and the Islamic Defender Front, who openly demand a more Islamic constitution of Indonesia. In the early years of the reform era, disputes emerged, mostly from smaller Islamic groups, that proposed the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, including the spirit of the Jakarta Charter or the implementation of Islamic sharia in the constitution. However, the proposal was not acceptable to the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) as well as to the Muslim society representatives such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah; both are the largest Muslim-based mass organization in Indonesia that existed long before the independence.¹⁷ Generally speaking, most Indonesian Muslims already support political modernization and democratization by adopting Pancasila as a refusal of

¹² Moch Nur Ichwan, "Secularism, Islam and Pancasila: Political Debates on the Basis of the State in Indonesia," *Bulletin of the Nanzan Center for Asia-Pacific Studies* 6 (2011): 1-43.

¹³ Densmoor, "The Control and Management of Religion in Post-Independence, Pancasila Indonesia."

¹⁴ Ichwan, "Secularism, Islam and Pancasila."

¹⁵ Nurcholish Madjid, "Agama Dan Negara Dalam Islam," *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah*. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994, 588-94.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Nur Ichwan, "The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia," SOIAS Research Paper Series Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Sophia University, 2012).

discrimination-based politics and religious understanding, and only an insignificant number still rejects it. Pancasila, surviving those series of disputes, and the so-called mistreatment of Pancasila during the New Order Era, is still functioning as the state basis of Indonesia.

Nevertheless, not unpredicted that Pancasila's existence and the debate on the position of religion within the state remain problematic. The latest development on this issue, especially in current President Jokowi's administration (starting from 2014), was the enactment of BPIP (Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila/Counseling Body on Pancasila as Ideology) and the latest 2020 law concept regarding Pancasila as Ideology (Undang-Undang Haluan Ideologi Pancasila). However, people criticized those two attempts, perhaps, due to bad experience with the New Order Era in making Pancasila a means of ideological state apparatus. Even regarding Pancasila as a "national consensus" to envision the Indonesian way of life, one is still suspicious when it comes to translating and internalizing Pancasila's values through the political state authority. It was somehow different from the public responses when, for instance, so¹⁸me Islamic scholars confirm that Pancasila is following Islamic values.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the State of Malaysia's foundation known as 'Rukun Negara' has historically been formulated to guard the harmony of society in Malaysia to stop being trapped in ethnic conflicts, as ever happened on May 13, 1969. After Malaysia achieved independence, the first Malaysian Prime Minister faced regulating the colonial inheritance's economic system, which causes the economic gap between the upper and lower classes to widen. The extreme gap between urban luxury and poverty in the village, especially the luxury shown by non-indigenous groups, became one of the roots that triggered anxiety until it reached its peak during the bloody events of May 13, 1969.²⁰

The incident came after a third election day in which the Perikatan Party failed to win a majority and has lost two-thirds of the seats in the People's Council. In the election, the People's Movement Party (GERAKAN), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Progressive Party (PPP) have won 25 seats, while PAS has 12 seats in Parliament. This victory caused the GERAKAN Party's supporters and members to convene to celebrate a victory that has symbolically offended the Malay people. This situation caused tension among Malays and also the Chinese. On May 13, UMNO also held a counter convoy, resulting in riots between the two

¹⁸ Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 5 (2004): 669-90.

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz and Azman Nordin Muhamed Nor, "Pemikiran Pembangunan Perdana Menteri Malaysia," in *Seminar Paper on Regional Seminar on Humanities 2009 - Managing Asean's Future* (Regional Seminar on Humanities 2009 - Managing Asean's Future, Perak, Malaysia: Anjuran Universiti Teknologi Petronas, 2009).

sides. The issue is the culmination of Malaysian society's discontent that began due to the colonial government, which prioritized certain groups' interests.²¹

Yang Dipertuan Agong, the head of State of Malaysia, finally announced the emergency on May 16, 1969, causing Parliament to be disabled, and the *Majlis Gerakan Negara* (MAGERAN) was formed to run an emergency government where Tun Abdul Razak was inaugurated as MAGERAN executor under the 22-month Emergency Order. Parliament as a People's Representative Council, re-activated its function on September 22, 1970. Through MAGERAN formed the *Majlis Barber States* responsible for formulating the national ideology of Rukun Negara, which became the state philosophy to realize a stable nation-state. The Rukun Negara was officially established on August 31, 1970, by Yang Dipertuan Agong Malaysia.²²

These two fundamentals of the State genealogically have several similarities, among which are born after a conflict situation. If Pancasila was born with an external upheaval between the people and the invaders, the Rukun Negara was formulated after the internal conflict between the Malays and the Chinese in 1969. This affected the dynamics of the State's two necessary foundations in surviving as the state ideology and evolving into a national identity capable of giving birth and shaping nationalism's spirit. The durability of Pancasila and Rukun Negara is tested with various issues that reinforce the existence of both as the basis of a state that managed to survive and move to various fields so that the way of life of the people in the State.

Dynamics of Pancasila and Rukun Negara: Durability and Continuity

In Indonesia, the nation's journey to interpret and run Pancasila began from the Old Order as a state ideology formation period. The Old Order has achieved national identity and unified the Indonesian nation. However, the Old Order also provides an opportunity to blur that identity (Maful, 2010: 76). Pancasila during the Old Order was interpreted in a paradigmatic framework that developed when the world situation was overwhelmed by sharp ideological conflict. At that time, domestic political and security conditions were also overwhelmed by uncertainty and socio-cultural conditions residing in the transitional atmosphere of colonized peoples into an independent society. The old order period is the search period for the implementation of Pancasila, especially in the state system. Pancasila is implemented in different forms during the Old Order, reflected in several periods: 1945-1950, 1950-1959, and 1959-1965 (Anshori, 2015: 6).

In 1945-1950, Pancasila was faced with a severe problem with the emergence of efforts to replace Pancasila as the State's basis. At this time, Pancasila

²¹ Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz, *Rukun Negara Dalam Memperkukuhkan Ketahanan Negara* (Institute of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's Thoughts, Universiti Utara Malaysia, 2010).

²² Ibid

was at the center between the two ideological opposites. On the one hand, Pancasila is about to be shifted by communist ideology intensified by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) since its rebellion in 1948 in Madiun. On the other hand, Pancasila wants to be replaced by religious ideology by the DI / TII movement desiring to establish an Islamic State.²³

From 1950 to 1959, Pancasila's application was directed as a liberal ideology that could not guarantee the government's stability. Although the foundation of the State remains Pancasila, the formulation of the fourth precepts does not entail consensus deliberation, but the majority vote in the voting. The peak of this period was when President Soekarno, on July 5, 1959, issued a Presidential Decree containing the constituency's dissolution by establishing the re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution and the non-implementation the 1950 Constitution, as well as the formation of MPRS and DPAS. One of the essential considerations of the issuance of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, was the failure of the constituents to carry out their duties. At this time, Soekarno used a guided democracy system. Sukarno's action issued a Decree on July 5, 1959, was questioned its legitimacy from a constitutional juridical standpoint, because according to UUDS 1950, the President is not authorized to "enforce" or "not enact" a Constitution, as is done by decrees (Maful, 2010: 77).

The period of 1959-1965 is known as guided democracy, where the highest leadership is in the President's power. So there are various irregularities of interpretation of Pancasila in the constitution. As a result, President Soekarno became authoritarian, appointed himself as a president for life, gave birth to contentious international politics, and incorporated Nationalists, Religious and Communists (NASAKOM) that did not fit the values of Pancasila. In implementing Pancasila, President Soekarno implements the understanding of Pancasila with a paradigm called USDEK. To direct the nation's journey, he stressed the importance of upholding the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian-style Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and National Personality. But the result was a coup of the PKI and the economic condition of concern. Furthermore, the revolutionary war from 1960-1965, which is also a prologue of the Gestapu / PKI rebellion, has provided political lessons that are valuable even to be paid at a high cost (Muhdi, 2011: 118).²⁴

Meanwhile, during the New Order government, Pancasila was used as a criticism of the Old Order, which was considered to deviate from Pancasila's values. The P4 program (Guidance of Pancasila Understanding and Actuating) was established. The New Order succeeded in defending Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the State and succeeding in removing communist ideology in

²³ Ali Muhdi, *Merevitalisasi Pendidikan Pancasila Sebagai Pemandu Reformasi* (Surabaya: IAIN Surabaya Press, 2011).

²⁴ Ibid.

Indonesia. However, the implementation of Pancasila in this era is controversial. Several years later, the policies issued were not following the soul of Pancasila. Pancasila is interpreted according to the interests of governmental power and is closed to other interpretations. Pancasila used it as a tool to perpetuate his power. There are several methods used in Pancasila indoctrination, firstly, through P4 teaching conducted in schools through briefing or seminars. Secondly, the sole principle where the people are allowed to form organizations as long as it is based only on Pancasila. Thirdly, stabilization by issuing a prohibition on criticisms can bring down the government because President Soeharto thought that criticism of the government causes instability within the State. And to stabilize it, President Soeharto using military force so that no one dared to criticize the government. President Soeharto implemented centralized democracy or government-centered democracy.²⁵

President Soeharto also reinforced Pancasila's practice by issuing Presidential Instruction (Inpres) no. 12 of 1968, dated April 13, 1968. This instruction provides confirmation of the official Pancasila sequence or formulation, which should be used in daily writing, reading, and pronunciation.²⁶ Besides, the President also controls the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions so that the rules made must be following his agreement. The President also undermines aspects of democracy, especially the press, because it is considered to endanger his power. So, President Soeharto set up the Ministry of Information and censorship board on a large scale so that any news published in the media does not fall on the government. His other misconduct is corruption, collusion, and nepotism, where many state officials are corrupt. At this time, the Indonesian State also experienced a monetary crisis caused by the State's unstable finances and the massive amount of debt to foreign parties. Democratization ultimately did not work, and human rights violations were ubiquitous by the government or state apparatus.²⁷

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, the Rukun Negara was defined as the state ideology in 1970 when the government was run by the *Majlis Gerakan Negara* (MAGERAN). One of the first steps to implement the Rukun Negara was when in 1970, the Malaysian government provided "commissioned research and consultancy" on particular themes to experts and researchers from abroad. One of these was given to the Harvard University Development Advisory Service to conduct "Social Science Research for National Unity." The findings of the experts and researchers then recommended to the Malaysian government to introduce social science disciplines at the *Universiti Malaya*, *Universiti Sains*, and *Universiti*

²⁵ Heru Santoso, *Sari Pendidikan Pancasila* (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2010).

²⁶ Jimly Asshiddiqie, "Membudayakan Nilai-Nilai Pancasila Dan Kaedah-Kaedah Undang-Undang Dasar Negara RI Tahun 1945," *Prosiding Kongres Pancasila III*, 2011, 129-58.

²⁷ Santoso, *Sari Pendidikan Pancasila*.

Kebangsaan (at that time Malaysia had only three universities) as well as provide human resource training in the field of social sciences, to contribute positive and concrete steps in realizing the unity of plural Malaysian citizens as endeavors to anticipate the reoccurrence of the May 13, 1969 riot (Embong, 2010: 20, Aziz, 2010: 447).²⁸

Therefore, the Rukun Negara formulated at that time is to overcome all the differences in plural Malaysian society. The elements in the Rukun Negara do not show the property rights of a particular people or ethnicity. This is to build a vast circle that can ultimately regulate, control, and direct citizens' character characterized by Malaysian customs and traditions.²⁹

Five Rukun Negara principles embodied as state ideologies have been formed based on Malaysian society's social conditions with ethnic, racial, and religious diversity. The principles established in the Rukun Negara aim primarily to reinforce ethnic unity. According to Tun Abdul Razak, the secret of Rukun Negara's perfection is in its practice. Without practice, Rukun Negara will be a mere document without meaning. As for Tun Abdul Razak, it is essential that every Malaysian people understand the Rukun Negara and fully practiced with all the wisdom contained therein so that the Rukun Negara becomes the blood and the flesh of Malays.³⁰

As part of the Rukun Negara practice to be accepted by the people, the Malaysian government established the Majlis Perpaduan Negara and incorporated the elements of the Rukun Negara within and outside the government institutions. These elements of Rukun Negara have also been included in the education curriculum. This is to realize the blend among the plural people in Malaysia. As Tun Abdul Razak's statement that the responsibility to practice the Rukun Negara is for students in schools and adults, organizational leaders, teachers, and another laity also have the same responsibility to understand and practice the principles of the State.³¹

Among the steps taken by the Jabatan Perpaduan Rakyat (People's Integrity Office) under the Prime Minister is establishing the Rukun Negara club at the school level and the Rukun Negara secretariat at the university student level aimed at reviving the Rukun Negara among the younger generation. Also, during the reign of Dato 'Seri Mohd Najib Razak has introduced a concept known as the slogan "Satu Malaysia (1 Malaysia)" which brings aspirations to establish inter-ethnic fraternal relations and ensure all Malaysians can forge closer ties as contained in the principle of the State. Therefore, any group with any background needs to believe that they are a Malaysian nation where everything needs to be

²⁸ Abdul Aziz, *Rukun Negara Dalam Memperkukuhkan Ketahanan Negara*.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

enjoyed together. With the concept of Malaysia 1, no community or group is expected to be marginalized from enjoying the country's development (Aziz, 2010: 454).³²

Nevertheless, the concept of Satu Malaysia, which is a manifestation of the State's values and has produced many programs in various fields, especially the economy, ultimately draws sharp criticism from the government's opposition line with the use of the budget. This also resulted in a change of reign power, which was the first time in Malaysia's political history where the Barisan Nasional coalition led by Dato' Seri Mohd Najib Razak was defeated by Pakatan Harapan led by Tun Mahathir and Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim. How the practice of the State of affairs in various policy sectors during the current Prime Minister Tun Mahathir's administration period, of course, cannot yet be seen thoroughly, but a better chance in internalizing the values of the Rukun Negara will be the hope and support of the Malaysian people in his leadership.

Conclusion

With a wide range of issues to be faced behind it, Pancasila and Rukun Negara can eventually become a national identity and a spirit in shaping the nationalism of citizens in Indonesia and Malaysia. Several reasons determine the success of the two necessary states' grounding in shaping citizens' nationality identity and spirit of nationalism. First, the socio-historical setting of the birth of Pancasila and Rukun Negara influences the process of identity formation and the spirit of nationalism in both countries. Second, the success of the two ideologies of the State in shaping the identity and spirit of nationalism in Indonesia is supported by the representation of structural and cultural elites. Thirdly, the manifestation of Pancasila and Rukun Negara is done in various fields to become the way of life of Indonesian and Malaysian society, which finally become the amplifier of awareness in shaping nationalism identity and spirit of nationalism in both countries.

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