HYBRID THREATS TO UKRAINE AND PUBLIC SECURITY.
The EU and Eastern Partnership experience

Analytical report

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THE EU AND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP EXPERIENCE

The analytical report analyses hybrid threats to Ukraine’s security, capabilities and weaknesses of the state to meet them, the experience of some countries of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership, which can be useful for Ukraine. The document also contains conclusions and recommendations on the development of Ukraine’s capabilities to ensure security of the society in the context of hybrid threats. The document may be interesting for representatives of the Ukrainian state authorities, the Eastern Partnership countries, international organizations, experts, civil society organizations working in the security sector.

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Under general editorship of V. Martyniuk (project manager)


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SUMMARY

The hybrid warfare of the Russian Federation puts a threat to the Ukrainian society because of its unpredictability and the use of the society as an object and, at the same time, an instrument of aggression. The centralized state mechanism of the RF, which is involved in its aggression, uses actively the weaknesses of the security system of Ukraine, which needs further improvement. A comparative analysis of Ukraine’s abilities to withstand aggression at the stage of its transition to the active phase in 2014 and at the current stage can reveal the reasons for the low effectiveness of countering hybrid threats and formulate recommendations for building state capacities to guarantee the public security. At the same time, the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the EU also became a part of the theatre of aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, and, therefore, their experience in this dimension is relevant to Ukraine.

During the preparation of this analytical report, the results of expert discussions, expert surveys and an international round-table were taken into account that allowed to work out a wide range of expert assessments and views in Ukraine and the countries of Eastern Europe and the EU, as well as promoted awareness of the Ukrainian society about the EU’s activities and European integration of Ukraine in the security sector. Among the recommendations prepared as a result of the study, it is worth to highlight the need to develop a conceptual vision of a comprehensive counteraction to hybrid threats based on the EU model, the transition to a real parliamentary republic and the establishment of a system of state governance without the influence of the oligarchs, the elimination of corruption at all levels, and the clear formulation of public policy in the public security sector. The recommendations will be useful for Ukrainian state bodies, which are responsible for the security of the state and society, as well as interesting for the consideration by certain EU institutions, in particular, the European External Action Service, the EU Delegation in Ukraine, the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine, the countries of the Eastern Partnership, scientific and expert organizations, which deal with security issues.
INTRODUCTION

The Eastern Partnership region is not stable and safe due to a number of conflicts: Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The population of the EaP countries suffers not only from hostilities in conflict zones, but also from methods of hybrid warfare. The latter also assume the use of the civil society in the process of achieving the goals set by the aggressor. Accordingly, the population needs protection from such hybrid challenges and threats that requires the development of mechanisms for their clear identification and counteraction. Therefore, one of the Eastern Partnership Initiative priorities is stability and security, which, in particular, was reflected in the Joint Working Document “Eastern Partnership — 20 Deliverables for 2020: focusing on key priorities and tangible results”, approved in December 2016. The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU also focuses on security issues, and among the aims of the political dialogue is “to strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Parties on international security and crisis management, particularly in order to address global and regional challenges and key threats”.

The war in eastern Ukraine has demonstrated that society should not only be a consumer of security, but also a participant in its preservation, and the state should strengthen its own ability to withstand new challenges and threats. Today, this ability of the Ukrainian government bodies still needs to be improved that becomes obvious after analysing the factors that led to the invasion of the Russian Federation (RF) into the Ukrainian territory, as well as the current gaps in the state security. This can be facilitated by the assessment and correction of existing shortcomings, taking into account the accumulated recommendations of Ukrainian and foreign experts, as well as the experience of the Eastern Partnership countries, which have been counteracting hybrid threats for long time, and active interaction with the EU to guarantee the public security, on which this research is focused.

The peculiarity of a war of the hybrid type is that it is camouflaged with the use of predominantly non-linear tactics and is not aimed at capturing the whole territory of a country, although it is possible to take control over certain territories, but to obtain control over state patronage, which is achieved through the influence on the population, politicians, business, and power structures. Therefore, counteraction to hybrid threats, which should be clearly identified in the state, requires attention to increasing the society resilience.

Not only the state security forces, but also almost all ministries and departments, non-governmental organizations, business, civil society are involved in combating hybrid threats. Taking into account Russia’s active use of information and propaganda tools, economic and energy tools, interference in domestic politics, stimulation of linguistic, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts, historical manipulation and other instruments of pressure on the “soft spots” of the state and society, the first
priority is the development of national immunity of resilience and an effective public oriented state administration system.

Not only the society of Ukraine, but also societies in other Eastern Partnership countries and some member states of the EU are at risk of Russian aggression. The methodology of the RF hybrid influences in these countries has similar characteristics, and, therefore, countermeasures developed in one country can be applied in other ones. Although Ukraine has the greatest experience in counteracting Russian hybrid aggression, the constant study and analysis of the situation in other countries of the Eastern Partnership and the EU is necessary because of Moscow’s attempts to use them to scale up the hybrid offensive.

Profound international cooperation for a consolidated confrontation to Russia’s hybrid aggression is extremely important, but the key reasons for its success are within the state. Therefore, efforts to develop Ukraine’s state capacity to withstand hybrid threats relate primarily to the internal dimension, which is also the focus of this research.
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1. RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE: THREATS OF A NEW (OLD) TYPE

Russia’s hybrid aggression (hybression) against Ukraine turned into an active phase in early 2014, although its subversion activities against Ukraine began to take place immediately after the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence in 1991. This view is shared by the majority (51.4%) of 37 Ukrainian experts, who participated in the survey carried out from August 18 to 28, 2017 by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” with the support of the EU and the International Renaissance Foundation. Estimates of Ukrainian experts also indicate that Russia has always worked on the weakening of Ukraine, and this activity was particularly intensified with V.Putin coming to power.

1.1. Russian hybrid threat to the security of the Ukrainian society

The initiator of the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine was V. Putin, but he should not be blamed as the only responsible for its unleashing. Except him, other personalities from Putin’s “power vertical” are involved in its preparation, in particular Vladislav Surkov (Aslanbek Dudayev), Valery Gerasimov, Alexander Dugin, head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Kirill (Vladimir Gundyayev) and some other persons from Putin’s palace guard considered as the general customer of hybression against Ukraine. In particular, the concept of the “Russian World” (Russkiy mir) was developed by a well-known Russian geopolitical revanchist, an adviser to a number of Russian leaders on geopolitical issues A. Dugin2, who formed a request for a new version of non-linear (hybrid) warfare. If initially the “Russian World” was perceived as a category of “soft power” to influence on the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, but after the Crimea annexation — as an excuse for Russian hybrid aggression.

Technological vision of the implementation of the concept of hybrid warfare belongs to the main political consultant of the Kremlin, Vladislav Surkov, who appeals to the basic 4-stroke algorithm of non-linear processes, in detail described in the analytical publication “Wars XXI: Russia’s Polyhybression” of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, that are used for hybrid technologies of warfare: 1) false-target programming (FTP) of a partner or enemy through a “co-operation model” under cover of which a program of its crypto-destruction is implemented; 2) transformation of certainty and conditions into a set of uncertainties, chaotization of cause-effect chains; 3) managing chaos through quick decisions, initiative actions and preventive

1 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf

measures towards other actors; 4) organizing chaos, re-engineering of space, deriving a new reality through synergy. Consequences of non-linear processes are often unpredictable, arbitrary, self-organized.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was engaged in military aspects of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation, where General Valery Gerasimov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff since December 2010 and Chief since November 2012, was responsible for the direction of hybrid wars. Significantly, during the military reform, the Black Sea Fleet of the RF, which main forces were based on the territory of Ukraine — in Sevastopol and Crimea, was subordinate to the Southern Military District (SOUTH), created on October 4, 2010 with the headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. This was important for the success of the campaign of sending the “little green men” to the peninsula, who were not subordinated to the fleet, which had many Ukrainian citizens in its composition, because this would determine the disclosure of the operation in the process of its preparation. Instead, the location of the headquarters in Rostov was extremely convenient from the point of view of providing operative management of combat operations in the eastern regions of Ukraine within the framework of the Novorossia Project, as well as within the framework of the possible land corridor from Donbas to Crimea through the Ukrainian Pryazovia.

The team of the co-authors of the RF hybrid warfare against Ukraine also includes the above-mentioned head of the ROC, Kirill, the Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, the former head of the administration of the Russian President Sergei Ivanov, kum (relationship between the father and godfather of a child) of Putin, leader of the pro-Putin organization “Ukrainian Choice” Viktor Medvedchuk. Already, the composition of this “authoring team” demonstrates that, although the ultimate goal is the control over the State of Ukraine, but the way to achieve it lies through the Ukrainian society and its consciousness.

In the period of rising of oil prices in the 2000s a symbiosis of post-Soviet kleptocracy and European plutocracy arose. Revenues from export of energy resources from Russia to the EU, redistributed through offshore mechanisms, largely settled in Europe in the form of bank investments, real estate and local business purchases. While the European politicians saw only profitable business in this, Putin’s regime used this as a bait to create a powerful and influential lobby, which at D-Day would play its role in helping Russia within the EU. A vivid example was the gas crisis of 2009, when Russia used the gas lever of influence, shutting off gas supplies to the EU and forcing millions of people to freeze in the winter, and a number of European politicians urged Ukraine to conclude unprofitable gas contracts with Russia.

A considerable burden on the preparation of the hybrid warfare was laid on the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation and the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs,
the organization of its compatriots abroad and on international humanitarian cooperation, better known as “Rossotrudnichestvo”. The “Russian World” machine started to work from the conglomerate of marginal pro-Russian organizations, movements, parties and blocs, under the organizational care of diplomats from the Russian Embassy in Ukraine and the Consulate General in Simferopol. In November 2016, in its resolution, the European Parliament considered “Rossotrudnichestvo” as the Kremlin’s instrument to influence citizens of the EU Member States.\(^3\)

According to experts, the Russian Federation was preparing for the occupation of the Crimean peninsula in 2015. As a result of the next presidential election “threats of coming to power in Ukraine of the Nazi president” served as the pretext to it. However, the unpredictable scenario - Euromaydan, the Revolution of Dignity, the escape of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine, forced the Russian military-political leadership to implement their expansionist plans ahead of time.

The RF set off the hybrid war against Ukraine not in April 2014 with the beginning of actions in Donbas, and not in February with the beginning of the occupation of Crimea. The beginning of the Crimean actions symbolized the use of the military component, which Moscow did not need before (although everything was prepared for the military scenario), so everything went on according to the “Anschluss Plan”. The basic elements of this plan were the de-Atlanticization and de-europeanization of the management system through institutional changes. Particularly it should be noted how, under the influence of the Kremlin agents, institutional changes in the system of power in Ukraine were introduced. With Yanukovych’s election as a President of Ukraine in 2010, key institutions, which were responsible for cooperation with NATO and the EU suffered amputation, namely - National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration under the President of Ukraine and the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. A law on principles of domestic and foreign policy was adopted, in which the “non-aligned status of Ukraine” was recorded that did not have an international legal mechanism for recognition. This allowed Russia de facto to turn Ukraine’s policy from the European and Euro-Atlantic directions to the Eurasian one, leaving only the pro-European rhetoric of Kyiv unchanged for appeasement and misleading the Ukrainian society and the leaders of the European Union.

The implementation of the Putin blitzkrieg of incorporating Ukraine into the “Russian World” through the mechanism of Eurasian integration, in fact, started

from the speech of the President of the Russian Federation on July 27, 2013 in Kyiv on the occasion of the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’ at the conference on very revealing symbolism in the title “Orthodox-Slavic Values — the foundation of Ukraine’s civilisational choice”, which was organized by the pro-Putin “Ukrainian Choice” of V.Medvedchuk.

“Semi-rigid influences”, in accordance with the Kremlin plan of hybression, as of August 14, 2013, have received new quality within the proxy phase. Russia without preliminary permission and massively began to stop Ukrainian exports to Russia, causing economic losses to Ukraine. According to the Federation of Employers of Ukraine (FEU), “Russia has actually blocked all Ukrainian imports”. The FEU noted that problems at the Ukrainian-Russian customs began in the third decade of July, which coincided with the visit of Vladimir Putin to Kyiv on July 27. According to FEU, on August 14, all Ukrainian exporters were added to the risk profile of the Russian Federal Customs Service’s risk management system without exception. The FEU considered the situation as “a complete stop of Ukrainian exports for an indefinite period of time”. It is significant that the information source about the trade blockade of Ukraine was the organization (FEU), headed by the gas oligarch D. Firtash, who played a key role in the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 and was in fact Russia’s proxy instrument in Ukraine. The alarmism of FEU’s announcement apparently was intended to provoke Ukrainian exporters to pressure the government to accept the decision to join the Customs Union.

Thus, the goal of the efforts of the Russian Federation has become obvious — to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and to involve Ukraine in the Customs Union. The essence of this scenario is to take Ukraine without a single shot, using stick and carrot policy, forcing Yanukovych regime to make a irrevocable geopolitical turn to Russia. In the summer and autumn of 2013, the mechanism of the “stick” and hard pressure was activated, which was intensified due to imposed contacts in October-November, shortly before the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. Neither Putin, nor Yanukovych took into account the Eurointegration aspirations of the Ukrainian society.

Reprogramming the “presidential control module” of the public administration system provided Putin with Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The implementation of the result expected in the Kremlin was the order

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5 Ibid.
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 905-p of November 21, 2013, which determined the suspension of the “process of preparation for the conclusion of the Association Agreement between Ukraine on the one hand and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, on the other hand”. In November-December, the “cakes” — promises of multibillion contracts for enterprises of Ukrainian military-industrial complex — were used.

The culmination of using the “cakes” was the promise of the Kremlin to provide Ukraine with 15 billion dollars of credit resources, three billion of which were provided immediately, as well as gas with a “discount for Yanukovych” for 268.5 USD per 1,000 cubic meters which was reflected in the Moscow agreements between Putin and Yanukovych on December 17, 2013. In practice, this was the ultimate surrender of Yanukovych and the success in applying false-targeted programming by the Kremlin, which led to the turning of the foreign policy vector from the European direction to the Eurasian direction and the replacement of the declarative European integration model with the basic structures of the aggressor country: “Orthodox Slavic Unity”, “Russian World”, “Custom Union”. These actions of the Kremlin proved to be generally successful. However, Euromaydan caused an unpredictable scenario and thrown out uncontrolled energy of Ukrainian society, which forced the RF to proceed to the use of a military component.

The operation of the RF Armed Forces on the occupation of the Crimean peninsula was a camouflaged military phase of the RF hybrid aggression against Ukraine. It was a pre-planned stage of engagement of the military component of the hybrid warfare in case, if after the intensive proxy phase that lasted from August 14, 2013 until February 20, 2014, it would not be possible to reach the strategic goal of taking Ukraine completely, conquering the Maydan.

The operation began on February 20, 2014, when President Yanukovych was still in Kyiv and negotiated with the opposition in presence of the international mediators — foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France, as well as the Russian President’s special representative. Meanwhile, using the right to pass sea borders without a customs checking, provided to the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian agreements of 1997, the BSF landing craft carriers with “little green men” on board entered the Sevastopol bay, and the aircrafts with special operations soldiers (Spetsnaz) of the “Vympel” detachment landed on the airfield in Kacha. At the same time, measures were taken to ensure the support of the RF aggressive actions among the local population, including sharing of propaganda and creation of local “self-defence forces” as camouflage for the Russian special operations soldiers and mercenaries. According to the Crimean expert Andriy Klymenko, information and propaganda preparation of the territory was based on direct intimidation of the population by the mythical repressions of the
“Ukrainian fascists”. In order to further misleading of the local population, as well as the international community, “referendums” on the accession of the Crimea to the Russian Federation were held under the control of Russian troops and “self-defense detachments”.

The occupation and annexation of Crimea has become rather exemplary in terms of meeting the goals of the previously elaborated plan and the sequence of its implementation. It has become a peculiar standard for performing hybression. The tried-and-tested pattern was immediately applied during the next stage of the “Russian Spring” — Novorossiya Project.

The border-line of transition of the war from a hybrid type to a conventional type is the open massive use of regular armed forces by the aggressor country. An incident of shutting down of a Russian civilian plane over the Ukrainian territory and blaming the “Kyiv junta” in it had to become a reason to turn to a classic war. Destruction of the MH17 flight of the Malaysian airlines on July 17, 2014, probably due to a mistake by the executives from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the RF Armed Forces, put a cross on the scenarios of an open war against Ukraine.

Russia was forced to continue the hybrid war, but according to the “B-scenario”, that is, when “A-scenario” of the Crimean blitzkrieg in the east and south of Ukraine failed to succeed, and “B-scenario” — the Novorossiya Project obviously began to fail: “uprising of the Russian-speaking population of the South-East of Ukraine against the fascist junta” did not take place; separatist performances in Kharkiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk were neutralized by the central authorities; expansion of the declared “DNR” and “LNR” proclaimed in the occupied territories of Donbas to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts failed; the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteer battalions localized the activity of illegal armed groups and Russian interventions within the separate regions of the two regions of Donbas. Acting on the technology of the hybrid warfare, Russia continued to argue that the RF Armed Forces were not involved in the “conflict in Ukraine” (“they are not there”), which it still goes on to do.

Russia’s actions against Ukraine, as aggression of the hybrid type, took place in a masked form - initially under the guise of formations of militias, Cossacks, volunteers, and later in the form of armed formations of puppet state formations, where, according to the legend of the Russian propaganda, local “tractorists”, “miners”, “farmers” got weapons and military equipment, hidden in mines and captured from the “Kyiv junta”. The main danger of hybrid warfare at all stages is the use of the population in the process of achieving the targets set by the aggressor through the impact of information and propaganda on their consciousness, stimulating distrust of the state and law enforcement agencies, imposing a belief that life in the aggressor country is better, compared with a victim state, and a decrease in the level of security of society as a whole.
1.2. Information sphere - a key dimension of a hybrid war

Russia started its offensive against the West on the information and propaganda front, as well as in the cyberspace. Russia began considering information-psychological and cyber operations as a kind of non-lethal weapons of mass destruction. The first Russian powerful offensive cyber operation abroad was in April 2007, directed against the member state of NATO and the EU — Estonia. A three-week systematic hacking attack on state and private sites was a retaliation action against the intentions of the authorities of Tallinn to replace the monuments of the Soviet era that caused the Kremlin’s negative reaction. They were accompanied by a powerful informational aggression against Estonia. The next polygon for working out cyber-attacks, but that time in military conditions, became Georgia during the war of 2008.

The Georgian campaign became the stimulus for Russia’s next step in expanding its offensive cyber-potential. At the end of 2009, on the order of D. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, the Centre for training specialists in the information confrontation was set up, the tasks of which, among other things, were preparation and implementation of hacker attacks on media resources and important enemy objects, work in the interests of the special services in order to obtain a wide range of unique information. At the same time, from 2007 to 2013 the process of taking the Russian media space under the control of the state was continued. Independent Russian mass media were either bought by the pro-Kremlin structures, or closed. For example, the NTV channel, which for a long time has been considered “the mouthpiece of freedom of speech”, is now a completely pro-government media.

As the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine) notes in its monograph “The World Hybrid War: The Ukrainian Forefront”, for the first time Putin tested controlled media as an information weapon in conjunction with military action during Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008. The tested information and propaganda mechanisms were later used in Ukraine: the rapid and large-scale filling of the zone of military operations by Russian journalists; attempts to monopolize control over the provision of content from the conflict zone; fake production; sending Russian cultural figures to the zone of hostilities; use of hired foreign journalists. The Kremlin drew conclusions from the failures of the information coverage of the war against Georgia and paid more attention to the possibilities and needs of the information tools. The Russia Today budget was increased from 30 to 100 million US dollars, and in recent years it has reached 250 million US dollars. In order to spread the outreach product to a foreign audience, MIA “Russia Today” was formed.

7 Ibid.
on the basis of RIA Novosti and the radio company “Voice of Russia”, with a budget of 99.7 million US dollars in 2016. Within it, “Sputnik”, a new information tool, was created with abilities to disseminate information in more than 30 languages in dozens of countries, mainly in Europe, reaching the level of a local news-maker.

In 2013, the activity of forming new secret structures under the auspices of the military department witnessed the sharp shift in the direction of offensive activity in cyberspace. In 2014, by order of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu, troops of information operations were created, as well as the cybernetic command — in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. On this occasion, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces in 2004-2008, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky noted: “Victory over the enemy in this [information] war may be much more important than victory in the classical military confrontation, because it is bloodless, and the effect is impressive, bleeds and paralyses all the authorities of the enemy state.”

In late 2015, in order to increase the effectiveness of the information war against Ukraine, the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation established a Centre for Information Confrontation (CIP) in Novocherkassk as part of the Centre of Territorial Forces of the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation. Under its administration, a powerful software and hardware complex was delivered to Donetsk with the aim to distribute cyber-attacks (DDoS-attacks).

The RF informational propaganda work against Ukraine was directed at the pro-Russian-oriented population of the industrial regions of Ukraine with a concentration on the target groups of civil servants, intellectual elites, and elderly people. Russia’s activity in social networks (first of all, the most popular in the post-Soviet space “Odnoklassniki” and “VKontakte”), where pro-Russian messages were distributed, was dynamic.

The Russian Federation continues to carry out special information operations throughout Ukraine, using the most diverse channels, including non-reserved media resources and social networks. The main efforts of the Kremlin are aimed at discrediting the leadership of Ukraine, the Ukrainian army, the foreign policy course of the state, the restoration of Ukrainian power in the liberated territories, the work with internally displaced persons, and the ongoing process of reforming the country.

10 Ibid. 264 p.
1.3. Progressive hibression of Russia

A retrospective analysis of the materials of pro-Kremlin analysts leads to the conclusion that one of the main goals of Russia is the destruction of the transatlantic partnership and solidarity system, the repositioning of Europe towards Eurasia to create a so-called common security and trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok and from St. Petersburg to Colombo. In order to determine what Putin’s Russia will do, it is necessary to understand the Russian coordinate system in which strategic decisions are made. “Russia is a self-sufficient country” - this is a significant statement by Putin at his Valdai speech of 2014.

According to SIPRI, at the time when the EU countries and NATO reduced their military spending, Russia was increasing them and still has no plans to stop if it is not stopped by external factors: reducing energy prices; sanctions of the EU, the USA and other western countries; reduction of economic cooperation with the Russian Federation, etc.

![Figure 3. Military expenditure of Russia, EU and NATO Europe 2000–14](http://www.sipri.org/media/website-photos/milex-media-backgrounder-2015)

The beginning of the hybrid warfare is imperceptible. It becomes noticeable after the deployment of the military component in an explicit or disguised form. All this indicates that the Kremlin is ready for a new, larger wave of geopolitical expansion, based on the strength of Russia (including the armed forces) and the weakness of the West. Actually, this expansion in the test mode was started in August 2008 with a 5-day war against Georgia. In 2014, it continued.
The demonstrative disregard for Western sanctions, counter-sentiments, the denial of the armed invasion in Ukraine, together with the demonstration of nuclear power, is proof that Russia does not intend to stop. Moreover, the reactive and insufficient actions of the West against Russia during the current hybrid against Ukraine were generally predictable for the Kremlin, like the expected effect of fatigue from the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation. This is ideal for the Kremlin.

The Kremlin’s current plan may be to create preconditions for a strategic deal with the United States. Under the current conditions, when Putin is in Russia, when the West is not consolidated as during the Cold War, when anti-American sentiment is spreading in Europe, a unique window of opportunity appears. Therefore, the Kremlin does not deviate from its aggressive goal, using all available options, including: the impact on the situation in Syria; intensifying the military imbalance in the Black Sea region in its favour due to the militarization of Crimea; destabilization of the Western Balkans; demonstration of nuclear power.

There, where Russia activates politically, the situation becomes increasingly tense - in the South Caucasus, Moldova, and the Balkans. Russia uses a method to create multi-crisis scenarios for the West. In order to operate in the regions of the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Balkans, as well as against Ukraine and Europe, Russia is increasing its military potential in Crimea. Russia, with its technology of subversion and hybrid wars, according to the CIMSEC (Centre for International Maritime Security), is a source of regional risks and threats to Europe. Along with the destabilization of the Western Balkans Russia exacerbates the pressure on its closest ally — Belarus, whose limited independence is becoming an obstacle to the Kremlin’s geostrategic plans in Central and Eastern Europe.

The creation of tension and instability by Russia, which uses hybrid methods, is accompanied by a decrease of the level of security for the population in places of its residence that causes concern in NATO and the European Union. Therefore, Brussels is increasingly focusing on identifying hybrid threats and ways to neutralize and counteract them.

1.4. Approaches to hybrid threats in the EU

The EU has quite clearly identified “hybrid threats” and defined corresponding countermeasures. A number of documents was developed, including the EU Global Strategy, the Joint Framework Document on Countering Hybrid Threats (06.04.2016) and the Joint Report to the European Parliament and the European

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The Joint Framework Document states that key challenges for peace and stability lie in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhood, although there, unlike the above-mentioned European Parliament document, which explicitly refers to the RF and IDIL, the reference to the sources of these challenges is absent. The EU Global Strategy even determines that “to the east, the European security order has been violated”, and the reason is “Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilization of Ukraine”. The Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council emphasizes that “threats are becoming increasingly unconventional”.

In the Joint Framework Document, hybrid threats are conceptually defined as “mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare”. In the mentioned report of the European Parliament, a hybrid war is defined as “a situation in which a country resorts to overt use of armed forces against another country or a non-state actor, in addition to a mix of other means (i.e. economic, political, and diplomatic)” and a hybrid threat as “a phenomenon resulting from the convergence and interconnection of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat”.

The EU classifies areas of response to such threats: the information sphere, energy, transport and infrastructure, space, military, health and food security, cyber space, the financial sector, industry, public or social dimension.

It should be noted that the EU has taken a fairly serious approach to detecting hybrid threats and even proposed to set up the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service. This new structure, which became fully operational in May 2017, is charged of collecting, analysing and communicating public and private information on indicators and warnings about hybrid threats. This Centre brings hybrid threats to a

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single European denominator and provides information about them, including in the form of the “Hybrid Bulletin”, to the EU and its institutions. At the same time, it was proposed to set up a Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats that was launched in April 2017 in Finland and focuses on research of threats of this type and mechanisms to counteract them.

The countries - sources of hybrid threats, as defined in the EU, can use vulnerable members of societies, impose radical and extremist ideas through modern channels of communication (propaganda). Therefore, in the information sphere, the European Union has identified a key task for raising public awareness and countering propaganda. The East StratCom Task Force was set up, a special EU-STRAT project was launched that works for the Eastern Partnership countries, and the seizure of illegal information content is a responsibility of the EU Counter Terrorism Centre within Europol. In the cyber sector, the EU has approved the EU Cyber Security Strategy, the European Agenda on Security, the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS). Separately, the European Commission has created the EU Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) for countering cyber threats at the EU level and the NIS Platform for the cooperation of the EU bodies with public and private players in the cyber space.

It is important to note that in the energy sector, as a counteraction to hybrid threats, the Common Framework Document identifies the need for diversification of sources and routes of energy supply to the EU, first of all, the development of the Southern Gas Corridor for the supply of Caspian gas and the construction of liquefied gas hubs. In order to protect critical infrastructure, the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is functioning, and the European Defense Agency is working on defining the necessary protection options. In order to counter hybrid threats in the military sphere, the EU was limited to increased intelligence, the development of appropriate capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and counteract the use of mini-drones.

The European Union interacts with other countries and international organizations - the UN, OSCE, NATO — to counter hybrid threats. Thus, in the Joint Statement of the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and NATO Secretary General of July 2016, the first task was to “increase the ability to counter hybrid threats”. In practical terms, this resulted in close cooperation at the working level between similar EU and NATO institutions, for example: Joint


16 Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [Electronic resource]/NATO. — Access mode: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm
European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats; the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell - NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch; CERT-EU — NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). The EU and NATO have also developed a package of 42 proposals, 10 of which deal directly with countering hybrid threats. Through its cooperation with third countries, the European Commission, using the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, is taking steps to strengthen the sustainability of partner countries, including Ukraine, by providing strategic communications assistance and additional support in border management. In particular, most Ukrainian experts (78.4%) believe that closer cooperation between Ukraine and the EU could increase Ukraine’s ability to confront hybrid threats.  

In the EU, combating hybrid threats is still seen as a set of tactical measures and does not identify an integrated source of such hybrid threats - the Russian Federation, that already really threatens the security in Europe. However, in Ukraine, which has been opposing the hybrid aggression of Russia for four years, even a single document on combating hybrid threats has never been approved. Therefore, Ukraine should take the similar EU documents as examples and deepen cooperation with the European Union in this dimension.

### 1.5. Actual hybrid threats to Ukraine’s security

Despite the already ongoing fourth year of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, a number of hybrid threats from 2014 remains relevant today, creating a danger of destabilization and weakening of our state, violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, lower living standards and, indeed, the peaceful existence of Ukrainian citizens.

To identify hybrid threats, that have not been made in Ukraine so far, the notion of “challenge”, “risk”, “danger”, “threat”, “emergency”, which are basic in the theory of “security”, should be distinguished. Often some of them are identified and used as synonyms, which does not always correspond to the real state of things.

Despite the existence of numerous developments on security issues, both in Ukraine and abroad, there are no unified commonly accepted definitions of the above chain of notions. However, some generalizations and systematization can be carried out and a coordinate system can be determined. We formulate key definitions based on the methodology of Ukrainian specialists, in particular, Horbulin - Kachinsky and foreign experts.

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17 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD% D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0% BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
SECURITY — is the state of preservation and protection of the stable existence and development of an object (system), in which the probability of caused by external or internal influences changes of any parameters (characteristics) of functioning is minimal — close to zero.

British authors of the English dictionary I. Funk and A. Wagnalls characterize security as “the state of freedom from risk and threats”. Security and danger (insecurity), which are often considered as opposites, based on linguistic peculiarities in Ukrainian and some other Slavic languages, are in fact not concepts-antonyms. According to Horbulin - Kachinsky vision, the level of security is measured in the interval \([0-1]\) or in the percentage from 0% to 100%. Thus, we can assume that “danger” takes up an intermediate position in the chain of “security” — “challenge” — “danger” — “threat” — “catastrophe”. From the analysis and generalization of the definitions of key security categories existing in national and foreign sources, it is possible to streamline key definitions.

CATASTROPHE — a state opposite to security characterized by a radical change in the parameters (characteristics) of the object (system) functioning, which leads to destruction and a number of associated negative effects on the environment and human.

The catastrophe is a peculiar peak of the chain of “accident” — “emergency” — “catastrophe”. They can be considered as synonymous for machine systems, but for human machine, social systems can form a causal sequence. In the future, the chain of “accident” — “emergency” — “catastrophe” is considered as synonymous with the use of a generalized “emergency” situation.

CHALLENGE — expressed or revealed intention of the subject to implement certain actions that may affect the security status of the object (system). The feature of the call is its duality. It contains both a potential risk in an uncertain form, and a potential chance of obtaining an object (system) of new quality as a result of the intention of the subject.

Awareness of a challenge is important in terms of creating conditions for minimizing potential negative impacts and maximizing potential added value.

The risk appears with a challenge and has a potential (virtual) character as long as the practical activity is not started. As a rule, the risk is understood as the probability of occurrence of a certain adverse (undesirable, uncertain, critical) event (emergency) that can cause damage and cause a series of losses.

The term risk in ancient versions of modern languages means close concepts: in Italian *risicare* - to maneuver between rocks, in French *risquer* - to bypass the cliff, the rock. The connection with the word “rock” is not accidental, because the roots
of this are at the time of primitive navigation in coastal waters, when collision with a rock meant a ship disaster.

**RISK** — the uncertainty parameter, the randomness of the development of an object (system) that, with a variable probability level, can lead to the sequential generation of hazards and threats, which, in turn, can lead to an emergency situation that will lead to negative consequences.

**DANGER** — the state of balancing, in which events, phenomena and processes are observed, which, under certain circumstances, can lead to a quantitative increase in risk, which will lead to its transformation into a threat, and in other circumstances - to avoid such a transformation.

**THREAT** — the condition of the prevalence of the probability of the inevitability of an emergency occurring over the likelihood of its avoidance, in which, as a result of the advancement of danger, the factors of damage that are capable of causing harm to people, society, the state, the environment, cause other unwanted consequences are manifested.

The main characteristics of the chain “risk” — “danger” — “threat” is: the probability of occurrence of an event that manifests itself in that it may happen, and may not happen; the uncertainty of the consequences, the non-determinism of the results of the implementation of risky activities, the variability of the level of risk in time and the influence of other objective and subjective factors that are in the dynamics.

Considering these methodologies, weaknesses and gaps in the system of national security should be seen as a danger that sooner or later will be used by the enemy with the purpose of creating a threat or threats projection.

* **Dangers (weaknesses) and hybrid threats to the security of Ukraine and society at the present stage:**

**nation-wide character:**

**dangers:**

- the “all against all” political struggle in the Ukrainian establishment, provoked by the authorities in order to gain an electoral non-alternative for the ruling political group, stimulated from the outside by the aggressor with the use of internal-Ukrainian agents of influence;

- the ineffectiveness of parliament due to its fragmentation into corporate segments, which offset the parliamentary-presidential model defined by the Constitution of Ukraine;
unsatisfactory level of professionalism of the Ukrainian public service;
- PR-activity of the government in Ukraine instead of substantive activity;

**hybrid threats:**

- the contour of external governance, which has been preserved and modernized since the pre-war period, is masked by the public-political organization of the “Ukrainian choice” (Eurasian choice), under the communication channel of negotiations with the aggressor within the framework of the Minsk Process;
- hunting for Ukrainian citizens and demonstration of artificial groups of “saboteurs”, “drug couriers”, etc., for the purpose of forming the image of Ukraine as a terrorist and criminal state and creating new levers of pressure on Kyiv;
- discrediting media campaign through foreign media on illegal supplies of technology, weapons and military equipment to the pariah countries and in the conflict zones (DPRK missile propulsion, supply of weapons to the Southern Sudan) in order to represent Ukraine as a violator of international law and a country contributing to dubious regimes;
- combined actions of a complex nature (sabotage on critical infrastructure + cyber attacks + resonance killings + compromising on the above state leadership) in order to increase the protest potential of society against the ineffective government;

**in the military sector:**

**dangers:**

- corruption in the defence sector, especially in the systems of financial and logistics support;
- incompleteness of the creation of a fully-fledged territorial defence system of Ukraine;
- contaminated in the mine-explosive sense territories and remnants of unexploded ordnance, mines, explosive devices;
- dissatisfied needs (stipulated by laws) of the ATO veterans and dismissed servicemen;
- low pace of reforms and development of the military organization of the state;

**hybrid threats:**

- the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of Ukraine aimed at destabilizing the internal social and political situation in Ukraine, the violation of
the functioning of state authorities, local authorities and the blocking of critical industrial and infrastructure objects;

- the creation by Russian special services and agents in Ukraine of conspiratorial and conserved illegal armed groups in the form of patriotic NGOs, waiting for D-Day to create chaos in Ukraine and preconditions for a change of power;

- aggressor’s sabotage and reconnaissance groups activities masked under the guise of Ukrainian security forces in order to discredit them;

- illegal distribution (trade) of weapons that leads to uncontrolled possession of weapons by the people of the country and opportunities for its acquisition;

- activity of mercenaries from among citizens of Ukraine, Russia and other countries for committing terrorist and criminal acts with the use of weapons, explosives, etc.;

- threats of taking under military control of the territory of Ukraine by military formations of an aggressor country under the cover of pseudo-peacekeeping operations;

- purposeful measures to discredit the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations and security structures;

in the law-enforcement sector:

\textit{dangers}:

- corruption in the law enforcement system;

- cases of creating a mechanism of circular bail in the system of police/security/customs, tax service - prosecutors - courts;

- some cases of impunity for law enforcement officers on the background of the general corruption of the state system of power;

- cases of appointment to high posts not by professional, but by political or personal principles, which will follow instructions, not according to functional nor guidance principles;

- a raising level of crime and social tension in society;

- outflow of professional staff due to low level of their provision;

\textit{hybrid threats}:

- use of compromising materials on representatives of the law enforcement system not to eliminate them from work, but to promote the decisions necessary for the interested party;

- purposeful discrediting of the law enforcement system through information campaigns;

- physical removal of active law enforcement officers;
- staying in positions in the law-enforcement system of persons connected with special services of other countries;

- use of external influence on criminal elements for aggravation of the situation in Ukraine;

**in the information sector:**

**dangers:**

- gaps in the legislative environment in the field of information security, lack of appropriate mechanisms to prevent the activities of Ukrainian and other media to retransmit pro-Russian narratives or other types of anti-Ukrainian information;

- a low level of coordination of the CEA (central executive authorities) in the information sphere that allows the aggressor to use information products of the Ukrainian authorities for the purpose of its own propaganda;

- an unformed policy of informational support for the consolidation of national identity in Ukraine, in terms of work with the population of Ukraine, especially in the occupied territories;

- insufficient financial and technical support of the Ukrainian state bodies for prompt and timely response to relevant acts of information aggression against the background of Russia’s financial and instrumental advantage in the information component of the hybrid war against Ukraine;

**hybrid threats:**

- constant use of special narratives and information labels by Russia in the official (Russian Foreign Ministry) and political arena with the aim of deligitimating the Ukrainian authorities (the “war party”, “Kyiv junta”, “Bandera”, “fascists”, “Nazi”);

- the formation of channels of information and propaganda work by Russia aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian authorities along the target groups: 1) Russian citizens and citizens of Ukraine in the occupied territories; 2) citizens of Ukraine; 3) the countries of the West, Ukraine’s partners in counteracting aggression; 4) societies of countries in the orbit of Russian influence;

- open and implicit use of democratic norms and procedures of the EU countries, as well as the United States and other partner countries for information discrediting Ukraine and its attempts to form international support for counteracting Russian aggression;

- political and lobbying activities in the West, which are used by Russia to create doubts about the correctness of the position of the EU countries on the extension of the sanctions against the Kremlin, as well as for the legitimization of the annexation of the Crimea;
- expanded use by the Kremlin of the information channels of the ROC — UOC MP (Moscow Patriarchate) with the creation of new propaganda and disinformation flows to Ukraine in order to demoralize and disorientate the population, reduce its resilient potential to the aggressor;

- using Ukrainian television channels and other media to broadcast pro-Russian narratives in dosage forms or with opposition slogans;

- a predominant use of Russian social networks by citizens of Ukraine (even despite a ban in Ukraine) for communication and receiving/disseminating information;

- distribution of information products using regional, ethnic and national, linguistic and other particular identities among Ukrainian citizens to form split lines in society, imposing a sense of discrimination and insecurity, preparing a social base for protests and provocations;

- formation of an isolated socio-cultural and information reality in the occupied territories of Ukraine, blocking the access of residents of these territories to Ukrainian information content;

- using Ukrainian experts and opinion leaders to form a negative information image of the Ukrainian expert environment, deligitimize the main evidences of Russian aggression;

**in the cyber sector:**

**dangers:**

- low level of culture and knowledge among civil servants on the IT-security in their work and private correspondence and communication through electronic channels;

- installation of software developed by foreign companies, including Russian companies, and unlicensed software;

**hybrid threats:**

- massive cyber attacks against central authorities, objects of the strategic and critical infrastructure of Ukraine;

- technical possibilities of concealing real perpetrators of crimes in cyberspace;

- the use of software products for the covert collection of information about individuals and organizations in the territory of Ukraine;

- unauthorized access to private and working electronic mailboxes of Ukrainian politicians and civil servants;

**in the economic sector:**

**dangers:**

- hidden reformatting of important business activities to update old or create new mechanisms of Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia;
HYBRID THREATS TO UKRAINE AND PUBLIC SECURITY.
THE EU AND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP EXPERIENCE

- a significant offshoreization of property in Ukraine, which creates prerequisites for manipulating both financial resources (deducing profits in offshore, imposing debts on the state budget) and support from foreign, in particular, Western partners of Ukraine;

- consideration by a part of the Ukrainian citizens of the Russian Federation as a place for earnings, which is a channel for disseminating propaganda and an opportunity for anti-Ukrainian provocations;

hybrid threats:

- continued presence of Russian banks in Ukraine, which still control a large part of the finance of business and citizens;

- control over important economic assets in Ukraine, in particular in the energy sector (oblenergos, oblgas), by Russian or pro-Russian owners, which makes possible quiet diversions (sabotage, conditional accidents and downtime), the introduction of malicious software for further cyber attacks, destruction of strategic enterprises;

- external economic impact on the activities of large enterprises, which creates preconditions for influence on large working groups and manipulation (miner’s protests);

in the energy sector:

dangers:

- the domestic gas market, which remains one-third dependent on the transit of Russian gas through the territory of Ukraine;

- critical dependence of the Ukrainian market of petroleum products on imports;

- functioning of the electricity market in a single technological regime with the Russian Federation;

- unbalanced coal market of Ukraine;

hybrid threats:

- termination by Russia of gas transit through Ukraine;

- possibilities for Russia to directly control its own deliveries of petroleum products to the Ukrainian market and relatively easy to influence supplies from Belarus;

- possibilities of conducting targeted actions on the territory of the Russian Federation to destabilize the work of the United Energy System of Ukraine;

- bypass activities of Russia under the guise of Russian-German and Russian-Turkish business cooperation in order to implement infrastructure projects for the levelling of the gas transit function of the GTS of Ukraine (North Stream 2, Turkish Stream);
in the sector of human rights, national minorities, indigenous peoples and inter-confessional relations:

\textit{dangers:}

- ignoring by the authorities the problems of the Crimean Tatar people as the indigenous people of Ukraine that can be used by the aggressor;

- representation of Ukrainian citizens in Russia as a socially, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society;

\textit{hybrid threats:}

- exploitation by an external subject of “protection of the rights of national minorities”, “violation of rights in the language policy sector”, “manifestations of discrimination on the basis of nationality” and contradictions in inter-religious relations to achieve their own goals;

- the use of non-state actors, activists and political parties to destabilize the situation under the guise of pseudo-argumentation of violations in the field of human rights and national minorities;

- the use of language policy to destabilize the situation in the country;

- cultivation of xenophobia, in particular, Islamophobia, polonophobia, antisemitism;

- incitement of representatives of a particular religious denomination to protection, such as their violated rights, and the creation of an inter-confessional setback;

- the outside state-managed infringement of the rights of national minorities with the aim of fomenting inter-ethnic strife, stimulating manifestations of separatism and destabilizing the situation;

\textit{in historical policy:}

\textit{dangers:}

- low level of informing the society about the true history of Ukraine;

- preservation of post-Soviet narratives in history textbooks;

\textit{hybrid threats:}

- the use by Russia of integration strategies based on the cultural, ethnic and state unity of Ukraine and Russia, as allegedly available or desired in the future, which is accompanied by a policy of reviving the concept of the Russian Empire of the “triune Russian people”;

- the stimulation of nostalgia for the times of the “single Soviet people” and the actualization, in this context, of social welfare, “order”, geopolitical power, “common achievements”;
- the introduction of Russia’s strategy of split by territorial dimension, with the promotion of plots of “artificiality” of the territorial composition of Ukraine (“gifts of Lenin, Khrushchev”, etc.), the emphasis on the identity of individual regions, or their historical affiliation with other states;

- the direction of Russia’s efforts to the ethnization of Ukrainian society, somehow historically past, and the opposition to the emergence of a modern civil Ukrainian nation;

- representation of Ukrainian narratives exclusively as “ethnically Ukrainian ones” with simultaneous opposition to Russian, Crimean Tatar, Greek, Bulgarian ones, etc.;

- representation of Ukrainian national historiography, national consciousness, Ukrainian language, traditional religious organizations “fictional”, “externally imposed”, “non-serious”, “opportunistic anti-Russian”, “non-canonical”, “criminal”, etc.;

- using the historical theme of the struggle against fascism in the twentieth century to discredit Ukrainian patriotism and denationalize Ukrainians under the slogan of “Ukrainian fascism”.

Identified weaknesses and hybrid threats allow assessing the state’s ability to ensure the security of society and they are indicators for such an assessment.
2. WEAKNESS OF THE UKRAINIAN SECURITY SYSTEM BEFORE THE AGGRESSION - CARTE BLANCHE FOR RUSSIA

Almost all the time since 1991, Ukraine had not paid enough attention to strengthening its own security, considering that its surrounding is potentially friendly and did not have serious threats to the state and public security. For example, in the previous Military Doctrine of Ukraine adopted in 2004, “the desire of most states of the world to limit the use of military force as a means of achieving political goals” and “confidence-building and spread of international cooperation in the military sphere” were written. As a result, from year to year the Ukrainian security system had become weakened, that resulted not only in the inability of the Armed Forces to fulfil their assigned tasks, but also in weakening the state system as a whole and its separate security components, in particular - the law enforcement system, economy, energy, information space, cyber sphere, human rights dimension, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, political system.

2.1. State ineffectiveness to guarantee public security against the RF aggression

Retrospectively, it is possible to determine the degree of vulnerability of the state to aggression of the hybrid type in terms of the basic determinants of the probability of conducting a hybrid war that is described in the paper “Wars XXI: PolyHybression of Russia”, prepared by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation.

**Internal Determinant:** Ukraine had a subcritical internal conflict potential. The higher is an internal conflict potential in a country, the higher is probability of a hybrid war against it through stimulation of it.

**External determinant:** Russia as a neighbour of Ukraine has similar ethno-national, religious, linguistic and other features of the adjoining territory and uses interregional communications for the purpose of induction of centrifugal processes. The combination of similarities increases the likelihood and effectiveness of applying hybrid-type war techniques.

**Communication and energy determinant:** The potential of communications in the eastern and south-eastern territories of Ukraine (ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other component of society) with neighbouring Russia exceeds an aggregate communication potential within a country, then the centrifugal potential that arises can be used by Russia to conduct a hybrid type war with minimal use of military forces.

**Information and communicative determinant:** Russia has developed a powerful propaganda apparatus for Ukrainian audience, including actions from inside, it is an
indicator of crypto-enforcement and preparation for potentially unfriendly actions against Ukraine, whose population has been and still is exposed to information psychological processing.

**Cultural and Humanitarian Determinants:** Russia initiated a variety of cultural, linguistic, religious, educational and other humanitarian projects that raise its role in the civilization dimension not only in its own territory but also in Ukraine that has become an indicator of crypto-enforcement and preparing for unfriendly actions in the future.

By three determinants, Ukraine can be defined as a country against which the technology of a hybrid-type war can be applied, while the fourth and fifth determinants point to Russia as an aggressor. The presence of an internal conflictogenic potential that did not have a critical mass, but which was artificially stimulated by an external actor, Russia, through asymmetric economic relations, energy dependence, corruption schemes of business involving political figures and high-ranking officials, interregional ties with eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, inhabited mainly by Russian-speaking citizens employed in the industrial sphere, which, since the Soviet times, focused on sectoral cooperation with Russian partners, all this in aggregate those created the internal vulnerability of Ukraine to Russia, covered by the geopolitical revenge syndrome. The fourth and fifth determinants can be illustrated by the concepts of “Russian World”, “Orthodox Unit”, “trinity of Slavic peoples of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus”, the activities of Russian media in the territories of other countries, etc.

Signs of the beginning of a hybrid war should be structured in three levels: yellow (danger), orange (threat), and red (emergency). Let’s consider how it was in the case of the preparation of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

**Yellow level (danger):**

- Russian media massaged systematically Ukrainian topics with an emphasis on threats to Russia’s security (depot complexes of NATO on the borders of the RF);

- initiation and conduct of various public events of a scientific and applied nature on the resonant theme (negative consequences of the association with the EU, the “amenities” of the Customs Union, etc.), which contributed to the split in the public consciousness of Ukraine;

- throwing out customized materials of manipulative, discriminating character into the information space of Ukraine and the world media (Ukraine as “failed state”);

- obtruding of forms of “interregional cooperation” between border regions (Russian-
Ukrainian interregional economic forum for 6 subjects of the Russian Federation (Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov and Krasnodar region) and 6 regions of Ukraine — Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk oblasts and Crimea) in order to create and strengthen centrifugal tendencies;

- the activity of various Russian governmental and non-governmental organizations of educational and cultural and economic orientation both in the capital and in the oblasts, covered by the corresponding ideology and propaganda (“Russian World”, “Rossotrudnichestvo”, “Ukrainian Choice”);

- creation and support of paramilitary groups that regularly hold meetings with ideological, political and special training in the territory of the contiguous state (youth camps on the Lake Seliger, illegal formation “Oplot”);

- active work with social networks, including the creation of thematic groups, trolling of patriotic forces, active work of bots.

**Orange level (threat):**

- promotion of Russian henchmen to responsible positions in the central bodies of Ukraine (power bodies — O.Yakymenko - Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), D.Solomatin, P.Lebedev - Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (MoD), humanitarian block — D.Tabachnyk);

- institutional changes in the public administration structure that are not in line with national interests but are in the interests of the RF (liquidation of institutions responsible for European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine);

- establishment of discriminatory trade regimes for Ukrainian export goods and services, creation of difficulties in importing critical goods (energy resources), on which the neighbour’s economy depends (August 2013 - stopping Ukrainian exports to Russia);

- increase in the number of regular passenger transport services in the border zone (Belgorod — Kharkiv, Rostov — Donetsk);

- strengthening of special services activity and, in particular, military intelligence of the adjoining state (RF) on the territory of a neighbour;

- the concentration of the RF armed forces and means in the near-field, conducting military exercises in the immediate vicinity of the border (“West-2013” September 20-26, 2013 with the participation of 9400 servicemen; a sudden comprehensive check of combat readiness of military units of the Western Military District, Russian
Aerospace Forces, VDV (Russian Airborne Troops), Military Transport Aviation, February 26 — March 3, 2014 with the participation of 150 thousand (!) Personnel;

- a sharp increase in the activity of the propaganda apparatus of the Russian Federation to the outside with an intense release of large volumes of misinformation and false interpretations of events in Ukraine with the aim of disorientation of the world community (“Maydan - chaos in Ukraine”, the “fascists”) in the world information space.

Red level (emergency):

- holding pro-Russian NGOs mass events under anti-government slogans (anti-maydans in Simferopol, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, etc.);

- “Humanitarian aid” by special forces on the part of the Russian Federation’s security forces to the Yanukovych regime in its attempts to suppress the “Ukrainian fascists” on the Maydan in Kyiv, which was an outright attempt to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs;

- appeals to the RF leadership from NGOs, rallies and meetings that took place in the big cities of eastern and southern Ukraine, with appeals for “rendering assistance”, “providing protection” with one or another argumentation and motivation (end of February — beginning of March 2014);

- the appearance of “self-defence detachments”, Cossack units, private military formations in Crimea;

- local disconnections from the broadcast of state television channels, their replacement by TV channels of the aggressor country in the south-east of Ukraine;

- the emergence of Russian armed units in the form of unidentified militia groups (“little green men”) in Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine.

It is important to look at the red level and its features on the example of Crimea. According to Andriy Klymenko, editor-in-chief of the “BlackSeaNews” web-site, the technology of special operations to occupy Crimea had standard elements, which were then applied in other oblasts of Ukraine:

1)massive information preparation of the territory, based on direct intimidation of the population by the mythical repressions of “Ukrainian fascists”;

2)stormtroop tactics of fighters (“Cossacks”) from the Krasnodar region of the RF in support to the “Cossack” organizations of Crimea — initially for creation of
mass presence at meetings, and then for the creation on their basis of illegal armed formations “Crimean self-defence”;

3) latent ground invasion, mostly special forces, marines and airborne forces (“little green men”) with equipment, using the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

4) the capture by “little green men” strategic objects - administrative buildings, airports and ports, blocking the deployment of military units of the Ukrainian Army, Naval Forces and State Border Guard Service, the SBU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Forces;

5) the formation of “self-defence detachments” from among the implemented “Cossacks”, military personnel of the Black Sea Fleet in reserve, fighters of the disbanded Ukrainian militia special forces “Berkut” who participated in the Maydan shooting in Kyiv in February 2014.

At that time, the state did not have the means to counter Russian hybrid aggression, and then the Ukrainian leadership instead of protecting national interests acted in favour of the aggressor.

2.2. Military organization of Ukraine — “an old cart without a wheel”

Before the aggression at the beginning of 2014, the military organization of Ukraine was characterized as weak, unbalanced and incapable of fulfilling the tasks of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The majority (51.4%) of 37 Ukrainian experts, who participated in the survey conducted from 18 to 28 August 2017 by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” with the support of the EU and the International Renaissance Foundation, called the lack of capabilities of the Ukrainian army as the second most important factor, which provoked the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The number and implementation plans of the Armed Forces allowed them to be (theoretically) used in a small local conflict, but their unreadiness to use weapons and a fully centralized military command and control system did not allow the unequipped, undressed and incomplete army to protect even themselves that was clearly demonstrated during the occupation of Crimea.

The general policy of the leadership of Ukraine until 2014 was aimed at destruction of the military organization of the state. It was documented in the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Foreign and Internal Policies” of 2010, which determined

Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
the status of non-alignment, and the Military Doctrine of 2012, in which the term “defensive sufficiency” allowed the Ministers of Defence with Russian citizenship (D.Salamatin and P.Lebedev) to bring the country’s Armed Forces to a state of formal existence. Although not only these two ministers, but also any of the previous leaders of the military ministry of Ukraine did not care to bring the deployment of the Armed Forces to the possibility of defeating the invasion from the East. According to former Defence Minister O.Kuzmuk, during all time of Ukraine’s independence, no strategic defence plan was developed for protection from the North and East.\(^\text{19}\)

![Fig.2. The strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1993 - 2015. Source: http://www.ukrmilitary.com/2015/03/1993-2015.html](http://www.ukrmilitary.com/)

During the decade until 2014, the Armed Forces were reduced to minimum, military equipment and weapons were destroyed or sold. In 2013, about 28 thousand units of weapons were registered at the Centre for accounting of surplus military assets of the Armed Forces.\(^\text{20}\) For 20 years, from 1993 to 2013, the number of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was reduced by 2.7 times and in 2013 it was 165.5 thousand persons, only 120.9 thousand of which were military servicemen. According to the draft Law of Ukraine dated November 21, 2013 No. 3657 “On the Number of Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2014”, the quantitative composition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

\(^{19}\) Armed forces of Ukraine: an attempt to give an answer for a lot of “why”? [Electronic resource]/“Tyzhden”. — Access mode: http://tyzhden.ua/Society/112060

had to be reduced more — to 157.5 thousand persons, of which 119.2 thousand were military servicemen.

From more than one hundred thousand army, almost the half (49 thousand servicemen) served in various types of headquarters, and around 6,000 servicemen were capable and ready to immediate fulfilling of combat tasks. Thus, the army was a support-to-headquarters army, not ready to withstand armed aggression. The following factors were also negative for Ukraine’s defence capability: low level of patriotic training; widespread belief in the absence of threats of armed attack from another state; “peaceful rhetoric” of the military leadership of the Ukrainian Army; unsatisfactory level of salary and supply of the military personnel.

Up to 2014, in the Left-Bank Ukraine, troops were reduced to a minimum: 2 formations (in Lubny and Artemivsk (Bakhmut) were disbanded, and 3 brigades were located at a distance of 200 to 500 kilometres from each other (in the Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts) that did not allow to organize at least some kind of defence in a case of a direct armed conflict with the Russian Federation. The same situation was with the air forces (air force and air defence), which were practically absent in the east of the state. Thus, the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were demilitarized, but at the same time there were a large number of weapons and military equipment in the storages of Artemivsk (Bakhmut).

That situation was used in the Kremlin’s plan - the intelligence and sabotage groups of the Russian troops and the illegal armed formations formed by them from local residents and citizens of the Russian Federation did not have to meet resistance of the Ukrainian troops, which were not on Donbas. At the same time, without any particular obstacles, they had to take over the Artemivsk storage, which further had to be a justification of sources of weapons for the illegal armed formations. After unsuccessful attempts to capture Artemivsk, Russia had to deliver weapons from the Russian territory to the Ukrainian territory of Donbas uncontrolled by the Government.

The total absence of troops in eastern Ukraine was the reason for the lack of contacts between the army and the local population, as well as forced the Ukrainian leadership to transfer troops from the central and western regions to Donbas, which faced hostile attitude of the local people influenced by Russian propaganda, although they were quite friendly towards the illegal armed formations21 — “These are our local guys”. That factor emphasized the absence of a direction of civil-military relations in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In early 2014, the actual absence of effective territorial defence (TD) in Ukraine, which existed only on paper, strengthened the positive perception by the local population of the so-called “militia” as their defenders. The “self-defense units”, which were partly formed from representatives of the local population and former Russian military men, Cossacks, criminals, Russian and foreign mercenaries, were actively created by Russia and ruled by professional Russian officers. The conscious pro-Ukrainian population of the South-East of Ukraine, who wanted to defend their country and a “small homeland” from the external aggressor, did not have that opportunity because of the lack of a mechanism for employment them and structures capable to organize local resistance.

The Ukrainian troops transferred to the east were not ready to resist the hybrid forces - paramilitary and illegal armed formations, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and units without identification marks. The Ukrainian military units were not ready to act in the absence of a front line, when enemy forces could appear anywhere and strike from an unexpected direction, or undermine the ways of their movement.

Unreadiness of the 18,000 Ukrainian military contingent in Crimea to engage in hostilities allowed Russia to avoid direct clashes and seize the peninsula almost without sacrifices. In addition to the negative system factors inherent in the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the whole, that was also facilitated by non-military factors: negative moral and psychological influence on the Ukrainian military of higher (3-4 times) level of money supply and provision in the RF troops, stationed in Crimea; close neighbour, friendly and even family ties of Ukrainian and Russian servicemen; fillings of isolation from the mainland.

In spite of the fact that Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine was apparent after the actual capture of Crimea, the Executive order of the President of Ukraine (acting President — O.Turchynov) No. 405/2014, the “Anti-terrorist operation” and not a defence operation against the military aggression of the RF, was started that created a collision for the Ukrainian military men, who were extremely difficult to recognize “terrorists” for neutralizing them. Moreover, the leadership of the Anti-terrorist operation was carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine, which made it more difficult for the operational use of military units and the complex conduct of measures to counter real aggression.

Thus, at the beginning of the Russian aggression, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were not ready to guarantee the security of the Ukrainian society, not through classical resistance to an external aggressor, nor by repelling an aggression of the hybrid type.

22 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 405/2014 "On the decision of the NSDCU of April 13, 2014 “On urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine” [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4052014-16886
2.3. The law enforcement sector — inviolability of the leadership and public insecurity

Law enforcement agencies should play a key role in combating hybrid aggression, because hybrid aggression is carried out from outside as well as from inside of a victim country. The loosening, chaos of society, increasing of the level of criminal and economic crime, tolerance to corruption, overt and covert manifestations of separatism contribute to emergence of centrifugal tendencies in the society, undermine the force of the central government and facilitate the aggressor to achieve its goals.

Before Russia’s aggression, Ukraine had a substantially degraded law enforcement system. The work of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies was marked by the low professional level, the facts of corruption, impunity, “mutual surety”, cooperation with criminals, presence of agents of special services of foreign states.

For a long time, the law enforcement system has gradually degraded, while becoming a punitive organ in the hands of authoritarian and low-moral leadership. People, who planned to enrich themselves due to the use of their official position, came into law enforcement agencies. The general situation in the state did not contribute to ensure that professional, competent, moral and responsible personnel rested in the law enforcement system. The low level of financial and logistical support prompted policemen to seek additional earnings, which led to corruption, “protection of criminals”, promotion of illegal activity. Corruption in the law enforcement agencies was named by the majority (56.8%) of Ukrainian experts as the first factor that was used by Russia to begin its aggression against Ukraine.23

Law enforcement agencies often did not care about the security of society, and worked exclusively to ensure their own interests, as well as interests of the power, oligarchy, criminals. More and more reports appeared in the media about cruel massacre of people in police stations, “protection of prostitution” by the agencies, drug trafficking, game business, illegal extraction of minerals, and raider seizures of successful enterprises.

The society was unprotected, even more — subjected to pressure, intimidation by law enforcement officers of different levels - from militia officers, traffic inspectors and tax inspectors to investigators of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), prosecutors, etc. The assassination of Georgiy Gongadze by law enforcement officers, the “Vradiivka Case”, other cases of violence, extortion by the agencies showed the entire level of degradation of the law enforcement system.

23Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0 %BD%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0 %BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
Even international organizations noted the negative state of affairs in the law enforcement system. For example, on the eve of the Euro-2012 European Football Championship, the international human rights organization Amnesty International noted that the actions of the Ukrainian police were a threat to fans. “For the moment, the fans of Euro-2012 are at risk of criminal acts by the police. Without a body that will bring law enforcement officers to justice, Ukrainian policemen will continue to beat and torture people as they pleased,” the Amnesty International quotes its coordinator in Ukraine Max Tucker.  

The impunity, created by “mutual surety” and corruption, was the factor that facilitated the transformation of law enforcement agencies, intended to ensure and maintain order in the state, to punitive pressure and intimidation. As Bernard Shaw once said, “the biggest crime is impunity”. According to statistics, in 2012, 114,474 complaints about the actions of the police were filed with the prosecutor’s offices (with a total of about 300 thousand employees of the MIA), investigations were conducted only in 1,750 cases, of which only 320 cases (0.2%) resulted in criminal prosecution cases.

This became the background and cause of a sharp decline of public trust in law enforcement. According to a survey conducted by the “Rating” sociological group at the end of December 2011, among the law enforcement agencies, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was the most trusted by citizens (16% - fully deserving of trust, 25% - not deserving, and 26% - does not deserve at all). About 12% of the respondents believed that the Prosecutor General’s Office deserved credibility; about 10% - police, tax and customs services. According to the majority of respondents, the main obstacles to the effectiveness of the Ukrainian police (militia) were corruption (64%), low moral standards (39%), distrust of the population (39%), dependence on higher authorities (34%) and low level of training (31%). The situation worsened, and in 2013, according to the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, only 1% of Ukrainian citizens fully trusted the militia.

Importance in the loss of the law enforcement agencies’ ability to counter hybrid threats was the penetration of agents of the aggressor state to the law enforcement and internal security system of the state. In particular, according to Head of the SBU

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in 2006-2010 Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, the “Alfa” and other units of the SBU, as of February 2014, were filtered by Russian ideology and agents so that by the end of April 2014 they were convinced that Russia was not an aggressor and Russians were brothers. Therefore, only about 30% of the SBU employees in Crimea remained loyal to the oaths\(^\text{28}\) (1391 SBU officers betrayed their oaths and turned to the enemy in Crimea\(^\text{29}\)). Even Head of the SBU O.Yakymenko defected.

All these negative trends in the degradation of the law enforcement agencies led to the fact that, with the onset of the military phase of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies were unable or unwilling to resist the aggressor and in many cases contributed to the annexation of Crimea and Russian occupation of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (ORDLO).

2.4. Ukraine hooked on the Russian “Energy Needle”

The Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020, approved in 2003, states that “**Russia has at its disposal significant reserves of energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis of economic development, an instrument for conducting domestic and foreign policy**”.\(^\text{30}\) The formulated basic provisions of the Energy Strategy up to 2035 do not conceal the additional dimension of external energy policy: “**Russia as a responsible state understands the foreign energy policy not from the narrow point of view of the exporter, which maximizes short-term income, but as a means of solving not only national but also world problems**”.\(^\text{31}\) So, Russia has documented the use of its energy resource potential to influence Ukraine and other European states.

One of the main directions of Russian non-military aggression is the gas sector. After gaining independence Ukraine inherited a huge economic complex, which in 1991 consumed more than 118 billion m\(^3\) of gas, of which only 24.4 billion m\(^3\) was Ukrainian production. After the Orange Revolution, in 2005, consumption was still 76 billion m\(^3\), while production fell to 20.6 billion m\(^3\).\(^\text{32}\) Only in 2015, at an extraction level of 19.9 billion m\(^3\) and consumption of 33.7 billion m\(^3\), it was possible to overcome the gas dependence on the Russian Federation through the establishment of reverse gas supply from Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

\(^{28}\) How Did We Lost Crimea. The testimony of the first people of Ukraine. [Electronic resource]/“Ukrainska pravda”.—Access mode:https://www.pravda.com.ua/cdn/graphics/2017/04/jak_my_vtrachaly_krym_svidchennja_pershyh_osib_ukrainy/

\(^{29}\) SBU unveiled a list of traitors from the Crimea. [Electronic resource]/”Novyny Poltavshchyny”.—Access mode: http://np.pl.ua/2016/03/sbu-oprylyudnya-spysoh-zradnykiv-z-krymu/


\(^{31}\) Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2035 (main provisions) [Electronic resource]/ Institute of Energy Strategy. — Access mode: http://www.energystrategy.ru/


A negative factor was the spread of corruption and shadow schemes for obtaining the financial and material benefits of the highest business and political figures in Ukraine, which were used by Moscow as an additional factor in destabilizing the state through countering individual forces and stimulating the struggle for access to corrupt incomes. The constant increase in expenses for the purchase of Russian gas has become an economic factor of pressure on the state, since taking into account intergovernmental agreements on the purchase of certain volumes of gas in Russia, the financial resources of the national joint-stock company (NAK) “Naftogaz of Ukraine” were replenished at the state’s expense annually, which entailed an additional burden on the Ukrainian budget. In parallel, Russia committed acts of gas aggression against Ukraine and European countries — in 2006 and 2009 — and, using their effects, initiated a number of by-pass projects to create pressure on Ukraine, one of which (“Nord Stream 1”) became operational in 2011.

One of the objectives of the Crimean occupation by Russia was to capture and establish control over the energy infrastructure on the territory of the peninsula, primarily stationary extraction and self-propelled drilling platforms, vessels of the technical fleet that were producing natural gas on the adjacent shallow Black Sea shelf. This, among other things, was facilitated by the lack of mechanisms for protecting critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine. So, after the announcement of seizure, the platforms from the central office of the NAK “Naftogaz of Ukraine”, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence, the MIA, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine or the RNBOU (National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine) did not receive clear instructions on further actions, adequate measures were not taken, the Maritime Border Service failed to fulfil tasks determined by the Law of Ukraine “On the Exclusive (Maritime) Economic Zone of Ukraine”.

The challenge for the functioning of the United Energy System of Ukraine (UESU) is the uninterrupted supply of fuel, primarily nuclear fuel and coal. The long-term conservation of the problems of the coal industry in conjunction with the occupation of certain districts of Donbas formed a deficit of coal and the need for its import, most types of which before the outbreak of hostilities were in abundance. An additional factor of destabilization was the high concentration of coal-mining assets and thermal generation in the hands of one owner — DTEK (Donbas Fuel and Energy Company), whose success was shaped not so much due to a successful business model but close ties with the authorities, political and corruptive influence.
Oil production and recycling became the arena of struggle between clan-oligarchic structures and, to a large extent, collapsed, forming a critical dependence on imports of petroleum products, primarily from Belarus. The political short-sightedness of the Ukrainian authorities and the systematic work of the Russian Federation both deprived Ukraine of the revenues from oil transportation and actually destroyed oil refining, its modernization, the use of alternative sources of oil supply, and a sustainable system for meeting the needs of industry and population. Due to direct blocking or indirect influence on Belarus, the RF had the opportunity to create a shortage of petroleum products on the Ukrainian market, especially in the context of delays in creating a state strategic oil and oil product stock, which is still relevant. The combination of these factors suggests that Ukraine was and still remains in the “red zone” of energy dependence on Russia, which pledges to use the energy component of the war.

2.5. Economic and business relations — Ukraine tied to the RF

The collapse of the USSR became one of the driving forces for the break-up of economic ties between the countries of the post-Soviet space through the introduction of duties, fees and payments, the formation of national security institutions, patent and other restrictions. Russia began to apply the practice of conservation and expansion of economic relations very quickly, where it, based on the difference in economic potential and significant control over business, including large private capital, began active economic expansion. The objectives of this process can be the following: 1) the binding of post-Soviet countries to the Russian market; 2) the seizure of key economic assets with their subsequent destruction or extensive use without significant modernization; 3) expansion into the financial market and in the sphere of banking services; 4) the spread of corruption practices and schemes; 4) conservation of the energy dependence of the newly created countries on the RF, as well as high level of energy consumption of their economies.

The energy sector is one of the key assets, the establishment of control of which was and remains one of the strategic objectives of the Russian Federation. If in the first decade of 2000th Federal Chancellor of Germany G.Schröder, President of the Russian Federation V.Putin and President of Ukraine L.Kuchma initiated the creation of a trilateral consortium for the management of the gas transport system (GTS) of Ukraine 33, then in 2013, Russia frankly demanded that the consortium must be bilateral or Ukraine had to simply transfer the GTS to the Gazprom’s management. 34

33 The signing in St. Petersburg of the joint statement of President of Ukraine L. Kuchma, German Chancellor G. Schroeder and President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on the creation of a trilateral consortium for the development of Ukraine's gas transmission system on June 10, 2002. https://dt.ua/ECONOMICS/energorinok_20_rokov_ne_zalezhnosti__.html

34 Russia will not arrange a tripartite consortium to manage the GTS of Ukraine. [Electronic resource]/Finance.ua.—Access mode: http://news.finance.ua/ua/news/-/297396/rf-ne-vlashtuye-trystoronnij-konsortsium-z-upravlinnya-gts-ukrayiny
At the same time, it is the gas dependence that formed a stable tendency of negative trade surplus with the RF and with its progressive growth. So, if in 2013 the trade exchange of Ukraine and Russia was about 38.3 billion US dollars with a lion’s share of the cost of imported energy resources to Ukraine, then in 2016 — 8.7 billion US dollars without a single cubic meter of gas.

Most of the enterprises of the machine-building and military-industrial sectors of Ukraine were focused on cooperation with Russian companies as a consequence of the preservation of the Soviet production chains, their privatization or control by financial-industrial groups of the Russian origin or non-capital-oriented profits. Already after the seizure of Crimea and the invasion into Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, a number of regulatory documents restricted the cooperation of the military-industrial sector of Ukraine with the Russian Federation, and some of the enterprises remaining in the occupied territory were taken by Russia or dismantled on scrap metal.

The RF has contributed to the arrival of Russian companies and individual businessmen on the Ukrainian market and their participation in privatization. In 2014, in every tenth of the 200 largest Ukrainian enterprises, the owners were Russian businessmen. After the beginning of Russian aggression, a part of the assets was sold, partly transferred to the management of the fast-established companies in Europe, for example, more than 200 petrol stations of the Russian company Lukoil was transferred to AMIC Energy Holding GmbH.

Despite significant progress, Ukraine remains tied to the RF in a number of areas. If coal imports still have opportunities for diversification, for example, petroleum products and especially liquefied gas, as well as nuclear fuel, remain extremely sensitive to Russian spheres of influence. Having failed to create strategic stocks of oil and oil products during the war, Ukraine remains extremely vulnerable to Russia’s actions to block imports of oil products from both the Russian territory itself and the territory of Belarus or even Lithuania.

2.6. Information security gap

The peculiarity of a hybrid war is a so-called mediaization - the strengthening of information support of all other militaristic and non-military methods of warfare. At the same time, Russia’s actions in the information sphere and cyberspace should

35 The volume of trade between Ukraine and Russia fell by $ 30 billion over three years. [Electronic resource] / “Livyi berih”. — Access mode: https://ukr.lb.ua/economics/2017/02/14/358638_obsyag_torgivli_ukraini_i_rosii_tr.html

36 The list of the largest Russian assets in Ukraine was composed. [Electronic resource] / “Livyi berih”. — Access mode: https://ukr.lb.ua/economics/2014/03/19/259973_sostavlen_spisok_krupneyshih.html

not be considered separately, detached from other forms of aggression, they are additional accompanying elements. This can be clearly seen in the so-called “doctrine of Gerasimov”, head of the General Staff of Russia, who described the new conflicts and corresponding tactics of their conduct.

Ukraine was under increased informational influence on the part of Russia long before the beginning of the open aggression in 2014. It may be noted the intensification of information and psychological work in 2008-2009 (after the operation of Russia on the occupation of Georgian territories). According to the director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies V. Horbulin, it was merciless to exploit the opportunities of an open information space for Ukrainians.38 In preparation to the aggression period, Russia’s main information work was focused on the eastern industrial regions of Ukraine and Crimea, but also certain target groups in other parts of Ukraine — civil employees, intellectual and cultural circles, the elderly people.39 However, such activities of the RF did not cause a protective reaction from the Ukrainian authorities and law enforcement agencies and was not perceived as a component of information and psychological operations.

In addition to openness, which in this case can be considered a sign of vulnerability, the active information aggression contributed to the chronic problems with the formation of the Ukrainian media landscape. For example, the dependence of the national information space on foreign media corporations of mainly Russian origin was negatively affected. This was especially evident due to invitation of Russian top management to the Ukrainian TV channels, dominance of Russian television products in Ukrainian cable networks. In the context of the meager support of the domestic film industry, all national and regional TV channels were filled with Russian TV series and films that broadcast the pro-Russian narrative.

The situation on the Ukrainian media market at the end of 2013 was characterized by excessive political engagement and concentration of central and regional media in the hands of the oligarchs and persons close to V. Yanukovych. The state media were openly censored by the central and local authorities. There was informational regionalization, in which through the regional or Russian media the individual regions received a distorted image of the socio-political situation in Ukraine.40 That

38 V. Horbulin. Ukraine has become a key state of confrontation between the West and Russia. [Electronic resource]/Ukrinform. — Access mode: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/2170805-volodimir-gorbulin-direktor-nacionalnogo-institutu-strategichnih-doslidzen.html


made possible manipulation of the population when it was necessary to mobilize the electorate for national elections, and also contributed to the strengthening of Russian information influence, which raised issues of national identity, ethnic and linguistic politics, inter-confessional relations, and internal and foreign policy differences. Informational regionalization contributed to the successful occupation of Crimea and Separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Russia, where for decades a favourable ground was created for the formation of a blurry identity of Ukrainian citizens. This situation was also fueled by the leading role of oligarchic groups and Russian media, which replaced the state in the system of communications at the central and regional levels.

Significant popularity among Ukrainian users of Russian social networks “Odnoklassniki” and “V Kontakte” allowed Russia to use these tools to develop and implement special information campaigns.

In general, the peculiarity of information and psychological operations during Russia’s hybrid war is the use of spheres of state activities and public relations, which in normal peace conditions do not correspond to information threats. The weakness of Ukrainian politics in the information sphere made our state even more vulnerable at the time of Russian aggression. National legislation, which was based on ineffective and declarative principles, that prevented the construction of an effective information security system.

2.7. The vulnerability of cyberspace

Using cyberspace as an asymmetric aggression dimension is a relatively new and less developed phenomenon in terms of understanding of the level of threats and possible counteraction. According to D. Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Information Society Development Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the discussion on the perception of the nature of cyberattacks and their responses began in 2010-2011. In 2011, the document “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare” was adopted, and in 2012, NATO recognized the cyberspace as a new theatre of warfare. However, in practical terms, the response is rather problematic, because it is difficult to prove the involvement of specific countries or groups before committing attacks.41

In general, in spite of Ukraine’s unwillingness to withstand Russia’s cyber attacks, some work on countering offences in the Internet and protecting the state

information and telecommunication systems in Ukraine was organized. The basic normative array was worked out, which laid the basis for ensuring the protection of information in the information and telecommunication systems and the procedure for cooperation between executive authorities in this sphere. However, the concepts of “cyberspace” and “cybercrime” were not mentioned in the legislative framework of Ukraine, and most of the legislative initiatives proposed at that time in the sphere of protection against crime in cyberspace were not supported. Despite that, some elements of the cyber security system existed in Ukraine. Thus, since 2007, the Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA), a specialized structural subdivision of the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, has been operating. However, there was no general coordination of activities.

First of all, as experts note, the activity of Russian intelligence services in the cyberspace of Ukraine until 2013 was not tangible. At the same time, Russian cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia were known. And in 2013, Ukrainian specialists began to record a number of ART attacks aimed at collecting classified or restricted information. Most attacks were suspected of Russian intelligence services and hacker-controlled communities controlled by them.\(^{42}\) The situation changed significantly during the Revolution of Dignity, when separate hacking groups committed actions in support of the Yanukovych regime and Russia.\(^{43}\)

The factors that made possible a creation a favourable environment for conducting cyberattacks by Russia in Ukraine are the following:

- Use of unlicensed software by the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian state organizations that reduced their security;

- Use of unlicensed anti-virus software or software products of Russian origin;

- Low level of security of internal information and communication networks at enterprises and organizations related to critical infrastructure facilities.

2.8. Problematic gaps in the field of fundamental rights

In 2013-2014, Russia used a variety of informational influences concerning the Ukrainian society, which were aimed at promoting inclusion of Russian discourse in the Ukrainian information field regarding the assessment of political events,

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geopolitical orientations. It actually provided the basis for the legitimization of Russian military intervention in Crimea and ORDLO.

In Ukrainian society, views of the Russian political leadership on events in Ukraine were actively disseminated, support was provided to public and political associations and journalists who played the role of repeaters of Russian information messages. They dealt with various spheres, including social and humanitarian policy (speech, inter-ethnic relations and human rights).

During the presidency of V. Yanukovych, the creation of a favourable ground for Russian intervention began - the social and humanitarian policy was conducted according to the Russian patterns. In 2013, human rights activists noted the existence of systematic violations of the social and economic rights of citizens. For example, restrictions on the rights of citizens to peaceful assemblies were recorded, for which the courts, law enforcement agencies, informal semi-criminal organizations were used and patronized by the leadership. Systemic measures were taken to foment internal social confrontation. Weapons were used against peaceful demonstrators in 2013-2014. The laws of January 16, 2014, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in violation of all procedures, contained the borrowed repressive provisions of Russian legislation - in particular, the introduction of the terms “extremist activity” and “foreign agents” regarding NGOs that received foreign grants. In parallel, Russia, in particular in Crimea, conducted a massive information campaign against public activists. In fact, by the efforts of Russia and Yanukovych, any peaceful protest was legislatively turned into an uprising, and the use of force was justified that Russia also used after the planned escape of V. Yanukovych to Russia.

The occupation of Crimea by Russia was held under the slogans of “supporting the Crimeans”, “protecting the rights of Russian-speaking and Russian people against “fascists”, “ensuring local expression of will”, “countering the threat to Russian-speaking people from Ukraine”. Accordingly, the Russian military men without identification marks, “Cossacks” and Russian mercenaries with involved ex-Berkut servicemen and other pro-Russian local people were represented as “local self-defence”. At the same time, there was a gross disregard for the rights of those Crimean residents, mostly Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, who supported unity with Ukraine and carried out numerous actions. Ukrainian authorities were not ready to protect their rights and ensure their security. The conclusions of a number of international bodies, in particular the OSCE HCNM, which stressed that there was no threat to Russians and Russian-speaking people in Crimea, were ignored by the Russian side.
Roughly violating the right of the nation to self-determination and the inadmissibility of external interference in internal affairs, in the spring of 2014, Russia launched the project “Novorossia” to dismember Ukraine, became the main catalyst for aggression in Donbas, and imposed the Ukrainian concept of “federalization”. These projects did not find public support within Ukraine. Thus, according to the results of the sociological study of the Rating Group conducted in March 2014, the majority of respondents (61%) called the unitary state as the most optimal type of a state system in Ukraine, and only 24% supported a federal state.

Against the backdrop of aggression against Ukraine, Russia used a kind of communication campaign, the main theses of which were such fake issues as infringement of the rights of Russian and Russian-speaking people, “rampant fascism” in Ukraine, manipulation of historical memory, aimed at socially legitimizing of Russian aggression in spite of the rights of Ukrainian citizens.

2.9. Vulnerable system of political forces

After Putin became a president, one of the leading policy directions of the RF was working with “compatriots” abroad to intensify the influence of Russia, as well as the support of political unions that supported the necessity of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the RF.

There were wide contacts between Ukrainian political parties and regional political forces with the political leadership of the Russian Federation and oligarchs incorporated into the Russian authorities. For example, one of the Russian Orthodox oligarchs K.Malofeev remembered his numerous contacts with S.Aksionov, leader of the political party “Russian Unity”, which played an important role in the occupation of Crimea, although it was supported by 1 percent of voters in Crimea in 2012. In 2005, the Party of Regions of V.Yanukovych and the “United Russia” signed a memorandum of cooperation for development of a “strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the deepening of economic co-operation”. The Communist Party of Ukraine actively cooperated with the Communist Party of the RF, propagating pro-Soviet ideas. Political projects focused on the Russian Federation were initiated. For example, one of the leaders of the Party of Regions M.Azarov, in 2009, created the Antifascist Forum of Ukraine, which promoted the Soviet-era positive and Russian views on Russia’s role in victory in the Great Patriotic War.

At the regional level, in particular in Crimea, the support of political forces by Russia was massive just after the mid-1990s. For example, the Russian community of Crimea (RCC) was provided with material and political support through various
structures under the control of the MFA of Russia, the Presidential Administration of Russia, Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov, the Institute of CIS countries, the International Eurasian Movement, whose leader Alexander Dugin was an honorary member of the Russian community of Crimea. In 2006, 19 members of the RCC, who rallied on the lists of the Bloc “For Yanukovych!”, the Communist Party of Ukraine and the PSPU, became members of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea.

In 2013, the dominant political force - the Party of Regions, played a key role in the Ukrainian party system with the support of oligarchic business elites, largely integrated with it. Its leader, V.Yanukovych won the presidential election in 2010 due to the promises to legalize dual citizenship and give the Russian language the status of a state language. In October 2012, the Party of Regions won the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Political forces controlled by Yanukovych in the Ukrainian parliament actually legitimized his policy, in particular, on the authorization of power (on September 30, 2010, the Constitution of 1996 was restored with a return to a presidential republic) and changes in the security orientations (declaring Ukraine’s neutral status). Authoritarian tendencies grew in the political system, the activities of opposition political forces were limited (the leaders of the opposition forces were under criminal prosecution — the cases of Yu.Tymoshenko and Yu.Lutsenko).

In this situation, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a number of decisions that potentially destabilized the situation in Ukraine and laid the long-term basis for Russian aggression. So, on April 27, 2010, under the pressure of Yanukovych, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the so-called “Kharkiv agreements”, which extended the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042. On July 3, 2012, the law “On the foundations of the state language policy” was adopted, which actually reduced the role of the Ukrainian language as a state language. Further vicissitudes of the relevant law gave the Russian Federation rhetorical grounds for aggression. For the sake of Russia there was a denial of the Holodomor and other facts of the Ukrainian history.

Russia’s support to political forces in Ukraine and the emergence of pro-Russian parties in the forefront created the basis for Russia’s influence on Ukraine’s policy and further Russian aggression. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities not only reacted poorly to these threats, but also contributed to the spread of such impacts at the highest political level.

**2.10. Undefended history of Ukraine as a benefit for Russia**

One of the threats to the existence and security of the Ukrainian state is that its history has become an instrument of manipulation and a hybrid war of Russia. The purpose of the Russian hybrid aggression on the field of Ukrainian history is obvious - to influence
the formation of the Ukrainian pro-Russian outlook and the Russian view of history. Russian propaganda emphasized the creation of a common historical space of Russia and Ukraine, where the idea of the “Russian World” should dominate, and the role of “younger brother” is assigned to Ukrainians.

For a long time under the rule of Russia, Ukrainians were deprived of the opportunity to independently form their national consciousness and their history. The central issue was Russia’s claims on the historical heritage of Kyiv Rus. At their basis, Moscow laid the thesis of the existence of a common Old Russian identity, on the basis of which a myth was formed that Muscovy and Kyiv Rus have common historical roots, and Russia has “hereditary rights” both to Kyiv Rus and to modern Ukraine. Such a distorted historical approach is used by the Russian leadership to humble Ukraine and justify the aggressive imperial policy of the Russian Federation, because it understands that without a great historical past there is no single “Russian people”, and without Ukraine it is impossible to create a Russian empire.44

Started at the times of Peter I and Catherine II, the case of the abduction of Ukrainian history is continued by Putin’s Russia. In justifying his intention to return Ukraine to the Russian Empire, Putin has repeatedly stated to do this because “we are one people”. While Ukraine did not take active measures to protect its own history, in Russia in May 2009, a special body was created by presidential decree of D. Medvedev - “The Commission under the President of the Russian Federation to Counter the Falsifications of History to the detriment of Russia’s interests”, and it was actively involved into the preparation of hybrid aggression in the historical plane.

The book and media market of Ukraine was captivated by Russian editions on historical subjects, in which the history of Ukraine was distorted and humiliated, and the facts, events, historical figures of ancient history were wrongfully attributed to Muscovy. Despite the large circulation, these publications in Ukraine were distributed at very low prices. Ukrainian historical magazines were produced in a small amount, and the Russian ones were widespread. The Russian Foreign Ministry persistently offered to coordinate Ukrainian textbooks on history with the Russian ones, in order, according to Ukrainian historian V. Viatrovych, to influence the vision of the past of Ukraine and the formation of the national identity of its citizens.45

Using the principle of “divide and conquer”, Russia launched hybrid-historical projects of the Rusyns of Transcarpathia, Polischuks of Polissya, so-called “Cossacks” of the South. In this way, attempts were made to split the Ukrainian people to pieces to drag it to the “Russian World”.

Despite the fact that the hybrid aggression in the historical plane was systematically and persistently conducted, proper attention was not paid to those dangerous processes, and systemic counteraction was not conducted in Ukraine. At the level of the state, there has not been sufficient work to bring the true history of our state and the history of neighbouring countries, in particular Russia. This was facilitated by the fact that many Ukrainians, especially the older generation, perceive the history of the state as it was misleadingly presented in the Soviet Union.
3. GAPS IN STATE SECURITY CAPABILITIES. CURRENT SITUATION

The 2014 hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, which created a real threat to the existence of the Ukrainian state, forced the Ukrainian leadership to review the state security policy and take immediate measures to increase the ability to guarantee the security of the state and society. However, two thirds (64.9%) of experts who participated in the poll conducted from August 18 to 28, 2017, believe that the Ukrainian authorities did not take into account the lessons of 2014 and could not reform the state security system to the level that was necessary to counter hybrid threats from the RF. This indicates that there are still gaps in the state security capabilities.

3.1. Weaknesses of the state security mechanism

Vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the state security system should be considered as dangers, which an opponent would eventually use in order to create a threat (projection of a threat) and subsequently to defeat. The refusal to resolve a number of fundamental issues concerning the legislative definition of the state of war with the Russian Federation leads constantly to ersatz-solutions and will continue to create additional problems. Among the unresolved security issues, vulnerabilities or weaknesses are the following:

- Incomplete legislative procedures on the recognition of the RF as an aggressor, determination of the status of ORDLO as temporarily occupied territories and the refusal to declare martial law on a part of the territory of Ukraine;
- Refusal to break the diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation after the annexation of Crimea;
- Preservation of Ukraine’s participation in the CIS;
- Excessive attention of the supreme state leadership exclusively to diplomatic means of influencing the aggressor through the Minsk process and the Normandy format;
- Excessive readiness to follow in the wake of the policy of certain countries of the Normandy format, whose interests do not coincide with the Ukrainian ones;
- Refusal of active defence and counteraction to the forces of Russia and its quasi-formations (“DNR / LDR”) in the occupied territories;
- Actual refusal to create the territorial defence forces;
- Refusal to transfer OPK (Military-Industrial Complex) to mobilization mode for quick creation of new production facilities (ammunition, unmanned aerial vehicle,

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46 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
etc.), as well as engagement of existing capacities to produce new, modernized and repaired most demanded types of armaments (antitank missile systems, tactical ballistic missile systems, communication facilities, radio-electronic intelligence and electronic warfare etc.);

- Non-alignment with NATO’s centres of excellence for energy security (NATO EnSec CoE), strategic communications (NATO StratCom CoE), cyber defence (NATO CCD CoE);

- Insufficient protection of objects of critical energy infrastructure and failure to take into account lessons of the Balaklia and Kalynivka;

- Absence of national operator of secure mobile communication for security sphere;

- Dysfunction of the SBU as for effective prevention of terrorist and sabotage activities of the enemy;

- Ineffective lustration of the state apparatus, due to which a significant part of the enemy’s agents continues to be active (the case of S.Yezhov);

- Preservation of some external impact contours under the pretext of the need to have an unofficial channel of communication with the enemy, which has become a channel for blocking Ukraine’s active position and deforming influences on politics and economics;

- Inability to ensure development of the capacity for technical intelligence, electronic interception and monitoring of telecommunications and cyber intelligence, as well as the inability to create a modern aerospace intelligence system in accordance with the priority tasks defined in the National Security Strategy (lack of own intelligence satellite);

- Cyber vulnerability of state institutions and critical infrastructure, especially in the energy sphere;

- Political confrontation and abuse of power by the supreme state leadership (the GPU vs NABU, the case of Saakashvili, etc.);

- Economic strengthening of the oligarchic clans that were used by the aggressor and distanced themselves from supporting the country’s defence (according to the results of the mentioned expert survey, 73% of experts called the preservation of the clan-oligarchic model the main factor stimulating the mechanisms of dysfunction and auto-destruction of the state);

- An increase of corruption of the authorities that gives the aggressor additional opportunities for warfare inside Ukraine;

- Lack of coordination at the state level in the field of energy security that allows the enemy to actively push projects of infrastructure damage to Ukraine and Europe (Nord Stream-2, Turkish Stream).
3.2. Slow changes in the establishment of a state defence system

Although today the Ukrainian Army is operative, armed and equipped, but in the defence sector of Ukraine there are still gaps that prevent it from reaching a sufficient level for effective counteraction to a hybrid-type aggression.

After nearly four years of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO), which was rather blurred in the conceptual sense, because it was managed by the SBU, although all the pressure of the aggressor was against the Ukrainian army, its status was changed by a law. On January 18, 2018, the Verkhovna Rada voted for the presidential draft law No. 7163 “On Reintegration of Donbas”, according to which Russia is recognized as an aggressor and an invader, the ATO is proposed to be renamed for “measures to ensure national security and defence, deterrence and repression of Russian armed aggression in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts”, which will be managed by the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and uncontrolled territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are recognized as occupied. However, after approval of this law, the regime of military status in the ORDLO was not still introduced. Almost four years of delay in approving such a law led to cases when Ukrainian defenders were sentenced for their duties to protect the state (the case of the border guard Sergey Kolmohorov, who was sentenced to 13 years47), and pro-Russian militants and their cousins were released (Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal found Yuriy Apukhtin, the organizer of the South-East movement, to be innocent48). It demoralized not only the power structures, but the society as a whole.

Until now, there is a threat that the military formations of the aggressor country, covered under a pseudo-peacekeeping operation, will take part of the territory of Ukraine under military control. Russia declares that an “internal conflict”, not an external aggression, is under way in Ukraine, and the ATO status has indirectly contributed to such a vision. In the absence of a clear declaration of a “conflict with the Russian Federation”, Moscow has the opportunity to continue claiming that Ukraine and the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” are the “conflict” parties that allows Russia to insist on the inclusion of Russian peacekeepers in a possible UN peacekeeping mission in Donbas. The experience of Transnistria and South Ossetia clearly showed that a peacekeeping operation with Russian participants is a legalization of the Russian occupation. While the US, Canada, Germany and other leading countries of the world supported the Ukrainian proposal for a peacekeeping operation in Donbas, Ukraine should consolidate it by legally defining Russia as a party to the conflict.


An important problem is **corruption in the defence sector**, especially in the systems of financial and logistic support of troops. The Ukrainian defence ministry has not got rid of its corruption officials, which by their actions impede the development of combat capabilities of the Ukrainian Army, undermine the trust of society and international partners in it. Thus, according to Mykola Sunhurovskyi, Director of military programs of the Razumkov Centre, a significant deterrent for the United States to supply arms to the Ukrainian Army is corruption in Ukraine.\(^{49}\) In turn, Captain of the United States Navy Gary Tabach noted that today the enemy of Ukraine is not only Russia, but corruption, which prevents a victory over the aggressor.\(^{50}\) Unfortunately, corruption cases in the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Ukraine exist. More recently, in October 2017, detectives of NABU and SAP detained Deputy Minister of Defence Lieutenant-General I. Pavlovskyi and Director of the Department of State Procurement and Supply of Material Resources of the MoD Volodymyr Hulevych on suspicion of squandering 149 million UAH.\(^{51}\) In January 2017, NABU registered the production of possible frauds in the purchase of unmanned vehicles for the army, and in June 2017, the Ukrainian court, on the petition of the SAP prosecutor, arrested seven apartments and 2 non-residential premises owned by the father-in-law of the colonel who was the head of the 1363 Main Defence Representative of the Ministry.\(^{52}\)

After the bitter lessons of 2014, when a significant part of the Ukrainian territory was unprotected, because of the absence of military units and effective **territorial defence** (TD), which would fill those gaps and become the primary defence of the Motherland, the work on forming the TD units started. Despite the wording on the TD in the Military Doctrine of 2015 and approval of the Provision on the Territorial Defence of Ukraine (Presidential Decree of September 23, 2016 No. 406/2016), in the White Paper of 2016, the creation of a territorial defence system was not defined as a priority task for 2017 year. And in the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine of 2016 the TD is mentioned only in the context of legal support for reform measures.\(^{53}\) Positive signs are the creation of battalions of TD in each oblast, and in

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50 Not only Russia: the United States has named the main enemy of Ukraine. [Electronic resource]/ “Sohodni”. — Access mode: https://ukr.segodnya.ua/ukraine/ne-tolko-rossiya-v-ssha-nazvali-glavnogo-vraga-ukrainy--1098017.html


52 NABU, investigating the purchase of poor-quality uniforms for the military, found 7 apartments in the colonel's father-in-law. [Electronic resource]/ “Tsenzor NET”. — Access mode: https://ua.censor.net.ua/news/443639/nabu_rozsliduyuchy_zakupivlyu_neyakisnoyi_formy_dlya_viyiskovyh_znayishlo_7_kvartyr_u_testya_polkovnyka


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the districts — TD troops. In addition, in the united communities, new centres of security began to provide civil protection for the population and territories. They have the support of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), which supplies equipment, including those received from international donors (USAID and others). The centres of security are comprised of volunteers whose task is to respond quickly to threats to human life and help the regular units of the SESU. At the same time, a full-fledged territorial defence system of Ukraine is still in the process of being formed and has no legislative reflection (the Draft Law “On Territorial Defence of Ukraine” was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada in July 2015 and withdrawn for revising in February 2017). There is still uncertain number of issues, including the use of weapons by the TD units.

A great danger for both military men and local residents of Donbas is mines and remains of unexploded ordnance. Ukrainian engineering units carry out demining of objects and separate sites, but for safe living and vital activity of the population in this territory, it is necessary to conduct large-scale humanitarian demining according to the international standards of IMAS. In Ukraine, the law on mine actions, which would legislatively regulate the procedure for integrated clearance of contaminated territories and participation of international organizations and foundations in conducting and financing of such activities, has not been approved by this time. So far, such works are carried out locally, for example, on August 14, 2017, the organization “The Halo Trust” began to assess the degree of pollution of the territories in the Mariupol area. However, as the experience of the Western Balkans shows, this work should be carried out in a comprehensive and coordinated manner by a separate interdepartmental body, a centre for humanitarian demining, the creation of which is delayed, because the mentioned law has not been adopted yet.

Illegal distribution (trade) of weapons became an urgent problem for Ukraine, since its source is the conflict zone in the East of the country. Even in the EU there is growing concern about this problem, because there is a threat that arsenals from the Donbas can be smuggled across Ukraine to the west. So, for example, in 2016, on the border with Poland, the SBU detained cars with illegal weapons and ammunition.

Russia is stimulating this phenomenon, since it is in its interests to flood Ukraine with unrecorded weapons that can easily be used by criminals, terrorists and saboteurs, and to present Ukraine, from this angle, as an extremely dangerous state. Given the uncontrolled section of the Russian-Ukrainian border, through which weapons are massively supplied, and the lack of international control there, the neutralization of this threat remains difficult and unaccomplished task for Ukraine.

54 Reform in Action: In Ukraine, communities continue to create local fire brigades and open security centres. [Electronic resource]/DPSU. — Access mode: http://www.dsns.gov.ua/ua/Ostanni-novini/69270.html
3.3. New functions of law enforcement agencies in current conditions

Requirements for the law enforcement system in conditions of the external aggression against Ukraine are extremely high. Together with the Armed Forces, law enforcement officers are at the forefront of defending the country from the aggressor. After carrying out armed aggression, Russia also uses criminal structures to create additional threats to the security of society and destabilization of Ukraine, and these threats must be countered by law enforcement agencies.

Within the framework of the basic tasks of the law-enforcement system, such as protection of the constitutional system, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens, society and the state as a whole, the fight against crime, the law enforcement agencies are facing separate tasks in modern conditions.

The first of these tasks is a radical reform of the law enforcement system, which has degraded for a long time and thus completely discredited itself in the eyes of society. For all years of independence, despite some attempts to change, the law enforcement system, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, SBU, the prosecutor’s oversight, tax and customs control, has remained such a cumbersome repressive machine as it was created in the Soviet times. Modern conditions require radical reforming of the law enforcement agencies for their transformation into a socially-oriented structure and eradicating the negative legacy of the Soviet authoritarian system.

As part of the reform, it is necessary to significantly improve the level of professionalism and responsibility of employees, ensure the restoration of public confidence in the law enforcement system, will allow closer interaction with citizens. Active cooperation with the population and local communities will ensure the creation of a service model for the law enforcement agencies focused on addressing society issues within the framework of the generally accepted worldwide community policing approach. The reform framework should also cover increased financial and logistic support for staff, which will give them a decent place and role in a democratic society. Thus, as a result of reforming of the system, one of its main functions must be achieved - the modern law enforcement system should become one of the really reliable pillars of the state’s integrity and stability, and the security of its citizens.

The second function of a modern law enforcement system should be protection against new threats and abilities to respond to the latest challenges that has not been fully achieved yet. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shown that the arsenal of external and internal actions, aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian statehood,

56 M. Kryshtanovych. To the iSBUe of the tasks and directions of modern reform of the internal affairs bodies of Ukraine. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.lvivacademy.com/vidavnitstvo_1/edu_42/fail/19.pdf
is very large. Ukraine faced a wide range of destructive tools, the counteraction to which is entrusted to the law enforcement bodies. Among them are:

- Cyber threats - hacker attacks on the United Energy System, bank, governmental and privat institutions are a serious challenge for the law enforcement agencies;

- Constant propaganda aimed at strengthening the public’s distrust to the actual government and making doubts on the legitimacy of the existence of the Ukrainian statehood;

- Manifestations of separatism, through which attempts to shake the south-eastern regions of Ukraine continue;

- Sabotage acts on strategically important facilities and critical infrastructure (subversion of certain sections of the GTS, ammunition stores) that require increased attention to the protection of such facilities, the use of the latest technical methods for monitoring objects;

- The emergence of new criminal schemes in the economic sphere, because the modern criminal world is inclined to centralization and commercial activity;  

- New types, forms and manifestations of corruption aimed at retaining power by persons who seek to use a public post for their own enrichment and, as a result, block constructive decisions (75.7% of Ukrainian experts identified corruption in the law enforcement system as the main problem for the society security);  

- The penetration of the Russian agents to responsible positions in various governmental bodies;

- Outright sabotage or inactivity of officials who, in the context of military aggression against the state, are of a criminal nature;

- Acts of terrorist intimidation, in particular, the noisy assassinations of Sheremet, Voronenkov, and Shapoval (there are gaps in Ukrainian legislation due to the lack of a clear differentiation of anti-terrorist, anti-sabotage and counter-intelligence activities, because the Law of Ukraine “On Counter-Intelligence Activity” does not anticipate counteraction to sabotage acts, but instead includes anti-terrorist activities, duplicating the provisions of the Law “On Counteraction to Terrorism”);

- Uncontrolled migration and infiltration of subversive elements into the Ukrainian society.

57 Main directions of activity of law enforcement bodies in terms of providing economic security. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://pidruchniki.com/12590605/ekonomika/osnovni_napryami_diyalnosti_pravoohoronnih_organiv_schodo_zabezpechennya_ekonomichnoyi_bezpeki

58 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F-%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
Thus, new functions of law enforcement agencies in modern conditions should be revised to ensure the integrity and stability of the state, as well as protection against new threats and the ability to respond to the latest challenges.

### 3.4. What restraints Ukraine’s energy independence?

In order to ensure energy independence, Ukraine should create conditions for the growth of the national economy while reducing energy consumption, for which it is necessary to maximally promote the development of domestic extraction of available resources (primarily natural gas), diversify and reduce dependence on imports, in particular nuclear fuel and petroleum products.

Ukraine is gradually abandoning cross-subsidization of energy resources for different categories of population and moving to market pricing. This process is significantly slowed down by low incomes of the majority of consumers, and the long-term practice of political populism, which has formed an thoughtless consumer culture, reduced payment discipline and environmental consciousness of citizens.

The total Russian offensive on the gas front in 2014 forced the political leadership of the state and NAK “Naftogaz of Ukraine” to take radical measures - to refuse gas import from the RF, initiate litigation in international arbitration and programs for replacing gas in the consumption structure. At the same time, the reform of the gas market was aimed primarily at the national level, leaving on the ground a monopoly of “oblgas” and the influence of companies controlled by oligarch Dmytro Firtash, known for his pro-Russian views. The struggle for the influence on the company-operator of the main gas pipelines is being developed between the leadership of the NAK and the representatives of the pro-presidential political force in the government that jeopardizes the image of the state and the possibility to create preconditions for the transition to the European regime of the functioning of the GTS and the reform of the gas market at the regional level by 2019.

As the experience of many well-known energy companies in the world and the dynamics of development of NAK “Naftogaz of Ukraine” show, the preservation of the state ownership of such an enterprise, in the conditions of development of an effective mechanism for separation from political influence through an independent supervisory board and ensuring the transparency of its functioning, is a justified step. Turning into one of the largest taxpayers of the state budget, the company is also one of the strategic tools in the fight against Russian aggression, because it can provide gas supplies and the work of the gas transportation system in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet of Ministers in the state of emergency or instructions of military administrations in martial law.

The gas industry is currently the most reformed one, with a wide diversification of sources and supply routes. After a significant increase in natural gas prices for most of
the preferential categories of consumers, the chronic budget deficit of the “Naftogaz of Ukraine” was overcome, and it demonstrated an increase in profitability in 2016. At the same time, the company remains the only “supplier of last hope”\(^{59}\) for those categories of consumers who are not able to obtain energy from other sources.

Russian aggression made significant adjustments to the functioning of the United Energy System of Ukraine (UESU). After the annexation of Crimea, its regional power system was disconnected from the UESU and nowadays the “Ukrenergo” cannot provide information about its state.\(^{60}\) Also, the interaction between the UESU and the generating capacities in the occupied part of Donbas is reduced to the minimum necessary volumes.\(^{61}\)

The challenges for the functioning of the UESU, which works in synchronous mode with the energy systems of the post-Soviet area (Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova), are the uninterrupted supply of fuel and electricity consumption. If the latter is provided through the dispatching of all components, the supply of fuel depends on external suppliers. The presence of Soviet nuclear reactors in Ukraine preserves its significant dependence on Russian nuclear fuel, the supplier of which is the “TVEL” fuel company. Due to technological complexity and enormous political pressure, cooperation with an alternative supplier — a Swedish subsidiary of the Japanese-American “Westinghouse” develops slowly. Russia has not yet decided to break off relations with Ukraine in the nuclear sphere, but the likelihood of such a step as an element of aggression persists.

After the Revolution of Dignity, the electricity sphere and the coal industry was almost not reformed, primarily due to the large influence on them of several financial-industrial groups with the leading blocking role of DTEK’s owner, Rynat Akhmetov. In 2014, he played a destabilizing role in disrupting the situation in Donbas with the purpose of blackmailing the official Kyiv, but Akhmetov managed to find a common language with the state leadership and maintain business profit through a number of controversial decisions of the National Commission for state regulation in the energy and utilities (NKREKP), in particular, by the formula “Rotterdam +” (an adopted in 2016 method of price formation on the fuel component (coal) in electricity production at thermal power plants in Ukraine) in support of thermal

\(^{59}\) Naftogaz was the only contender for the supplier of the “last hope”. [Electronic resource]/“Naftogaz of Ukraine”. — Access mode: http://www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweb.nsf/0/809F26F456A306D4C2257F10004D27FE?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,\%D0\%BF\%D0\%BE\%D1\%81\%D1\%82\%D0\%B0\%D1\%87\%D0\%B0\%BB\%D1\%8C\%D0\%BD\%D0\%B8\%D0\%BA%20\%D0\%BE\%D1\%81\%D1\%82\%D0\%B0\%D0\%BD\%D1\%8C\%D0\%BE\%D1\%97%20\%D0\%BD\%D0\%B0\%D0\%B4\%D1\%96\%D1\%97

\(^{60}\) Crimean power-station. [Electronic resource]/Ukrenergo. — Access mode: https://ua.energy/about/struktura/krimska-es/

generation. Delaying the process of changing members of the NKREKP threatens to slow down implementation of the provisions of the law on the market of electricity and preserving existing imbalances between the interests of nuclear, hydro and thermal electricity generation. Efforts to preserve the business of DTEK significantly undermine the possibilities for reforming nuclear generation, for which the lowest tariffs and numerous inspections and lawsuits continue to be applied, although the state-owned company “Energoatom” is simultaneously developing cooperation with alternative Russian suppliers of nuclear fuel, and plans to introduce modular reactors of low and medium capacity from “Holtec”.\(^{62}\)

The long struggle for control over oil refining and oil transportation assets has led to the loss of three of five domestic oil refineries, most of the transit and separate branches of oil pipelines. At the same time, a heavy dependence on the import of petroleum, mainly of Russian origin, which takes several billion dollars annually from the national economy, was formed.\(^{63}\) Only in 2017 the unblocking of the Odessa oil refinery and the restoration of import of oil from non-Russian sources, in particular Azerbaijan, began. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that the RF retains levers of influence on the supply of most of the oil products to Ukraine both from own production and from Belarusian processing.

It is extremely difficult to reform the national economy and utilities in the context of reducing energy consumption and increasing energy efficiency. Only the pressure of the public and international partners promoted the formation of the legislative field of energy efficiency in buildings, utilities accounting, etc. High rates and limited government support for energy saving projects, coupled with weak self-organization of the population, hamper the process of modernizing the housing funds, which remain one of the most expensive in terms of consumption of financial and energy resources both for the population itself and for the state budget (52 billion UAH for subsidies in 2017).\(^{64}\)

### 3.5. Difficult reorientation from the Russian market

For many Ukrainian exporters, the Russian market was largely conserved practices of the Soviet Union with the corresponding GOSTs and the ability to sell goods of not the highest quality. The growth of ownership of Russian businessmen in the

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\(^{62}\) “Energoatom” is studying the possibility of replacing the existing APS units with small modular reactors in the future. [Electronic resource]/UNIAN. — Access mode: https://economics.unian.ua/energetics/1830141-energoatom-vivchae-mojlivist-zamini-diyuchih-energoblokiv-aes-na-mali-modulni-reactori-v-maybutnomu.html

\(^{63}\) In January, Ukraine significantly increased imports of oil and petroleum products. [Electronic resource]/UNIAN. — Access mode: https://economics.unian.ua/energetics/1762142-ukrajina-v-sichni-znachno-zbilshila-import-nafti-i-naftoproduktiv.html

\(^{64}\) In the budget-2017, a subsidy was set at 52 billion — Zubko. [Electronic resource]/Ukrinform. — Access mode: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/2146837-u-budzeti2017-na-subsidii-zaklali-52-milardi-zubko.html
Ukrainian economy has stimulated such cooperation, despite the unpredictability of Russian Rostechnadzor, which is governed not by the WTO or international treaties, but by the Kremlin’s political aspirations in the context of the hybrid war against Ukraine.

After the beginning of the Russian aggression, a broad public campaign against Russian goods was launched on the Ukrainian market. From its part, beginning from 2013, the RF used the trade and economic component of its hybrid aggression, immediately stopping the import of a wide range of products from Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine and Russia introduced a series of sanctions, which created additional prerequisites for reducing trade turnover.

Although the decline in trade reached a minimum in 2016, in the first months of 2017, according to the State Statistics Committee and the Customs Service, it grew. Despite the war, Ukraine continues to trade with the aggressor. A considerable part of the Ukrainian machine building industry cannot find markets outside the post-Soviet space, given the long-term production links and the similarity of technological lag. At the state level, the mechanisms of integration of the relevant Ukrainian enterprises into European production cycles have not been worked out, and their owners are looking for ways to preserve economic ties with Russia, but do not prepare large-scale investment projects for radical upgrading of production.

Political decisions blocked the cooperation of most enterprises of Ukrainian military-industrial complex with Russian companies, but the export of goods (for example, metal semi-finished products), which can be used for the production of arms, continues. Russia can use the transformers and electrical equipment, which Ukraine supplies to the Russian Federation, for supplying electricity to the occupied Crimea.

In 2016-2017, the process of crowding out of the Ukrainian financial market of Russian banks through systematic and coordinated actions of state institutions began. However, since the beginning of 2017, the statistical authorities have reported on the growth of the number of investments from Russian sources to Ukraine, in particular, in the banking and financial sectors.


The strengthening of influence of Russian business on the Ukrainian market was recorded in 2017, when a scandal broke out in the market of liquefied natural gas. The sharp increase in prices coupled with a number of law enforcement and special services indirectly helped some companies to enter the market. They were companies that are associated with Viktor Medvedchuk — “Glusko Ukraine”, “Creativ Trading”, Wexler Global LP (UK) and Gikka Limited (British Virgin Islands) importing liquefied petroleum gas from “Rosneft”.

Meanwhile, the commencement of the functioning of the Association Agreement since September 1, 2017, with an deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, puts new demands indicated in the corresponding programs of mutual simplification of trade regimes and, accordingly, increased competition, and opens new opportunities for Ukrainian business.

Realizing the impossibility of a rapid breakdown of all economic ties with the RF, the state should make considerably more effort to reorient the business and provide conditions for the modernization of existing enterprises. Despite the complexity of the severance of economic ties, this process is a prerequisite for accelerating the restructuring of the national economy, reorienting obsolete industries and low-competitive production, reducing economic pressure from the Russian Federation.

3.6. Ukraine’s information policy: patching holes

Against the backdrop of Russian aggression, Ukraine faces several interrelated tasks in the context of information challenges. The problem of inconsistency of national legislation with the new challenges of information war required immediate solutions. Despite the large number of regulatory acts in the information sphere, the causes and consequences of information aggression, which the majority (51.4%) of Ukrainian experts called the main factor of the vulnerability of Ukrainian society, could not be overcome.69

The lack of an information security system as a coherent and coordinated mechanism has led to duplication of functions and significant gaps in certain areas of information work. Partially coordination functions were assigned to the RNBOU. The Information and Analytical Centre (IAC), created in April 2014 within the RNBOU with the tasks of coordinating activities of the executive authorities on national security issues in the information sphere, worked for only a year till May 2015.70 Only two

69 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD% D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0% BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf

years later, the Information Security Service was created in the updated structure of the RNBOU Secretariat by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of No. 109/2017 dated April 14, 2017.

The Ministry of Information Policy (MIP), formed in January 2015, took over a significant part of the powers in the field of information security coordination. It has become the main body in the state system for the formation and implementation of state policy in the areas of information sovereignty of Ukraine, the state broadcasting and information security. At the same time, the majority (56.8%) of Ukrainian experts called the decision to create this Ministry, as an instrument of information security of Ukrainian society, unjustified.

In 2015, work on conceptual documents in the field of information security began. Within the framework of the Expert Council under the MIP of Ukraine, the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine and the Concept of Information Security of Ukraine were developed. Although this process was open and inclusive, not all the work was implemented in life. For example, the Information Security Concept remains at the stage of the project. Approved in February 2017, the Doctrine of Information Security defined the priorities and national interests of Ukraine in the information sphere, as well as the threats to their implementation. However, it did not become the basis for the development of a comprehensive regulatory system of information security of the state.

The development and protection of the information space of Ukraine placed a number of challenges to the state authorities. The task of creating an effective system to counteract Russian information aggression was complicated by the need for simultaneous processes of reaction and reform.

At the response level, most of the activities were focused on the prohibition of activity of some media and the use and retransmission of certain content. Following the monitoring, the relevant state institutions (the National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine) removed 10 Russian channels from the cable networks. The Ukrainian State Film Agency, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On

72 Promoting building of Ukraine's capacities to guarantee citizens' security in the conditions of hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8E.pdf
Cinematography”, cancelled the state registration of films, which have been produced in Russia after January 1, 2014. In addition, in 2017, Ukraine imposed sanctions against “Yandex Ltd.”, “Mail.Ru Ukraine”, “VKontakte”, “Odnoklassniki”, etc.

The reforming of the information and media space takes place in several key areas that indirectly affect the state of information security. The Law of Ukraine “On the Reforming of the State and Municipal Print Media” launched the process of denationalization and reduction of the influence of state and local authorities on editorial policy. The other direction of reforms was the creation of public broadcasting in Ukraine. Today, these reforms have not yet reached the final stage.

The formation of the system of government communications has also undergone several stages of development, but the process of restructuring is still ongoing. At the end of 2015, Ministry of Informational Policy of Ukraine conducted an audit of government communications, on the basis of which a strategy for the further introduction of changes was developed.

Assistance of Western partners is important. In 2016, the implementation of the signed in September 2015 Road Map of the Strategic Communications Partnership between the RNBOU and the International Staff of NATO started. In March 2016, the MIP together with the RNBOU and the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine held the first meeting of the working group on developing the structure of strategic communications and coordination mechanisms. A plan for the implementation of the Roadmap for the short term has been developed. In some ministries, posts of advisers on strategic communications were introduced, to which foreign experts were invited. However, it would be an exaggeration to talk about the effective conduct of strategic communications by the Ukrainian government officials at the present time, especially with regard to the adherence to the “sole voice” policy in the international environment.

The Law of Ukraine “On the System of Foreign Broadcasting of Ukraine” gave start to work on the creation of Ukrainian information content for foreign consumers. On October 1, 2015, the Multimedia platform of foreign broadcasting of Ukraine, which united the resources of the TV channel UA|TV and Ukrinform, was launched. Since April 2016, the active phase of reformatting the channel in accordance with the world standards of foreign broadcasting began. By the end of 2016, contracts were signed with 58 operators of cable networks in foreign countries.

In December 2015, the Public Diplomacy Department was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, whose functions include the implementation of programs to improve Ukraine’s image abroad. In 2016-2017 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized several large-scale cultural and public events that attracted the attention of the world community to Ukrainian issues.

In October 2016, the government approved the MIP concept of promoting Ukraine in the world and promoting Ukraine’s interests in the global information space. The concept is based on a systemic approach and maximum involvement of all stakeholders. In 2017, a plan to implement the Concept with the involvement of relevant ministries and departments was developed. In 2017, the interdepartmental commission at the MIP was established to popularize Ukraine in the world. However, today it focuses on the issues of national brand development.

Ukrainian civil society plays an important role in the implementation of the information security policy - from participation in public and expert councils to implementation of specific projects of information resistance and popularization of Ukraine. Some public activists in the information sphere even went to the public service to continue and strengthen their activity.

3.7. Disadvantages and achievements in the cyber sphere

According to the conclusion of experts on cyber defence, since 2014, Ukraine has been used as a testing ground of new cyber hackers’ practices for the Russian special services and groups under their control. There have been fixed several types of attacks on informational and psychological impact on the population, illegal collection of information, paralysis of the activities of central authorities, as well as causing material damage to the state and citizens through the disabling of information and telecommunications systems at critical infrastructure facilities.

In the years 2013-2017, cyber attacks against Ukraine were carried out using ART-attacks (Snake, Uroboros, Sofacy/APT28, Epic Turla, Black Energy 2 and 3, Armageddon and others), which were typical for Ukraine. The first system attacks were recorded in May 2014 on the Ukrainian railways and the server of the Central Election Commission during the presidential election. Cyber attacks on the energy sector took place in December 2015 - on “Prykarpattiaoblenenergo” and “Kyivoblenenergo”; in January 2016 — on 4 enterprises of the energy sector of Ukraine; in December 2016 — on the company “Ukrenergo” (consumers of part

of the right bank of Kyiv and the surrounding areas of the region were left without electricity).

In June 2017, Ukraine suffered a large-scale attack of the computer virus Petya-A. The virus-encryptor penetrated a number of networks of Ukrainian public and private institutions, including the site of the Government and a number of ministries, the Pension Fund, the Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA), a number of banks, large state and private enterprises. The Cyber Police of Ukraine managed to stop the next wave of cyber attacks and discover that it was preceded by a collection of data on Ukrainian enterprises. According to experts, this information was the real goal of that cyber attack for further cyber intelligence and subversive actions. Thanks to preventive measures, in October 2017, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies managed to avoid losses and mass distribution of cyber attacks to certain objects, in particular, the Odessa airport, the Kyiv subway, the Ministry of Infrastructure.

Despite such large-scale attacks, the system of protection of cyberspace Ukraine is slowly creating but remains weak. For example, the decision to create a Centre for Cyber Security of the National Bank of Ukraine (CSIRT-NBU) was initiated only in July 2017, after the June attack of the Petya-A virus, which caused significant losses.

In total, at the legislative and institutional levels, work on the formation of an appropriate system for the protection of cyberspace began in 2014. The development of the Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine, the draft law “On Cyber security of Ukraine”, the creation of the National centre of cyber defence and counteraction to cyber threats, the National Centre of operational and technical management of telecommunications networks in Ukraine was launched to meet

75 SBU has established the involvement of RF special services in attacking the virus Petya-A, 01.07.2017 [Electronic resource]. — Access mode : https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-technology/2257453-sbu-vstanovila-pricetnist-spsluzb-rf-do-ataki-virusu-petyaa.html


78 Banks will strengthen their own information security and cooperation on countering cyber threats, 06.07.2017 [Electronic resource]. — Access mode : https://bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=51479152&cat_id=55838
the needs of the state’s defensive capabilities in a particular period.\textsuperscript{79} The National Security Strategy of Ukraine of 2015 for the first time formulated threats to cyber security and the security of information resources, as well as priorities for ensuring cyber security. However, the work is progressing slowly.

Since July 2015, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine has launched the State Centre for Cyber Defence and Counteraction to Cybercrime, created on the basis of the State Centre for the Protection of Information and Telecommunication Systems. In the same year, the Department of Cyber Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine began to operate.

Only in March 2016, the President of Ukraine P.Poroshenko signed a decree, which introduced the decision of the RNBOU dated January 27, 2016 “On the Strategy of Cyber security of Ukraine”. The Cabinet of Ministers, the SBU and the Intelligence Service were instructed to develop and implement annual plans for the implementation of this Strategy. To implement it, in June 2016, the National Cyber Coordination Centre was established in the RNBOU. Among the Centre’s significant activities, there is a deployment of the national telecommunication network and creation of the IT security contour for the protection of state information resources and critical infrastructure objects.\textsuperscript{80}

On August 23, 2016, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) adopted resolution No. 563 “On Approving the Procedure for the Formation of the List of Information and Telecommunications Systems for Critical State Infrastructure Facilities”. In February 2017, by decree of the President, the decision of the RNBOU “On Threats to the Cyber Security of the State and Urgent Measures to Neutralize Them” were put into effect.

In September 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the law “On the Basic Principles of Cyber Security Protection of Ukraine”. The law broadens and clarifies the provisions of the Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine, defines the terms for cyber defence, taking into account the terminology of the EU and NATO. In particular, it was determined that the main subjects of cyber defence are the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the National Police


\textsuperscript{80} Turchynov told Tramp's advisor to create a “protective IT contour”. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/2315427-turcinov-rozpoviv-radniku-trampa-prostvorenna-zahisnogo-itkontura.html
of Ukraine, the SBU, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces, intelligence agencies and the National Bank of Ukraine. These strategic documents determine the achievement of relevant standards in the field of cyber security to the EU and NATO standards.\(^{81}\)

Cooperation with NATO and the EU greatly enhances the potential of Ukraine in confronting threats in the cyberspace. Thus, the NATO Trust Fund to assist Ukraine in building national cyber security capabilities was launched by the decision of the NATO Summit in September 2014. The country-leader of the Fund is Romania. In early July 2017, NATO and the Security Service of Ukraine signed an agreement on the implementation of the NATO Trust Fund on Cyber Defence for Ukraine. The assistance is aimed at building a network of situational response centres for computer incidents and an extensive network of automated event sensors integrated into the information networks of critical information structure objects.\(^{82}\)

The theme of cyber security is also important at the level of cooperation with the EU and some Western partners. The Action Plan for 2017 on the implementation of the Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine provided the implementation of the Directive 2008/114/EC on the protection of critical infrastructure, in particular, on cyber security and cyber defence of critical infrastructure objects. In addition, it is planned to develop a Roadmap for approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU legislation in the field of telecommunications.\(^{83}\) In September 2017, during the first bilateral cyber security dialogue between Ukraine and the United States, Washington announced its intention to allocate more than 5 million US dollars as new assistance to Ukraine in the field of cyber security.\(^{84}\)

### 3.8. Human rights, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. Is the state capable to react?

After the occupation of Crimea and the aggression of the Russian Federation in Eastern Ukraine, new challenges were encountered in the field of the protection of human rights and freedoms. Experts point out that today the key problem factors

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in this area are occupation, military actions and inhibition of reforms. They are connected with “disregard for the rule of law and human rights, populism that engenders political corruption and irresponsibility of power, assurances of large groups of politicians and social activists, that complex problems can be solved in simple ways, in particular, through the use of force and coercion”. Because of the Russian aggression, internally displaced persons - more than 1.5 million people; challenges regarding their rights relate to their social security, employment, housing, and various humanitarian needs appeared in Ukraine.

The application of the norms of the legislation of the Russian Federation on the Crimean peninsula, occupied by it, has brought about significant deterioration in human rights and freedoms - first of all the violations are compulsion to Russian citizenship, restriction of freedom of speech, utterances and peaceful assemblies. Systemic repressions are being observed through the criminal and administrative prosecution of Crimean Tatar and pro-Ukrainian activists. In Crimea, there is the Centre for Countering Extremism, which in actual fact persecutes citizens, especially Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians disagreed with the new authorities. A terrible manifestation of the oppression of indigenous peoples and violations of the rights to freedom of association was the ban by the Russian authorities of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars in 2015 and the complete disregard for the negative reaction of international organizations to this problem.

In turn, Ukraine and the international community have limited opportunities to influence the situation in Crimea and mostly resort to diplomatic assessments, statements and sanctions. In early 2017, it was recorded more than 40 political prisoners on the peninsula. The RF disseminates distorted information about the situation in Crimea and continues to promote anti-Ukrainian sentiments among Crimeans.

Extremely difficult human rights situation is in temporarily uncontrolled districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (ORDLO), where more than 3 million Ukrainian citizens live. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, from the middle of April 2014 to December 1, 2016, 9758 people died in Donbas, more than 2,000 of which were civilians, and another 22,800 were injured. The basic rights and freedoms are violated: the right to life and personal inviolability, freedom of assembly and expression. The facts of repression on pro-Ukrainian positions are

86 The United nations called the number of dead and wounded in the Donbass. [Electronic resource]/ «Express”. — Access mode: http://expres.ua/news/2016/12/09/217008-oon-nazvaly-kilkist-zagybyh-poranenyh-donbasi
fixed; people constantly disappear without a trace, the arbitrariness of the “people’s militia” flourishes, it is impossible to complain about it.\textsuperscript{87}

In Ukraine, there are manifestations of such hybrid effects as the use of quasi-public organizations, media and social networks to destabilize inter-ethnic relations, exploiting the theme of politics of memory and sociocultural issues. For example, in May 2017, in some regions, an advertising campaign of the “Opposition Bloc” was deployed with provocative slogans that spurred the escalation of conflicts: “We demand stopping repression and the onset of Nazism”, “We demand the end of the war”, etc. In June 2016, an attempt to create the Bessarabian People’s Republic was made.\textsuperscript{88} On July 25, 2017, facts of organizing by the Russian curators of pseudo-protest actions aimed at artificially provoking inter-ethnic conflicts in different regions of our country, in particular, in Zaporizhzhia, Odessa\textsuperscript{89} and Zakarpattia oblasts were discovered.\textsuperscript{90}

The Russian media actively highlights the situation in the field of inter-religious relations, in particular, the transitions of communes from the UOC-MP to the UOC-KP are presented as facts of violation of the rights of parishioners of the UOC-MP. Experts recorded cases of such hybrid influences as the spread of rumours about the threat of closing and burning temples of the UOC-MP (in particular, in Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky of the Odesa oblast), which was the source of conflict risks. In May 2017, they stated that the UOC-MP was preparing its statutes according to the patterns of the Russian Orthodox Church, according to which diocesan administrations would have the right to control the whole life and activities of religious organizations. Draft laws No. 4128 and No. 4511\textsuperscript{91}, which should establish a special status for religious organizations whose management centres are located in the territory of the aggressor state, as well as regulate the change of subordination of the religious communities to religious centres by registering a new version of the statute or amending the current


\textsuperscript{88} The head of the SBU explained why the FSB needed to change separatists from Odessa. [Electronic resource] / “5th channel”. — Access mode: https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/holova-sbu-poiasnyv-navishcho-fsb-znadobylos-obminiuvaty-separatystiv-z-odesy-117784.html

\textsuperscript{89} SBU: all fake protest actions in Ukraine are organized and coordinated by the Kremlin. [Electronic resource] / SBU. — Access mode: https://SBU.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/3722#.weAjD3US.dpbs


one, have caused a negative resonance in the UOC-MP. However, these draft laws were not considered by the Verkhovna Rada.

The use of the theme of war and peace in the church’s rhetoric is perceived by society in ambiguous terms. For example, the resonance procession organized by the UOC-MP in honour of the celebration of Volodymyr the Great in July 2016 from Pochayiv (Ternopil oblast) and Sviatohorska Lavra (Donetsk oblast) had pro-Russian rhetoric, but no significant excesses were recorded. The procession caused protests from a number of pro-Ukrainian organizations, but in Kyiv, in the end, everything went without negative incidents.

These events illustrate the long-term use by Russia of sociocultural policies, inter-ethnic, inter-religious relations for rolling out and destabilizing the situation, stimulating the activities of pro-Russian organizations. One of the leading leitmotifs of such influence is a peculiar illustration of the Russian thesis that the war in Ukraine is of an internal nature, because in such kind of events it is not about Russian invasion and influence. Often, the information manifestation of the hybrid war can be seen not only in the topic of carefully selected stories in the media, but also in total silence about this or that topics, for example, the situation with violation of human rights in Crimea and Donbas. Pro-Russian organizations completely ignore these dangerous facts.

3.9. Political parties of Ukraine. Is a stable political system formed?

After the Revolution of Dignity and the fall of the Yanukovych regime, reformation of parties took place in the Parliament and regions, and the majority in the Verkhovna Rada was formed under pro-European slogans. The Party of Regions has ceased to exist, but other political projects were created on its basis. For example, its former members joined the new political party “Opposition Bloc”, created in September 2014. There was a destruction of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and then its proscription in court. 29 parties participated in the elections in 2014 in multi-member districts, and 6 of them overcame the 5% barrier. In total, 10 parties came to the Verkhovna Rada, including candidates elected by the majority system. The experts stated that the party system, which was formed on the results of the elections, had a high level of fragmentation, could lead to the complication of communication in the political dimension, functioning of the parliamentary majority and the government, which could entail complex parliamentary crises.

To a great extent, today’s challenge is not only the issue of reforms and socio-economic relations, but also the positioning of political forces, in particular, in their attitude towards the Russian Federation, and the nature of the war in Ukraine.
Conventionally, political camps were divided into a “party of war” and a “party of peace”. The latter one, despite manipulative rhetoric, largely personifies the representatives of the “Opposition Bloc”, which, in the information space, practically do not talk about the external aggression of the Russian Federation as the cause of the war, and some deputies in general deny the annexation of Crimea, emphasizing the internal conflict.

In the Russian media, the situation in Ukraine is constantly presented as a “civil war”, the facts of the presence of Russian military men in ORDLO are denied, despite documentary evidence of such presence, and the aspiration of Ukraine’s defence and restoration of territorial integrity are referred to the consequences of the policy of the “party of war”. At the same time, rhetoric about “fraternal peoples” or “one people” exists.

In turn, in Ukrainian society, according to sociological research of 2016, only 3% of respondents expressed a very good attitude toward Russia, a good attitude — 13%. At the same time, 21% of Ukrainians were neutral to Russia, and 59% had bad attitude. Experts point out that the annexation of Crimea and events in Eastern Ukraine, the involvement of which the Kremlin denies, reduced the level of good relations with Russia three times compared to 2012. Political parties in one or another way take into account similar tendencies in their activity.

3.10. The policy of correction of historical memory as a counteraction to hybression

An important component of the undeclared hybrid war that the Russian Federation is waging against Ukraine is the manipulation of historical memory. Russia tries to interpret modern events and processes in the light of the ideas inherited from the USSR, and it is a part of the strategy to restore its status as a great power and a world leader.

Counteraction of such imperial strategy of the Russian Federation should become the main task of the policy of national memory of Ukraine. The condition for the effectiveness of countermeasures of historical hybression is aggressiveness and bias. That is, one should not only look for arguments to refute Russian historical insinuations, but also discredit the Russian vision of history. A historically grounded Ukrainian point of view on the main historical processes, phenomena and events, historical figures of both Ukraine and the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union should be worked out and channels for bringing it to the citizens of Ukraine and the world community should be created. At the same time, it is necessary to take into

account the fact that historical events and personalities are assessed differently in different regions of Ukraine. To create a common basis for historical memory, a set of measures is required at the national level, but it has not been developed yet.

A special component of the policy to remedy the national memory and countering hybression should be condemnation of the crimes of communism and development of the Ukrainian point of view on the Second World War and justification of the historical gap between modernity and the socialist past — a period when not only history but also the existence of the Ukrainian people were threatened.

As rightly noted by Anthony Giddens, the researcher of the history of nations: “A nation should not only boast its far past, on which it is possible to base its promise of immortality, but it must be able to unfold a glorious past, a golden age of saints and heroes... As fuller and richer is the ethno-history, the more convincing becomes its claim and the deeper the chord it can strike in the hearts of the nation’s members.”

At present, measures to formulate a policy of national memory are somewhat at odds with the needs of Ukrainian society, and therefore the main challenge today is the reformatting of historical memory in such a way that it is modernized and adapted to the challenges and needs of the present.
4. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EU AND EAP COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPING STATE CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER HYBRID THREATS

Trying to counteract the EU Eastern Partnership Initiative, Russia struggles to exert pressure on its participating states. In this regard, the European Parliament even approved a resolution stating that the European Union is ready to protect the countries of the Eastern Partnership, taking into account Russia’s increasing pressure. The document, among other things, condemns the Kremlin’s attempts to impede deepening of the political and trade relations of the EaP countries with the EU.\(^{93}\)

During the survey conducted from 18 to 28 of August 2017 by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” with the support of the EU and the International Renaissance Foundation, Ukrainian experts, who participated in it, called Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Romania, Germany, USA, Finland, France, Great Britain and Croatia as examples for Ukraine in the development of its capabilities to guarantee the public security in conditions of hybrid threats. However, besides the Baltic States and Poland, the experience of other countries of the Eastern Partnership — Georgia, Moldova and Belarus, which also faced the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation, including involvement of the military component as for the first two, is also important for Ukraine.

In general, according to the experts, Ukraine can use the following experience of these countries: consistency, efficiency and systemicity of state institutions; purposefulness of the policy to counteract threats; creation of an effective mechanism for guaranteeing the public security; strengthening the regulatory framework for counteracting hybrid threats; information policy and resistance to propaganda; systematic cyber security; fight against corruption; reforming the sphere of defence and changing the attitude towards the army; creation of a territorial defence system; continuous improvement of law enforcement agencies; interaction of law enforcement agencies with the society in countering threats; creation and use of patriotic paramilitary structures; personal responsibility of citizens for security; overcoming of the Soviet heritage.

4.1. Poland strengthens counteraction to hybrid threats

The theme of the war of hybrid type was worked out in Poland after a fairly quick recognition of what Russia was doing against Ukraine in 2014. At first, Polish anxiety was due to the lack of clarity of Russia’s future intentions in Europe and the possibility of aggressive actions against Poland, neighbouring Baltic States, as well as NATO and the EU, which the RF identified as unfriendly Western alliances.

\(^{93}\) For the sake of the association Moldova is ready to withstand any pressure from Russia. [Electronic resource]// “Chernivtsi Times”. — Access mode: http://times.cv.ua/2013/09/22/zarady-asotsiatsii-moldova-hotova-vytrymaty-bud-yakyj-tysk-rosiij/index.html
Over time, Poland came to the conclusion that Russia’s potential hybrid aggression against Poland in the Ukrainian model was unlikely, because, unlike Ukraine, the Polish society was rather monolithic, had little in common with the split post-Soviet societies and was less exposed to Russian information influence. Subsequently, after the change of power in the country in 2015, the motivation for a deeper understanding of the topic of hybrid wars was supplemented by the desire to adopt and adapt technologies of its conduct to the Polish strategic arsenal.

In countering hybrid threats, Poland makes the main stake on multilateral cooperation within the framework of NATO and the EU. Warsaw also actively pursues a line of cooperation between the two alliances for the sake of their mutual reinforcement on the principle of “together better than alone”. This is due to the shortcomings of current NATO policy based on a quick armed reaction, which has weaknesses in case of a conflict of the hybrid type. Firstly, NATO Member States cannot have unanimity in identifying the source of a threat that will create a significant barrier to rapid joint action. Secondly, there is not enough powerful military force to combat hybrid threats, and deterrence, based solely on military force, is not reliable.

On April 16, 2015, the National Defence Academy in Warsaw hosted the first conference on possible threats and challenges to Poland’s national security in the context of the war in eastern Ukraine. The subject of attention was the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as an example of a modern hybrid war. The main conclusion was that hybrid warfare was becoming a permanent element of world politics, and therefore it was necessary to learn how to live with this phenomenon and respond effectively to it. In 2015, the National Security Bureau of Poland came to the conclusion that, taking into account the geopolitical position, the country should develop a separate doctrine on the issues of the hybrid war, based on its peculiarities. Since the hybrid war blurred the difference between war and peace, Poland had to define the border between aggression and pressure. This fuzzy border was a transition from a threat to use force to an actual use of force. Developments to counter hybrid threats were carried out in two dimensions - non-military and military.

The supreme state leadership of Poland, unlike other NATO and the EU member states, quite quickly made appropriate conclusions from the “Ukrainian crisis”. The level of defence spending was increased (more than 2% of GDP)\(^94\), the technical modernization of the army was carried out, which, after revision of the relevant law, could be used for reaction to crisis situations.

Poland makes a serious emphasis on the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). In 2013, a few months before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Republic of Poland (RP) revised the military doctrine, emphasizing territorial defence. The restoration of the TDF

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was started at the end of 2015 due to the appointment of the respective authorized person on the post of the Minister of Defence. Already in April 2016, the Concept for the Establishment of Territorial Defence was approved, and in November of that year, the Parliament introduced the necessary amendments to the law on general military duty and some other laws that were immediately signed by the President of the Republic of Poland. From March 29, 2017, the Territorial Defence Forces started full-fledged activities and should reach 50 thousand people by 2022. In the framework of the first stage of the formation of the TDF three brigades were formed in the east of Poland - in Bialystok, Lublin and Rzeszow. According to the plans of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland, by the year 2019, 17 brigades must be formed - one in each of the 16 voivodeships and two in Mazovia, the largest voivodeship in the east of the country.

The task of the TDF, in addition to traditional measures of anti-crisis response, disaster management and search and rescue operations, is the implementation of: joint activities in cooperation with the regular troops of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Poland; independent anti-sabotage and anti-landing operations, as well as non-traditional operations; embranchment of NATO allied forces in certain areas of their deployment; strengthening and protection of non-military structures; information actions. On the basis of the order of the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland, the TDF cultivate the traditions of the Armia Krajowa.

The strengthening of defence capabilities of the Republic of Poland in the east is caused, among other issues, by the Suwalki Gap - a strip along the Polish-Lithuanian border, which is about 100 kilometres long, separating the territory of Belarus from the Kaliningrad region of the RF. It is believed that Russia can resort to breaking through the corridor for land isolation of the Baltic countries from other NATO and EU member countries, and to create additional operational and strategic advantages in the military campaign against the Polish Armed Forces and units of other NATO countries stationed in Poland and the Baltic.

Fig.4. Suwalki Gap.
Under such circumstances, the TD Forces can play a significant role in counteracting Russian aggression, preventing the enemy from establishing permanent control in the corridor area.

Another strategic direction, which was identified in 2015, is information and cyber security. The cyber security doctrine of the RP was approved in January 2015. The project of the doctrine of information security of Poland was worked out in the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland. According to this document, the security of the Republic of Poland, among other things, may be threatened by the creation of a negative image of the state on the international scene, in particular among NATO member states and the EU, can lead to escalation of tensions in bilateral and multilateral relations. It is supposed that this can be achieved by showing the image of Poland as a country with xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments, and hostile special services can inspire the deterioration of Polish-Lithuanian relations through the formation of disinformation flows about the existence of Polish armed separatism in the Vilnius region. In a similar way, according to the developers of the draft doctrine, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict can erupt against the backdrop of the complex historical past. It was pointed out a possibility of terrorist acts that allegedly could be carried out by Ukrainians against Poles and vice versa.

After the change of power in the Republic of Poland as a result of the October elections in 2015 and the victory of the authoritarian-conservative party “Law and Justice”, the doctrine of information security has never been approved. As a result, the Polish authorities, without external interference, complicated their relations both in multilateral formats (EU) and in bilateral relations with Lithuania, Ukraine and Germany. In addition, external stimulation should also be considered, including the well-known Zhirinovsky’s letters of 2014 to the authorities of some Central European countries - Poland, Hungary and Romania. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, according to the Kremlin’s plan, should lead to similar actions by Poland in relation to the part of the former “eastern chists” - the western region of Ukraine. The rapid evolution of the leadership of the Polish ruling party and the government in the 2016-2017 period from the strategic partnership with Ukraine to the complication of relations with Lithuania, forces Kyiv and Vilnius to assess the probable challenges from Poland as a country with unpredictable consequences of political transformations. Poland had certain experience of organizing quasi-hybrid

95 In particular, it is stated in the letter that: “Short of war the USSR leadership, trying to protect itself and its allies, was practically forced to include the part of Bessarabia, owned by Romania, in the Soviet Union. Today it is the Chernivtsi oblast on the territory of Ukraine. In addition, geopolitical considerations dictated the expansion of the USSR due to a number of originally Polish territories. These are Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne oblasts. These lands have always been part of the Polish state... Another, no less eloquent example — Zakarpattia, the region, ethnically and historically refers to Hungary … Why would not Poland, Romania and Hungary think about getting a referendum on the territories of the abovementioned regions of Ukraine, as well as in the neighboring regions of Poland, Romania and Hungary? There is a question - the possibility of returning the Chernivtsi oblast to Romania, Zakarpattia to Hungary, and five regions of Ukraine - Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne - to Poland”.
operations to capture a territory of a neighbouring country. Thus, after World War I, Vilnius and Vilnius County of the newly-established Lithuanian state were occupied by the “rebellious” division of General L.Žilikhovsky on the orders of J.Piłsudski. The state of the Middle Lithuania was proclaimed and subsequently annexed to Poland.96

Thus, Polish developments on the issues of hybrid wars deserve deep attention in Ukraine in the context of borrowing positive experience of systemic actions of the authorities in the field of the formation of territorial defence, cyber defence and counter-intelligence activities. It is necessary to monitor the growing potential of anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Poland, which is only partly a cue from Russian templates (historical manipulations) and is largely a product of the actual Polish developments. According to the systematization and stage of preparation for a hybrid war, such actions on the Polish side may be a manifestation of the crypto enforcement in Ukraine in two basic determinants: information and communication, cultural and humanitarian.97

4.2. Baltic front of counteraction to hybrid aggression

In the Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where large Russian-speaking minorities live, there is a danger that Russia, possessing the large army and the nuclear component and realizing the military power of NATO and its readiness to defend its member countries, uses nonlinear hybrid methods to harm the Baltic countries, especially taking into account that the Alliance has not decided on the mechanism of application of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the case of a hybrid war. Therefore, with the support of the EU, NATO and the United States, the Baltic countries pay great attention to countering hybrid threats, as exactly there

96 The capture of Vilnius by Poles was staged as an arbitrary action by the command of the Division of L. Żeligowski, which came out of control of Warsaw. Everything was presented in such a way that the faithful forces of Żeligowski rushed into the battle to avoid letting the “Lithuanian, Bolshevik and German” graves of the Polish ancestors abuse themselves (Poles looked at independent Lithuania as a puppet entity created by the Germans). Three years later, Piłsudski admitted: “I organized the L.Żeligowski movement by myself. My order was actual until the end”.

97 Crypto enforcement (hidden constraint, implicit compulsion - from the Greek κρυπτός and English enforcement) is a separate stage of unfriendly acts in an implicit form that are not perceived as aggression. It is a phase that precedes hybrid aggression, but is not the stage of the hybrid war itself. Crypto enforcement is a form of hidden, systematic and long-term depletion of the vital potentials of the enemy, which lasts until the time when a decision is made to aggression of the classical or hybrid type.

Informational and communicative determinant: If a neighbouring country develops a powerful advocacy apparatus for a foreign audience, including from within certain countries, it is an indicator of crypto-analysis and its preparation for potentially unfriendly actions regarding the country (groups of countries), whose population is targeted informatively, psychological treatment.

Cultural and Humanitarian Determinant: If a neighbouring country initiates a variety of cultural, linguistic, religious, educational and other humanitarian projects that enhance its role in the civilization dimension, not only in its own territory but also in neighbouring countries, it is an indicator of crypto-analysis and training to unfriendly actions in the future.
Russia can inflict a tangible blow to the Euro-Atlantic unity and the authority of Brussels and Washington.\(^8\)

Among the three Baltic countries, the most vulnerable to Russian hybrid threats, as defined by RAND Corporation, are Latvia and Estonia, as they have a common border with the continental part of the Russian Federation (excluding the Kaliningrad enclave) and quite numerous Russian minorities (27% of ethnic Russians are in Latvia, 25% - in Estonia, 6% - in Lithuania).

In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, one notes that their countries have faced non-military attacks for decades, in particular, the influence of Russian propaganda and cyber attacks. According to their opinions, Russia seeks certain control over political decisions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and also aspires to undermine the unity within the EU and NATO. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States turned to the creation of a clear identity in accordance with their nationalities and languages. Estonia and Latvia announced the legal continuation of the functioning of their governments that existed before 1940 and were in exile until independence was restored.\(^9\) Thus, these states succeeded, perhaps not completely, in filtering out the flow of old Soviet cadres to the central authorities. This helps now the Baltic States in confronting the hybrid effects of Russia and, together with membership in the EU and NATO, is an important factor of their security.

At the same time, the Baltic States believe that it will be difficult for NATO to launch a collective defence mechanism if the aggression against a member country is hybrid, for example, with the use of ethnic minorities, as Russia did in Ukraine, without resorting to or hiding the use of troops. Therefore, all three countries joined the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (although initially the leadership of Estonia did not support this idea) and now they are active in combating hybrid threats.

The probability of a \textbf{military offensive} of the Russian army to the Baltic countries is low, but Russia is likely to resort to actions that will show the lack of unity in NATO and the Alliance’s readiness to defend its member countries. Such actions are violations by the Russian Federation of the air and maritime spaces of the Baltic States, provocative actions on their borders, demonstration of force through tactical and strategic exercises, and deployment of a powerful Russian grouping on the borders, which has led NATO to return to its deterrence strategy, especially on the

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\(^9\) Ibid.
eastern flank. According to the decision of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, four battalion-sized battlegroups totalling approximately 4,500 troops have permanently deployed to the Baltic nations and Poland. The Alliance’s air patrol mission in the Baltic airspace continues. On a non-permanent basis, there are warships of NATO countries in the Baltic Sea area. At the same time, NATO units are potential targets of provocations by the pro-Russian forces in the Baltic countries, as the Intelligence Service of Estonia warns.\(^\text{100}\)

The Baltic States also emphasize the need to strengthen the military component of the European Union. So, at a meeting of the EU ministers of defence in Tallinn in September 2017, Lithuania called for the creation of a “Military Schengen Area” to expeditiously transfer troops across the territory of Europe.\(^\text{101}\) This initiative further led to the creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund. Lithuania, by the way, has headed one of the areas of PESCO cooperation - cyber security, with the creation of a rapid response group.

Taking into account the relatively small security and defence structures of the Baltic States, which are not capable of opposing Russian military units on their own, particular attention is paid to enhancing intelligence as a key component of timely warning about Russia’s covert (hybrid) actions against these countries, as well as a way to study hybrid tactics of the RF in order to determine measures of counteraction and forces needed for their realization. So, in April 2017, the State Security Department (VSD) and Second Investigation Department at the Ministry of national defence (MND) of Lithuania published a report in which all major threats were linked to Russia and Belarus, and the main of these threats were espionage and cyberattacks from the Russian side.\(^\text{102}\)

With regard to the experience of Russia’s use of “little green men” in Crimea and Donbas, in December 2016, Latvia forbade to wear a military uniform to persons who are not related to the Latvian Army. For the illegal wearing of military uniforms there is a fine of 2 thousand euro, and for unauthorized trade of the uniform or

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100 Estonian intelligence have warned about Kremlin “honey traps”. [Electronic resource]/ “24th channel”. — Access mode: https://24tv.ua/estonska_rozvidka_poperedila_pro_medovi_pastki_z_boku_kremlja_n784803


distinctive signs of the Lithuanian army — up to 20 thousand euro.\textsuperscript{103}

In the case of hidden aggression of the RF, an important task of the Baltic States is the detention of the entire territory under the control of national security structures. Therefore, the role of \textit{territorial defence} (TD) and local security services has increased.\textsuperscript{104} For example, territorial defence in Estonia (Kaitseliit) is organized according to a regional principle in 15 counties. The structure of its units (about 20 thousand people) includes local residents who have been trained and formed in a unit. They keep arms at home, are subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in wartime they are transferred to the operational subordination of the Estonian Armed Forces. Since Estonia’s TD is based on the historical heritage (Kaitseliit appeared in 1917-1918), the TD forces consist mainly of ethnic Estonians with a high level of patriotism. In addition to TD troops, local police assistants and volunteer rescuers operate in Estonia. Their groups are formed on a regional basis in communities and include individuals who have been selected and trained and have the necessary equipment. The formation of such groups began with an information and awareness campaign, during which the population was told about the need to take responsibility for community security.

According to the RAND Corporation, one of hybrid threats to the security of the Baltic States is a \textit{network of organized crime} tied with Russia, which can be used as an intelligence tool in favour of the Kremlin and an instrument for internal political destabilization.\textsuperscript{105} A number of Latvian and foreign political scientists called Latvia one of the centres of Russian organized crime.\textsuperscript{106} However, forensic experts and Latvian deputies point out the success of national law enforcement agencies in reducing such presence and influence of the RF, although the use of the Latvian financial sector for money laundering is worrying even the European Commission.

With the aim of counteracting Russian propaganda, the Baltic States are resorting to prohibition of content and channels, which threaten national security, as well as soft countermeasures to stimulate alternative channels of informing the population. So, in order to create a counterbalance to the propaganda of Russian television channels,

\textsuperscript{103} Illegally wearing military uniforms will be fined in Latvia. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://zbroya.info/ru/blog/11559_v-latvii-budut-shtrafovat-za-nezakonnoe-noshenie-voennoi-formy/

\textsuperscript{104} Sam Jones, “Estonia Ready to Deal with Little Green Men,” Financial Times, May 13, 2015

\textsuperscript{105} Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats and Potential Responses. [Electronic resource]/RAND. — Access mode: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1577.html

in February 2018, in the south-eastern regions of Lithuania, where a large number (200,000) of ethnic Poles live, broadcasting of Polish TV channels - TVP Info, Kino Polska International, Kino Polska Muzyka International - begins, for which the budget of 350 thousand euro is foreseen. Polish TV channels should push the Russian ones, which have been still quite popular among the Polish population of Lithuania.  

**Pro-Russian organizations** in the Baltic States are mainly aimed at protecting the Russian language or “anti-fascist” rhetoric, which is heated by Russian propaganda, but their separatist mood is very low. Russian-speaking residents of Estonia and Latvia are well aware of the difference between the quality of life in Putin’s Russia and the Baltic States, and therefore they do not want to become citizens of the Russian Federation. Ethnic Russians are well integrated into societies in the Baltic States. In addition, living standards in areas of compact residence in Latvia and Estonia are higher than in neighbouring regions of the Russian Federation. This powerful restraining factor does not allow the Kremlin to use ethnic Russians to inflame separatist sentiments but it is not an obstacle to “pouring” the domestic political situation in the Baltic States with the use of the thesis of minority rights, language protection and preservation of history. This shows that Ukraine should pay attention to the socio-economic development of the areas along the border with the Russian Federation, so that an unsatisfactory standard of living there does not become a basis for separatism, on which Russia played in the Crimea in 2014.

For residents of the Baltic States who are unable to integrate into their societies, there is a status of “non-citizens”. In most cases, these are ethnic Russians who have not been able to obtain the citizenship of the Baltic States mainly due to lack of knowledge of the state languages. In Latvia, non-citizens are accounted to 12.2% of the total population, and in Estonia - 6.2%.  

It would be useful to use this experience in Ukraine. De-occupation of temporarily uncontrolled territories (Donbas and Crimea) should preview the procedure for restoration of the Ukrainian citizenship. Persons who renounced the citizenship of Ukraine and assisted the invaders must undergo appropriate procedures and obtain the status of “non-citizens”, and for obtaining the Ukrainian citizenship they should to fulfil certain requirements.

The Tatar and Polish communities of Lithuania are under the hybrid attack. The VSD of Lithuania believes that the RF seeks to use local Tatars in the interests of

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legitimizing the annexation of Crimea. Russian diplomats constantly emphasize the fact that in Lithuania the rights of ethnic Russians and Poles are violated and they demand “to grant an exclusive rights to the Polish community of the Vilnius region”, trying to create the preconditions for exerting the same rights for ethnic Russians in the Baltic States.

Russia is also trying to act through political forces. For example, in Latvia, it is worrying that the Harmony Centre (a political party) is financed and has close ties with Moscow that poses risks to the security of the country. A similar attitude is to Savisaar Centre Party. However, to neutralize these risks no Latvian or Estonian political forces go to a coalition with a pro-Russian political force. The fuse is a strong pro-European and pro-NATO political consensus in these countries.

Security Services of Estonia\textsuperscript{109} and Latvia\textsuperscript{110} have expressed concern about the use of a “distorted history” by Russia to undermine the sovereignty and security of the countries, in particular the imposition of an alternative vision of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, in which the Baltic governments are referred to as “fascist”.\textsuperscript{111} In 2007, correction of the Soviet-distorted history in Estonia led to a serious aggravation of the internal political situation, when after the replacement of the monument “Bronze Soldier” from the centre of Tallinn to the military cemetery about two thousand ethnic Russians attended the massive riots. Then the adviser to the President of Estonia Merlo Maigre called these events “a conflict of a hybrid nature”, and the Estonian people “woke up” and the work on developing measures to prevent the recurrence of such cases began.

4.3. Hybrid War: Georgian State Lessons for Ukraine

Georgia has a tragic and multifaceted experience in countering various forms of Russian aggression. In the early 1990s, different separatist movements started their activities in the territory of the country and received immediate assistance from Russia after Georgia’s independence declaring. It was Russia that intervened in the confrontation between the first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze. At the height of the confrontation and with assistance from Russia, separatists from South Ossetia and Abkhazia succeeded in their activities. Focus of Georgia on integration into NATO and the EU was one of the reasons for further inflammation of inter-ethnic conflicts and later on the war provoked by Russia in 2008. Since then, nearly a decade the confrontation does not cease, requiring significant efforts from Georgia to resist multi-factor threats of political, economic,

\textsuperscript{111} Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats and Potential Responses. [Electronic resource]/RAND. — Access mode: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1577.html
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financial and security nature. In addition, the above events are interpreted as elements of Georgia’s struggle for its independence, and the concept of hybrid war started to be applied by Georgia only after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

After-war lessons of Georgia

The Russo-Georgian War 2008 contributed to the national security system development. The National Security Council (NSC) of Georgia intensified its activities in identifying and overcoming gaps, in particular, preconditions for implementation of the following processes were established:

- Institutionalization of the Government’s approach to the national security planning as an integrated process;

- Interdepartmental cooperation deepening within the process of the national security policy planning (political level - Interdepartmental Commission at the level of the Deputy Ministers of the NSC, managerial level - Interdepartmental Working Groups at the level of Departments, operational level — provision of communication, support and supervision over the daily activities by the National Security Council of Georgia);

- Development of the state authorities’ capabilities involved in cooperation with the National Security Council of Georgia through the relevant trainings;

- Transparency, openness and inclusiveness of the process of the national security policy planning through cooperation with the Parliament, NGOs, partner countries and academic circles.

Constitutional changes and the changeover of the ruling coalition in 2012 have made some adjustments to the process of the national security development in Georgia. The vertical system of subordination under the auspices of the National Security Council was changed, and the process of legislative reformatting towards the parliamentary republic was initiated.

Methods of threats neutralization to the national security of Georgia

Georgia still believes that possible Russian offensive targeted at the occupation of the whole territory of the country and establishment of a pro-Russian government are the key threats to its national security. The only format to counteract such threats, as defined in the Strategic Defence Review, is Georgia’s accession to NATO, but it is not clarified by the Alliance at this historic stage.\(^{112}\)

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Georgia is constantly facing the “creeping” Russian occupation, when the armed groups of self-proclaimed republics and Russian military displace the signs of delineation into the Georgian territory. Georgia cannot currently offer an effective mechanism to counteract such actions, because it fears another large-scale armed conflict, and official statements and complaints at the international level do not bring any benefit.

Only in 2017, Georgia officially recognized Russian propaganda and “soft power” as threats and initiated relevant countermeasures. Georgia has set up the hybrid war as a separate type of threat to its security. Therefore, today, this country is actively studying the experience of Ukraine, the Baltic States and the EU regarding formation of a system to combat hybrid threats.

In particular, Georgia did not include the issues on counteractions to terrorism as a threat to the national security in its Strategic Defence Review, thus reducing the weight of such factors: citizens’ participation in IDIL and Al-Nusra; proximity to traditional routes of radical forces through the Caucasus; manifestations of the respective activities of groups of Chechens, Abkhazians and Ossetians supported by Russia; the threat of radicalization of the population.

**National Security Bodies**

The key national authorities guaranteeing national security of Georgia are the *National Security Council of Georgia, the Ministry of Defence of Georgia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and the Ministry of Finance of Georgia*. Each of these state authorities has its legally defined scope of competencies and relevant structural divisions to analyse, take, implement, control and review their decisions.

The *National Security Council of Georgia*, as the consultative body of the President of Georgia, exercised coordinating and supervisory functions in the national security system and was responsible for the creation and development of the armed forces. This situation continued even after the constitutional changes in 2004 and until 2012, when the country moved to the parliamentary system of governance. Since 2012, the National Security Council of Georgia has lost some of its powers resulted from the powers redistribution from the President in favour of the Government. According to the Atlantic Council of Georgia, this had a negative impact on national security, since the National Security Council of Georgia was taken away from the functions of forming an integral system of national security, turning it into a purely advisory body.113

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In 2013 the Government of Georgia established the Council for State Security and Crisis Management\textsuperscript{114}. The Ministers of Internal Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance of Georgia were included in this Council, which in general is similar to the structure of the National Security Council of Georgia\textsuperscript{115}. The functioning of both state institutions thus looks like a duplication and does not contribute to effective coordination and development of national security, although the Government’s Council plays a decisive role.

**Legislative changes**

*The Concept of the National Security of Georgia* is a fundamental document on which the state policy for responding to identified threats is based\textsuperscript{116}. The third edition of the Concept was approved in January 2012 (the first two - in 2005 and 2011). According to the British analyst agency Chatham House\textsuperscript{117}, the updated document has a number of strengths and weaknesses and is deprived of unbiased strategic analysis. A key advantage of the Concept updated was awareness of the multifaceted nature of the state security system, which should include, in addition to military and diplomatic events, systematic activities for economic development, overcoming one-sided dependence and creating balanced trade and economic relationship, reliability and stability in energy supply, increase in citizens’ confidence to the national authorities, and balance between the local self-governance and central institutions.

Significant drawbacks of the Concept are: no comprehensive state policy for sustainable economic growth; no realistic program to overcome economic poverty and unemployment; disregard for political education of the citizens and their removal from political processes in the country; insufficient level of attention to the situation in the Caucasus as a whole; no scenarios for possible development of relations with Russia; unreasonable expectations from the EU and NATO in the context of their contribution to security and development of Georgia; weakness of the institutional foundations for democratic ruling in Georgia; consequences of internal migration processes of the population, in particular, internally displaced people, for the economic development of the state.

*National Threat Assessment Document* is a conceptual document, which includes a retrospective analysis of the previous years with appropriate scenario predicting

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\textsuperscript{115} National Security Council of Georgia. Structure. [Electronic resource]/NSC Georgia. — Access mode: https://nsc.gov.ge/eng/static/37

\textsuperscript{116} National Security Concept. [Electronic resource]/MFA Georgia. — Access mode: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/NationalSecurityConcept.aspx

future development and describing threats to the national security, level of their possible occurrence and outcomes.

In 2009, the National Security Review preparation was launched, which intended to implement three logical and interrelated stages: 1) the Concept of the National Security and National Threats Assessment adaptation; 2) coordination in the strategic documents’ development; 3) the National Security Strategy development. After constitutional changes, above process was suspended until changes and amendments to the laws of Georgia in terms of the powers transfer between the branches of state authorities.

National Security Strategy by its nature should be a strategic document and clearly indicate any shortcomings of the security system of Georgia and offer effective and achievable ways for their elimination. It has been planned to approve above document by the end of 2012, but due to constitutional changes this process was postponed until the period of legislative changes finalization118.

Responsibility for the preparation of the National Military Strategy was transferred from the President to the Parliament.

Due to changes and amendments to the Law on Military Duty and Military Service and the Law on Military Reserve in Georgia, the system of recruitment and military service coordination that had been within the competence of the President was violated in Georgia. The President being formally the Commander in Chief has lost its powers to influence the processes. Changes to the state of emergency proclamation and martial laws limited the powers of the President. And currently the corresponding presidential decrees require Government’s approval to entry into force. The latter calls into question validity of his/her functions in cases, when the state of martial law should be introduced.

Since 1995, Georgia has implemented its crisis management system in case of large-scale external or internal crisis situations. Only in 2010, a separate system for interdepartmental cooperation in crisis was introduced, however, the strategic concept of crisis management and documents planning for the relevant activities were not adopted. Since 2009, Georgia started cooperation with Great Britain to strengthen its own capacities for crisis management. In 2016 the National Situation Room was jointly opened.

Conclusions for Ukraine

The main conclusion of Georgian experience in terms of national capacities development to counter hybrid threats is recognition of necessity to establish a single

118 Strategic Documents of Georgia. [Electronic resource]/NSC Georgia.– Access mode: https://nsc.gov.ge/eng/static/57
state body with an independent status and broad powers for the internal and external
risks and threats analysis, national security policy development and implementation,
coordination and control over all state authorities’ activities. This body should be as
far as possible remote from any political parties, have a mandate protected by the
law to establish and implement national security system, guaranteed budget and the
right to cooperate with all potentially useful institutions within the security issues,
the veto right to legislative and regulatory acts of Parliament, Government and
President provided that reasonable security warnings are available.

Effective countermeasures to the hybrid threats are possible only with the integrated
and systematic analysis of external and internal environment by independent
and professional body without any political or economic influence of any parties
concerned.

The state should provide legal framework for the national security system
functioning, regardless of political changes at the parliamentary or governmental
levels.

It is important to take into account not only the influence of foreign policy, military
and macroeconomic factors when forming the national security system, but also any
technological progress, labour, migration and cultural relations, objective analysis of
the state capabilities, political field, electoral preferences and sentiments.

4.4. Moldova in countering hybrid aggression

With various types of influence, which are now called hybrid, Moldova has faced for
a long time. After the end of the hot phase of the Transnistrian conflict, in which Russia
fully supported separatists, the leadership of the Russian Federation took various
measures to return Moldova to its sphere of influence, to obstruct the European and
Euro-Atlantic choice of the country, to bring it closer to Russia-initiated Eurasian
integration initiatives. Russia resorted to political, economic, energy, migration
pressure on Moldovan authorities, actively disseminated propaganda and distorted
information through controlled media, considered the use of so-called “little green
men” to destabilize the country.

Therefore, in order to strengthen its institutional capacity, Moldova is expanding its
cooperation with the EU, the OSCE, NATO, the United States, and Romania. On
27 June 2014, Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU, which fully
came into force on July 1, 2016. The United States provides significant assistance
to Moldova in countering Russian pressure. For example, the US budget for the
2016-2017 fiscal period provided assistance to Moldova for “counteracting Russian
aggression” for tens of millions of dollars (a total of $ 51 million was planned to
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“counteract Russian pressure and destabilizing actions in Moldova and Georgia”).

A significant part of the Moldovan population still maintains a course toward greater integration with Russia, despite the destructive actions of the Russian Federation. The formation of such a position is influenced by Russia’s economic pressure on Moldova. In particular, in 2006, 2013 and 2014 Russia banned the import of Moldovan winemaking and gardening, which affected the winemakers and local farmers. The claims of Rospotrebnadzor to Moldovan products coincided in time with the initialing of Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and its signing in 2014. At the same time, Russia allowed the supply of 5 winemaking companies from Gagauzia and the unrecognized Transnistria, supporting separatist sentiments there.

Moldova reoriented the export of wine to the Romanian market, which declared support for Chisinau in confrontation with Russia. The European Commission also announced its readiness to meet Moldova’s request to increase the import of vegetables and fruits to the EU. In response to Russia’s economic pressure, the EU lifted restrictions on the import of wine from Moldova. The tactics of Russia have changed: now it has weakened the export regime for Moldova, demonstrating it as a merit for the pro-Russian President I.Dodon.

Another measure of economic pressure on Moldova has been labour migration to Russia, as almost a third of the country’s adult population works in Russia. The money that they send makes up a significant part of the state budget. But now there is a tendency to reduce transfers of funds from the Russian Federation and the growth of transfers from the EU, Israel, the United States and Canada. As of 2016, transfers from the Russian Federation decreased by 7% compared to 2015 and accounted for about 35% of the total volume of remittances received in Moldova.

121 Wine of Moldovan producers may return to Russia. [Electronic resource]/ BBC Russia. — Access mode: http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/06/150602_moldavia_wine_russia
123 Romania will become the largest consumer of Moldovan wines. [Electronic resource]/ «Locals». — Access mode: http://locals.md/2015/rumyiniya-stanet-krupneyshim-potrebitelem-moldavskih-vin/
In 2013, Russia blackmailed Chisinau by expelling Moldovan migrant workers, forcing the country to abandon association with the EU and join the Customs Union. In this way Moscow also tried to increase the number of supporters of pro-Russian forces in Moldova. The neutralization of such destructive influence of the Russian Federation was the introduction of the EU visa-free regime for Moldovan citizens, stimulated Moldovans to seek work in European countries.

On the energy front, Moldova had to give Gazprom control over its gas transmission system. To enhance the country’s energy security, a gas connection with Romania, the Iasi-Ungeni gas pipeline, was put into operation in 2014, but its capacity was only 1 billion cubic meters of gas per year, which is around 1/3 of the total gas consumption in the country. And only in 2017, with the support of the EU, the construction of the extension of this gas pipeline to Chisinau began, where 60% of gas consumers are concentrated.

The leverage of Russia’s gas pressure on Moldova is the so-called “debt” for gas supplied by Gazprom to consumers in Transnistria, which in 2017 amounted to 6.5 billion dollars. However, this is the debt of the Moldovagaz company, in which Gazprom holds 50% of shares, and 13.44% is transferred to Gazprom’s management by the so called “Transnistrian Property Management Committee”. By thus indirectly providing financial support to an unrecognized republic, Russia claims to be allegedly indebted to Moldova and uses it as a method of political pressure.

Some progress has been made by Moldova at the front of the struggle against propaganda. First, in Moldova, the issue of the influence of Russian media on the domestic political situation in the country is actively raised. According to experts, Russia somehow controls almost two-thirds of Moldova’s television channels which distribute anti-European messages. Secondly, in order to reduce the use of media by oligarchs and business groups controlled by Russia, amendments were made to the Code of Television and Radio, limiting to two units the number of media


that one person can own\textsuperscript{130}. In addition, in 2013, the decision of the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) came into force, according to which at least 30\% of the airtime of television and radio stations in the prime time should take local production programs; the quota for programs in Romanian should be 50\%. In May 2015, NTRC banned the relay of the Russian channel “Russia 24”, accusing it of misinforming society and breaking the law. There were also penalties imposed on Prime, Television 7, RTR Moldova and Ren TV Moldova channels for retransmission of manipulative and propagandistic Russian news and analytical programs.\textsuperscript{131}

At the same time, attempts to close Russian propaganda channels came across a tough reaction from the US and the EU, which pointed to the undemocratic nature of such a move. Moldova had to listen. The blocking of access to Russian social networks is also not considered, although Moldova discussed this possibility and is studying the Ukrainian experience in this matter.\textsuperscript{132}

Regarding the legislative field, only in June 2017 a bill was submitted to the Moldovan parliament on combating foreign propaganda. It envisages strengthening the state’s information security and protecting the information space from propaganda promoted by Russian media broadcasted throughout the country.

Moldova is actively opposed to the threats of separatism that Russia is heating up. In 2014, before the signing of the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU, the Moldovan special services managed to prevent the destabilization of the country. Agents of the Russian GRU, together with the head of the Gagauz autonomy, Mikhail Formuzal, and the head of the Department of Youth and Sports of Gagauzia, Anatoly Kara, tried to establish militarized troops in southern Moldova to carry out an operation in accordance with the model that was implemented in the East of Ukraine\textsuperscript{133}. For the preparation of the “Gagauz saboteurs” in 2014, the same persons were responsible, who then, in the fall of 2016, were involved in the attempt of the state coup in Montenegro. With a view to countering separatism, amendments were made to the Criminal Code of Moldova to increase responsibility for such actions. In addition, in 2016-2017 years rules governing the use of force and weapons by foreign troops in the territory of the Republic of Moldova were adopted, as well as the use of force and armament of the Armed Forces of Moldova in peacetime, which can be confidently called to deter possible actions of “little green men”.


\textsuperscript{131} The same place.

\textsuperscript{132} Ukraine-Moldova: Different approaches to the expected interference of Russia in the elections. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/64481

\textsuperscript{133} How the “Donbas scenario” has been prevented in Moldova in 2014. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: http://cripo.com.ua/?sect_id=4&aid=226429
Counterterrorism is an issue for Moldova, which has some legislative and institutional developments in this direction. In 2013 a working version of the Roadmap for the cyber security of the Republic of Moldova for the years 2013-2015\textsuperscript{134} was presented. In 2015, a government decree “On the National Cyber Security Program of the Republic of Moldova for 2016-2020” was adopted. In order to implement this program, the Government of Moldova has adopted Mandatory Minimum Requirements for Cyber Security\textsuperscript{135}. The training of specialists, carried out with the assistance of the EU and NATO, plays an important role in creating an effective system of cyber security. Moldovan specialists recognize that the main problem of ensuring cyber security in the country is lack of professionalism - even in the presence of advanced technologies, the country still lacks the relevant specialists.

Given the difficult economic and internal political situation, it is a challenge for Moldova to withstand the hybrid influences that Russia exerts on the country, using a wide range of instruments. This is especially true for promoting pro-Russian forces to power in Moldova, issues of economy and propaganda. The Moldovan society is split, which does not contribute to the consolidated activity of the power institutions in implementing a consistent course for reform and the development of successfully functioning state institutions. Only due to the active work of the pro-European forces and the constructive support of external players Moldova can resist the hybrid pressure of the Russian Federation, aimed at its return to the Kremlin’s sphere of influence.

4.5. Integrational hybrid nature of relations between Belarus and Russia

Unlike the countries of the Eastern Partnership, which signed the association agreements with the EU, the experience of Belarus in confronting hybrid aggression should be considered in terms of the negative consequences and attempts of the Belarusian leadership to withstand Moscow’s pressure. Unfortunately, official Minsk is rather one of the proxy-tools for spreading the hybrid aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s hybrid influence on Belarus is specific in view of Belarus’s dependence on Russia in nearly all spheres: from political and economic to military and energy. Therefore, the Belarusian leadership is limited in the possibilities of counteraction.

First, the Union State of Russia and Belarus (SG) imposes on Minsk the obligation to coordinate with Russia its foreign policy, security policy and defence activities.


\textsuperscript{135} Mandatory minimum requirements of cyber security are approved in Moldova. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: http://www.iksmedia.ru/news/5376936-V-Moldove-utverzheny-Obyazatelnye.html
The regional grouping of troops (forces) of Russia and Belarus functions, joint protection of the external border in airspace is carried out, annual joint strategic and operational-tactical exercises are conducted.

Secondly, Belarus is an active participant in the post-Soviet integration areas of the socio-economic (CIS) and defence-security spheres (CSTO) created under the aegis of Russia. One of the priorities of Belarus’ chairmanship of the CSTO in 2017 was to strengthen the international influence of the organization and improve the operational readiness of the Collective Forces.\[136\]

Thirdly, since 2015 Belarus has become a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEMP) - Russia’s project aimed at deepening economic ties between the Russian Federation and the post-Soviet countries, in particular, Belarus. In captivity of such concentric circles of integration with Russia, it is almost impossible for Belarus to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, official Minsk has identified two areas for building relations with Kyiv: mediation in the settlement of the conflict; continuation of trade and economic cooperation with Ukraine.\[137\] Belarus turned to building an informal channel of communication with Ukraine to demonstrate a neutral position, distancing itself from Russia’s aggressive policies and restoring contacts with the EU and the US.

In order to neutralize the negative consequences of Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine, Belarus, although with a low efficiency, focused on the following tasks:

*in the military security sphere*: to resist the involvement as Russian ally in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; to prevent the flow of conflict from Ukraine to the territory of Belarus; to strengthen the Belarusian security and defence sector; do not allow the Russian Federation to initiate in Belarus a scenario similar as it had made in Ukraine;

*in the information sphere*: to observe the information neutrality in the Belarusian mass media about the events in Ukraine; to bypass the question of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, but not to recognize it officially; to use the situation in Ukraine for creating a positive image of the Belarusian leader as a guarantor of stability;

*in the economic and energy spheres*: to strengthen the presence on the Ukrainian market, taking the place of Russian enterprises; to occupy niches in the Russian

\[136\]The results of the Belarusian chairmanship will lead the heads of the CSTO on November 30 at the summit in Minsk. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode : http://www.soyuz.by/news/security/36983.html

\[137\]Maksak G. Ukraine and Belarus in New Realities: Between Security and Economy. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode : http://prismua.org/belarus-ua/
market, which are being released because of Russia’s sanctions against Ukraine; do not join the Kremlin’s sanctions policy towards Ukraine.

In **military dimension**, O.Lukashenko drew attention to strengthening the fighting capacity of the Belarusian army, coordinating efforts between various security agencies. The new edition of the Law “On Martial Law” of February 2015 made appropriate changes to the regulatory framework of Belarus: the imposition of martial law is possible if another state or on behalf of another state someone sends to Belarus the armed gangs, irregular troops, mercenaries or units of regular troops\(^{138}\). In July 2016, the president signed a new Military Doctrine of Belarus, in which, among threats, certain so-called “coloured” revolutions and provocation of internal military conflicts were determined\(^{139}\).

In 2014-2016, O. Lukashenka managed to avoid the issue of the deployment of Russian military airbase on the territory of Belarus, although the Russian side insistently offered two Russian squadrons of C\(\text{Y}-27\text{CM3}\) (NATO reporting name Flanker-B) at Bobruisk airbase. At the same time, Russian media reported on the Kremlin’s plans to deploy two more bases in Belarus - the Iskander (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) missile base and the base of the ground forces or special operations forces\(^{140}\). Perhaps the compromise was the intergovernmental Russian-Belarusian agreement on joint technical support for the regional grouping of forces, which was signed in November 2016 and entered into force in December 2017; the term of the agreement is 5 years\(^{141}\).

The dependence of Belarus in the military sphere is often used by the Kremlin to achieve its goals in the hybrid war against Ukraine. A vivid example is the Russian-Belarusian military exercises “West-2017”, which took place on the territory of Russia and Belarus in September 2017. The large-scale redeployment of military equipment (up to 680 units) and personnel (12.7 thousand servicemen) of the Russian army to the territory of Belarus caused considerable concern in Ukraine and other neighbouring states.\(^{142}\)

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141In Belarus, an agreement with the Russian Federation on the provision of a regional grouping of forces entered into force. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4775252
In the **information space**, official Minsk was less successful because of the weakness of the national media in shaping public opinion. The lack of a clear position of the official Minsk regarding the events in the Crimea and the Donbas has forced Belarusian citizens to focus on Russian media and, accordingly, to take a pro-Russian stance. The coverage of the audience by the national Belarusian TV channels (ONT, Belarus-1) in 2014 decreased, and by Russian channels (NTV-Belarus and RTR-Belarus) expanded. Among the Internet users in Belarus, services vk.com, mail.ru and yandex.by also dominate.

This situation prompted the Belarusian authorities in December 2014 to adopt amendments to the Law “On Mass Media”. The Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus received the right to block access to the Internet resources of the Belarusian segment without trial. Amendments to the criminal and criminal procedural codes provided for criminal punishment for placing in the network calls for the seizure of power or its change by force. Thus, at the end of 2014, independent online resources belapan.com, belapan.by, charter97.org, naviny.by, belaruspartisan.org, udf.by, gazetaby.com, zautra.by and racyja.com were blocked for few days. In December 2017, the Internet newspaper “Belarusian Partisan” was blocked. In 2015-2016, the Belarusian authorities reacted to the Russian media’s growing criticism of Lukashenko for his ambiguous attitude toward the annexation of Crimea and detained Belarusian journalists working for the Russian media.

Russia is the main **economic and energy partner** for Belarus, because it accounts for almost 50% of the volume of Belarusian trade turnover. Since most of the goods from Belarus can be freely replaced by Russian goods or imported from third countries, the Kremlin has an economic lever of influence on Minsk and uses it in the form of restrictions on trade. Belarus has no symmetrical answer.

Belarus has a credit dependence on the Russian Federation - without loans from Russia and its integration structures, Minsk will not be able to fulfil its obligations on foreign debts. For example, in 2011-2013 Belarus received a loan from the EurAsEC
Anti-Crisis Fund in the amount of 3 billion US Dollars, and in 2014 - 2 billion Dollars from the Russian VTB Bank.

Russian energy resources are of special interest for Minsk. Every year Belarus buys in the Russian Federation about 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas for its own needs and 20 million tons of oil for processing at Belarusian refineries. According to Belarusian experts, in 2015, preferential prices for oil and gas provided an additional bonus to the country in the amount of 5.3 billion US dollars of budget revenues. Below market prices for energy resources for the Republic Belarus allow the RF to manipulate pricing, depending on the behaviour of Belarus.

**Belarusian-Russian relations influence the security policy of Ukraine,** because Belarus is trying to find a compromise between dependence on the Russian Federation and the desire to maintain a minimum good-neighbourly level of relations with Ukraine. Kyiv positively assessed the readiness of Minsk to become a platform for negotiations on the settlement of the situation in the Donbas, as well as readiness for the restoration of indicators of trade and economic cooperation. However, the Kremlin constantly intervenes in the Belarusian plans, using the position of Belarus as an instrument of hybrid influence on Ukraine.

The level of trust between the countries has decreased, especially after the abduction of Ukrainian citizens by Russian special services from the territory of Belarus in 2017, spy scandals and the mutual expulsion of diplomats. However, the greatest damage to bilateral relations is the position of Belarus in the international arena. By supporting the Kremlin, the OSCE PA and the UN General Assembly, Belarus does not vote and even block resolutions in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the condemnation of the situation with violation of human rights in Crimea. Due to the position of Minsk, the final declarations of the Eastern Partnership summits in 2015 and 2017 substantially lost political weight in the issues of recognizing Russia as an aggressor.

It is unpleasant to use the context of Ukraine in the struggle of Lukashenka’s regime with the opposition and to counter internal riots. The Belarusian authorities tried...
to show the “Ukrainian footprint” in the mass street protests that swept Belarus in March 2017149. Some Belarusian experts explained this by the fact that Belarusian special services provided O.Lukashenko with information from Russian sources.150

In the medium term, one can hardly expect an official review of Belarus’ political position and a reduction of its proxy-instrumentality in the Kremlin’s strategy. Ukraine should take into consideration, that Moscow and Minsk are finalizing preparation of the Military Doctrine of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, where Russia would spread even more its control over Belarus in terms of security and defence with further limitation of its sovereignty.


150 Yu. Tsarik. The organizers of the spring protests have worked in favour of Russia. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://euroradio.fm/ru/carik-organizatory-vesennih-akciy-protesta-srabotali-v-polzu-rossii
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine, which has been already lasting for four years, the state security system still has gaps which prevent it from regaining its territorial integrity and sovereignty and fulfil its obligations to ensure the security of Ukrainian society. As a result, suffer citizens of Ukraine, living in the occupied Crimea and the ORDLO, “gray” zones and adjacent to the line of confrontation areas, other oblasts of Ukraine, which are directly affected by the aggressor or hybrid threats.

To counter hybrid threats, according to Ukrainian experts\(^{151}\), the state security mechanism of Ukraine lacks the following changes: the transition to a truly parliamentary republic; introduction of a comprehensive strategic systemic vision of state policy and reform making; performance of all-out lustration; neutralization of the pro-Russian oligarchy; changing in the model of decision-making and the priority of protecting the people, not state authorities; comprehensive depoliticization and “decommunization” of the state security mechanism and increase of its professionalism, co-ordination and ability to respond to new threats; increase of responsibility of Ukrainian officials; political will to overcome corruption; well-formulated information policy; proper social and humanitarian policy.

It is expedient to change the situation, based on evaluation of gaps in the system of Ukraine to ensure the security of society, including the analysis made in this publication, and taking into account the experience of individual EU Member-States and the Eastern Partnership, developed with regard to countering Russian hybrid threats.

**The state security system in the context of hybrid warfare** requires the use of immediate nationwide measures to increase Ukraine’s ability to guarantee the security of society, the primary of which is:

- carrying out real, rather than simulating nationwide activities to eliminate corruption and reducing the impact on the state authorities from the oligarchs-oriented system;

- identificating and liquidating schemes for corrupting Ukrainian civil servants, politicians, members of parliament and government;

- taking effective measures to disroot Russian agents from the state system;

- approving a separate document (strategy) with a set of measures to counter hybrid threats, modeled according to the EU Common Framework Document for Combating Hybrid Threats;

151 Promoting the development of Ukraine's ability to guarantee the security of society in hybrid threats. Results of the expert survey. [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/\%D0%94\%D0%BE\%D1%81\%D0%BB\%D1%96\%D0%B4\%D0%B6\%D0%B5\%D0%BD\%D0%BD\%D1%8F\%D0%BD\%D0%BD\%D0%BB\%D1%96\%D0%B9\%D1%81\%D1%8C%D0%BA\%D0%BE\%D1%8E.pdf
- developing public-private partnership in promoting the deployment of full-fledged broadcasting on the occupied territories;

- strengthening the counter-intelligence capabilities of the state, conducting active measures;

- neutralizing the activities of the “DPR” and “LNR” missions abroad and the work to prevent their occurrence;

- counteracting Russian influence on Ukrainian society through religious organizations;

- liquidation of existing and neutralization of new attempts to establish hidden contours of external management of the security, economic, media sectors by the aggressor;

- monitoring and countering the aggressor’s attempts to open the “western front” of the crypto-war against Ukraine and the “northern front” from the territory of Belarus;

- toughening the procedure for selection to the civil service in order to screen out candidates who may damage the national security of Ukraine;

- using in Ukraine the experience of the Baltic States on the status of “non-citizens” and the definition of the procedure for restoring the citizenship of Ukraine for persons which renounced the citizenship of Ukraine and contributed to the invaders’s activities.

Although the military organization of Ukraine has significantly improved over the four years of Russian aggression and increased its viability, there are still gaps that are extremely necessary to fill. In order to enhance the ability of the state’s military organization to withstand hybrid threats, it is expedient, among other things, to take the following measures:

- at the international level, to continue assigning to Russia the status of aggressor and the side of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which should prevent a pseudo-peacekeeping operation with the participation of Russian “peacekeepers”, and full responsibility of Russia for violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, human rights in the occupied territories, for the consequences of the destruction, theft and wrecking of public and private property;

- to increase international pressure on Russia with the aim to expand the mandate of the OSCE Observation Mission at Russian-Ukrainian checkpoints on the entire uncontrolled section of the border between Ukraine and Russia;

- to increase the responsibility for corruption related to the security and defence sector of Ukraine, equating them with betrayal of Motherland;
- to revise the principle of territorial disposition of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to ensure the possibility of defence of the country throughout the perimeter;

- to ensure the deployment of Ukrainian units in regions with increased threat of separatism and development of civil-military relations, aimed at neutralizing the threats of separatism and increasing the weight of the Ukrainian army;

- to determine as the ultimate goal of Armed Forces of Ukraine development their capacity to withstand the armed forces of any of the neighbouring countries, and the criterion should be the capacity to withstand the Russian Army (without taking into account the nuclear component);

- to strengthen military cooperation with the European Union through educational courses and trainings, involving specialists from the EU Member States; the introduction into the curricula of military educational institutions of programs for the integration of Ukraine into the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU; joining PESCO; participation of Ukrainian military units in all missions and operations of the EU and the battlegroups of the European Union;

- to complete the establishment of an effective system of territorial defence of Ukraine by introducing certain elements of the experience of Poland and the Baltic States, including approving the Law of Ukraine “On Territorial Defence”, regulating mechanisms for the involvement of TD units and their use of weapons;

- to accelerate the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On mine actions”, which will fix the implementation of IMAS international standards for humanitarian demining in Ukraine, establish an interdepartmental (governmental) coordinating body (centre) for humanitarian demining and ensure the possibility of involving international structures of various forms of ownership in security arrangements and demining operations on mine-polluted areas, as well as the use of international assistance for these purposes.

The law enforcement system of Ukraine was not ready to counter both hybrid and direct threats from Russia. Low level of competence, corruption, use of posts not for the purpose of supporting public security, but for personal enrichment, led to the fact that not the system but individual units and law enforcement agents were prepared to withstand external influences. At the same time, it was possible to prepare for countering hybrid aggression in advance, because, for example, in Moldova, Russia uses similar patterns. But even today the Ukrainian law-enforcement system has gaps that must be filled in order to guarantee the security of society, and for this purpose we need:

- to reform radically law enforcement agencies, increase their financial and material support, education, training and preparation for the fulfilment of tasks;
- to ensure the restoration of public confidence in the law enforcement system by strengthening the close interaction with the population and local communities through the community policing approach, including with the assistance of the EU Consultative Mission in Ukraine;

- to turn law-enforcement agencies rather into a socially-oriented structure than an instrument to guarantee the inviolability of power;

- to strengthen the responsibility of law enforcement officers for corruption and unlawful actions in order to prevent their transformation into punitive structures in relation to society;

- to complete the reformatting of the Security Service of Ukraine after the final entry into the operational capacity of the State Bureau of Investigation, having transformed it from a law enforcement agency into a state security service with counter-intelligence, counter-sabotage and antiterrorist functions;

- to amend the Law “On counter-espionage activities”, in particular, to supplement it with provisions on countering sabotage acts and sabotage bodies against the exclusion of provisions duplicating the provisions of the Law “On countering terrorism”;

- to neutralize the FSB’s efforts to use criminality in Ukraine for internal political destabilization;

- to carry out an information campaign to increase the responsibility of the communities for their own security while providing the conditions for expanding the experience of establishing centres of security for all communities, and also to introduce the institution of civilian police assistants according to the model of Estonia;

- to develop a system for protecting critical infrastructure in close cooperation with the ministries of infrastructure, energy and defence, including using the latest technical methods of documentation and control.

The energy sector of Ukraine at this stage still remains dependent on imports of natural gas, oil, petroleum products, nuclear fuel, coal and other energy resources, which poses a significant threat to the existence of the state, given the continuation of Russian aggression and the deterioration of the security situation in Europe. For effective resistance to external aggression, Ukraine must, as soon as possible, take advantage of all available resource and organizational capacities to enhance energy independence and resilience towards possible Russian multi-component offensive.

The beginning of 2019 seems a convenient moment for Russia to try deployment of a large-scale plan to eliminate Ukraine’s independence by using a multi-frontal strike on the political, military, energy, social and information spheres. Taking advantage of the end of the existing contracts for the supply and transit of gas through Ukraine, Russia can stop the flow of gas, thus provoking the need to reconfigure the operating
mode of the Ukrainian gas transportation system and unbalancing the gas supply system of a significant part of Central and Eastern Europe. Accusing Ukraine of interrupting gas transit towards the EU, Russia can simultaneously block the supply of coal, oil and petroleum products, use cyber attacks on the United Energy System facilities with the aim to unbalance it and provoke social protests and chaos.

To minimize this scenario, in the shortest possible time it is necessary:

- to create an effective vertically integrated body, subordinated to the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine for coordinating the energy policy of the state headed by the Special Envoy with the rank of vice prime minister;

- to agree and implement a plan for the implementation of urgent measures to prepare the energy sector for operation in a state of emergency and a minimum level of external assistance with a medium-term goal of ensuring maximum coverage of energy demand from internal reserves;

- to determine the urgent package of bills aimed at increasing domestic hydrocarbon production, creating their strategic reserves, ensuring the functioning of the energy sector in a state of emergency, as well as improving energy efficiency and reducing energy consumption;

- to check the readiness of the power system to work in emergency situations, including with the involvement of neighbouring EU countries through the organization of a series of exercises;

- to analyse the degree of influence of Russian capital on the economy of the state, identify critical areas and develop a plan to neutralize it;

- to oppose the hidden and disguised expansion of Russian capital into the sensitive spheres of the Ukrainian economy;

- to ensure continuous monitoring of the situation in the country, first of all, monitoring the actions of financial and industrial groups and assessing the likely scenarios of Russian impact on them for adjusting state policy;

- to focus efforts on the social and economic development of the border areas, primarily with the Russian Federation, so that an unsatisfactory standard of living there does not become a basis for separatism;

**Information security** is a very specific component of confronting hybrid threats from Russia, as the evidences of information and psychological impact are not always visible, which does not allow immediately to localize threats and reduce the level of negative influence. Moreover, information warfare affects most areas of social and political life. Russia carries out information impact differentially on different target groups in Ukraine. That is why, starting from 2014, the understanding of information security significantly exceeds the range of threats, the level of tasks and the response tools comparing with the definition of information policy.
In confronting information threats, Ukraine has made significant progress, even considering the low level of initial preparedness for withstanding the aggression. However, the positive transformations achieved cannot guarantee reliable protection of Ukraine’s national interests from future manifestations of Russian information aggression, because the Russian side has a significant advantage in the means of information warfare and constantly adapts new tools and technologies of subversion activities.

Against this background, it is advisable to implement several recommendations, which can strengthen Ukraine’s security against threats in the information and cyber space:

- in addition to the sanitation of the Ukrainian media space from Russian content, it should be ensured that it is filled with high-quality information products of domestic production;

- to fill the system of abroad broadcasting with content, developed according to the information needs of different target audiences abroad;

- to detail the Information Security Doctrine through documents of operational and tactical levels with a clear distribution of responsibility for the implementation of certain tasks in the field of information policy and cyber security;

- to strengthen coordination between the main actors of information policy in order to build an effective system of strategic communications and promote the Ukrainian image abroad;

- to introduce more differentiated approach to the work of the responsible institutions (MIP, MFA) with the countries in the development of messages on Ukraine and the search for channels of their utilization abroad, taking into account the various social sentiments;

- to use effectively the tools of public diplomacy, and in the process of forming a positive image of Ukraine to conduct periodically public opinion polls in the respective countries or regions of activity;

- to intensify and systematize cooperation with NGOs, experts, cultural figures to enhance the capacities of relevant state organizations;

- to strengthen cooperation with European think tanks in countering Russian propaganda both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries, in particular Moldova;

- to create state-owned (with the participation of the state) mass media for national minorities of Ukraine (in the language of national minorities) and to fill them with patriotic content;
- to strengthen cyber defence of state facilities and to increase its own information and cyber capabilities on the basis of the tandem “Ukrainian Cyber Alliance” — “InformNapalm”;

- to increase the number of information materials (printed, audio, video) telling about real life in the regions of the Russian Federation, internal threats to Russian society, anti-people activities of the Russian leadership and other aspects in order to counteract the Russian influence on attracting citizens to choose the so-called “pro-Russian” side.

Russia’s hybrid influences on Ukrainian society include a combination of information influences, support for proxy-organizations, political parties which are used to promote Russia’s ideological interests, in particular, the ideas of the “Russian World”, cooperation within the framework of the Customs Union, counteraction to Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, Russia is actively using the thesis of discrimination of Russian-speaking and Russian-cultural citizens in Ukraine, which became a peculiar basis for the legitimization of the Russian invasion and occupation of Crimea.

For many years, as part of helping “compatriots,” Russia supported pro-Russian organizations and political movements which played a leading role during the occupation of Crimea and the invasion into Donbas. Systemic propaganda was used. And today, residents of the temporarily occupied territories receive distorted information about the “aggravation of the crisis in Ukraine”. Now the Russian media are widely integrated into the world, they use multiple opportunities to influence the information space through social networks, create a proxy influence in various countries, including through the support of various organizations, which then rebroadcast messages favourable for Russia.

The Ukrainian state should be proactive in the areas of protecting the rights of national minorities, implementing the Human Rights Strategy, consolidating the society, supporting public organizations, implementing programs to support Ukrainian citizens residing in the temporarily occupied territories. For this the following recommendation should be implemented:

**Concerning support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs):**

- creation by the state authorities of communication platforms with domestic NGOs;

- support to human rights organizations in their activities to protect human rights; dissemination of information on the activities of organizations working in the field of human rights protection;

- support to the activities of Ukrainian public organizations in the EU countries;

- implementation of the strategy for the protection of human rights;
concerning temporarily occupied territories:
- support for political prisoners in the occupied Crimea and Russia (providing lawyers, supporting families of political prisoners);
- support of social and humanitarian activities in relation to citizens in the temporarily occupied territories (educational policy, medical and social security, work with youth);
- development of Ukrainian broadcasting in the temporarily occupied territories and the “grey zones”;

concerning the rights of national minorities:
- constant monitoring of the implementation of the law of Ukraine on combating discrimination;
- broad communication by the state with representatives of national minorities on issues that concern their life, in particular, culture, language, rights and representation in government bodies;
- adoption of legislation in the field of protection of the rights of indigenous peoples of Ukraine;
- dissemination of information about real problems and achievements in the field of protecting the rights of national minorities, human rights, in particular, in Eastern Europe;
- restoration of the post of Commissioner in the sphere of ethnonational policy.

The Russian hybression, not only in the political or economic spheres, but also at the value-semantic level, creates challenges for the Ukrainian national memory policy. Attempts of Russia and other neighbouring countries of Ukraine, in particular Poland and Hungary, to discredit the fact of the existence of a conciliar, sovereign state by means of historical speculations require the pooling of efforts and resources of public authorities responsible for educational, cultural and information policies, public and academic research institutions, cultural and educational institutions, cinema, television and mass media. The efforts of these institutions should be aimed at finding appropriate means of response.

In order to solve the problems of preserving national memory and effectively counteracting Russia’s hybression in the sphere of national memory policy, it is necessary:

- to initiate and develop the Strategy for Preserving National Memory and Counteracting Historical Manipulation of Certain Foreign Countries, primarily the Russian Federation, aimed at discrediting Ukrainian history and statehood;
- to establish as soon as possible an independent anonymous expert council to assess and reissue textbooks in history;

- to monitor the current laws of Ukraine, which in one or another way concern the problems of national memory policy and, if necessary, make changes to them;

- to continuously monitor the actions of Russia and its agents of influence in the West, aimed at compromising the history and statehood of Ukraine, to respond effectively to such actions;

- to establish effective control over the distribution of printed materials on the territory of Ukraine in which the history of Ukraine is distorted;

- to create a permanent platform for representatives of civil society, research institutions, educational institutions to discuss the concept of the history of Ukraine, national memory policy issues in the context of counteraction against the hybrid war of Russia;

- to actively involve representatives of European institutions in discussions about national memory policy.

Last but not least, Ukraine should intensify its efforts to join the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki and the three centres of excellence of NATO - on energy security in Vilnius, StratCom in Riga and Cyber Defence in Tallinn.
HYBRID THREATS TO UKRAINE AND PUBLIC SECURITY.
THE EU AND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP EXPERIENCE

AFTERWORD

In ancient times the shield was used for protection, a quality shield meant reliable protection and had a deterrent effect on the enemy. No wonder the word “shield” became the embodiment of state protection and society security. The shield in the defensive sense is a set of means and methods of their use. A hybrid-type shield is a complex and multi-faceted concept, since in this case, non-military means are used as weapons, aimed primarily at society with all aspects of its life.

In the conditions of maximum development and accessibility of the media and communications, it was simplified for the aggressor to implement an information and propaganda influence on society, but creating a protective shield for society became more complicated. The aggressor does not look like an open enemy, and masks its actions under the slogans of “taking care” of individual groups of people in the victim state, but draws out its leadership and the patriotic part of society in the image of an “enemy” that harms them. It blocks the resistance of the state and undermines the public’s confidence in it. In addition, societies of other countries, such as Belarus, Moldova, Poland and other states, are drawn into aggressive actions against the Ukrainian state that indicates the necessity to study their experience in combating hybrid threats and raises the need for international security cooperation to a higher level.

For an effective confrontation with hybrid threats from the Russian side, the Ukrainian leadership needs to work closely with the public, especially civil society organizations, to increase their confidence in its actions. Although Russia as an aggressor makes a series of mistakes, as a result of which its hybrid war against Ukraine becomes less and less effective, but Ukraine makes domestic mistakes and very slowly corrects them. Some gaps in Ukraine’s security system, despite four years of confrontation with Russian aggression, are still relevant and pose a danger to the society.

The creation of a shield to confront the Russian hybrid aggression requires, first of all, the internal consolidation of Ukraine, related to the development of good governance and socially oriented power structures, eradication of corruption and deoligarchism, consolidation of society, guaranteeing of the functioning of civil society organizations independent of the ruling structures, development of efficient economic and energy markets, implementation of a balanced inter-ethnic and inter-confessional policy, wide truthful informing of the society about sensitive topics, including historical ones, which are used or can be used by the aggressor to achieve its goals.

In any case, ensuring the security of society really becomes a system in which not only power structures are involved, but also non-governmental organizations, the private sector, business, expert and scientific circles, independent media and other actors. Only an integrated comprehensive approach will allow consolidating society and ensuring its security. Such an approach can serve as an example for other Eastern Partnership countries, which suffer from hybrid threats.
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