

Post-Conflict Segregation, Violence, and Reconstruction Policy in Ambon

NATIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING SYSTEM (SNPK) PROGRAM
THE HABIBIE CENTER (THC)

RESEARCH TEAM:

Mohammad Hasan Ansori
Rudi Sukandar
Sopar Peranto
Fathun Karib
Sofyan Cholid
Imron Rasyid

Table of Contents

Introduction	vii
Glossary and Acronym	ix
Executive Summary	xi
CHAPTER I	
PREFACE	1
Background	1
Concept and Literature Review	5
1. Concept of Segregation	5
2. Segregation and Violence in Post-Conflict Region	8
3. Post-Conflict Segregation and Government Reconstruction Policy	10
Research Methodology	14
1. Research Approach and Data Collection Technique	14
2. Sampling Strategy	15
CHAPTER II	
OVERVIEW OF AMBON CITY	17
Demographic Picture of Ambon City	17
1. Picture of Ambon City	17
2. Picture of Ambon City Population	18
The Latest Situation of Ambon City	20
1. Social Situation	20
2. Political Situation	21
3. Economic Situation	24
CHAPTER III	
REFUGEES, RELOCATION, AND FORMATION OF POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION	27
Brief History of Segregation and Post-Conflict Segregation Patterns in Ambon	27
1. Brief History of Segregation in Ambon City	30
2. Post-Conflict Segregation Patterns	32
Relocation/ Displacement Process	32
1. Management, Data Collection and Verification of Post-Conflict Refugees	32
2. Relocation Option and Scheme	38
3. Relocation and Community Concentration	41
Reasons for Relocation	43
1. Minority Group	43
2. Security	44
3. Failure to Return to Area of Origin	46
Conditions of Refugee/ Relocated Community	47
1. Empowerment of Refugee/Relocated Community	47
2. Physical-Health Condition and Population Issue	49
3. Distribution of Assistance	50
Issues on Refugees Rights and Civil Affairs	52
1. Civil Rights to Housing and Assets They Left Behind	52

2. Land Dispute	53
3. Land Certification	54
CHAPTER IV	
POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION, INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP, AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICY	56
Development Program and Post-Conflict Segregation Handling	56
1. Reconciliation and Restoration of Brotherhood Tie	56
2. Opening of New Plural and Heterogeneous Settlement	57
3. Child Counseling, Trauma Handling and Informal Meeting	59
4. Social Harmony	60
5. Building Brotherhood (<i>Orang Basudara</i>) Relationship	63
Realization of Development Program in Post-Conflict Segregation Handling	66
1. Realized Programs	66
2. Unrealized Programs	69
Social, Economic and political Discrimination	72
Post-Conflict Inter-Community Relationship	77
1. Improved Inter-Society Relationship	77
2. Strengthened Public Awareness on Conflicts	79
3. Inter-Community Cooperation and Communications	81
4. Some Inter-Community Interaction Obstacles	82
5. Post-Conflict Social-Economic Deconstruction	83
Feeling Secure: Various Perspectives of Society's Segments	85
1. Mothers' Perspectives	85
2. University Students/ Students' Perspectives	86
3. Pedicab/Motorcycle Taxi Drivers' Perspectives	87
4. Small Vendors' Perspectives	88
5. Employers' Perspectives	88
Unifying and Dividing Factors	89
1. Unifying Factors	89
2. Dividing Factors	92
CHAPTER V	
POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION, VIOLENCE, AND ROLE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL AND LEADERSHIP	95
Segregation and Emergence of Post-Conflict Violence	95
1. Background of Segregation	95
2. Post-Conflict Segregation and Emerging Violence	98
3. Post-Conflict Violent Incidents	100
The Role of Security Personnel in Handling Post-Conflict Violence	105
1. The Role of Security Personnel in The September 11, 2011 Riot	105
2. Personnel Assignment	107
3. Security Personnel's Involvement and Partiality	109
4. Evaluation on Personnel Performance in Disclosing Violent Cases	111
5. Issues of Border Post Construction and BKO Troops	114
Factors of Leadership, Harmony and Post-Conflict Violence	116
1. Leadership of Religious Figures	116
2. Leadership of Local and Traditional Figures	120

CHAPTER VI	
ROLES OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY IN HANDLING POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND VIOLENCE	125
Various Society's Efforts to Prevent Post-Conflict Violence	125
1. Social, Cultural and Religious Aspects	125
2. Political Aspect	129
3. Economic Aspect	130
Various Efforts of Civil Society Organizations and NGOs to Handle Post-Conflict Segregation and Violence	131
1. Religious Category	145
2. Social/Educational Category	148
3. Economic Category	151
Women's Roles in Preventing Violence and Suppressing Segregation	153
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Program: Evaluative Approach	155
1. Perception on other Non Governmental Organizations	155
Perception on Peace Programs Executed by NGOs	157
CHAPTER VII	
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	159
Conclusion	159
Recommendations	164
1. Handling of Post-Conflict Segregation	164
2. Handling of and Resolution To Refugee/Relocation Problems	167
3. Security Personnel and Handling of Post-Conflict Violence	168
Bibliography	170
Books and Articles	170
Documents, Reports, Newspapers, and Magazines	175
Index	178
Annexes	181
Profile of Research Team	187
Profile of The Habibie Center and National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK)	188

Introduction

Amidst concerns that Indonesia will be divided due to violent conflicts in some provinces following the fall of New Order regime, a few peace agreements have successfully been reached and halted violence that had claimed thousands of lives and properties. One of the agreements was Malino II Peace Agreement that was viewed as the milestone of the termination of prolonged conflicts in Maluku Province.

However, smaller and sporadic violence continues to occur in Maluku, especially in Ambon City. Peace researchers and activists have identified that one of the problems faced by Ambon City is post-conflict segregation. There has, however, yet to be a study focused on the relationship between post-conflict segregation, emerging violence and post-conflict developmental policies. Therefore, the study is designed to fill in the gap in such information.

The study is conducted as part of the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS), a cooperation between The Habibie Center and Deputy I Office for Environmental and Social Vulnerability Coordination of Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, and supported by The World Bank. The program is funded by a grant from The Korea Economic Transitions and Peace Building Trust Fund.

The researcher team would like to extend gratitude to all parties who have provided significant support for the study. Among them are Sana Jaffrey, Wahyu Handoyo, Adrian Morrel of The World Bank who have provided major inputs from the development of the initial concept of the research through the final report development; Mr Willem Rampangilei, Mr Nelwan Harahap, and Ms Zuraini from Deputy I Office of the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare who have contributed inputs to the development of the research concept and provided assistance during the field research in Ambon City; Prof. Kamanto Sunarto (FISIP-UI) and Dr. Thung Ju Lan (LIPI) who have made critical notes on the first draft of the research concept; Najib Azca (PSKP-UGM) and Jacky Manuputty (peace activists in Ambon) who have brought significant inputs into the improvement of the drafted initial report of the study. The research team would like to thank Institut Tifa Damai Maluku, especially Hilda, Loury, and Jamal for their warm cooperation during the research; to all informants/ respondents who delivered information during the research; to the executive board and staff of The Habibie Center who have fully supported the research, especially Ima, Mr Ghazali, Mr Kun, Vivi, and Tasha.

Finally, we hope this research benefits our concerted efforts to build peace in.

Peace,
Team NVMS-THC

Glossary and Acronym

Amplaz	: Ambon Plaza
Angkot	: Angkutan Kota (<i>public van</i>)
Bappekot Ambon:	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kota Ambon (<i>Ambon City Development Planning Agency</i>)
BBM	: Butonese, Bugis, Makassarese
BBR	: Bahan Bangunan Rumah (<i>House Construction Materials</i>)
BKO	: Bawah Kendali Operasi (<i>The designation of auxiliary forces outside the province, and nominally placed under local command</i>)
BPN	: Badan Pertanahan Nasional (<i>National Land Agency</i>)
Depag	: Departemen Agama (<i>Ministry of Religious Affairs</i>)
DPRD	: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (<i>Regional Legislative Council</i>)
FISIP	: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (<i>Faculty of Social and Political Sciences</i>)
GMKI	: Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Christian Students Movement</i>)
Golkar	: Golongan Karya (<i>a national party</i>)
GPM	: Gereja Protestan Maluku (<i>Maluku Protestant Church</i>)
HMI	: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (<i>Islamic Student Association</i>)
IAIN	: Institut Agama Islam Negeri (<i>State Institute for Islamic Studies</i>)
Inpres	: Instruksi Presiden (<i>Presidential Instruction</i>)
ITDM	: Institut Tifa Damai Maluku
JICA	: Japan International Cooperation Agency
Kemenko Kesra:	Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat (<i>The Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare</i>)
KNIL	: Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (<i>Royal Netherlands East Indies Army</i>)
Komnas HAM	: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (<i>National Commission on Human Rights</i>)
KPM	: Koalisi Pengungsi Maluku (<i>Maluku Refugees Coalition</i>)
LAIM	: Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku (<i>Maluku Interfaith Institute</i>)
LAPPAN	: Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak (<i>Women and Child Empowerment Institute</i>)
MTQ	: Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (<i>Qoran Recital Competition</i>)
MoU Malino	: Memorandum of Understanding (Butir-Butir Perjanjian) Malino
MUI	: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Ulema Council</i>)
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
OKP	: Organisasi Kepemudaan (<i>Youth Organization</i>)
Pesparawi	: Pesta Paduan Suara Gerejawi (<i>Church Choir Festival</i>)
Pemkot	: Pemerintahan Kota (<i>City Government</i>)
PDIP	: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (<i>Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle</i>)
PDRB	: Produk Domestik Regional Bruto (<i>Regional Gross Domestic Product</i>)
PK	: Peninjauan Kembali (<i>Judicial Review</i>)
Purek	: Pembantu Rektor (<i>Vice President</i>)
RMS	: Republik Maluku Selatan (<i>South Mollucan Republic</i>)
RPJMD	: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (<i>Local Medium Term Development Plan</i>)
RPJP	: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (<i>Local Long Term Development Plan</i>)
SBB	: Seram Bagian Barat (<i>Western Seram</i>)

SMPN : Sekolah Menengah Pertama Negeri (*Public Junior High School*)
SNPK : Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan (*National Violence Monitoring System*)
SWPP : Sub Wilayah Pusat Pertumbuhan (*Growth Center Sub-Region*)
TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia (*Indonesian Military*)
UNICEF : The United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
Unpatti : Universitas Pattimura (*Pattimura University*)

Executive Summary

The economic crises hitting Indonesia in late 1990s had significant impacts on economic, political and social conditions. Combination of such impacts triggered various violent conflicts that took place almost simultaneously in some regions of Indonesia. Highly-escalating violent conflicts occurred quite fast such as in Aceh, Papua, East Timor (now the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste), Maluku, North Maluku, Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. Over the course, almost all the conflicts experienced de-escalation, and/or were resolved significantly in late 2002, except for Aceh conflict which was eventually resolved in 2005 through Helsinki Agreement. Nevertheless, although large scale conflicts have politically been resolved, incidents of violence do not stop immediately. In some post-conflict areas, violence still becomes an issue, with serious potential, which requires anticipation.

Based on the data of National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) (2002-2012), out of five provinces that witnessed communal conflicts (West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi), Maluku tends to have fairly high intensity of violent conflicts. Especially according to NVSM data, Ambon City still becomes an area with the highest accumulated violent conflict rate from February 2002 to December 2012. Beside that, different from other post-conflict areas, in which violent conflicts have transformed into a new form, in Ambon identity-based conflicts are still dominant. Strong identity building gets more obvious if observed from physical and social segregation phenomena among those of different identities.

Based on the data and dynamic condition, The Habibie Center's NVMS team conducted the research with specific goals of (1) identifying and describing the process of segregation formation in post-conflict Ambon; (2) identifying impacts of government policies on post-conflict segregation in Ambon; (3) explaining segregation effects to occurrence of violence in post-conflict Ambon; (4) understanding participation of institutions in overcoming violence-related segregation impacts in Ambon. The research used quality approach. Primary data was collected by using in-depth interview technique, *focus group discussion* (FGD), and observation. Secondary data included documents, reports, academic publications, magazines, and mass media, both printed and online.

Ambon City has been long known as one of the Indonesian areas with strong segregation characteristic, both socially and spatially between Christian and Muslim communities. After the 1999 social conflicts, the resolution was reached through post-conflict reconstruction policy by the local government. The policy had a role in creating indirect and unintended consequence, taking the form of new socio-spatial segregation. The birth of post-conflict segregation mainly originated from community displacement process and refugee problem-solving mechanism, especially through relocation program. When social conflicts between Islamic and Christian communities broke out in Ambon (1999-2002), thousands of both community members took refuge to areas whose population has similar ethno-religious identity with them in order to secure safety. When the conflict abated, the refugees were reluctant to return to their homelands. Consequently, areas that before the conflict had been relatively heterogeneous, get more homogeneous ethno-religiously.

Beside that, a huge task of Ambon City Government, and in general Maluku Provincial Government is to deal with refugee problems which currently become problematic such as validity of refugee data, absence of refugee empowerment, uneven distribution of assistance, deteriorating physical and health conditions of refugees, dispute over inhabited lands, population issues, return of civil rights to abandoned assets, land certificates, and excess of government claims that refugees management was completed in 2009 so that any handling efforts have been halted.

Refugee relocation mechanism originated from some policy options offered by the government as part of solutions, namely returning to homeland, relocation, or staying in refuge areas. Among those options, relocation was the main option chosen by the refugees at that time. The relocations have unintentionally and indirectly contributed to construction of new segregated community concentrations as the refugees tended to choose the relocation sites near, or around, the community of

identity similar to them. Three important reasons why the refugees tended to choose the relocation places were their status as minority group in their homeland, absence of security guarantee if they returned to their homeland, and failure in requesting to return to their homeland.

Ambon City Government has determined and implemented some post-conflict development priorities. In general, the policy in the development priorities is to reconstruct Ambon physically, infrastructurally and psychically which covers thorough refugee management, reconciliation and restoration of brotherhood tie, opening of new heterogeneous settlement, trauma handling, children counseling, gatherings, Social Harmony, and development of *Orang Basudara* (brotherhood) curriculum. Such programs have been clearly outlined in the 2006-2011 and 2011-2016 Medium Term Development Plans of Ambon City and particularly the 2006-2026 Long-Term Development Plans of Ambon City.

In evaluative-qualitative fashion, some post-conflict reconstruction policy programs that have been relatively realized are reconciliation and restoring of brotherhood, both through gatherings, joint organizing of various religious events, and inter-faith dialogs and cooperation; construction and development of new heterogeneous areas; construction of public spaces for meeting such as reconstruction of Mardika Field; Social Harmony; development of *Orang Basudara* (brotherhood) curriculum; development of border areas; trauma handling.

Based on the research data analysis, there are some critical-evaluative notes addressed to such developmental programs and other unimplemented programs. *Firstly*, the 2006 Social Harmony Program suffered from many fund leaks and did not accord the society target, as well as had many project results that have been damaged and not functional. *Secondly*, trauma handling did not run optimally. Moreover, the constructed *Center for Trauma* is not functional any longer. *Thirdly*, public spaces development for inter-community meeting only focused on Mardika Field, and there is almost no development of other public spaces. *Fourthly*, development of *Orang Basudara* (brotherhood) curriculum was still in the concept/ idea and no real implementation was done. *Fifthly*, construction/ renovation of traditional markets which are very strategic for meeting spaces was not fully realized. *Sixthly*, development of border areas which often constitute the hot spots of violent conflicts has yet to be executed at all, both economically and socio-culturally. *Seventhly*, post-conflict children assistance tended to sporadic-ceremonial. *Eighthly*, frequency of joint organizing of religious events was still low. Then, two other problems that require special attention are different perceptions among society segments on the urgency of permanent posts construction in border areas and presence of the Indonesian Military (TNI) under *Bawah Kendali Operasi* (BKO) in Ambon. Apart from that, common perception on discriminatory access to education especially to higher education and employment would require special attention.

Generally, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon are said to run relatively well, and particularly, inter-community relationship and interaction may be said to run quite well. Well-restored relationship is strengthened by shared awareness on conflicts and inter-community cooperation in managing conflicts/ violence which occur after the conflict. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that certain society segments still feel trauma, fear, or discomfort when they enter or visit particular areas where the majority of the population used to be their enemies, especially at nights. Therefore, trauma handling and mutual trust building between communities require special attention and treatment.

Increased post-conflict segregation has contributed to and played a certain role in the emerging cases of violence. Field findings show that many post-conflict violent incidents occurred in border areas between Islamic and Christian communities. Some elements have been identified as the triggering factors of such violence, and have some connection with, or constitute indirect effects from, segregation. Some of the elements are intervention from external parties including provocation or playing both communities off against each other; social disharmony between new comers and indigenous people; suspicion between groups resulting from post-conflict effects; vulnerability of border areas as hot spots of emerging violence; easy mobilization of society by using religious sentiments.

Leadership aspect is an integral part of the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence. This aspect generally can be divided into three categories, namely leadership of religious leaders, leadership of local leaders, and leadership of traditional figures. Participation of religious

leaders in Ambon in the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence is a necessity, due to their strategic position in the society, even though such participation is not fully able to prevent violence yet. From Christian community's perspective, efforts to prevent the spread of violence have been supported by centralized Church leadership in the congregation. Unfortunately this is not easy to be found in Muslim community due to various people affiliations to religious leaders and Islamic organizations. This has caused the society's initiative to be more dominant than that of the leaders in Muslim community.

Local figures that hold positions both formal and informal ones, possess important influences in the society under their responsibility. Even, religious difference with the community does not prevent them from carrying out the tasks without any discrimination. The leaders exist within the Muslim and Christian communities, and actively engage in conflict prevention. Besides that, ethnic-based leaders play major roles in influencing their communities, especially for political interest. Similarly with traditional leaders, they also have strategic roles in maintaining peace and preventing violence. They do this by issuing announcements and disseminating it to the public. However, there are some challenges faced by traditional leaders, such as limited legitimacy in the areas with pluralistic demographic characteristics, many traditional leaders getting involved in political activities so that they cannot represent traditional communities, and absence of Latupati rule that binds all kings, making problems in the society hard to resolve.

Various society efforts to prevent post-conflict violence include those in the social, cultural, religious, political and economic aspects. Efforts in the social, cultural and religious aspects cover involvement of another religious community in organizing religious events, disseminating peace values in religion through education channels, involvement of youth and interfaith figures in observation of religious holidays, strengthening of youth roles and initiatives through media, as well as strengthening of local wisdom to settle violence. The political aspect generally covers political division of power, while the economic aspect is mainly carried out through society initiatives to set up temporary, surprise markets in another community area to support intensified interaction and communications.

Lastly, strategic efforts to deal with post-conflict segregation and violence have also been conducted by various civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO). The organizations' initiatives are normally based on orientation of each organization, which can be differentiated into religious, socio-educational, and economic initiatives. Religious organizations, both Islamic and Christian, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Maluku Protestant Church (GPM), and Maluku Interfaith Institute (LAIM) much emphasize peace messages and de-radicalization in their speeches, sermons, as well as various religious activities. Socio-educational initiatives included the gathering of kings from Latupati Council to discuss to-do actions in order that the September 11, 2011 incident did not get widespread, recruitment of peace activists to minimize tension in border areas, advocacy of gender perspective and child protection budget, facilitation to conflict-related trauma healing activities, counseling for violent perpetrators, as well as establishment of *Peace Goes to School*, Early Childhood Care and Development center (PAUD), and others. Economic aspects focused more on the utilization of cooperation with foreign agencies to develop segregated areas, such as strengthening of women's micro enterprise through credit disbursement.

Preface

BACKGROUND

Prolonged large-scale violence in the transition period of the New Order to Reform Era has reduced. However, until today potential conflicts are still major issue in Indonesia. Many problems which previously triggered big conflicts still have the potential for recurrence of violence in post-conflict areas. Beside that, other forms of episodic conflicts- land and natural resource disputes, local leadership elections (*pilkada*), and thugs— continue to take place in various provinces, both those previously hit by big conflicts and not. Therefore, Indonesian post-conflict society is very vulnerable to recurrence of violence, even when peace has been built. As emphasized by Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2006), in the post-conflict society, violence often recurs with averagely 40% of the whole risk of conflict occurrence in a decade. Such estimation is even higher than conflict risk which is generally faced by poor countries.¹ Therefore, it can be imagined how much violent potential will recur in post-conflict areas in Indonesia.

The fall of the New Order (ORBA), marked with President Soeharto being dethroned in 1998, created a historical moment which Bertrand called (2008) “*critical juncture*”, in which violent conflicts occurred and grew dramatically and almost simultaneously in various areas across Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004). A violent conflict took place for the first time between Dayak tribe and Madurese migrants in December 1996. In the initial process of democratization, various violent conflicts in some areas of Indonesia escalated quite fast, namely in Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku,² Central Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.³ Almost all of the conflicts experienced de-escalation or were resolved in late 2002, except Acehese conflict.

Out of five provinces which experienced communal conflicts—West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi— Maluku Province tends to have fairly high intensity of violent conflicts. The province’s violent conflict trend tended to increase during 2002-2012 (see Graphic 1).

NVMS data shows the size of accumulated violence in all districts of Maluku Province. From Graphic 2 above, we can see that Ambon City still becomes an area with the highest accumulated rate of violent conflict during February 2002 to December 2012. If compared to the total violent incidents in Maluku Province, the violence percentage in Ambon City is more dominant than in other areas, namely 50% of violent incidents; 38% deaths; 54% injuries; 43% damaged buildings. From the total violent incidents in Ambon City, data shows there are causes of the violence (see Graphic 3).

Based on Graphic 3 above, identity-related violence is still dominant, although peace agreement between conflicting communities during the major conflict was reached in early 2002. As viewed from the identity perspective, one aspect that often generates intercommunity violence is religion. In the last 10 years data shows that violence between religious followers are is still a high-rate conflict. (Graphic 4)

The data below shows that inter-religious violence increased sharply in 2011 after a relatively low level of violence before it.

Reflected on the above data, identity factor still becomes a significant element that can influence the emergence of violence in Ambon. The strengthening of identity is felt more real if seen from segregation phenomenon—both physically and socially- between parties of different identities, for example through determination of area border owned by a group or relocation of settlement of a party previously involved in a dispute. Although segregation between groups in Ambon has existed through

¹ Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2006.

² For brief information on Ambon conflict, see Box 1.

³ Bertrand 2008, page 425.

history, the frequent phenomenon is not only the strengthened historical segregation, but also the birth of new segregation resulting from government policies and conflict resolution efforts. Relocation process which was one of the government policies in managing the 1999 post-conflict refugees has created unintended consequence, namely birth of new community concentrations separate to each other. This segregation existence is a phenomenon which would raise many questions, especially if related to post-conflict condition and its connection to recurring violence.

Therefore, the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) team from The Habibie Center understands that segregation problem in Ambon constitutes a case worth studying, in a view of Ambon status as one of the areas that once had a huge conflict. Particularly, the research has the goals of:

1. Identifying and describing the process of segregation formation in post-conflict Ambon;
2. Identifying impacts of government policies on post-conflict segregation in Ambon;
3. Explaining segregation effects to the emergence of violence in post-conflict Ambon;
4. Understanding participation of agencies in overcoming violence-related segregation impacts in Ambon.

The benefits of the research can be divided into two: academic and practical benefits.

Academic Benefits:

1. In general, the research will become additional important literature and/or fill in the literature gap on segregation study in Indonesia.
2. In particular, the research will provide or offer specific perspective in segregation study, namely post-conflict, or consequence of post-conflict developmental reconstruction policies.

Practical Benefits:

1. Availability of information on segregation, emergence process and its impact on violent conflicts recurring after conflict, as well as involvement of non-governmental organization both local and national ones.
2. Availability of inputs and recommendations on the need of policy change in overcoming segregation and its impacts on post-conflict violence emergence.
3. Availability of reference for development agencies, policy makers, NGOs, local and central governments, as well as other developmental stakeholders that work for development and conflict management in Ambon.

CONCEPT AND LITERATURE REVIEW

CONCEPT OF SEGREGATION

Segregation can be understood as segmentation of society based on group identity, for example ethnicity, religion, geographic origin, and others. The factors constitute separating elements⁴ which are generally found in socio-cultural society which was and was not previously hit by conflicts and violence. Segregation phenomenon is also excess of disturbed societal stability which is related to domination and marginalization of a societal group, for example in a bid to access resources. (see Qadeer, 2003; Reskin & Bielby, 2005).

Segregation can take place in voluntary and forced fashion. The first type of segregation occurs when the society tends to choose to live among the people with the same ethnicity, religion or geographical origin. For Indonesia case, the above identity-based enclaves are mainly found in various areas such as *Kampung Jawa* (Javanese Kampong), *Kampung Melayu* (Malay Kampong), *Kampung Arab* (Arabic Kampong), Pecinan (Chinese Area) and others (see Chang, 2002; Kosasih, 2010). The second type of segregation may happen, for instance, due to government policies⁵ which

⁴ Separating elements (and unifying elements) are concepts loaned from Bakhtin (1984) on *centrifugal* and *centripetal forces of narratives*.

⁵ Reasons for and consequences of segregation due to government policies in other countries, for example the Netherlands and Namibia, can be seen in Barbra (2009).

intentionally construct enclaves in transmigration areas in Kalimantan and Sumatra for Javanese and Balinese people who joined the program.

Segregation keeps on moving in the framework of community's social formation. It means segregation phenomenon is not static, but it can have its own dynamics. Historical factors can also strengthen or weaken segregation, beside any internal and external pressure which later can change the shape of segregation in community's social formation, such as social conflicts, natural disasters and others (Djajadi, 2004).

Segregation can take two forms namely spatial segregation and social segregation (Barbra, 2009). Although both segregation forms can be seen separately, there are many cases in which combination of both (socio-spatial segregation) takes place. According to Barbra, spatial segregation and unbalanced control over landscape are the reflection from social gap formation because, for instance, perceived culture is different. The social gap itself is an effort taken in voluntary or forced fashion to accommodate the interests of each group or authority. A classical example from forced segregation with social-spatial form can be seen in the establishment of special reservations for native Americans and resettlement of Mollucans, ex Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger/KNIL), as well as Dutch supporters in the Netherlands. Voluntary segregation with socio-spatial form can be seen in the Amish community settlement in the U.S.

Beside the physical-spatial and social segregation approach, there is more psychological segregation approach, namely segregation in the form of thinking map related to settlement area. Concept and/or mapping of segregation is often called "segregation in mind" (perceived segregation). In the Ambon context, for example, since long time ago Batu Merah or Waihaong *negeri*⁶ has been perceived as *Salam* (Islamic) area, although another community's members of a different religion live there. Karang Panjang or Kudamati, for example, is perceived as *Sarani* (Christian) area although in the area live people of a different religion. Nevertheless, such segregation patterns do not necessarily threaten social integrity since they are still relatively managed through various safety valves in the form of local institutions that have participated in minimizing conflict potential due to the existing differences.⁷

For Indonesian case, the phenomenon of societal grouping in one area is one of the conflict excess—seen, for instance, in the shifted settlement configuration which tends to group in an area with the same identity, such as groupings of Muslims and Christians in post-conflict North Maluku (Rozi et al., 2006). Not only that, markets as interaction space for different communities are affected by conflicting group separation, such as Jailolo Market which soon after the conflict ended is dominated by Christian community (Rozi et al.). Beside that, in less conducive situation after the conflict, almost all villages in North Tobelo subdistrict have experienced segregation in almost all sectors of life, including markets and schools (see Djana et al., 2004).

Conflicts also bring about the strengthening of previous segregation. For example, strengthened segregation based on ethnicity and religion after the conflict in Poso (Diprose, 2007) and strengthened area exclusivity based on group identity by setting up barricades that separate their area from other areas in Ambon (Pariella, 2007). Beside that, impacts of conflicts in other areas because of the coming of internally displaced persons/IDP can trigger segregation which was less obvious, such as the arrival of East Timorese refugees in East Nusa Tenggara (Sunarto, Nathan, & Hadi, 2005).

Although it has already been mentioned that for certain reasons post-conflict segregation must be executed for de-escalation of violence,⁸ however at the same time segregation also generates negative impacts. For example, efforts to support peaceful and fair development are often hampered by post-conflict segregation (Hadi, 2005). Government officers also encounter difficulty in locating

⁶ For Ambon City people, village or usually called *negeri* is a community unit based on customary law with territorial border and autonomous authority as well as led directly by a kind or *Latupati*.

⁷ T. D. Pariella, response paper in Semi-Workshop NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013.

⁸ In this case it should be underlined that post-conflict segregation to deescalate violence does not settle the root causes of conflicts and is merely temporary halt in violence.

“neutral” areas (Mawdsley, Tanuhandaru, & Holman, 2002) to discuss, for instance, development programs. Therefore, segregation can also hinder intervention efforts done by the government to build peace in post-conflict areas.

Literature review on the above segregation offers a description of some issues. *Firstly*, community stability can be disturbed, by, one of which is conflict. The stability recovery requires a long period especially in post-conflict times, moreover if there are internal and external pressure which hampers the process of stabilization. *Secondly*, segregation can take place because of being forced and voluntary, in which previous and current government policies can be the driving factor for segregation. If related to post-conflict condition, the research strives to focus on forced segregation. *Thirdly*, spatial and social segregations as well as the combination of both are commonly found in the effort to identify forms of segregation. For this, socio-spatial segregation in post-conflict condition becomes the key focus on the research, especially if related to government policies which give basis for the emergence of the segregation, and how the segregation is related to the occurrence (recurrence) of violence among previously-conflicting parties.

SEGREGATION AND VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT AREAS

Despite being frequently questioned, ethnic segregation can reduce violence intensity among used-to-fight groups (Weidmann & Salehyan, 2010). Some researches show that creation of partition, or physical segregation between ethnic groups is the best way to build peace (see Chapman & Roeder, 2007; Kaufmann, 1996; Sambanis, 2000). This needs to be implemented because when identity grows stronger due to violence, conflicting groups will not find it easy to trust one another and live together peacefully. With segregation, the inter-group contacts can be minimized and independent enclaves can be built. On the contrary, weak segregation can improve contacts, competitions, and frequencies of violence between used-to-fight groups (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney, 1996).

For Indonesian case, creation of partition or physical segregation can be implemented to prevent continued violence so that one of the fighting parties must be relocated to other areas. For instance, in ethnic conflict cases in West Kalimantan Madurese ethnic community was forced to move and settle down in other areas to escape violence against them. In this case, Madurese people must be segregated geographically and inhabit areas specially set for them. Due to low intensity of interaction with other groups, the relocated refugees tended to be avoided from potential new riots (Kusdijono, 2006).

However, effect contrary to the above finding is obtained from the International Contact Group report (2012). ICG reported that in Ambon case the absence of attention to the violence’s systemic root, one of which is segregation, could cause violence to occur very easily. Such statement is supported by the field fact that showed a few inter-group incidents in Ambon. For example, inter-group violence occurred in the torch relay at the 193th Pattimura Anniversary in May 2012. This incident showed that segregation did not reduce the level of violence because inter-group interaction intensity was still high, given Maluku geographic and demographic conditions.

The above explanation shows that although segregation can reduce the level of violence, it does not mean that violence can be fully avoided. Previous studies show positive and negative relationship between segregation and violence in post-conflict areas. It can be concluded that the existence of segregation in post-conflict areas shows that the society in the areas are still vulnerable to violence resulting from residue of previous violence or new conflict potential. Therefore, violence management measures in post-conflict segregation areas constitute an issue to look into, especially if connected to policy intervention efforts which are an important part in pushing reconciliation process in conflict areas.

POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND GOVERNMENT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY

The people living in post-conflict situations are faced with two major challenges, namely the recovery of economy which has been damaged due to conflicts and conflict risk reduction to overcome post-conflict peace fragility which can bring about recurring violence (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2006). Economic recovery through assistance program and reformed policies has been executed. However, the execution must be supported by conflict risk reduction because absent

violence is an important point in building peace efforts (Holtzman, Elwan, & Scott, 1998). Therefore, government capacity in implementing the policies becomes very strategic. For example, effective and timely implementation of control (*policing*) has given major impact on the long-term violence reduction (Weidmann & Salehyan, 2010). The government capacity itself can be seen into three categories: military capacity, bureaucratic/ administrative capacity, and political institutional coherence and quality (Hendrix, 2010). Given the wide categories, the research will only focus on bureaucratic/ administrative capacity, especially in carrying out government-developed policies.

Some measures have been taken to overcome segregation impacts in some post-conflict areas in Indonesia; two of them are policies on regional proliferation and relocation of refugees. For example, in 1999 the government agreed to the establishment of two new districts, Bengkayang and Landak, from the 'mother' districts, Sambas and Pontianak respectively. The main consideration of the district proliferation was based on the ethnicity factor, although the assumption was rejected by the government. However, demographic facts showed that the proliferation has been one of the steps to overcome conflicts by attempting segregation initiatives: two new districts are Dayak ethnic areas, while the two 'mother' districts are Malay areas. Nowadays, Bengkayang and Landak, which used to be conflict-prone areas, become areas with no tension (Tasanaldy, 2007). In this case, regional proliferation program by the government was consciously taken by ignoring reintegration factor. The implication is that state-sponsored reconciliation and reintegration processes do not happen just because the government's policy even hampers such processes. Nevertheless, such policy has proven to create calm situation in the areas that used to be vulnerable to ethnic conflicts. (Tasanaldy, 2007).

Beside that, the central government through the National Coordinating Board for Disaster and IDP Management (Bakornas PBP) formed through Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 3 Year 2001 along with the West Kalimantan government through Joint Team for Post Sambas Social Riot Madurese IDPs Management (TGPPPKSS) issued a policy on relocating madurese refugees following the communal clashes in West Kalimantan. The policy execution turned out to present less-promising results at least due to two things: such policy was formulated poorly and lack of coordination took place among policy-executing agencies (Susetyo, 2003). As a result, low infrastructure quality (for example, roads and houses) and limited access of refugees to resources (for instance, quality land and soil type) brought about unrealized goal of forced segregation policy (Kusdijono, 2006). Even though spatial segregation in the policy did prevent involvement of refugees in new violence due to low frequency of interaction with external people, but the social segregation caused the Madurese refugees not to have the capacity to participate fully in developmental efforts.

In the Maluku and North Maluku contexts, the government has issued a policy that underlines the need for overall rehabilitation in post-conflict areas. People's welfare approach can be seen in the consideration section of the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) which clearly prioritizes harmonizing efforts of social relationship between groups that used to fight. The above intended policy is the Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 6 Year 2003 on Accelerated Development Recovery of Post-Conflict Maluku and North Maluku. In other words, the *Inpres* becomes the legal basis for the implementation of post-conflict development reconstruction in Ambon, and generally in Maluku and North Maluku Provinces.

According to Bappenas (2010), conducive condition has been built in Maluku and North Maluku. Beside that, such *Inpres* is deemed important for peace recovery by "building the local government capacity and capability, rehabilitation implementation, dialog initiatives and effective communications as well as community facilitation" (g. II. 6-9). According to Bappenas (2009), in rebuilding trust among the conflicting groups, the government conducted "facilitation initiatives to socio-cultural agencies in conflicting areas of Poso, Maluku, and North Maluku" (p. 02-10). This has been done in partnership with NGOs, community-based organizations, and universities.

Nevertheless, there are some concerns in the field. Santoso (2006) reported that one of the concerns was triggered by the completion of fund support from the *Inpres*, while the field condition was not yet conducive so that refugee issues were ignored and could trigger new conflicts. The fund distribution—or in bigger scale, control over income per capita (see Fearon & Laitin, 2003)—had contribution to the low potential for civil violence in areas with people of various ethnicity and religions. Beside that, Maluku Refugee Coalition (KPM) Coordinator Pieter Pattywaellapia (quoted

in Santoso, 2006) mentioned that social reintegration processes among the segregated society at conflict time was not yet successfully recovered due to local government transparency issues.

Next, social blending which constitutes signs of social, economic and social relationship improvements becomes a challenge for policy makers and government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations in a bid to maintain post-conflict recovery process amidst segregation, especially based on the studies conducted in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku regions (Huber et al., 2004). Horizontal inequality and social/political exclusion aspects in getting access to employment, education and political participation are closely related to the recovery of social relations which are hampered by segregation (Diprose, 2009). Beside that, awareness among conflicting parties to revitalize or re-institutionalize their traditional values set aside during the conflicts can support reconciliation process, especially for those who experienced force segregation and relocation following the violence in Ambon (Adam, 2008).

Based on the above findings it can be concluded that government policies related to conflict resolution which have generated segregation between the conflicting parties show various results and tend to deviate far from the spirit of the policies' issuance. Some studies above are accompanied evaluative researches on government-issued policies, but do not specifically focus on the segregation aspects and resulting consequences. Therefore, the research also attempts to reveal the consequences of the government policies which end up with segregation, especially if related to violence that still may occur in post-conflict regions.

Beside that, theoretically the raised question is until when Ambon is considered as post-conflict area. Is there any timeframe or particular indicators in which Ambon is no longer called as post-conflict area? To get rid of post-conflict status and enter normalization phase, an area need to reach three conditions/ indicators: (1) intervention from external parties are no longer needed; (2) governance process and economic activities generally run in independent fashion; (3) internal and external relationship has run normally based on norms, tradition, and custom as before. Every post-conflict area has different dynamics and capacity to reach those three indicators—one area is likely to reach them relatively fast, while another one reach them very slowly. Thus, in this context, particular limit/ timeframe should not become the basis.⁹

With reference to those three indicators, based on our field findings, Ambon is not fully rid of post-conflict status yet due to some reasons. Among them are external interventions including the unfinished settlement of refugee's rights— as marked by the presence of BKO troops, planned additional reinforcement of BKO troops by Maluku Provincial Government, etc.—although overall such intervention relatively reduces. Beside that, even though in general internal relationship has run relatively well, there are still particular segments of society that feel unsafe/ uncomfortable to travel to particular areas and in particular time. One good side is that local government process and economic activities are said to run relatively well. So, it is still fairly reasonable to utilize post-conflict concept in the research.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE

The research uses qualitative approach. The data used here include primary and secondary data. The primary data are principally collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, and observation. Interviews are used to build rapport and understanding with respondents so that they can focus on disclosing their own perspectives on what they have gone through (Denzin, 2001; Wiseman & Aaron, 2001; and Beale, Cole, Hillege, McMaster, & Nagy, 2004; Patton 2002). Typology and interview respondent candidates can be seen from the explanation on section "Sampling Strategy". Interview data will be transcribed according to the format in Annex 1 "Form Interview Transcript". The research adopts some recommendations from Kumar (1989), especially concerning conceptual framework development, interview guideline preparation, and selection of key informants. Guideline for general questions for interview can be seen in Annex 2.

⁹ See Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) (May 2012).

The research uses focus group discussion (FGD) in collecting data. FGD is open-ended interviews with a group of informants (totaling five to eight persons) in which the informants are given opportunity to provide their inputs on the focused issues presented by researchers (Patton, 2002). According to Kumar (1987), FGD is useful in data collection for the purpose of assessment on an innovation, monitoring and evaluating, as well as interpreting available quantitative data.

Observation method in data collection is based on perspective dimension, Patton (2002), which covers (1) the role of observer (*spectator*); (2) dominant approach of external party (*ethic*); (3) individual and collective observations; (4) closed observation (*covert*) on observed objects; (5) single and short observation; (6) narrow observation done only on particular elements in interactive behaviors. Observation activities are conducted on interactions in particular places, such as markets and religious places, religious events, socio-cultural events, existence of enclaves, and others. The data is recorded in the form of daily journal (*field notes*) completed by researcher every time they conduct observation.

Lastly, the secondary data is elaborated from various sources including documents, reports, academic publications, magazines, and printed newspapers and online news. The secondary data is collected to complement the data obtained through interviews and observations, and become additional information in formulating questions and pave the way for data-adding initiatives (Patton, 2002). Furthermore, Altheide (2000) stated that document analysis is intended to find and explain an incident with the purpose of identifying the meaning, patterns, and process of such incident.

SAMPLING STRATEGY

To get and determine informants, the sampling strategy used here is purposive and snowball sampling. The purposive sampling will mainly used in the initial phase of field data collection. If rapport has been built with initial respondents, then snowball sampling will be utilized to find more respondents based on the recommendations from the previous respondents. Key informants will be taken from the element's representatives that are considered being relevant to the research topic. In general, key informants for this research are taken from three levels:

Macro, it is represented by officials that represent the central government and local governments.

Mezo, it is represented by government and non-governmental agencies operating in research areas, for example non-governmental organization (NGOs), community based organizations, District/City People's Welfare Office.

Micro, it is represented by community figures or representatives based on ethnicity, gender, religion, and others; as well as representatives from grass-root groups, for example village heads, religious leaders, youth leaders, and gender activists.

Particularly, key informants will be selected based on representation of various Ambonese society elements by basing on data needs contained in each research questions as follows (Table 1).

Table 1: List of Research Questions and Potential Informants

No	Research Questions	Key Informants	Output
1	How does segregation emerge/ grow after peace in Ambon?	Local academicians; NGO activists related to social issues, especially peace; religious figures; traditional figures; conflict actors (previous conflict perpetrators and victims); refugees	- mapping of segregation - cause analysis on emergence of post-conflict segregation
2	What are the impacts of post-conflict developmental reconstruction policies on the emergence of and strengthened segregation in Ambon?	Government elements (mayor, Bappeda, Social Affair office, Religious Affairs office, Spatial Planning office, Health office, Education office, etc.); security elements (TNI and Police, thugs); local legalization elements; movement elements (socio-political	- evaluation on policies - identification of stakeholders

No	Research Questions	Key Informants	Output
		and gender activists); economic elements (trader and business people); society elements accessing education, health services, etc.	
3	What is the relationship between segregation and emergence of violence in post-conflict Ambon?	Local academicians; security elements; traditional elements; religious elements; youth elements	problem analysis
4	What is the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations in managing segregation and the impacts on emergence of violent conflicts in Ambon?	Religious elements (FKUB, Islamic organizations, Christian organization, etc.); civil society elements (NGO activists related to social issues, especially peace); youth elements (youth leaders, youth organization <i>karang taruna</i> , etc.)	- NGO participation data - Segregation management strategy and the impacts

The data collection was conducted in two phases. The first phase was held from 10 December to 18 December 2012. The second phase was from 13 May to 23 May 2013. From both data collection, the total number of respondents was 74.

Overview of Ambon City

DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE OF AMBON CITY

PICTURE OF AMBON CITY

Geographically, Ambon City is located in most of Ambon island territory covering the width of 377 Km² according to the Government Regulation No. 13 Year 1979. The land width of Ambon City is 359,45 Km² based on the 1980 Land Use Survey. If seen from the topographic characteristics of Ambon City, the area composition consists of hills (73%) and low lands (17%).

From the administrative aspect, Ambon City is the center of Maluku Provincial government since its establishment as the capital of Maluku Province in 1958.¹⁰ Therefore, bureaucracy centers are located in Ambon City such as offices of governors and related provincial offices, Maluku Provincial Legislative Council office, Indonesian Military Headquarters (TNI) as well as Indonesian Police (*Polri*) Headquarters. The existence of such power centers have made Ambon City strategic for doing coordination of government affairs and policy making in Maluku Province. After the 1999-2002 communal conflicts, the previously damaged governmental offices and centers have been renovated. Not only that, the security condition is relatively conducive so that this has pushed governmental activities in the Maluku Province capital to return to normality.

Ambon City consists of five subdistricts namely Sirimau, Nusaniwe, Teluk Ambon, Teluk Ambon Baguala, and South Leitimur subdistricts. There are 50 *kelurahan*/villages divided into those five subdistricts (see Table 2).

Based on the above table, Sirimau subdistrict is the area that has the most villages/*kelurahan* if compared to the other subdistricts. The subdistrict is the capital of Ambon City. The existence of villages in Ambon City tends to be dominant in Teluk Ambon, Teluk Ambon Baguala, and South Leitimur Subdistricts. The distribution and location of subdistricts and villages in Ambon City can be seen more clearly in the above Ambon City map (see Map 1 page 143).

Table 2: Subdistricts and Villages and *Kelurahan* in Ambon City¹¹

Subdistrict	Villages	<i>Kelurahan</i>
Sirimau	4	10
Nusaniwe	5	8
Teluk Ambon	7	1
Teluk Ambon Baguala	6	1
South Leitimur	8	-

Source: BPS (Bureau of Statistics) of Ambon City 2012

PICTURE OF AMBON CITY POPULATION

In the last three decades, the population growth of Ambon City have had fluctuating trend (Graphic 5). In 1990 the Ambon City population totalled 275,888. The number decreased in 2000 by 191,561, and increased in 2010 totaling 331,254. Such trend was related to the outbreak of communal

¹⁰ Establishment of Ambon City as the capital of Maluku Province was based on Law No. 20 Year 1958 on Formation of First-Level Autonomous Region of Maluku.

¹¹ This composition is based on the Local Regulation (*Perda*) of Ambon City No. 2 Year 2006.

conflicts between 1999 and 2002 which claimed thousands of lives and tens of thousands people displaced (see Graphic 5).¹²

Almost one decade after the communal conflicts, the Ambon City population growth tended to increase. The 2010 BPS census data shows that the Ambon City population growth reached 5.65%, per year, the highest of all districts/ cities in Maluku Province. The population growth came from the urbanization which tended to increase and return of the people to Ambon who took refuge.

If seen from the Ambon City population distribution, Sirimau subdistrict is the most densely populated, followed by Nusaniwe, Teluk Ambon Baguala, Teluk Ambon, and South Leitimur Subdistricts (Graphic 6).

The villages (customary *negeri*) or *kelurahan* that have the highest number of population are Batu Merah Village in Sirimau Subdistrict, Passo Village in Teluk Ambon Baguala Subdistrict, *Kelurahan* Kudamati and Benteng in Nusaniwe Subdistrict.

Population density in some areas (subdistricts or village/*kelurahan*) is influenced by several things. For example, population density in Sirimau Subdistrict occurred because the area is the capital city in which there are many markets, offices and other public facilities. Beside that, population density in an area is also influenced by previous conflicts. For example, population density in Batu Merah Village is affected by many Muslim refugee locations who moved from areas both inside and outside Ambon due to security reasons and previous communal conflict trauma. Similar cases are also found in Passo Village and *Kelurahan* Kudamati as the destination of settlement for Christian community from inside and outside Ambon that previously took refuge when the communal conflicts occurred.

The population growth of Ambon City is closely related to the revival of society activity centers. This can be seen in some economic centers such as Mardika market and rows of shops with house above (*ruko*) in A. Y. Patty street. Beside that, the presence of new economic centers such as Ambon City Center area and Transit Bus Terminal in Passo Village has become one of the driving factors for the speedy economy growth which result in the increased population in Ambon City. Post-conflict relatively conducive situation also supports the educational process. Pattimura University becomes the magnet for the people inside and outside Ambon to access higher education. Those things have made Ambon City more fortunate than other areas.

Seen from religious aspect, the Ambon City population consists of Christians (59%), Muslims (39%), Catholics (2%), Hindu (0,13%), and Buddhists (0,04%).¹³ The population composition based on religion in Ambon City does not have significant change in the percentage if compared to the population composition in the previous communal conflict period. Both large communities, namely Protestants/ Christians and Muslims, are still dominant in Ambon City. The distribution of population by religion can also be seen based on the subdistricts in Ambon City (Graphic 7).

Based on the above picture, the distribution pattern of the population by religion tends to demonstrate people concentration in particular subdistrict. For instance, Muslims tend to live in Sirimau, Teluk Ambon, and Nusaniwe Subdistricts; while Christians dominate Nusaniwe, Teluk Ambon Baguala, and South Leitimur Sub districts.

THE LATEST SITUATION OF AMBON CITY

SOCIAL SITUATION

The social condition of Ambon City people currently cannot be separated from the previous communal conflict experiences. The problem of distrust in the social relationship becomes one thing that is difficult to erase, both in the Christian community to the Muslims or vice versa, as told by an informant:

¹² The conflicts claimed approximately 1,413 lives and tens of thousands people had to take refuge outside Ambon, Maluku. Seet Barron et al. (2012).

¹³ Population Census 2010.

... *katong* (we) Muslims still live next door, *katong* (we) Christians still live next door. [...] we live in a frame of *Pela Gandong*, living in brotherhood, but bordered by wall of distrust.¹⁴

One of the manifestations of the distrust is obvious in the people's actions that tend to choose to live in settlement with the community of same religion. Not only that, conflict trauma becomes the reinforcer of inter-community partitions. Such condition got worsened when religious violence recurred such as 11 September 2011 riot and clash at Pattimura Torch Relay of 15 May 2012. Such incidents often become the trigger of revival of strengthened distrust between Muslim and Christian communities.

Nevertheless, the distrust condition may be tenuous. For example, in the national event of *Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran* (MTQ) there was inter-community solidarity in Ambon City. Mutual trust and help between both communities of different religions were obvious in the event.¹⁵ However, this does not necessarily erase traumatic experiences among the Ambonese society, especially the previous communal conflict victims.

In the other side, uncertainty of law enforcement process has triggered social unrest. The death of a public van's driver with destination to Kudamati on December 15, 2011, for instance, does not yet find an answer although it has been under investigation by the local police. Until now the police has not found the assassin yet. The implication is that since the incident, drivers and owners of Kudamati-destination public vans that are used to passing through Waihaong street agree not to go through the area until the police succeed in finding the murderer.¹⁶ Consequently, the public transportation route of Waihaong–Silale to Benteng–Kudamati, Nusaniwe, is disturbed until today.

Another prominent social condition in Ambon City is related to the refugees of the previous communal conflicts. Unfinished refugee management process generates various further problems. For example, refugees in Warasia live in The Hatalas' land. A problem emerged when the land owner wanted to execute the land inhabited by the refugees, so that they felt threatened of not having a place to live. Beside that, unclear population identity issue has become an obstacle for refugees, especially when they want to access People Business Credit which requires identity completeness as citizens.¹⁷

POLITICAL SITUATION

The political map in Ambon City cannot be separated from the 1998 Reform momentum. Since the fall of the New Order regime, constellation of political parties dominating the map of power in Ambon City has also changed. Secular parties rule various general elections and Ambon City mayor election. Beside that, *PDI Perjuangan* (PDI-P) as a party identical to the fighting symbol against the New Order appears as the influential political actor. The existence of PDI-P in Ambon City has close relationship with Christian communities in the area. Moreover, some of the party committees and members are functionaries of the Maluku Protestant Church (GPM) in Ambon City (Klinken, 2007). The following picture shows explicitly the strong relationship between PDI-P and Christians (Photo 3 page 137).

Furthermore, the political map in Ambon City as seen in the composition of seats in the Local Legislative Council (DPRD) shows that secular parties are still dominating. PDI-P and Golkar Party still become two dominant parties in the seat competition in the DPRD in every general election (Table 3).

Table 3: Composition of Political Parties in Ambon City Legislative Council (1999-2009)

1999 General Election	2004 General Election	2009 General Election
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

¹⁴ Interview with one of the Christian community activists, 17 December 2012.

¹⁵ Interviews with some informants in Ambon City, Ambon, 14-16 December 2012.

¹⁶ It was suspected that the driver was stabbed to death Waihaong area. Provocation then occurred, claiming that the Christian driver from Kudamati was killed by a resident of predominantly Muslim Waihaong area (interview with informant, Ambon, 14 December 2012).

¹⁷ Interview with Maluku young employers organization's figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

Political Party	Number of Seats in DPRD of Ambon City	Political Party	Number of Seats in DPRD of Ambon City	Political Party	Number of Seats in DPRD of Ambon City
PDI-P	16	PDI-P	8	PDI-P	5
Golkar	6	Golkar	6	Golkar	5
PPP	6	PKS	4	PKS	3
Fraksi ABRI	4	Partai Demokrat	3	Partai Demokrat	3
PDBK	1	PDS	3	PDS	1
PKP	1	PPP	2	PPP	3

Source: Elaboration from various sources

Beside the constellation of political parties, the execution of Maluku Governor election also colors the political dynamics in Ambon City. This can be seen one the eve of Maluku Governor election execution in June 2013. Along the streets from Pattimura Airport to Latuhalat Village at the end of Ambon City, a number of banners and billboards displaying the candidates of governor or vice-governor were installed. In Sirimau area which is the center of Ambon City, the local election festive was marked with statements from community figures and political party members. Even, Ambon City Mayor Richard Louhenapessy joined and supported one of the candidates through billboards and banners installed along the Ambon City roadside.

The issues offered by the candidates were welfare improvement, distribution of development, poverty reduction and transportation improvements.¹⁸ Beside that, security issues are still raised by candidates through various campaign media such as backdrops and local newspapers. Issues on togetherness and solidarity surfaced in various statements by the candidates such as the tagline from the incumbent candidate Said Assegaf–Zeth Sahuburua: “Maluku for All” (Photo 4 page 137).¹⁹

Configuration of governor candidates is still filled with power sharing spirit between Muslims and Christians.²⁰ Almost each of candidate couples put governor candidacy from Christian community and vice-governor candidacy from Muslim community, or vice versa. This pattern has become a trend in the local election at the provincial and/or district/city levels in Maluku.²¹ Like in the 2008 Governor election in which four couples of governor and vice-governor were always Christian-Muslim, or vice versa. The sharing also shows an understanding among some communities that after two periods the Maluku Governors were always from the Christian community, now it is time for a governor coming from Muslim community.²² Such statement does not represent the Mollucan society entirely, but gives confirmation that power sharing between communities has been an integral part of political peace process in Maluku.

However, the execution of the democracy festive cannot be separated from various problems. One of them is some fear of political maneuver which ends up with violence, as stated by civil society representative as follows:

We see that potential violence on the eve of the Local Election still remains, such as previous conflict in Porto–Haria, an incident in Batu Gantung, and some others. We do not know whether or not those were

¹⁸ Quoted from the delivery of vision and mission by Governor and Vice Governor candidates in a candidate debate program organized by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) of Pattimura University (Unpatti), 21 May 2013

¹⁹ Pranala <http://www.siwalimanews.com>, 20 February 2013

²⁰ Power sharing between Muslim and Christian communities especially in the strategic positions in the political, economic and social affairs in Maluku has been post-conflict phenomenon.

²¹ See Tomsa (2008).

²² Interview with one of the Muslim activists, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

designed on the eve of the Local Election, but we as civil society (NGO) here have already told the people to protect each other and not to be easily provoked by SMS-SMS... because we here are very easily provoked.²³

The phenomenon emerging on the eve of the Governor Election, especially in Ambon City, is the mushrooming of forums or family ties based on ethnicity or particular areas. Such forums usually stage demonstrations or express their aspirations through newspaper or banners/ billboards. Usually they are utilized by governor candidates to voice out their interests and simultaneously attack their political rivals.²⁴ Frictions often emerge although they are not in large scale nor spread to other areas.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

The economic condition of Ambon City shows a positive trend. This can be seen from the economic growth of Ambon City in 2012, namely approximately 6.77%.²⁵ This figure was higher than the other districts/cities in Maluku Province. The development of the Regional Gross Domestic Product (PDRB) of Ambon City after the communal conflicts also demonstrated a positive trend and keeps on increasing every year (Graphic 8).

In 2011 the Ambon City's PDRB reached IDR4.2 trillion. The service sector was the biggest contributor to the regional revenue (nearly 27.81%) so that the economic growth rate of Ambon City was made positive. Then, the trading, transportation and communications sectors respectively contributed 27.38% and 18.05% of the total of Ambon City's PDRB.

According to Ambon Mayor Richard Louhenapessy, the positive economic growth in Ambon City was caused by high life expectancy, namely around 73.16%, which was the highest in the Maluku Province. The Human Development Index (IPM) of Ambon City is also the highest in Maluku Province, namely 78,94%. Positive trend of the economic growth of Ambon City could not be separated from the short-term developmental priorities applied after communal conflicts (2002-2011). The Ambon City government prioritized security stability as part of development programs.²⁶ This was intended to revive society routine, including economic activities.

According to an Ambonese employer, the Ambon City economic condition has far increased if compared with the initial post-conflict period.²⁷ This can be seen in the busy selling activities in A. Y. Patty street. Even according to him, some sellers and owners of shops with house above (*ruko*) from Chinese ethnicity have returned to carry out economic activities in Ambon like in A. Y. Patty street and Passo Village. Beside that, other migrants such as Butonese, Bugis, and Makassarese (BBM) people, also return to informal economic activities in Ambon City.²⁸ Currently the BBM groups dominate street-vendor trading and stands in Mardika Market, Batu Merah, and in Ambon Plaza (Amplaz) area.

Ambon economic revival cannot be separated from the opening of new economic spaces in various territories, not only in Sirimau. For example, the construction of trading centers (such as mall) in Passo village which also colors the economic sector distribution in Ambon City. Since the construction, Passo area has been busier because the visitors come not only from Passo but also from other areas. Initially they were afraid when the area is designated as new economic space, because Passo in the conflict time was the biggest Christian basis.²⁹ However with time passing by, this does not de-motivate people from outside Passo, especially from the Muslim community to participate in the economic activities there.

²³ Interview with one Muslim, Chairperson of an NGO in Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁴ Interview with Director of an NGO and church leaders in di Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁵ Pranala <http://www.beritadaerah.com>, 21 November 2012.

²⁶ Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon 14 May 2013.

²⁷ Interview with Maluku young employer representatives, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁸ According to Ambon City government official, Butonese, Bugis, and Makasarese people are one of violence targets in the previous communal conflicts (interview, Ambon, 13 December 2012).

²⁹ Interview with young Mollucan employer representative, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

Construction of the new economic spaces was also the priority of Ambon City development. As mentioned by an official for Ambon City development affairs, one of the developmental priorities is to develop new areas for economic activities, such as markets, malls.³⁰ In the near future, the focus will target the development of economic zones, such as markets in Nusaniwe. Not only that, construction and renovation of various supporting infrastructures such as roads and bridges will be targeted to support economic activities in Ambon.³¹

Nevertheless, behind the increased economic activities in Ambon City, there are also some problems. Unemployment is a big problem in Ambon City. According to data from Ambon City BPS, there were approximately 22,738 people who do not get jobs (open unemployment) or approximately 15.67% of the total work force.³² The rate is the biggest compared to all districts/cities in Maluku Province.

Unemployment issue is not only economic problem, such as lack of job opportunities or low level of education among the people. The issue is important to note as many jobless community members are the victims of previous communal conflicts. In this context one of the Ambon City political activists said:

Many of our young people here were victimized by the conflicts; [...] their parents died or [...] could not go to school because they lived in a refuge. So they, who are now adults, find it difficult to get jobs. Even if they work, they just do casual jobs. And many of them got drunk in alleys of these kampongs here. They are easily provoked to get to conflict. Like in the September 2011 riot, they were in the front.³³

After the communal conflicts, Ambon City has recovered. Governmental bureaucracies run normally; social, economic and political conditions have relatively experienced some increase. On the other hand, portrait of Ambon City still has some problems namely tendency of religion-based settlement concentrations, phenomenon of distrust between Muslim and Christian communities, as well as unemployment, especially among young people. Those problems have the potential for harming peace consolidating process that has been fostered in Ambon City.

³⁰ Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³¹ Like the construction of Merah Putih bridge, renovation of Mardika market and terminal, and construction of parking area in Sirimau.

³² Total work force in Ambon City in 2011 reached 145,072 people.

³³ Interview with one of the Ambon City political activists, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

Refugees, Relocation, and Formation of Post-Conflict Segregation

BRIEF HISTORY OF SEGREGATION AND POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION PATTERNS IN AMBON

BRIEF HISTORY OF SEGREGATION IN AMBON CITY

Segregation phenomenon is not a new issue in the life of Ambon City society. This indication is demonstrated by the settlement patterns of the Ambon City people before the communal conflicts, in which there were religion-based groupings. For example, Passo area was identical with Christian *negeri*, while Batu Merah was identical with Muslim *negeri*. There were also Mount Nona area with Christian majority and Leihitu peninsula with predominantly Muslims. This was affirmed by a respondent's statement:

... if we talk about segregation, it is not today's issue [only], but from long time ago our settlement patterns were segregated. It means, in the old days, there were *negeris* with the Christian population and *negeris* with the Muslims.³⁴

Looking back in the old days, those religions including Islam and Christianity, and Hinduism were the religions brought to Ambon by Asian and European traders who were interested in Maluku wealth of spices, at least since the Roman period. However, Hinduism only has small impact or influence in Maluku, while Islam and Christianity have been planted deeply and played a major role in the life of the Mollucan society. It is estimated that Christianity arrived in Maluku in the 16th century in the form of Roman Catholicism introduced by the Portuguese. When the Dutch expelled the Portuguese in early 17th century, they changed Catholic villages into Dutch Reformed Protestant ones.³⁵ However it should be noted that over the course of the history in Maluku, those religions have experienced modifications with the local culture and wisdoms as well as local people's custom.³⁶

Segregation condition in Maluku cannot be separated from the colonial society structure formed by the Dutch government at that time.³⁷ The colonial Dutch Government provided opportunities to Christian Mollucan people to get western education and became administrators. It can be said that the position of Islamic Ambonese in the Colonial Dutch era was slightly pushed out before it re-emerged during the Japanese invasion.³⁸ Discriminatory politics developed by the colonial government affected various sectors of the Ambonese society's life. According to a respondent:

For *basudara* Christian people here that was true, said our grandpa-grandma in the old days, even I still enjoyed it too, [...] easier to go to school and get into governmental bureaucracy compared to *basudara* Muslim brothers here.³⁹

Discriminatory politics generated the assumption that Christian community was more educated and identical to bureaucracy, while Muslim community's positions were traders and plantation people.

³⁴ Interview with one of the religious figures and Mollucan peace activists, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁵ Bartels (2003b).

³⁶ Bartels (2003).

³⁷ Colonial society structure divided the people by particular race or ethnicity. Furnivall (1957).

³⁸ Dieter Bartels (2003); *Ibid.*

³⁹ Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

This can be seen in the people settlement patterns based on their daily activities. As explained by one of the informants, before conflicts usually Muslim communities preferred to live in the “lower” areas (near coastal areas), while Christian communities live in “upper” areas, associated with hilly areas.⁴⁰

Furthermore, border change factor also modified area configuration in Ambon City. Through Government Regulation No. 13 Year 1979 on Change in Area Borders of Ambon Municipality, the Ambon city area got wider than before. The policy opened up spaces for new comers to Ambon. In the eras of Governor Hasan Slamet to Governor Akib Latuconsina, around 1980s to 1990s many migrants from Sulawesi, Java and Sumatra entered Maluku, including Ambon City. The policy was related to the national transmigration program in the New Order regime, and Ambon government efforts to add the number of human resources to fill in local socio-economic spaces. Both policies changed the dynamics of the society in Ambon City. Economic centers like Sirimau was then filled up with migrants who lived near their business locations.

Despite being dominated by particular religious community, some areas still provided spaces for communities of different religions to live in the area. Before the conflicts, there were no area that was exclusively inhabited by a particular community. Even, in Batu Merah Village/*Negeri* dominated by Muslims there were Christian communities.⁴¹ Although there was clear demarcation between Christian and Muslim communities in Ambon, social interaction between the community groups of different religions did not encountered significant disturbance or friction in the area before the conflicts. Often was found inter-community cooperation in two villages/*negeris* to carry out a task. For example, during the construction of a mosque in Batu Merah Village dominated by Muslims, the Passo Village with predominantly Christian people participated in providing materials and physical energy to construct the mosque.⁴² The phenomenon of the harmonious cooperation also occurred in the traditional ceremony organizing. When Laha Village inhabited dominantly by Muslims organized a traditional ceremony to appoint a king, the people from Amahusu Village with Christian majority participated in the ceremony.

The phenomenon is closely related to the deep-rooted culture that has been uphold by Ambonese society namely *Pela* and *Gandong*.⁴³ Before the previous communal conflicts, this cultural instrument could break through geographical partitions and Ambonese people’s beliefs. Despite of segregation by Muslim or Christian villages/ *negeris*, with the existence of *Pela* and *Gandong* the people could continue to interact each other.

Bartels (2003) added that the conflict starting on 19 January 1999 did surprise many parties, especially the Mollucan people, given the fact that they have *Pela* tradition inherited from generation to generation. Bartels emphasized that even though accusation of provocators as the sources of the conflicts was raised by many parties, Ambon condition itself has already provided a space for conflicts to happen. Such symptom, according to Bartels, were felt since 1970s with the coming of Muslim migrants to Ambon city, especially Bugis, Butonese, and Makasarese people from Sulawesi, as well as rapidly sharpened polarization between Muslim and Christian communities. Beside that, the violent conflict coincided with the weakened role of *Pela*. In Bartels opinion (2003), the weakened *Pela* and kinship system in Ambon City were mainly caused by internal things such as continuous Christianization and Islamization, as well as Indonesian policy on uniformity which was started in 1970.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Interview with one of NGO activists and Church activists, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

⁴¹ See Adam (2009).

⁴² See Brauchler (2009).

⁴³ *Pela* and *Gandong* are one social tie based on blood relationship between two communities of villages/*negeri*. According to Ambonese belief, *Pela* and *Gandong* are the driving motor in cross-border-and-religion social interaction. See Bartels (1977).

⁴⁴ Bartels (2003b); *Ibid*.

The current demographic condition of Ambon City cannot be separated from the previous communal conflict experiences. Population segregation pattern based on religion is very obvious at the village or *kelurahan* level. The same religion embraced becomes the strong reason for the people to settle down in an area and to leave the area.⁴⁵ As stated by one of the informants as follows:

Due to conflicts, our houses are destroyed to ground. We have to take refuge to refuge place. But this cannot continue like this... Eventually, in 2005 I moved to Benteng area (*Kelurahan* Benteng). I moved there because it was impossible for me to get a house in the area which our family continue to fear as (being).⁴⁶

Not only that, the conflict impacts have brought about changes in the characteristics of villages/*kelurahan* which were previously inhabited by heterogeneous communities by religion and now become more homogenous. For example in Batu Merah Village, in which before the communal conflict yang there were Christian population, especially in Batu Merah Dalam area, currently it is hard to find Christian community members.⁴⁷ Similar case happens in *Kelurahan* Waihaong, in which Christian population, both in forced and voluntary fashion, had to move out from the area. On the contrary, Muslim community also experienced similar thing in some areas. For example in *Kelurahan* Kudamati in which before the conflicts there were still Muslim population, the composition of the post-conflict population is mostly dominated by Christian community. This phenomenon of segregation in mind⁴⁸ also tends to occur in some villages/*kelurahans* in Ambon City.

Population segregation by religion in Ambon City not only happens at the *village*/*kelurahan* level. In *Kelurahan* Wainitu, especially in Waringin and Talake areas Muslim and Christian people live in one Community Unit (*RW*). Although living in one area, division between the two communities takes place. For example in Waringin, usually Christian community lives in Neighborhood Unit (*RT*) 3, while Muslim community in *RT* 4. The phenomenon cannot be separated from the Waringin context which before the conflicts was a slump area and not an interesting option for Ambon City people to live in. After the conflicts, the situation changed. The area becomes an option for the people to settle down. One of the factors for this is the fairly strategic location of the area which easily accesses downtown and various public facilities, such as school, hospitals, and markets. Beside that, information from the people showed that the area is not dominated by a particular community so that there they do not feel as a minority group. The area is usually called the border, because it is located between the “upper” part which is the Christian community settlement such as *Kelurahans* Benteng and Kudamati, and the “lower” part which is the Muslim community settlement such as *Kelurahans* Waihaong and also Silale.

Population segregation patterns in Ambon City also demonstrates reintegration phenomenon among the people in one area. For example, in Poka and Rumah Tiga Villages, Christian refugees who in the conflict times left the area could return back there. This can be separated from cooperation between Maluku Provincial and Ambon City governments supported by traditional and figures and local communities. This step was considered quite a success;⁴⁹ there have been no problems between Christian and Muslim communities living in the area until today.⁵⁰ Similar phenomenon also occurs in Latta Village. Muslim people, the majority of them coming from

⁴⁵ This is caused by the fact that previous communal conflict nuance was strong with religious symbols.

⁴⁶ Interview with one of the Christian people in Waringin, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴⁷ 2010 BPS Data on Population Census shows that in Batu Merah area almost 99% of the population is Muslim.

⁴⁸ See the concept “*perceived segregation/segregation in mind*” in T. D. Pariela, response paper in Semi Workshop of NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013. Particular areas in Ambon have been perceived as Muslim or Christian areas in general, even though there are another community in the areas.

⁴⁹ Repatriation of Rumah Tiga Christian community could not also be separated from support from traditional leaders of Muslim *negeri*, especially from Leihitu peninsula area.

⁵⁰ See Pariela (2007).

Buton, Southeast Sulawesi, in the conflict times had to go out from the village where the majority of the population was Christian. But in October 2005, these Butonese refugees could return to the village and rebuild their housing.⁵¹ Another phenomenon in which inter-community segregation does not relatively happen, occurs in Wayame Village. In the conflict times, this village did not experience huge waves of refugees both from Muslim and Christian communities. Until now, composition of Wayame Villagers is relatively balanced, namely Muslims 52% and Christians 48%.⁵²

RELOCATION/DISPLACEMENT PROCESS

MANAGEMENT, DATA COLLECTION, VERIFICATION OF POST-CONFLICT REFUGEES

As mentioned above, Ambon is one of the areas in Indonesia that has had a long history of Muslim-Christian community segregation, both before and after the conflicts. In the study on segregation growth in Ambon must be differentiated between segregation which occurred before and after the conflicts, both based on the background and formation process.⁵³ Segregation which was formed after the 1999 conflict can be called as unintended consequence from government's relocation policy to deal with post-conflict refugees. The post-conflict segregation model, therefore, can be called planned segregation (intended segregation or segregation by intention).⁵⁴ The background of the previous conflict which accompanies the growth of the segregation often strengthens the growing sentiment and fanaticism of the groups. Condition and situation of post conflict segregation growth has become the particular basis for consideration and attention in the development of 2006-2026 Long-Term Development Plans (RPJP) of Ambon City.⁵⁵

Generally, the growth of post-conflict segregation is closely related to the relocation process initiated by the government. In the outbreak of Ambon conflict, many people from Muslim and Christian communities took refuge to the places they considered to be safe. After the conflict abated, various places became the concentration of the refugees, such as schools, mosques, churches, Ambon Athletes House, and others. Overall, the number of refugees in Ambon City reached at least 3,824 households (KK).⁵⁶ Based on the ICG (International Crisis Group) data (2002), almost one third of the Ambonese people took refuge after the conflict broke in 1999.⁵⁷ After the 1999 conflict abated, the government collected the data on the refugees and offered some resolution options.⁵⁸

The management of refugees is one of the programs mandated by the Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) No. 6, Year 2003. Through coordination of Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (*Kemenkokesra*), the refugee problems are expected to be resolved very soon. The refugee management covers (1) identification and inventory of the needs for rehabilitation, development of damaged houses and settlement due to the conflict; (2) rehabilitation and rebuilding of damaged houses and settlement due to the conflict; (3) construction of refugee houses because of the conflict; (4) clean water facilities and environmental sanitation in the refugees' settlement. More than that, solution to refugees' problems has also been mandated in real and firm fashion in 2006-2026 Ambon

⁵¹ See Pariela (2007).

⁵² BPS's 2010 population census.

⁵³ Interview with one NGO activist and Ambon church activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁵⁴ Read T. D. Pariela, response paper in Semi-Workshop, NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013.

⁵⁵ See Local Regulation (*Perda*) of Kota Ambon No. 4 Year 2006, page 13.

⁵⁶ Interview with an official from Ambon Social Affair office, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

⁵⁷ See Jeroen Adam (2010), page 403.

⁵⁸ Interview with a Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012; and Ambon NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

City RPJP (Long-Term Development Plan), especially relating to their civil rights to avoid the occurrence of further conflicts.⁵⁹

One of the criticisms that emerge was pointed at the approach patterns of rebuilding people's damaged or burned houses. The approach based on the "house spots" or "fire spots" was deemed unfair because the family type in Ambon is extended family, instead of nuclear family, in which more than one family live together in one house, especially with their children who have been married and gotten children but cannot afford a house yet. Since only the extended families who received compensation, previous houses which were relatively big was only replaced by a simple 5x6 meter house without kitchens,⁶⁰ although the houses were inhabited by some households. From the government perspective, the "fire spots" or "by name by address" approach was taken for the sake of evenness. This policy became effective during the term of Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu (2003-2013).

Beside that, there were accusations of many dishonest people, that caused the refugee management process went lengthily until 2009. There were always people who came and claimed as refugees so that every year the number of refugees kept growing.⁶¹ According to the government, however, the reason for this lengthy refugee problem was the dynamic movement of the refugees from one place to another. For instance, initially refugees moved from place A to place B. when they were registered in place B, they turned out to have moved to C. Another possibility was that the refugees were travelling when the data collection was conducted. Another case, for instance, is disunited households following the conflict. In this case, the disunited household claimed themselves as refugees, although initially the refugees were their parents. The result of the complexity of the data collection process is that many refugees are not listed in the data, while non-refugees were put into the data through various ways or reasons.⁶²

The dynamics and various problems emerging in the refugee data collection process are admitted by various segments of the society. The problems included dishonesty, mark-up data, fictitious data et cetera.⁶³ The refugee data collecting process often received criticisms, especially after government claim on the completion of refugee problems in 2009. Among those criticisms it was indicated there was mark-up data on refugees from, what was agreed, around 30,000 in all Maluku Province, into 100,000 that were realized. Another criticism was related to indicators or limitation of refugees- if the problem was claimed to have finished, have they gone home and their houses been built? Beside that, another social problem related to refugees was not yet resolved and could be a timed bomb, like the problem of civil rights, education and health facilities, post-conflict psychic problem handling, and etc.⁶⁴

The Maluku Provincial Government and Ambon City Government claimed the problems or fulfillment of the rights of the refugees have finished. Former Ambon City Mayor, M. J. Papilaja, or the current Ambon City Government has firmly through separate Decision Letter (SK) determined the completion of refugee problems.⁶⁵ More than that, based on the Ambon City claim currently through Deputy Mayor, Olivia Latuconsina, the management of Ambon city refugees reached 3,824

⁵⁹ See Ambon Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 4 Year 2006, page 16.

⁶⁰ Interview with one Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁶¹ Interview with Ambon law official, Ambon, 22 May 2013.

⁶² Interview with another law official, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁶³ Interviews with several respondents, including Maluku Refugee Coalition, Lembah Argo Refugees, Maluku Province Social Affairs Office, and others, Ambon, 13-16 May, 2013.

⁶⁴ Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁶⁵ Ambonekspres.com, 1,066 Displaced HHs Not Served. Taken from <http://www.ambonekspres.com/index.php?option=read&cat=46&id=40569>, dated on 14 February 2012.

Households (KK) was settled in November 2009.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, in reality, the rights of thousands of refugees are still not fulfilled or handled yet. The government tended to let and consider the refugee problems just finish, even though there are many things unresolved. For example, the problems of refugees are not very few, and until now this becomes the debate among many parties.⁶⁷

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the termination of refugee issues is the agreement from Minister of Social Affairs (Mensos), Minister of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (Menkimpraswil), as well as Minister of Labour and transmigration (*Menakertrans*). All regents and mayors in Maluku Province supported the MoU. At that time only East Seram district (SBT) head and Ambon Mayor emphasized there are no refugees in their areas. The consequences of the agreement, if it turned out in the future there are refugees any longer, then the refugees will become burdens for each district/ city. Therefore, the relevant refugees will receive empowerment funds from district/ city governments.⁶⁸

After the issuance of government claim that the refugees problems were finished, many community members emerged who claimed as 1999 conflict victims and their houses were burned down but they have not received their rights since four years ago. Many of them visited the Maluku National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and Maluku Refugee Coalition to present their demands. Mediation between refugees through Maluku Refugees Coalition with *Menkokesra* staff and Minister of Social Welfare facilitated by the Indonesian Commission on Human Rights were organized on 12 March 2012 at Maluku Governor's office to discuss about the problems on data and the verification. From the mediation, it was found that more than a thousand refugees from all districts/ cities in Maluku who have not got their rights yet. In Ambon itself, the rest of the refugees whose rights have not fulfilled yet spread in many villages. The data is more based on refugees' reports.⁶⁹ The result was that the formation of the Refugees Verification Team which consists of Maluku Refugee Coalition, local government elements Baileo Maluku network, and the National Commission on Human Rights as a mediator. The legal basis for the establishment of verification team is the Governor's Decision Letter No. 394 year 2010 on Formation of Integrated Team of Verification on Data of Remaining Refugees to conduct Verification in 7(seven) Districts/ Cities and Official Travel Order Letter (SPPD) Regional Secretary of Maluku Province No. 465.2/1169 dated on 18 May 2012.⁷⁰

The set procedure was: when data are verified, the data must be legitimated by the district/city government with signature of regent/mayor, then it was submitted to the provincial level. Then, the provincial government will fight for the budget to the central government, although in reality there are often pulls among various parties in the process of data entry and approval.⁷¹ Based on the work report of Verification, team work mechanism includes three phases, namely conducting verification on the data findings of Maluku Refugee Coalition and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) with district/city data; the first verification result data will be continued by field verification to four districts/ cities that have been ratified together by the Team; then to the field verification result data, verification will be done with the data from Maluku Province's SIMDA.⁷²

The following is the remaining refugee data until 2012 based on the Verification Team work results (Table 4).

⁶⁶ Siwalimanews.com, November, Handling of Refugee Completed. Taken from http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/november_penanganan_pengungsi_kota_ambon_tuntas, on 14 February 2012.

⁶⁷ Interview with a Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

⁶⁸ Interview with an Ambon City Government legal staff, Ambon, 22 May 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁷⁰ Report on Verification of Data on the Remaining Social Conflict Refugees in Maluku Province, June 2012.

⁷¹ Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁷² Work Report of Verification Team of Data on the Remaining Social Conflict Refugee Victims in Ambon, June 2012. Data was taken from Maluku Refugee Coalition, 14 May, Ambon, 14 Mei 2013.

Table 4: Recapitulated Verification Result on The Remaining Data on Maluku Province Refugees⁷³

No	District/City	Initial Data	Data not Valid	Data Valid	Remark
1	Ambon City	1.335	-	-	Not yet verified
2	Central Maluku	1.029	557	472	-
3	Buru	363	79	271	13 Household are not diversified according to their existence in South Buru.
4	West Seram	722	399	323	
5	Southeast Maluku	67			
6	Easter part of Seram	125			
Total		3.641	1.035	1.066	

The data shows that based on the work result of the Verification Team there were still approximately 3.641 refugee households (HHs) whose rights were not fulfilled yet until 2012. In Ambon there were still approximately 1.335 HHs. The refugees felt that their rights were not fulfilled yet accordingly, were treated unfairly, and thought they were deprived from their rights by the government. In such psychical condition all things might happen, both done by the refugees or by particular parties who tried to take benefit and advantage from the uncertain situation.

If the refugee case was resolved, little by little the records would be gone. But if the case persists, when touched, the people would go back to their past—grieved, very bitter, poignant [...]. So the solution is, such condition should be improved by the government. Must be thorough.⁷⁴

The neglect of the refugee problems through claims and issuance of particular Decision Letters (SK) without looking at the field condition will just construct problems and generate new potential of violence which can blow up at any time. On the other side, the refugees will continue to demand their rights, and if they gather that other refugees or refugees in other places have received their rights. This relative deprivation feeling, theoretically and analytically, often transforms itself into one of the potential sources of violence outbreak. More than that, as long as the refugee management is uncertain, it is likely that particular parties show up and take the advantage of the situation through provocations for their own advantage or interest.

RELOCATION OPTION AND SCHEME

Some options were offered by the government as part of post-1999-conflict refugee resolution, namely return to their place of origin, relocation or living in refuge place. Among those options, relocation was the favorite option for the refugees, even though they should have chosen the “return to the place of origin” option as the best option. However, relocation became the favorite option due to absence of long-term perspective concept. In the future, such condition might definitely have bad impacts if it is not well managed very early. In general, there is a problem in realizing good negotiation between host community and the refugees. Nevertheless, for a particular case like in Latta Village, for instance, it is proven that Muslim refugees could return and settle down peacefully until today.⁷⁵

Many refugees who became minority group in their place of origin preferred relocation for various reasons, especially related to security guarantee and trauma healing.⁷⁶ For example, the relocated

⁷³ Data was obtained from Maluku Refugee Coalition, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with a peace initiator in Ambon, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

⁷⁵ T. D. Pariela, Response Paper in Semi-Workshop, NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013.

⁷⁶ Interview with former Maluku National Commission on Human Rights, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

refugees to Kayu Tiga are the Christian community coming from Batu Merah (see Photo 5 page 138). They decided not to return to Batu Merah because in the area they become a minority group. Similarly, the refugees in Ambon City coming from Mount Nona decided not to return to Mount Nona as they become a minority group in the area.

Interestingly, the local community divided the refugees into three categories based on their response to the government's offer, namely those who wanted relocation, those who wanted to return, and those who were submissive.⁷⁷ Here, the term of submissive refugees is more identical to those who completely submitted themselves to the government's decision and/or live in the relocation lands whose ownership is still in dispute.

In general, the relocation process scheme can be differentiated into two, namely the community providing lands and the government constructing houses, or vice versa. The mechanism generally applies both for the post-1999 conflict refugees and the refugees from sporadic violence after the 1999 conflict, for example the ones occurring in 2011 and 2012. Relocation in Warasia that was built in 2005 is the example of the first scheme. There the government only constructed houses, while the land was taken care of by the refugees.⁷⁸ The first mechanism seemed to be the most-preferred option by the refugees even though later many of them are still involved in land dispute cases. An example of the relocation whose land was provided by the government is the relocation in Passo.⁷⁹ Beside that, there are also relocation lands which are free grants by certain customary *negeris*, for example in Hative Besar.⁸⁰ Beside the two schemes, many refugees ran into mountains during the conflict and settle down there until today. Therefore, the refugee relocation process has been their own initiative, not from the government's offered options. For them, the government only provided funds to buy lands where they would settle down and build houses.⁸¹

For those who chose relocation option, the government provided funds, amounting to IDR2 million per HH for transporting cost to their place of origin, and IDR12 million per HH to buy a house construction materials (BBR) and build it in relocation site. In practice, the IDR2 million fund was generally used for buying land in relocation site. Beside that, often times the BBR fund received by the refugees was not IDR12 million- some of them only received IDR8 million, IDR9 million, or IDR10 million. This was common in many areas.⁸² This indicated there were reduction/cuts along the BBR fund disbursement process. Even for the context of Buru Island relocation in Lembah Argo, from 202 HHs, none received BBR funds due to various reasons although they had applied it to the government. They underlined that the house support they received was only the direct assistance from the Dutch, instead of the local government. The prevailing reason relating to this was that they did not get BBR assistance as they had received the assistance from the Dutch.⁸³

Beside the Buru Island refugees, other refugees that claimed they did not get BBR fund are the refugees in Pita Samudra (Pitas) (Photos 6 and 7 pages 138-9).⁸⁴ Many of them did get assistance during the leadership of Governor Sinyo Harry Sarundajang, but did not get it during the Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu period any longer.⁸⁵

⁷⁷ Interview with Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012, and with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁷⁸ Interview with one Warasia refugee, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁷⁹ Interview with Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

⁸⁰ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

⁸¹ Interview with Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012; and official of Ambon Social Affairs Office, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

⁸² Interview with one refugee in Lembah Argo, Ambon, 13 May 2013.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Pita Samudra is two fairly damaged goods warehouses owned by Pita Samudra company. For the time being, the refugees are lent the warehouses for housing use.

⁸⁵ FGD with Pita Samudra refugees, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

Another version mentioned that BBR assistance, assumed to amount to IDR12 million, was not in the form of cash, but materials/products such as iron sheeting, cement, plywood, mixed nails, and closets. Beside that, they also received fund amounting to IDR1,750,000 to buy timber for pillar, sand, and stones for foundation, as well as bricklayers' fee. The fund was actually the refugee returning fund amounting to IDR2 million. The assistance provision in the form of construction materials was conducted through tender mechanism, so that the people got them from contractors.⁸⁶

RELOCATION AND COMMUNITY CONCENTRATION

Relocation with various social and economic consequences became the government resolution option to deal with refugee's problems after the 1999 conflict and violence following it. The relocation program, unintentionally or indirectly, has created new community concentrations with resulting segregation in them. This occurs because the refugees tended to choose relocation sites close to or around the community of the same identity. This condition has raised criticisms from various parties on the relocation strategy initiated by the government.

It is manifested like this: the people settle down according to their community patterns. The Christians tend to go to the Christians, while the Muslims tend to go to the Muslims. That is the first- the form. Secondly, public spaces which were mixed, now tend to be homogenous. It used to be heterogeneous. If we do not open up dialogical spaces or public interaction spaces in a bid to build social cohesion, that will be able to sharpen—and become potential for—conflicts.⁸⁷

However, the Muslim were relocated to the Muslim locations, while the Christian to the Christian locations. I really want the local government to pay attention to this. They should not be separated like that. We hope we are united as before, so that we can prevent unexpected things from happening. The local government could put their staff in each location. Muslims used to live here. After the riot, the Muslims moved. The Muslims sold their houses. So did the Christians. Now they are segmented.⁸⁸

The post-conflict movement patterns of the people tends to lead into the formation of segregation. The previous communities mingled (were mixed) and were heterogeneous, now they become homogenous. In other words, the 1999 conflict not only claimed lives, but also has deconstructed social order in social and economic fashion and sharpened the face of segregation in Ambon. The conflict has also generated inter-community suspicion, trauma, sentiment, and hatred. Some examples of the people's movements are (1) the Muslims from Passo (predominantly Christian area) moved to Waiheru and Nania (predominantly Muslim areas); (2) the Muslims from Soya (Christian) moved to Kahena, Batu Merah (Islam); (3) The Muslims from Kudamati (Christian) moved to various places with Muslim majority; (4) The Christians from Batu Merah (Islam) moved to Kayu Tiga (Christian); (5) the Christians from Waihaong (Islam) moved to various places with Christian majority.⁸⁹

The sharpened segregation will definitely escalate the potential for conflicts. This was clearly confirmed by the Ambon Mayor, stressing his point that "... during the conflict the form of segregation got sharper. But it has the basis from the past."⁹⁰ Sharing the statement of the Ambon Mayor, hard criticisms were expressed by an NGO activist:

But the government has *never* understood that there is a problem resulting from the relocation options. The strategy that were implemented by the government (should be) to drive efforts to prevent (conflicts) or measures to (build) people's resilience. So that if relocation option is chosen, it must be supported by recovery processes to build relationship, communications, and create better cross-community environment

⁸⁶ Interview with a Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

⁸⁷ Interview with Maluku NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁸⁸ Interview with Passo female figure, Ambon, 17 May 2013.

⁸⁹ The examples are dug up from various resource persons/ interview informants.

⁹⁰ Interview with Ambon Mayor, 13 December 2012.

[in interaction]. But what happens is that the [...] inter-community there is still feeling of suspicion between one another—they still feel suspicious, traumatic. What happens now, the fostered interaction is only pseudo interaction. Whenever there is a conflict, [each community] will draw themselves and hate each other again. [However,] the recovery process is not seriously taken care of and the government does not have any pattern or strategy to handle such thing.⁹¹

The relocation strategy initiated by the government as part of resolution to the post- 1999 conflict refugee problems is considered an instant solution which has not been followed by resolution efforts to any effects resulting from the relocation process. The relocation process is only seen as the moving of people from one place to another. But after carrying out the relocation there are far more urgent problems to be immediately resolved, namely the strengthening of and recovery of inter-community interaction and communications. Unfortunately, the government is considered being less serious, even they do not have clear pattern and strategy on how to handle the problem.

REASONS FOR RELOCATION

MINORITY GROUP

Some main reasons pushed refugees to prefer relocation to staying in refugee place or returning to their place of origin. One of the reasons was related to the socio-cultural condition as minority group in the place of origin.⁹² Christian refugees tended to choose relocation if their places of origin were dominated by Muslim community, and vice versa. The unstable post-conflict condition made the refugees to think hard and be extra careful to return to their places of origin. Resistance of the refugees to returning because of minority factor as a community in their places of origin is the very common phenomenon, as stated by a respondent:

So, it depends on them (refugees). For example: in Batu Merah, many people agreed to be relocated there. Like in Kayu Tiga, they are from Batu Merah. Since they were a minority there, so they agreed to move/relocation.⁹³

SECURITY

The second reason, still closely related to the situation as a minority in the place of origin is a sense of safety or security. Many refugees preferred relocation because there was no security guarantee if they returned to their place of origin. As a minority group in their place of origin, their position would be very vulnerable as violent target by the majority group. The minority-majority issue, in relations to sense of safety/ security, was very relevant during the initial phase of conflict de-escalation. A respondent emphasized:

They could have returned there; because some (refugees) in some locations preferred to return to their places of origin. For example, some refugees from Buru in Lembah Argo have returned. This is really only (a matter of) guaranteed security from the government—can the government ensure, when they return, that the security can be fulfilled? Secondly, when they return, will they be faced with civil issues there or not? Some people really wanted to return, but they doubted if they would be safe or not.⁹⁴

With this security consideration, strong tendency emerged among the refugees to find relocation sites within the area dominated by the community of the identity similar to theirs. In the refugees' perspective, security assurance can be obtained by living in the area whose population embrace the same religion or have the same community identity. Even though the consequence indirectly generates new segregation or at least sharpens the previous segregation. So the fostered segregation is

⁹¹ Interview with Maluku NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁹² Interview with Ambon City official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

⁹³ Interview with Female NGO Activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁹⁴ Interview, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

related to the sense of safety. Since the state is deemed not to give the sense of safety, people will prefer to live in the majority community... People prefer a sense of safety. And they avoid any violent actions, don't they? So, [therefore,] it is normal when they do not want to return to their original settlement. The options were picked by the community along with all the risks. Despite long distance, they would prefer to (looking for) a sense of safety. They do not want any longer [if] they build houses and new life, then they would be burned down again. That will also [make] them feel such loss [...]— already spent their energy [to build], but they get burned down again?⁹⁵

In this context, the emergence of post-conflict segregation is clearly caused by the factor of security guarantee which is considered very fragile as the result of the prolonged conflicts. Once again, the minority-majority issue is closely related to this. For instance, one of Christian refugees chose Waringin as a new settlement because of similar religious identity and said that “It is safe too because here (Batu Gantung area) all community is Christian. GPM (Maluku Protestant Church) through the Synod Head also asked the refugees to come here.”⁹⁶

Strong tendency to choose an area in which the majority of the community has similar identity did not only happen in the collective relocation processes, but also in the individual relocation. Those people usually do relocation by selling lands/houses in the area of origin to buy lands/houses in new neighborhood.⁹⁷ For example, the Christians from Waihaong sold their lands/houses, then moved to other areas because the area is Muslim community basis. The movement process, which mushroomed after the 1999 Ambon conflict, has indirectly transformed the areas which were previously heterogeneous into homogeneous ones.

Theoretically, such condition can be understood as a survival strategy which is often times found in various forms in the society that is facing conflicting situation or pressure. Such condition often occurs when the state is absent in providing security guarantee so that every individual or group is forced to find new protection alternatives. In a situation where the state fails to execute or is weak in executing the function, ethnic and religious networks often become alternatives for consideration. In the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, for instance, uncertain situation because the states cannot handle- even are involved in- the conflicts is also encountered by doing cross-ethnicity consolidation called *poro* (Sawyer, September 2004).⁹⁸

FAILURE TO RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN

Not all refugees follow the relocation program. Some refugees decided to return to their areas of origin with various reasons. One of them was because they did not have other alternatives. For example, one Muslim refugee in Waringin preferred relocation or left Waringin due to frequent conflicts and violence. However, the person did not have alternative place to move or did not know where to move. Another reason that often motivated refugees to return to their place of origin was house certificate ownership—for those who took refuge during the conflict and kept/ had the certificate of the houses they left, returning to their places of origin was the best choice. For example, Sebagai contoh, in the 1999 conflict the *Mardika* refugees were accommodated in some places such as in Ambon Athletes House, relatives' houses, and others. After the conflict abated, they who still kept their certificates decided to return to *Mardika*.⁹⁹

The last reason that encourages refugees to return is historical and cultural tie with the places of origin. Not only because there is emotional and cultural closeness they would feel very hard to leave their places of origin because they are usually family/ traditional land owners there. Beside that,

⁹⁵ Interview with Women NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁹⁶ Interview with one Waringin committee member, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁹⁷ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

⁹⁸ T. D. Pariela, Response Paper in Semi-Workshop NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013.

⁹⁹ Interview with one *Mardika* refugee, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

another consideration is the easy access to public transportation service to the place of origin. The issue of better access has become the strong driving factor for them to return.¹⁰⁰

Based on the finding above, we can see that lots of refugees who intended to return to their places of origin. However, due to failed mediation between them and the community in the places of origin, they eventually could not return. There were three requirements to meet if they wanted to return: (1) filling in checklist, (2) being accepted by the community in the place of origin, and (3) stating their willingness to return to the places of origin.¹⁰¹ From the requirements, rejection by the people in the area of origin often became the main reason why the refugees could not return. Such rejection can be caused by various things such as ethnic sentiment and prejudice.

CONDITIONS OF REFUGEE/RELOCATED COMMUNITY

EMPOWERMENT OF REFUGEE/ RELOCATED COMMUNITY

Relocation is an effort to solve post-conflict refugee problems cannot easily executed; it is not sterile from various problems that cannot be solved in a short period of time, for example availability of livelihood. Relocating refugees is not just moving them to particular places, building houses, then letting them be and leaving them just like that. They also need facilities and infrastructures to survive and continue their life in their new place. According to a respondent:

But how about the rights they left behind? [...] after being relocated [then] they were hunted with unfinished problems... Then, they had to find a new living. What is their living support in the new place? Previously, they had shops, rented houses, pedicabs, and others.¹⁰²

This is one of the hard challenges to be faced by relocated refugees. When they moved, they were forced to leave behind all established livelihoods, then had to find new yet not-easy-to-get livelihoods. They require long-term livelihoods and cannot rely on need satisfaction from temporary assistance or charity.¹⁰³ This fact, on one hand, emphasizes the need of refugees for stable and sustainable sources of income, but on the other hand indicates that government-initiated relocation is no more than the taking of refugees from one place to another. There are no sustainable efforts and initiatives to make them survive in new places.

The absence of the initiatives to empower refugees in new places can be clearly seen from the land the refugees inhabit, which is only a narrow land for a house.¹⁰⁴ For refugees who used to be farmers, this will definitely be hard for them because their skill is only farming skill. Beside that, such waste of this working skill is also caused by the relocation of refugees who used to come from mountainous areas to coastal areas, or vice versa. Not yet finished with the rights they left behind for taking refuge, they have to face similarly complicated facts.

Many of the 1999 conflict victims do not have anything due to damaged houses, loss of income sources, and burned certificates of houses. Moreover, many refugees did not know where to live and how to rebuild their life. Therefore, potential efforts of empowerment and provision of livelihoods become very crucial. One of the 1999 conflict victims told the experience:

In 1999 it was really a downfall —no more houses and properties, could not earn a living, always lived in refuge shelter under minimum condition. Our kids were late for education and their future... But it turned out that conflicts recurred. How can we live that kind of life? We kept on falling... Income decreased and

¹⁰⁰ Interview with female and children NGO director, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁰¹ Interview with one Maluku peace activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012, and one refugee in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 11 December 2012.

¹⁰² Interview with Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon 12 December 2012.

¹⁰³ Interview with one Ambon refugee empowerment activist, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

mentally depressed because of living in such location. It is lucky that we were allowed to live here. If we are not given the opportunity, what would we be? But returning to Mardika does not guarantee the safety...¹⁰⁵

PHYSICAL-HEALTH CONDITION AND POPULATION ISSUE

Beside what has been mentioned above, other emerging issues are their house land dispute (will be discussed particularly in the next sub-chapter), house condition and refuge shelters which are deemed less decent, and other health issues, such as the leaked roofs of refuge shelters, muddy and inundated places, diarrhea, skin itches, and others.¹⁰⁶ From the observation, it can be seen that many refuge places are deemed less decent, in terms of construction and facilities inside. However, some refugees felt that some facilities in the refuge place were fairly decent and even comfortable. According to one respondent:

When we entered, we immediately [set up] lots. So we set up the lots on our own. Who came late, it means they looked for [places] upstairs. We never have difficulty in getting water because there is drilled well. Similarly with lamps, there is power network; day-night electricity is on. Bathrooms are also located on every storey. Upstairs there are two bathrooms, here in the back there are some bathrooms. Yes... since it is government's building, it is complete.¹⁰⁷

Beside the physical health condition, the important thing for the refugees is the spiritual health. As the effect of the conflict, many refugees especially children experienced quite worrisome trauma. According to a respondent's confession:

As Muslims we used to walk upwards (meaning Christian areas). When I was attending school, there were still [many Muslims] walking upwards; but not any longer now. Muslims pass through Muslim areas, Christians passing through Christian areas. I myself, if Lin III car (Talake) passes upwards, [there is] worry. I fear being mentally disturbed, so I asked a colleague: where is the psychiatrist do? I need to have consultation. I don't want [this worry] to disturb me to the heart.¹⁰⁸

Trauma is one of the serious problems emerging as the impact of prolonged conflicts everywhere, similarly for many victims of the 1999 Ambon conflict. Due to the previous conflicts, many refugees feel worried and anxious when passing through areas that used to be the basis of their enemy.

The next problem to be faced by the refugees is the population issue. There are refugees who find it hard to get Identity Cards (KTP) after they were relocated and stay in new places. The difficulty in getting the population status, for instance, is experienced by a refugee from Buru Island in Lembah Argo:

Since 2005 we have had the Ambon ID card. We tried on our own to meet with the city government [...]. He was there and stated that Buru refugees were Ambon City people. At that time five neighborhood units (RT) from one Community Unit (RW) were set up, and put under RW 13.¹⁰⁹

Even though later the refugee got the ID card, it was not easy for him to get back his population status. Unclear population status will make it difficult for the refugees to access public services, transportation, banks and others.

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE

Uneven assistance given has become an issue for refugees. Many refugees admitted receiving assistance from the government, but some others claimed they did not get assistance at all, or if there

¹⁰⁵ Interview with one Mardika refugee from Christian Community, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with one Waringin riot victim, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Interview with one Buru Island refugee in Lembah Argo, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

was assistance, the number was very few. For example, one of the refugees received assistance, telling that he had assistance in the forms of food, kerosene, noodles, rice and others every Sunday for three months. Children also received fund support for the poor, amounting to IDR.360,000 and transportation for poor children, amounting to IDR60,000.¹¹⁰ One refugee in Buru Island in Lembah Argo emphasized that this person did not receive assistance from the government at all. This person only got a 5x6m house, supported by the Dutch.¹¹¹

Unfortunately, many officials or politicians came to the location only to make these people as objects of practical political campaign by promising aid that will never come.¹¹² Not only that, many refugees became objects of the *touts*. These people intentionally sold the fate of the refugees for their personal gains. The the people like this, "fighting for" the fate of the refugees was their business field. According to a respondent:

... in a refugees managing process[there were] many *touts*, starting from the government level down to the community. There were so many manipulated data, also some were put into jail, [both] from the government people and community... The *touts* [conducted] data manipulation [so that] they could get the assistance fund. Like what happened to our Button colleagues that took refuge to Bau-Bau area- when they returned, many of their names were gone from the list [because of being manipulated by *touts*].¹¹³

From the statement we can see that the *touts* may come from ordinary people, particular community or local government officials. The common way done in the "*tout-business*": process was by manipulating data on the refugees entitled for assistance by adding fictitious names in the list or deleting certain names and replacing them with names of other people. Another way was by asking for rewards in particular amount when they managed successfully to help fulfill the refugees' rights.

ISSUES ON REFUGEES RIGHTS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

CIVIL RIGHTS TO HOUSING AND ASSETS THEY LEFT BEHIND

The next very urgent issues to be solved soon are related to the civil rights to housing and other assets left behind by the refugees at the time of conflicts. When the conflicts broke, many victims escaped or took refugee to safe places by leaving behind their houses and assets. After the conflicts abated, they found that their houses were destroyed or burned down; their assets were gone too.¹¹⁴

Many community members claimed their houses and assets were destroyed during the conflicts. This condition is related to the prolonged duration of the conflicts and the fairly high intensity and escalation. No wonder, as a result, many personal and public buildings were destroyed during the conflicts. The remaining civil issues after the conflicts also need resolving soon by the government, because if not, this situation will easily disturb and hamper peace building in Ambon that has been running quite well. Particular persons or provocators often emerge and disturb situation by taking advantage of the issues.¹¹⁵

One thing to be remembered is that compensation claims and demands from refugees are more based on government's promises that mentioned it would compensate for all of the people's houses or assets destroyed by the conflicts. In Kudamati as the Christian community base, for instance, many Muslim people from Southeast Sulawesi and Java took refuge when the conflict occurred. When they

¹¹⁰ Interview with one Waringin riot victim, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹¹¹ Interview with one Buru Island refugee in Lembah Argo, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Interview with Mollucan Human Rights Activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹¹⁴ Interview with one peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹¹⁵ Interview with secretary to an Ambon religious organization, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

returned, they demand their rights on the burnt houses or lost assets to the government. Such cases often overlap with other unfinished problems.¹¹⁶

LAND DISPUTE

Another emerging civil problem is dispute between refugees and land owner over the land they inhabit as relocation destination. Until today, lands in some relocation areas are still in dispute. Some respondents explained:

Until now, in Amahusu there are approximately 50 HHs coming from North Maluku [and] until this second they haven't received any assistance from the government. Even their land status in Halmahera or Ternate is still unclear. These are the cases that should be considered because [the] potential conflicts are quite high. In Kayu Tiga there are land problems too. It is most likely that they are removed by the land owners. This is confusing because the government does not bridge the dispute settlement process there. Problems must happen. Like in Waringin, it may be a bit different. Waringin used to be flattened, then it was rebuilt.¹¹⁷

After living here (Warasia, Batu Merah *negeri*), there was a problem of the land we inhabit between the owner from Masawio and from Hattala. PK was issued. At that time there was a decision from the court that Hattala won and the land belonged to Hattala, even though at that time [there was already] a deal between us and Masowoi [who sold the land with] land price per 10x15 [m] lot amounting to IDR3,500,000.¹¹⁸

From the above statement it can be seen that land disputes occurred in some relocation sites such as Amahusu, Kayu Tiga, and Warasia. As a result, the refugees are potentially removed from the relocation sites. If this happens, there will be series of new problems due to immature and hasty relocation planning and design. For example is the case in Warasia. With the issuance of the decision of Judicial Review (PK) by the Supreme Court (MA) that caused Hattala to win, the houses standing on the land were then marked by Hattala people with a sign saying "to be executed" (Photo 9 page 140).

In the land dispute case, the government tends to be reluctant to intervene, especially in the settlement process. In the last case, namely the case of refugees in Lembah Argo, the land they inhabit is still in dispute between the government and traditional party that claims that the land belongs to the Simaus.¹¹⁹ Amidst the dispute process, the government that claims the land through the certificate they hold should have been able to solve it immediately, for example by certifying the lands already given to the refugees.

In many cases, the government is deemed to often stay clear of them on the grounds that it entrusts the settlement process to the legal process. In reality, settlement through legal process often causes owners to win so that refugees will only have two alternatives, namely to be removed or move voluntarily, or buy the land they inhabit from the dispute winners with the price deal which may be different from the previous one, such as in Warasia. In Warasia there was exchange of claims between the Hattala and the Masawoi. When their dispute was submitted to the legal process, the Hattala eventually won the case, even though the refugees had made deal with the Masawoi before. Beside that, the money to be spent for buying the land tended to get higher than their relocation cost to the place of origin, namely IDR2.5 million. As a result, many refugees cannot pay off their lands so that some of them eventually pay in installments.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Interview with one Ambon peace activist, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Maluku National Commission on Human Rights, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹¹⁸ Interview with a refugee in Warasia location, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

¹¹⁹ Interview with one refugee in Lembah Argo, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

¹²⁰ Interview with one refugee in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 11 December 2012.

LAND CERTIFICATION

Land certificate also becomes a civil problem that should be solved soon. When the conflicts occurred, many people's houses were burned down and only land remained. At the same time, many land certificates were burned. As a result, many of people's land borders are less clear and cause illegal land occupancy cases and land claim overlaps.¹²¹

Re-certification of the lands must be carried out carefully and accurately by the government since the process can become a source of new conflicts and a vehicle for certain parties who want to take advantage for personal interest. Beside that, the condition even gets worse because the National Land Agency (BPN) of Ambon was burned when the conflict occurred. According to a respondent:

In this city what becomes [the source] of civil problems: the data on land ownership are in BPN. When the conflicts happened, BPN office got burned, so data recollection should be done. Many people's lands or people's settlements were taken by landlords on the grounds that previously [the people] were only lent with the use right instead of ownership right. The people's houses were also burned, so they could not prove it [since ownership proofs were also burned]. In the conflicts, all were burned. The data is non existent. The landlords took the land again and sold it to other people. The Kayu Tiga [refugees] cannot return any longer because they cannot prove [the ownership claims].¹²²

In such situation, the government is definitely expected to be able to carry out mediation in order to find solution. The refugees who still have land certificates can sell their lands, but those who only have land use right cannot do anything because the land belongs to the landlord, like in Batu Merah Dalam.¹²³

¹²¹ Interview with Maluku Human Rights Activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹²² Interview with one ITDM Maluku activist, Ambon, 11 December 2012.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

Post-Conflict Segregation, Inter-Community Relationship, and Reconstruction Policy

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION HANDLING

RECONCILIATION AND RESTORATION OF BROTHERHOOD TIE

In the first years after the 1999 conflict, the post-conflict development priorities were focused on inter-community reconciliation initiatives, especially in the leadership term of Mayor M. J. Papilaya (2001-2006). This program was strengthened through the issuance of Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) No. 6 Year 2003 on the Acceleration of Post-Conflict Maluku and North Maluku Development. One of the instructions were: “carry out thorough rehabilitation in various development aspects and harmonize social relationship between conflicting communities again.” Such priority is considered being rational given the fact that the Ambonese people just got out from the bloody conflict that harmed their social relationship and togetherness. Reconciliation priority was earmarked for pacifying, strengthening togetherness tie again, and forgiving each other.

The development priority after Ambon went through post-1999 conflict de-escalation, was adjusted to the vision of Mayor M. J. Papilaya, namely to create peaceful and secure Ambon,¹²⁴ with the main priorities of the government programs that became the missions: development of damaged or burned infrastructures and at the same time the strengthening of reconciliation efforts. Many reconciliation efforts were carried out by facilitating inter-community relationship through various peace-building programs and practical trainings. Emphasis on the increased awareness of Ambonese people on the conflict construction as the result of external parties and improvement in brotherhood among the people became key elements in the reconciliation effort. All of these efforts were conducted with cultural approaches.¹²⁵ Therefore, it can be assumed that the segregation management at that time was not fully a priority of post-conflict development planning in Ambon.

Then in 2004-2005, to strengthen reconciliation efforts focused on the restoration of inter-community brotherhood tie, post-conflict development was aimed at the construction of interaction spaces and meeting of the communities that were divided due to the conflict. Physical/infrastructure development must be able to help facilitate inter-community meeting.¹²⁶ Here, post-conflict development priorities started to move towards segregation management along with the growing awareness among Ambon figures and officials on the post-conflict sharpening segregation. The awareness is strengthened by the belief that efforts to unite various communities in Ambon and restore their brotherhood tie will only be effective if followed by efforts to construct interaction spaces or inter-community meeting to reduce actual segregation impacts. This must be done because it is very hard for the relevant parties to mix segregated people settlements by various social engineering and short-term development.

OPENING OF NEW PLURAL AND HETEROGENEOUS SETTLEMENT

The following development priority related to post-conflict segregation management is the opening of new plural and heterogeneous settlements. The development priority has become one of the agenda and vision of the 2011-2016 Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), which constitutes

¹²⁴ Interview with Ambon City Development Planning Official, Ambon, 14 December 2012, and Ambon Spatial Plan Official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Interview with Ambon City Management Official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

the outline and implementation of the 2006-2026 Ambon City Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP). The RPJMD mentions that in the context of spatial planning, for instance, regional development is divided into some sub-areas (SW) development concentrations, covering downtown and the surrounding area (SW 1), Rumah Tiga and the surrounding area (SW 2), Passo and the surrounding area (SW 3), Laha/Tawiri and the surrounding area (SW 4), and others.¹²⁷ In the 2006-2011 Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plan, the terms used to mention the development areas are Sub-Area Growth Center (SWPP).¹²⁸

In this context the current Ambon Mayor Richard Louhenapessy has made Poka and Passo the areas to be built as new plural and multicultural settlement areas. The Poka development is expected to be the developmental model which is oriented to Ambonese people de-segregation. If the Poka development is successful with expected social-community development effects, namely occurrence of de-segregation and/or natural blending among various different communities, Poka then will become the model of social-community development in Ambon.¹²⁹

Beside Poka, Passo is the next pilot project target. Passo is regarded as the entry point to Ambon and has fairly strategic position due to urban density and centralized infrastructure development in Sirimau.¹³⁰ The presence of new malls in Passo is expected to be interaction spaces between Muslim and Christian communities.¹³¹ Passo is planned to be new urban area in Ambon even though initially Passo development was earmarked to reduce density in the center of Ambon City or in Sirimau. As a new urban center, Passo is expected to become plural and multicultural area given that the area will become a transit or meeting point of various communities in Ambon. Like Poka, if successful, Passo will become one of the important model of social-community development with de-segregation orientation.

CHILD COUNSELING, TRAUMA HANDLING AND INFORMAL MEETING

The next development priority, especially relating to post-conflict developing segregation management is provision of counseling of and awareness raising among children or young generation more specific conflicts. Specifically, Ambon City Social Affairs Office is mainly responsible for and provides more attention to the development program and priority.¹³² Putting children as priority for providing post-conflict counseling is important as many of them witnessed directly various burnings and killings during the conflict, even many of their relatives were killed. Trauma, revenge, and horrible memories can be buried down in their subconscious mind. Therefore, this program may ease psychological burdens and trauma and neutralize revenge that still possibly exists. If not conducted simultaneously with the children of other communities, beside reducing psychological impacts the counseling can also become social investment. Therefore, the future de-segregation process of Ambonese community is commenced and the community unification through young generation can also be promoted.

Various suggestions are raised by the Ambonese society related to the post-conflict development that should be the priority. One of them is the recovery of intercommunity trust and trauma healing. Both things are not easy and cannot be done instantly. According to a respondent:

So, here it is: what we need to do first is the recovery of the Mollucan people trust. That must be the government's concern. If seen from the prolonged riots compared to the current healing time, it is not proportional. But now, it is proportional, even [there has been] progress. *Well, it is impossible in less than 10*

¹²⁷ See the Ambon City Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 4 Year 2006, page 6.

¹²⁸ See the 2006-2011 Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJM), page 4.

¹²⁹ Interview with Ambon Mayor, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹³⁰ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹³¹ Interview with one contractor in Ambon, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹³² Interview with Ambon City Social Affairs official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

years the people have restored their self-confidence. And there has been recovery program on past trauma, then economic recovery program, and now development arrangement. These are all significant processes.¹³³

The economic and infrastructure recovery is very crucial and urgent in order to make the wheel of the Ambonese society run smoothly and progressively. But without mental recovery, trust building, and trauma healing, the Ambonese people will lose an important foundation in building sustainable economic and physical development. Economic development can only be executed well if social condition is strong and stable; and behind the social and community stability there is a sense of mutual trust and respect between communities in Ambon.¹³⁴

Formal-ceremonial informal meetings are organized with the main goal of re-uniting different communities in an association, discussion and meal. Beside that, another goal of the events is to breaking the tension and trauma as the effects of the conflicts and rebuild inter-community brotherhood tie. Therefore, the main agenda is more focused on the increased awareness on Ambonese people's cultural tie, called *Pela Gandong*.

SOCIAL HARMONY

Another development program relating to post-conflict segregation management is Social Harmony. The program is more earmarked to improve togetherness and unity of two communities—Muslims and Christians—through various social segments and activities. More particularly the program is intended to prevent potentials for social conflict which can develop into open conflicts. The expected result is the realization of social integration—social acceptance in peaceful side-by-side living order through social harmony system and mechanism between conflicting community groups.¹³⁵ Social Harmony can be understood as social balance, in which members of both communities can take or assume a position together, and carry out social activity together. The executed Social Harmony Program seems to focus on conflict-prone areas especially in border areas between both segregated communities, areas that experience social disasters, and concentration areas of social disaster victims.¹³⁶

The types of Social Harmony Program activities, especially in 2006, are development of infrastructures together and the shared use of the infrastructures. However, some people criticized the program as project-oriented program. As a result, the effects and contribution to the development of togetherness has not been felt fully. According to a respondent:

... definitely the [development program] is also difficult because the government is still trying to find more effective format... for instance: *Inpres*. It [is] the Social Harmony [Program] that I just mentioned: project-oriented. So it does not address [the community]. In my opinion it failed. In my opinion, the [program] like the *inpres* [only] becomes additional income for officials, both at bureaucracy, local legislative council (DPRD), and also employers. The *Recovery* aspect is ignored.¹³⁷

For example, in 2007, many constructions of paths for share use by different communities, construction of meeting hall in conflict-prone location, and others.¹³⁸ However, many of the constructed paths are damaged because lack of maintenance, for instance a path constructed in Kahena (see Photo 10 page 140).

The path in Kahena was constructed in 2005. After completion, the path was unfortunately used by one community, the Muslim one. Beside paths, other infrastructures built are drinking water

¹³³ Interview with one member of Team 20 Wayame, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹³⁴ Interview with Ambon KNPI youth leader, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹³⁵ See the technical guide to Community-Based Social Harmony Assistance, Directorate General for Social Protection and Assurance, Directorate for Social Protection of Social Disaster Victims, 2012.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*.

¹³⁷ Interview with one peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹³⁸ Interview with Ambon City social affairs official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

reservoirs. Now the drinking water reservoir is broken and leaks, and eventually is not used any longer, leading to useless program (Photo 11 page 141).¹³⁹

In the Kahena case, a Social Harmony Program facilitator named Syakir Kaliki was just appointed by local Community Unit (RW) Head. Kaliki then explained to the people that he got fund from the government to carry out the programs. He managed the fund without public involvement and supervision, so that the accountability was not transparent. The participating people only received salary from Kaliki. Then, he was one of the suspect of the fund misuse.¹⁴⁰

Principally, the Social Harmony Program implementation in Ambon was divided into two phases, namely the programs launched in 2006 and 2013. The above mentioned examples and various subsequent problems are part of the 2006 Social Harmony Program. In the case of program request and fund disbursement procedures, there was a very clear difference between the two phases. Related to program request, the 2006 Social Harmony Program was more determined by local government, while in 2013 program initiatives were suggestions/ proposal from the community who get the assistance. Therefore, the 2013 Social Harmony Program is considered more “community-based”. Related to fund disbursement procedure, in 2006 fund disbursement was conducted by the third party or contractor. In 2013, the program fund was directly channeled to village beneficiary.¹⁴¹

Moreover, in 2013 program, the people formed forums to manage the program so that the fund was transferred directly to those forums. In Maluku Province, there are 15 villages that have received the Social Harmony Program assistance: 5 in Southeast Maluku District, 5 in Western Seram District, and 5 in Ambon City. For Ambon City, the village beneficiaries are Latuhalat, Hative Besar, Poka, Silale, and Batu Merah. Activities in Latuhalat included construction of clean water facilities and roads, in Silale construction of clean water facilities, in Batu Merah construction of water channels and water catchment facilities, while in Hative Besar construction of multi-purpose building for a meeting place of both communities. Selection of the five villages were more based on their position as refuge places. From the five villages, only Hative Besar has two different communities.¹⁴² Geographically, Latuhalat and Silale are two Christian *negeris* in Nusaniwe area that is very far from the border of Muslim community. Batu Merah and Poka are Muslim *negeris* that have closeness with Christian community. Hative Besar is also a predominantly Christian area framed by two villages: Tawiri (Christian) and Wayame (mixed). By considering the geographical position, the program effectiveness for the social integration achievement can be evaluated.

Nevertheless, other criticisms are also raised against the mismatch between program realization and the real program motivation, namely social reintegration. The Social Harmony Program, initially called Social Reintegration Program, tends to choose forms of activities designed for each community rather than activities executed together by the different communities. Ideally, the form of those activities should be implemented in the border of Batu Merah village–Mardika, border of Air Salobar–Pohon Mangga, border of Poka–Rumah Tiga, Latta, and others,¹⁴³ in which inter-community interaction often takes places.

¹³⁹ Interview with one program implementer and beneficiary from Social Harmony Program in Kahena, Ambon, 22 Mei 2013.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Maluku Provincial social affairs official, Ambon, 14 May 2013. See also Technical Guide (*Juknis*) to Community-Based Social Harmony Assistance, Directorate General for Social Protection and Assurance, Director for Social Protection of Social Disaster Victims, 2012.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

Related to the current RPJMD priority (2011-2016) on post-conflict segregation management, Ambon City government focuses on the improved relationship of *orang basudara* (brotherhood). The *orang basudara* relationship is one of the Ambonese people's local wisdom legacy that needs protecting. The program definitely becomes the implementation from one of the mandates of Inpres No. 6 Year 2003, namely "revitalization of values and socio-cultural institutions." Particularly, the Ambon City Government makes use of education as a strategic place to program development through *orang basudara* curriculum design, in which the contents are taken from various Ambonese people's local wisdom values.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, *Orang Basudara* (Brotherhood) Program has become one of the important approaches in the 2006-2026 Ambon City RPJP, as outlined in the Ambon City Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 4 Year 2006. The approach is called cultural approach in the Ambon long-term development. Various developmental efforts are expected to be able to strengthen the sense of "the Ambon quality of Ambonese people," in which the Ambonese society are characterized by religious and cultural differences but they are still peaceful because of strong sense of safety and togetherness. In the cultural concept of *Ambon Manise* (Sweet Ambon) there is socio-cultural reflection in the forms of harmonious relationship and interaction of different communities, which are generally expressed in the *Pela Gandong* relationship pattern.¹⁴⁶

Orang Basudara program explicitly has shaped the vision and missions of Ambon City RPJMD (2011-2016) manifested into post-conflict educational curriculums especially for children. It is hoped that the children are able to overcome their bad experiences during the conflicts and can grow better. In the curriculum contents are inserted cultural elements and/or local wisdom such as *Kalesang* (care for environment), *Pela Gandong*, and others.¹⁴⁷ In Pattimura University (Unpatti), for instance, is introduced a subject called "Mollucan Culture". In the subject are discussed Mollucan culture and local wisdom, such as family concept which aims to maintain and create harmonious inter-community relationship. The presence of such subject is a follow-up from the 2002 workshop in Unpatti.¹⁴⁸

In the context of curriculum for children, a book was published by the Ambon City Education Office, called Educational Curriculum on *Orang Basudara Maluku: Teachers' Book*. The book with psychosocial approach is the result of cooperation between *The United Nations Children's Fund* (UNICEF) and *Peace through Development United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP). The criticism then came up later that the book is more identical with module/ guide book that uses psychoanalytical approach to educate and provide treatment to children in post-conflict areas. In the book, there are almost no Mollucan cultural-local contents and/nor Mollucan local wisdom, because it contains more general knowledge which can be applied in any areas that experienced conflicts.¹⁴⁹ Ideally, the curriculum constitutes a combination between local culture/wisdom and universal values.¹⁵⁰

The *Orang Basudara* educational model were once practiced in State Junior High School (SMPN) 2 and Muhammadiyah Junior High School (SMP). Both schools were selected because the teachers

¹⁴⁴ *Orang Basudara* is one of the traditions uphold by Ambonese society concerning harmonious and peaceful relationship pattern of different communities especially between Muslim and Christian communities that have the same ancestors. See http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/wagub_jaga_soliditas_dan_solidaritas.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁴⁶ See Ambon City Local Regulation (*Perda*), No. 4 Year 2006 on Ambon City Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP) Years 2006-2026.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with a dean in a faculty at Unpatti, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

¹⁴⁹ See *Kurikulum Pendidikan Orang Basudara Maluku: Buku Ajar Maluku, Psikoanalisis*. September 2009. Ambon: Ambon City Educational Office.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Maluku interfaith figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

were mixed. Unfortunately, the trial was terminated. The program weakness caused by absence of special training for teachers who would teach the curriculum. The *Orang Basudara* education has been designed since 2005 and assisted by *Japan International Cooperation Agency* (JICA).¹⁵¹ Another perspective said that the teachers were already given special training, specially in pilot schools. However, the government did not continue it due to various reasons, such as no special budget for paying the teachers.¹⁵² Another source said that the *Orang Basudara* Education curriculum has been developed through UNICEF's program and Child-Friendly Schools through *Save the Children*, but it has not been used/ implemented well at schools.¹⁵³

Study on the *Orang Basudara* curriculum, for instance, especially and deeply have been conducted by Alpha Amirrachman (2012). Decentralization process has revived traditions and local wisdom in Ambon, which becomes one of the ways to strengthen peace in post-conflict Ambon. However, the revival of traditions and local wisdom bring dilemma; on one hand, it has strengthened identity and local political structure; on the other hand, it has created conflicts and exclusion from migrants groups in Ambon, especially Butonese, Bugis and Makassarese. In this context, the revival of *Pela* and *Orang Basudara* curriculum are believed to create potential for tension between local people (native Ambonese) and migrants.¹⁵⁴

One of the Amirrachman's criticisms to the concept and practice of *Orang Basudara* education is the over-emphasis on Ambonese locality and lack attention to the migrants who have long lived in Ambon. *Orang Basudara* education does have potential to cause exclusion from Ambonese coming from outside Maluku.

REALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION HANDLING

REALIZED PROGRAMS

Among the development priorities above, what is considered being successfully implemented are reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie, formation of inter-faith informal meetings, guidance and counseling for children, social harmony and reconstruction of *Mardika* field. To measure the level of program success it requires special evaluation with various indicators and/ or valid measurement and focus on one of the strategic development programs. Nevertheless, qualitatively some parties opinioned that post-conflict development was relatively successful although there were weakness and emerging problems. According to a respondent:

Regarding the leakage of [budget is] everywhere. We need to prove that there is really a leakage. [But] we cannot prove without any other indicators [in order to] measure the success of [the] post-conflict [program] according to the existing reality.¹⁵⁵

First, the reconstruction of *Mardika* Field as one of the realized programs is deemed important because one of strategic open spaces for inter-community interaction. Beside that, various budget market centers have been built in Ambon City. The revival of the markets generally intends to attract various communities to come and foster communications as well as interaction through trading process. The construction of these budget markets is a breakthrough with wider effects to the reconstruction of brotherhood tie, amidst the limited existence of creative segregation management program, especially if conducted consistently and evenly in Ambon City.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Interview with GPM Research and Development head, Ambon, 5 September 2013.

¹⁵³ FGD, Ambon, 23 October 2013.

¹⁵⁴ Amirrachman (2012), page 80.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Ambon youth leader, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

Behind the successful reconstruction of Mardika Field, some Ambonese community elements regretted that this field was the only open space in the present time.¹⁵⁶ In the segregated society it is necessary to have many public spaces for inter-community interaction as a strategic solution. In general, Ambon City Government is expected to increase the number of open spaces and build them more creatively. Neutral open spaces must be built especially in inter-community border areas or conflicting areas. Therefore, Mardika Field construction must become the start, instead of the end, of the building of open spaces in Ambon City.

The *second* implemented development program is the construction of schools in border areas such as SMPN 2, SD Latihan, and others. These schools were designed as joint inter-community schools, instead of previous schools concentrating on particular communities. However, based on the field findings, very many schools in Ambon are segregated, both between the teachers and students. When conflicts happened, some school teachers from a particular community were entrusted to other schools for security reason.¹⁵⁷

Beside that, school attendance zoning policy is considered supporting segregation emphasis in education. In State Senior High School of SMA Negeri 1, for instance, there were many Muslim students, although the number is reducing now. Religion-based settlement segregation is also confirmed by educational school attendance zone which makes many Muslim children unable to go to school located in predominantly Christian area. The segregation occurs particularly due to the push of policies in separate facility construction for both conflicting communities. For example, in the case of conflict between students from Porto Village and Haria Village in Senior High School of SMU Kota Saparua, which later triggered tension between the two neighboring villages, the district government decided to construct two separate senior high schools, each in Porto Village and Haria Village.¹⁵⁸

In the areas whose people are segregated spatially, the social spaces will usually be segregated in a natural fashion. Therefore, as a solution to the spatial segregation, the construction of schools in plural border areas becomes very strategic to reduce segregation effects in the social spaces. Beside that, schools are also one of social spaces that are very strategic in uniting youth generation from the two communities, especially in border areas which often become the places where conflicts and violence start. Therefore, the government may need to more consistently multiply the construction of the schools.

The *third* post-conflict realized development is the provision of psychological counseling to handle trauma and fear resulted by the 1999 conflict. The post-conflict trauma healing is one of the mandates from the *Inpres* No. 6 Year 2003, under the coordination of The Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare. The psychological counseling is generally carried out by the Ambon City Social Affairs Office by maximizing the function of Community Health Center (*Puskesmas*). The people's mental recovery due to trauma and shattered trust becomes a special attention, both by the government and the general public. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, such recovery requires a long duration. However, the strategic program did not run consistently because the number of psychiatrists was limited.¹⁵⁹ Such shortage has been felt by the people and government. Even worse, the trauma center set up in Sirimau Subdistrict had to be closed because of operational cost and absence of psychiatrist. The trauma center only operated until 2004.¹⁶⁰

The government's attention should be prioritized more to the sufficient availability of psychiatrists. In the context of operational termination of the trauma center and psychological guidance in the community health center, the government was considered to look down on the trauma impacts experienced by the people and to prioritize more physical construction, even though trauma is the

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Maluku inter-faith communications activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with GPM Research and Development Head, Ambon, 5 September 2013.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Ambon City health official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Ambon City social affairs official, Ambon, 13 December 2012; and female NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

fundamental issue in every post-conflict condition across the world. Trauma can hamper and prevent the recovery of inter-community communications and brotherhood tie. Eventually, psychological counseling or guidance and consultation due to the trauma resulting from the 1999 Ambon conflict tend to be more handled by NGOs. Looking at such reality, the government should take more initiative to deal with the problems rather than just leave them to non-governmental organizations.¹⁶¹

UNREALIZED PROGRAMS

Two untouched development programs, despite its inclusion in the future Ambon City development plans, are development of traditional markets and public transportation. Development of both sectors is considered being strategic because they become potential places of inter-community massive meeting and interaction. This condition was directly admitted by the Ambon Mayor by stating:

There are some points we have not touched yet [...] especially [...] markets and transportation sector. And we will deal with them, because our policy: we take the measure [must] have solution. If we [just] demolish them, we can do it. But it can create new problems...Because of so massive volume of social activities there, so that social clashes often occur [...]. So, that is the problem. My policy: [...] I push the development of subdistrict markets. In 2012, we had two or three [new markets] so that we drag out the volume of [transactions] [in the markets] again.¹⁶²

The traditional market development program should be immediately realized given the intensive transaction volume in those markets. Demands of new market development must soon be realized under two important considerations, namely the strategic function of the traditional markets as inter-community interaction spaces, as well as massive transaction in the markets will cause friction and clash between communities.

There are also programs that have been initiated but not well realized yet. One of them is counseling for children. The similar program was implemented by the Social Affair Office in 2007. Unfortunately, the program was temporary, sporadic and unsustainable. Beside that, the program design and planning tended to be less systematic.¹⁶³ Counseling and awareness-raising among Ambonese children, especially the conflict victims or who witnessed directly the conflicts must be done in systematic and comprehensive fashion so that it cannot be executed temporarily and in only in particular locations. Education and counseling for the children even need to be design in a special manner and included in school curriculum. Through the program the children are expected to be able to really understand and be aware of what really happened in the 1999 conflict.

Awareness-raising and counseling are important especially in handling revengeful feeling that remained in the children's heart. If the feeling is neglected, the children are feared to grow with full revenge and can become the main actors of future conflicts. More than that, trauma counseling and peace curriculum given to schools will simultaneously take part in the establishment of Ambonese future generation characters which are more sensitive, tolerant and multi-cultural.

Because [when occurred] the 1999 incidents, the children who [live] here and now were still small and are between the golden age (1-4 year. So in the future and right now it needs internalization or formation of the characters so that more harmonious inter-religion or ethnicity relationship is fostered. We must build that. Moreover, [in the] current segregation condition, violent values are planted [which] was supported again with settlement pattern. So, they do not know and [do not] recognize their brothers and sisters who are Muslim or Christians.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Interview with Ambon City Health Office official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁶² Interview, Ambon Mayor, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹⁶³ Interview with one *imam* in Wayame, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Maluku peace activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

It is very obvious that peace and brotherhood curriculum has become the attention and demand of the general public. As a response to the demand, the Ambon City Government through the City Development Planning Agency (Bapekot) has design the newest RPJM which gives emphasis on and priority to *orang basudara* curriculum development.¹⁶⁵ It is hoped that the program can be implemented as soon as possible given that the post-conflict period has passed more than one decade.

Special guidance and attention should be given to the Ambonese children and young generation. The phenomenon of the Ambonese young people is closely related to the context and dynamics of the conflicts, especially to jobless youth. The youth unemployment issue has played a particular role in the outbreak of the 1999 conflict.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, it is well grounded to give special attention and guidance to them, not only because many of them suffered from conflict-generated trauma, but also because their socio-economic condition can be potential for future violence.

The next program that is considered to give lots of positive contributions to the creation of peace and restoration of inter-community brotherhood tie is the social cohesion through various religious events. Unfortunately, such program is still in the proposal phase by various parties and is not a post-conflict development priority yet.

That's right; we need physical reconstruction, but without constructing social adhesives, it is in vain. [The fund] will be used up. Don't they build social adhesives so that another project occurs? I don't know. This is the difference between the way they think and we think as society. The maximum facilitation we do, our limitation is only on our community, and does not go through Muslim community.¹⁶⁷

Development and construction of border areas, both physically and psychically also become post-conflict programs that are deemed important and urgent to realize. Border areas are those very prone to violence and conflicts; not only inter-community that live in the border areas, but also inter-group clashes in other places which are most likely to spread and trigger subsequent clashes in the border areas.

Yes in the future, in our city planning, later in the border zone there will be no settlement to be constructed. Such as in the border of Batu Merah–Mardika; we will build parking area there or we build public facilities there. We just compensate for the people/ their houses/ lands. We buy the land, then we just relocate them? Because the area [tends to be an area] of burning conflicts. Like [in] the Pattimur Day, that [conflict] will get sparked there again.¹⁶⁸

The above statement clearly confirms two things: (1) border local development design should have been one of the post-conflict development priorities, even it has been included into the *master plan* of future Ambon city arrangement; however (2) those priorities are still in the planning phase and no realization nor implementation is done. Practically, border area development is not earmarked for settlement but more intended to public facilities which can be utilized together by different communities. The facilities—bedrooms, parking lots, traditional/modern markets, community health centers, schools, city parks etc- can become public spaces for inter-community interaction.

Eventually, post conflict development priority balance needed, between physical, social and mental/ psychic developments given the 1999 conflict. Not only impacting physical infrastructures but also social infrastructures so that it inherits psychic trauma. Emphasis on more than 2 development aspect will only emphasize distortion and very partial development in Ambon City.

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION

Another important which is generally related to segregation is discrimination, both in social, economic and political sectors. In other words, in segregated areas whose people composition is

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁶⁶ See Garry van Klinken (2001), pages 1-26.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Ambon City Christian figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

minority-majority, the discrimination phenomenon often occurs as the effect of very fierce competition in getting access. Similarly Ambon; as one of the areas in Indonesia where the people are segregated, the city is also closely related to discrimination phenomenon. In Ambon City, discrimination also takes place in public services, although the Ambon City Government has so far tried hard to eliminate the discriminatory practices. The Ambon City Government effort is reflected in the health services, as stated by a respondent:

The health service does not differentiate whether a person is Muslim or Christian in providing health [service]. This provides a picture for other people that the Health Office staff in providing the service do not select even though during riots. That was done in the Community Health Center (*Puskesmas*) and [...] in Muslim and Christian border areas. The Health Office often organize free medical treatment in Muslim-Christian border areas and attended by Muslims and Christians.¹⁶⁹

The public services given by the Ambon City Health Office above describe an effort to eliminate discrimination, as the city government confirmed that they do not differentiate in the service delivery, both to Muslim and Christian communities, to the local people and refugees. However, it turned out that the discrimination happened in the provision of assistance to refugees. When floods hit Ambon in August 2012, for instance, refugees from a particular community felt the assistance received was less than the assistance that another community received:

... because we have good relationship, so we want that the assistance should not only go to the Christians. But only a little [that we asked]. Recently, there were refugees from Muslim [community] that questioned why all Christian refugees got it while Muslim [refugees] did not. We explained that that was right they had it, but we only got a little, no more than 10 units of mattress. Hundreds of refugees may *figh* [because assistance distribution did not reach all people]. So, only we selected [the assistance recipients].¹⁷⁰

In the case, it seemed that flood victim refugees from the Christian community got priority more in accessing assistance rather than the refugees from Muslim community. From the nominal side of the assistance, the Christian refugees tended to get more assistance than the Muslims. Even many Muslims did not get assistance at all. Discrimination in accessing assistance or in other domain, even if well done by the government official, it will only destroy social structure and harmony long built in Ambon.

Some other discrimination cases are related to economic issues, for example project tender process and trading. There are a number of cases in which particular ethnicity or groups are prioritized than the others. Chinese community, for example is considered having many privileges because they give “bribes” in a certain amount to bureaucrats.¹⁷¹ In small economic sector, for example, in Valentin Market which is the refugees’ relocation market, small vendors opinioned that local government pays more attention to traders in Mardika Marketn with set up more decent stands. Traders’ stands in Mardika are made from wood, while in Valentin Market from bamboo. But the renovation was done after the traders of Valentin Market asked many times to the government. As a result, they felt the Mollucan-native people as the majority of traders in Valentin Marget were marginalized.¹⁷² From the above cases, we can see discrimination in the economic aspect and may occur in other sectors, is often linked with ethnicity issues, especially if economic resource distribution is conducted through particular ethnic channels.¹⁷³

Some discrimination also happened in socio-political sector, for instance, related to some socio-political position or governmental bureaucracy. In these cases people from a particular community are often prioritized than the others. One respondent in Unpatti, for example stated that:

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Ambon City Health Office, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Ambon City Muslim organization, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁷¹ Interview with one Ambonese young employer, Ambon, 22 May 2013.

¹⁷² FGD with some traders in Valentin market, Ambon, 22 May 2013.

¹⁷³ See Fearon and Laitin (1996).

The recruitment of lecturers are seldom announced two or three days before the test. Now [the recruitment] seems to explode again because [there is] certification of lecturers. The data of many Muslim lecturers, including me, is obscured. Since the promotion until today, I have never failed my tasks to carry out the university's Three Duties (*Tri Dharma*). I have been lecturing since tens of years. Why does new lecturer who has just lectured for two years immediately get lecturer certification? What's wrong with us? In Unpatti there is only one Muslim dean—from eight faculties; nine with faculty of medicines. The one person, [dean]of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP); [then] Mr Madubun and Mr Udin, and PR 3 (Assistant to President 3). ... The segregative life outside the university has been taken into [campus]—symbolic things from outside go inside.¹⁷⁴

The above remark describes discrimination case in the recruitment of bureaucrats and lecturers in Unpatti. In this case, Christian. So do the promotion and lecturer certification. Lecturers from the Christian community are more prioritized even though those who come from Muslim community feel they have met the requirements and are more entitled for a position or status. If closely observed, discrimination and segregation in the education sector in Unpatti constitutes a reflection from segregation implanted in Ambonese society in general. In other words, spatial segregation in Ambon has entered social dimension.

Still in relation to social-educational life in Unpatti as a case, discrimination turns out not only to happen in the recruitment and promotion, but also in the scholarship granting. The nominal value of scholarship received by Christian students is higher than what is received by Muslim students. In this case, Christian students can get scholarship amounting to IDR 7 million, while Muslim students only get IDR 3 million. Similarly in the disbursement process, the scholarship for Christian students tends to be disbursed earlier than the scholarship for Muslim students. Some examples above describe condition in which excess of segregation in Ambonese society has reached social-educational sector in the forms of discriminatory cases related to services and public access.¹⁷⁵

Nevertheless, the discrimination phenomenon in Unpatti is denied by some parties, especially the university leadership. In terms of student acceptance quota, for example, it is deemed reasonable if many students accepted are Christian because the number of Christian student candidates who register are more than that of Muslim student candidates. Such ratio often applies at faculty level. According to the parties who deny the existence of discrimination, there is no priority given to students from particular community because the acceptance process has also been done through University Entrance Test (UMPTN) or Joint Entrance Selection of State University (SBMPTN) as well as through independent lane, and not based on proportion.¹⁷⁶

However, there is also another interesting finding in the university institution, namely the emergence of post-conflict positive change related to transparency in academic sector. Before the conflict, as admitted and felt in person by one of the leaders in Unpatti, there was sometime discrimination in giving scores, as well as difficult procedures to get bureaucratic service for students coming from particular community. Related to this, the 1999 conflict has provided particular lessons learnt, grown openness, and created pressure against the university to avoid discriminatory and corruptive things.¹⁷⁷

In the context of filling in strategic positions in Unpatti, often times there is unwritten deal among the leadership to share positions. For instance, if the president is Christian, some deputies must be Muslims. Such phenomenon has occurred since the 2003 election of the university president. Similarly in the recruitment of lecturers, after the 1999 conflict the recruitment system has been improved and more transparent. Even though based on the testimony from one of the former Unpatti leadership from Muslim community, the people from Muslim community tend more to apply for jobs

¹⁷⁴ Interview with one of Ambon Unpatti academician; and with peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with one of Unpatti leaders, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.; and with Ambon Muslim young figure, Ambon, 15 May 2013; with dean of one faculty in Unpatti, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

as government employees rather than lecturers.¹⁷⁸ After the conflict, scholarship granting is more open and competitive. Many have failed to get scholarship more because of English skills and academic potential, instead of priority or discrimination. Even though the discrimination occurred, it has been more casual.¹⁷⁹

Demand for inter-community power sharing, especially in relation to the power sharing type, once surfaced in the discussion process of Malino II Agreement. Some parties once proposed “pro-rate” power sharing scheme, 50-50. But many parties that refused the power sharing model because it will potentially set aside factors of individuals’ quality, competencies, and professionalism. If the demand for “pro-rate” is too much followed, someone who does not have the required ability or skills can be put in a particular position for the sake of quota demand. Therefore, the balance which is then deemed fair is proportional, namely which considers individual’s capacity and skills.¹⁸⁰

POST-CONFLICT INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP

IMPROVED INTER-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP

Until now, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon can be said to run well. The life has been normal, the people have returned to the initial life and activities, inter-community communications and interaction have run relatively well. Although not all, many of the community members have mingled after getting separated due to the prolonged conflict.¹⁸¹ The improved situation of Ambon City, which once experienced social distortion and weakened inter-community cohesion, has become one of the attentions and important considerations in the 2006-2026 Ambon City RPJP.¹⁸²

However, although inter-community interaction and relationship has returned to normalcy, it should be admitted that particular social segments still experience trauma, fear, discomfort, and others. There are still some issues due to the conflict and it requires a long period to solve them. Inter-community stigma, as represented by *Acang* (Hasan) label for Muslims and *Obet* (Robert) for Christians, is one of the post-conflict problems. A respondent revealed:

But nowadays there is still problem deep down in the heart especially for grass-root people. For example, for elderly people there are people [who] often say, “Who’s that? *Acang* or *Obet*?” Who do we still use the words like that? *Acang* (Hasan) is Muslim and *Obet* (Robert) is Christian. This is one stigma/ mark made by the Police. At that time the Indonesian Police asked Franky Sahilatua to create a song and the song was followed by a video clip in which Muslim and Christian children are in a shattered place, then they yelled out “... *Acang* ... *Obet* ...” So, from that, the stigma on Muslims and Christians is still here until now by the calling of *Acang* and *Obet*. But in our community who really understand it we often put it in a joke like: “Oh, *Acang*, do come in, or *Obet*, do come in.”¹⁸³

Generally, trauma resulting from the conflict is still visible; inter-community sentiment and suspicion are still experienced by various segments of the society. One of the result is when travelling many people choose to find alternative road to avoid the need of passing through other community area. For instance, Christian people who want to pass through Air Salobar to reach the Christian area which is located across the area, must take a speed boat. For Air Salobar people, if they want to go to Al Fatah Mosque located inside the city, for instance, also must take speed boat because they are reluctant to pass through their neighboring Christian area. Similarly with Amahusu Christian people,

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.; and with one Catholic leader, Ambon, 13 May 2013.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with dean of a faculty in Unpatti, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with one Unpatti leader, Ambon, 16 May 2013, and with one Catholic leader, Ambon, 13 May 2013.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Ambon City senior official, 13 December 2012.

¹⁸² See Ambon City Local Regulation (Perda) No. 4 Year 2006.

¹⁸³ Interview with Maluku Human Rights Activist and with Ambon Health Office head, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

they must use speed boat to reach Benteng or go around the mountain to reach the center of Ambon City.¹⁸⁴ The phenomenon is particularly caused by suspicion and sentiment built by the 1999 conflict, and it turned out that it would not just disappear. After the September 11, 2011 occurred, for instance, the phenomenon of “avoiding” in doing the travel recurred. Since there is still sentiment and suspicion, many relationships which ran well before the conflict, have really cut off after the conflict.

[Previously] the Christians, would visit us in Lebaran day for gathering... I have lots of friends above (in Christian environment)—they even brought cakes. Later, [...] if they celebrated Christmas we would go there for gathering, bringing cakes. But now it never happens again [gathering]... Cut off... Previously in Christmas they invited us to celebrate Christmas together. Usually there was drama from the Muslim community, we joined. That was before 1999. So we participated. In Lebaran day, Biasanya we invited [them] again. [Now] they often pass through here, but no more greetings.¹⁸⁵

Although it should be admitted that in many places in Ambon inter-community relationship generally has improved, but the case told by a respondent above has also been experienced by many Ambonese people. The two communities used to help each other and work together in various religious events, now even there is no greetings any longer and it was as if they do not know one another.

STRENGTHENED PUBLIC AWARENESS ON CONFLICTS

Improved inter-community relationship is followed by strengthened public awareness on not being involved in conflicts. The people have learned from the 1999 conflict that it only brought misery and destruction to the Mollucan people, especially Ambon. This can be seen from various religious activities especially sermons, Muslim teachings, religious speeches, both from the Muslim and Christian communities, which contain the call for not being easily provoked and falling into communal conflicts.¹⁸⁶

More than that, the Ambonese society even get more aware that the 1999 conflict was not their will. The current Ambonese people, especially the traditional people, are aware that they are brotherly community since long time ago. For them, the conflict was engineered by external parties. A respondent stated:

In my opinion, after the conflict we are truly brothers here and there is no problem. But actually external intervention or influences came in. So, if we see it in *negeris*, they usually will return if they have *petuanan* (traditional area). Even though they have several times experienced conflicts. What was built was burned down again. But they returned because it is their traditional *negeri*. The problem occurs in urban area because in the area the people have mingled. For us, as Ambonese people, there is no problem any longer.¹⁸⁷

Assumption that the 1999 conflict was external party's construction and interest has made the intention of having conflicts slowly disappear from the mind of the Ambonese people. After the conflict, the Ambonese people really tend to return to their place of origin because of two things, namely the sense of brotherhood or traditional tie and no intention among them to have conflicts.

That after the conflict their resilience now has been far better than before, namely when there was violence, they could easily localize and settle it shortly. Even though post conflict violence is often linked to religious issues and sentiment by particular parties, but the conflict forms always happen only within a short period of time and in a particular location.¹⁸⁸ The post-1999 conflict peace process has made the Ambonese people more mature and stronger in facing each emerging violence; like in

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Maluku peace activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with a refugee of Warining riot, Ambon, 12 December 2012

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Ambon City religious affairs leader, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Ambon City religious affairs official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

Waringin on September 11, 2011, and in Torch relay on May 25, 2012 in which the violence could instantly localized and settled.

More than that, in border areas such as Waringin and Mardika, which often become the inter-community violence and conflict sites, the people have been committed to living peacefully together.¹⁸⁹ The Waringin people who used to take refugee following the 1999 conflict have now mingled with other community members and lived peacefully together.

INTER-COMMUNITY COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Inter-community cooperation and communications in handling violence after the 1999 conflicts constitute another important fact that shows more improved and strengthened post-conflict inter-community relationship. The communications and cooperation have greatly been fostered by the community leaders, for instance between reverends and Ulemmas, between GPM Synode and MUI both at the provincial and city level, etc.¹⁹⁰ When violence occurs after the conflict, the figures of both communities always go down to the field, foster communications and provide explanation to their respective congregations so that they are not easily provoked or involved in any violence.

People's strengthened social resilience, better inter-congregation communications and cooperation should have been followed by reactivation of traditional and togetherness values, for instance by helping each other to build religious places and revitalize *Pela Gandong*.¹⁹¹ The cultural values and treasure must be revived as the prevention from all potential violences that can still threaten the Ambonese people. The Activation of *Pela Gandong* and teaching of history of inter-community togetherness culture are very important to strengthen the Ambonese young generation, which may forget or even be unaware about it. Until now, the very real post-conflict inter-community cooperation and communications in organizing several religious events such as Iedl Fitr, Christmas, *Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran/* Qoran Recital Competition (MTQ), and others. According to a respondent:

Just like my experience in Silo: every year at Christmas, the Mollucan Mosque Youth and Teenagers Coordinating Body guarded Silo Church. Every [any time] devotion/religious services, they will guard the church by wearing traditional Muslim hat (*kopiah*), *koko* shirt. That is a very beautiful condition. On the other way round it happens so; during the Ied prayer, we from the GPM Young Generation also guard the mosques like in [Mosque] Al Fatah oar [Mosque] Jami. But for churches, the ones that are often guarded [are] Silo Church, Maranatha Church, Sidang Jemaat Allah Filadelfia Church, and Bethlehem Church. The four churches are regularly guarded by Muslim community every year.¹⁹²

Beside cooperation in securing religious events, young people from both communities consistently conduct creative and interesting activities to maintain peace in Ambon by utilizing social media, such as organizing "Kopi Badati" movement. Through the movement, they collect Christian-Muslim young people to carry out joint movement, for instance by giving coffee and tea to the posts built in border areas. They carry out this to build communications and discussions with security personnel and friends of another community in border area.¹⁹³ Behind the "Kopi Badati" activity, an important value is promoted, namely unity and awareness of inter-community young generation on protection Ambon together for sustained peace.

SOME INTER-COMMUNITY INTERACTION OBSTACLES

Inter-community relationship and interaction have so far run quite well. However, some problems as the direct result from the conflict still require serious and systematic handling. If not handled, those

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Ambon City Christian Church leader, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Ambon City Christian church leader, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁹² Interview with Maluku peace activist; and with Maluku Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

problems can disturb the on-going peace building or even harm inter-community relationship and interaction that run quite well.

The intended problem, *first* is trauma and disappearance of mutual trust. In the context, a peace activist in Ambon, for example, emphasized that “before the conflict there were no[issue of trust]—all trusted one another. So, distrust occurred after the conflict happened. But [to deal with it] requires time, doesn’t it? We cannot just talk about it.”¹⁹⁴ Another respondent revealed:

If we go to the Christian community area, we are not afraid any longer, but we cannot stay long. That happened during the day. on May 15, we were afraid and cautious or alert, but did not leave Waringin because *katong* thought there was guarding personnel in the post. But *katong*’s feeling was not calm because we felt that security personnel was no guarantee.¹⁹⁵

The story described the suspicion and distrust within the community members. The problems should be immediately taken care of since the 1999 conflict has really harmed mutual trust and triggered inter-community suspicion although another perspective believes that the disappearance of this mutual trust had been there years back before the 1999 conflict broke out.¹⁹⁶

The *second* problem that needs serious attention for maintaining inter-community relationship and interaction is the demand for fair treatment by the government to both communities.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, there are particular community segments which until today still feel discrimination and lack of power sharing between both communities.¹⁹⁸

The *third* problem which potentially harms well-maintained inter-community relationship and interaction is unfinished law settlement of the violence emerging after the conflict. This law uncertainty may create mutual suspicion and accusations between them or between communities. Many parties still tend to think that if an incident happened to a Muslim, a Christian must be the actor, and vice versa.¹⁹⁹ To avoid such suspicion, thorough disclosure of each case by security personnel is a crucial step to clear up the real problem and eliminate mutual suspicion and accusation between communities.

POST-CONFLICT SOCIAL –ECONOMIC DECONSTRUCTION

Beside the problems that may prevent good relationship between the communities above, after the 1999 conflict there have been an interesting thing such as deconstruction of social-economic structure of the Ambonese society. Before the 1999 conflict, Christians were not interested in non-formal jobs and preferred formal jobs only, for example being civil servants (PNS), officials, or office employees. Meanwhile, Muslim community tended to choose non-formal sector or private sector jobs, such as being sellers, pedicab drivers or motorcycle taxi drivers. However, after the 1999 conflict there has been a shift within the Christian community; now they are not reluctant to work in non-formal sector, such as pedicab drivers, market sellers, laborers, house assistants, brick layers, and others.²⁰⁰

Nevertheless, the different identity can still be identified between the non-formal workers from the different community. For instance, pedicab drivers from Christian and Muslim communities can be differentiated based on the physical form and accessories of their pedicabs. Muslims’ pedicabs tend to look good, neat and well-maintained. Usually their pedicabs are equipped with rear tyre fender.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with peace activist in Ambon, 17 December 2012.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with a Waringin riot victim, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with GPM Research and Development Head, Ambon, 5 September 2013.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Maluku Christian Church Research and Development figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with one *imam* in Wayame, Ambon, 14 Desember 2012.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with a village head, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012; and with an Ambonese contractor employer, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

Christian pedicabs tend to be as they are, not well-maintained, and usually without rear tyre fender (Photo 12 page 141).²⁰¹ However, day after day the physical characteristics of pedicabs as the indicator of identity of the drivers becomes irrelevant since pedicab drivers from one community may drive pedicabs with the characteristics which previously belonged to the pedicabs of another community.²⁰²

The change in preference of Christian community's livelihood is also related by a respondent:

For instance: Christians, I said, used to be *Ambtenaar*. Now it changes. Did we ever see a Christian drive a pedicab? None. Did we see Christians sell in markets? None. Did they hang around? None. If yes, there would be people from my *negeri*—from mountains. Mothers with baskets that we called *bakul*, on their heads, just [now] are walking around selling door to door. Previously, there was none of them in markets. But now, all of our social structure has changed. Many Christian now sell in markets. Many [Christians becoming drivers of] pedicabs too, ... [drivers of] motorcycle taxi too.²⁰³

After the conflict, the relationship dynamics between Muslim and Christian communities related to jobs has changed too. During the conflict, the factor of the same religion became an important thing to consider in the job recruitment. But now, the majority of the people have started to consider more the professionalism aspect rather than someone's identity based on the community of origin.²⁰⁴

FEELING SECURE: VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIETY'S SEGMENTS

MOTHERS' PERSPECTIVES

In general, many mothers both who take refuge or not, have been relocated or not, stated that now they felt secure to travel to various places in Ambon. According to them, it is no problem for mothers from the Muslim community to go to Christian areas; and the other way around.²⁰⁵ However, it must be admitted that there are still particular segments of the society who have so far felt insecure and traumatic to come to certain places, especially the mothers who now live in relocation areas. For instance, mothers in Kayu Tiga, whose majority is Christian refugees, underlined that they still felt afraid of going to Batu Merah and Kebun Cengkeh, dominated by Muslim community. One respondent stated:

Until now [I] still feel uncomfortable because if for instance there is someone dead in Kayu Tita here, then I asked where is the funeral took place, then if the answer was the funeral in Benteng, I will would go there, but if they said the funeral in Kebun Cengkeh, I would go ... But now I dare to go with the mournful people go [to] the a funeral in Kebun Cengkeh. If we have invitation from Batu Merah, for instance I will not go even during the day and moreover in the evening.²⁰⁶

Other mothers from the Christian community emphasized that they dared to go to Kebun Cengkeh if together. However, will be afraid to go to Batu Merah, even during the day and in the evening. Beside the places, the other places they consider insecure to visit are Kairatu, Western Seram, in which they have to go through Liang, a location of ferry piers where the majority of the people are Muslim. Such feeling has originated from the 1999 conflict experience and the resulting trauma.²⁰⁷

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Interview with a Muslim pedicab driver from Buton, Ambon 15 May 2013.

²⁰³ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁰⁴ Interview with young Mollucan employer figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁰⁵ FGD with mothers in Latta, Ambon, 16 May 2013; with refugee mothers in Pita Samudra, Ambon, 16 May 2013; interview with a wife to a mosque *imam*, Ambon, 21 Mei 2013; and interview with mothers in Kayu Tiga, 20 May 2013.

²⁰⁶ FGD with mothers in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 20 May 2013.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Different from the mothers in the Kayu Tiga relocation, the Muslim mothers in Latta who once took refuge during the 1999 conflict decided to return to Latta which is dominated and surrounded by Christian settlements. Social assets in the form of sense of mutual trust with the Christian community in their area made them willing to return. They emphasized that they had strong inter-community brotherhood tie as taught for generations in Latta. Even the Muslim community intentionally send their children to Christian schools to foster the sense of unity and mutual understanding.²⁰⁸

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS/ STUDENTS' PERSPECTIVES

University students/students in general emphasized that they felt secure to travel to several places in Ambon which are mainly inhabited by the community different from them. However, some university students/ students feel insecure to travel to some places or in particular hours. The similar condition, like the mothers' perspectives, is mainly shaped by traumatic feeling resulting from the 1999 conflict which has completely disappeared.²⁰⁹ Muslim university students, for instance, stressed that since 2006 they have been often come to Kudamati area as a Christian area, to foster cooperation with the students from Christian organizations.²¹⁰

However, the university students who live in border areas have different experiences and feelings given that they often witness and experience violence or conflicts. Muslim university students who live in border area, for instance, stressed that they would feel afraid to enter Christian areas in the evening. The fear is often strengthened by awareness that identification of particular community membership can be easily done by anyone by only looking at dressing model, language and home address. Such condition also happens to Christian university students who live in border areas.²¹¹

PEDICAB/ MOTORCYCLE TAXI DRIVERS' PERSPECTIVES

Both motorcycle taxi/ pedicab drivers in general underlined that they felt secure to enter various areas in Ambon, especially when they are operational or at work. Only in particular areas, many of them still feel afraid to enter them, many among them will feel afraid of entering in the evening. For instance, motorcycle taxi driver from Muslim community will avoid Kudamati and Batu Gantung in the evening and tend to operate only in Ambon city.²¹²

During the day I am not really [scared]. In the evening, I will refuse it. What I mean here is that we refuse it to be careful [so that] nothing will happen to us. If asked to go to border area [I] am willing to do it. Because we see: which area is the most vulnerable, so do enter it. I can also talk to my passenger that I can only take them here. I cannot take them there.²¹³

Christian motorcycle taxi drivers tend to feel secure if they operate in Christian areas and avoid operations in Kebun Cengkeh and Batu Merah in the evening. Beside those areas, other areas which are often avoided by Christian motorcycle drivers are Air Besar, Waihaong, and STAIN. But motorcycle taxi drivers have their own communities- Muslim drivers in Muslim areas while Christian ones in Christian areas.²¹⁴

Special attention is mainly given to Kudamati area. The Christian public van (angkot) drivers, motorcycle taxi drivers, or pedicab drivers think it is the most secure place for them, after Batu

²⁰⁸ FGD with mothers in Latta, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

²⁰⁹ FGD with Unpatti students, Ambon, 15 May 2013; and interview with Muslim student organization figure, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²¹⁰ FGD with student/Muslim student organization member, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²¹¹ Interview with one student activist in Ahuru area, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

²¹² Interview with motorcycle taxi driver in Waringin, Ambon, 20 May 2013, and Waihaong, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²¹³ Interview with motorcycle taxi driver, Waihaong, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²¹⁴ FGD with Christian motorcycle taxi drivers in Tanah Tinggi, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

Gantung and Mangga Dua.²¹⁵ In another side, for them Batu Merah is a place to be avoided, not only because the area is the Muslim community concentration, but also because there are increasing criminal cases in that area. There are many jobless people in the area and many young people get drunk so that non-formal workers feel insecure.²¹⁶

SMALL VENDORS' PERSPECTIVES

In general, street vendors feel secure selling everywhere even though in certain condition and place we feel insecure to sell. The insecure feeling originates from the trauma resulting from the conflict or violence experiences, so that the street vendors tend to feel secure selling in their own community area. In other words, Muslim vendors feel more secure to sell in area/markets whose the majority of vendors are Muslim; similarly also to Christian vendors.²¹⁷

Christian vendors in Valentin Market (Photo 13 page 142), for instance, who moved from Mardika Market and Matu Meja Market because of the 1999 conflict feel uncomfortable and insecure to return to Mardika Market which is dominated by vendors from Muslim community (Photo 14 page 142). Many of them still admitted that they were still trauma and afraid of getting trapped into the same riot. But, going to Mardika Market will not be a problem as long as they only shop and not sell.²¹⁸ The vendors who sell in Waringin feel secure only because in the area there are security posts with 24 hour guard by 4 battalions.²¹⁹

EMPLOYERS' PERSPECTIVES

For employers, security situation is not a problem. They feel safe and comfortable to conduct transactions everywhere and with any body. Such condition is considered quite far different in conflict times and post-conflict periods.²²⁰ The problem really felt by employers, especially contractor employer, is the transparency of tender system in every project in Ambon. The corruptive practices are pointed out to apply by providing priorities to certain groups.²²¹

The security feeling includes some transaction of Muslim employers conducted in Christian areas, and vice versa. For instance, a young Muslim employer in Ambon smoothly and comfortably conduct some business transaction in South-east Maluku and Kisar, Western South-east Maluku, dubbed as Christian areas.²²²

UNIFYING AND DIVIDING FACTORS

UNIFYING FACTORS

Ambon is known as one of the areas in Indonesia colored with tight segregation. However, there area some aspects or factors which have been so far considered taking important role in maintaining peace in Ambon. The main factor which is widely known is the cultural value called *Pela Gandong*. Thanks to the brotherhood system, the Mollucan people, especially the Ambonese, live peacefully and in brotherhood for years. After the conflict in 1999, the need for reviving *Pela* and *Biking Panas*

²¹⁵ Interview with public van driver in Kudamati, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

²¹⁶ Interview with public van driver in Waihaong, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²¹⁷ FGD with vendors in Mardika Market, Ambon, 22 May 2013; interview with vendors in Waringin, Ambon, 14 May 2013; and FGD with vendors in Valentin Market, Ambon, 21 May 2013.

²¹⁸ FGD with vendors in Valentin Market, Ambon, 21 May 2013.

²¹⁹ Interview with street vendor in Waringin, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

²²⁰ Interview with one Ambonese employer, Ambon, 20 May 2013.

²²¹ Interview with one Ambonese young employer, Ambon, 22 May 2013.

²²² Ibid.

*Pela*²²³ is very urgent. Through the brotherhood culture, the intercommunity harmonious relationship is expected to realize quickly and well after the 1999 conflict. Sharing the statement, a respondent emphasized that “we live in the frame of *Pela* in Ambon, but it is still limited by the wall of distrust... We are brothers and sisters. In Maluku, there are Muslims-Christians, but ‘*salam-sarani*’; *salam* means Islam, *sarani* means Christianity.”²²⁴

Beside that, huge trust in *Pela* as inter-community brotherhood tie in Ambon has made most of Ambonese society believe that the 1999 conflict was only the construction of external parties who wanted to damage Ambon.²²⁵ The belief in the strength of *Pela* also takes the people to another point of belief that the source of the 1999 conflict is not related to the inter-community internal relationship in Ambon. Therefore, *Pela* is the main source of the disappearance of inter-community prejudice.

Nevertheless, although there is a common belief that the 1999 conflict was the construction of external parties from outside Ambon, the attention is still given to the absence of *Biking Panas Pela* in the last few year before the 1999 conflict. *Biking Panas Pela* is usually conducted every five years. For instance, when a Muslim village and a Christian village have *Pela* relationship, at one time Muslim people will visit their Christian neighbors. Then, in the next five years, Christian people will visit the Muslim village. On that occasion, there will be huge feast, big meal and others.²²⁶ *Biking Panas Pela* is an effort to maintain and preserve tradition and brotherhood tie between them. The occurrence of the 1999 conflict can be assumed as the turning point of the revival of Ambonese awareness to restart the routine event. Even, some respondents emphasized that Ambonese people’s strength to resolve and build peace is by using the cultural approach or *Pela Gandong*.²²⁷

However, the special position of *Pela* in the construction of peace and inter-community brotherhood in Ambon by some parties is considered being contraproductive, and even negative. The reason is that *Pela* can become a reason for a particular community to help the community that has *Pela* tie with it when the community is involved in the conflict by the other community.²²⁸ The late 2012 clash between Hualoy and Kamariang villagers in Kairatu subdistrict, Western Seram district, may become one example. Sepa villagers that have *Pela* with the Kamariang villagers were invited to attend the installation of Kamariang Village King. To come to Kamariang, Sepa villagers had to pass through Hualoy village. There was unclear reason for the clash between Sepa and Hualoy villagers that claimed 5 Sepa villagers’ lives, and Kamariang villagers that feel to have *Pela* with Sepa community immediately helped Sepa villagers in the clash.²²⁹

Another important unifying factor is inter-community cooperation and mutual help in organizing various religious events. The togetherness in conducting various events is one of the strong and practical means to maintain and defend peace in Ambon. For instance, in the execution of the 2012 MTQ in Ambon, the GPM women’s group (pelwata) designed social charity activity with Muslim women. In Christian areas like Galala, the Christian community produced lanterns bearing the pictures of star and moon. They also installed huge banners, for instance, with sentences like “Success to the National MTQ.” Similarly, Muslim community every year end install big banner saying “Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.”²³⁰ Cooperation between Muslim and Christian communities in the

²²³ *Biking Panas Pela* (*heating up Pela*) is event/ceremony organized periodically to keep the *Pela* alive. Ceremony or feast between both communities that have the *Pela* is usually followed with plea renewal, singing, dancing and others. See Bartels (1977), page 3.

²²⁴ Interview with Ambonese refugee empowerment activist, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

²²⁵ Interview with one conflict victim that took refuge from Buru island to Lembah Argo location, Ambon, 15 December 2012, and with contractor employer and Maluku young employers organization figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²²⁶ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²²⁷ Interview with one Team 20 Wayame member and Unpatti academician, 14 December 2012.

²²⁸ Interview with Ambon City Police official, Ambon, 12 December 2012

²²⁹ Kompasiana.com, “*Bentrok Maluku, 5 Tewas*,” quoted from: <http://regional.kompasiana.com/2012/12/30/bentrok-maluku5-warga-tewas-520821.html>, accessed on 14 February 2013.

²³⁰ Interview with one refugee in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 11 December 2012; and with Maluku peace activist, Ambon, 11 December 2012.

MTQ execution that was opened by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on June 8, 2012²³¹ becomes an important key to the revival of inter-community brotherhood that was once damaged due to the 1999 bloody conflict.

The last unifying factor can be referred to the emergence of pluralistic point of view and people's openness. The emergence of Ambonese special segments that are aware of the importance of pluralism and tolerance for religious difference, especially from Christian or Muslim community figures, will greatly help out the process of maintaining and guarding inter-religious community brotherhood and peace in Ambon.²³² Pluralism and multiculturalism can become deadly weapon in maintaining heterogeneous community harmony and having fairly high level of segregation. The understanding can also start to be developed seriously and consistently in school and higher education's curriculum in Ambon.

DIVIDING FACTORS

Apart from some unifying factors, there are also some important factors that are often regarded as the sources of conflicts/ clashes or the source of inter-community divider in Ambon. One of them is provocation by particular parties that make use of sensitive issues and religious symbols to make the communities clash or conflict one another. Provocative efforts to the people often become debates because it is difficult for security personnel to capture the provocators. The goal of the provocations is relatively clear: playing one against another and confronting two different communities in order that conflicts/clashes occur.²³³ But the provocators' interests may vary and are not easy to identify. Outside all the debates, provocations really become the trigger of the 1999 conflict and, in some incidents, of post-conflict violence. According to a respondent:

On September 11, 2011 there were really many issues related to religious issues, in which religions were made as inter-community conflict trigger. It is the understanding to be revived in the life of *orang basudara* between Muslims and Christians. Christians and Muslims in Maluku are only one, all are brothers and sisters. But, with provocations that use religious elements, [people are prone to conflict]. So Latupati tries to strengthen traditional structure as *orang basudara* (brotherhood). Never be influenced by untrue issues²³⁴

The statement above reveals there was provocation that brings sentiment and group fanaticism when a riot in Waringian occurred in September 11, 2011. Similarly it happened in the 1999 conflict.²³⁵

Another factor that is considered being able to divide community, and even potentially triggers inter-community clashes, is absence of respect for local tradition which has for years a role in maintaining inter-community harmony and. Such tradition especially refers to the communal construction of religious places, as well as permits given by particular communities to the other communities in constructing their religious places.

Our fault and the government's have been *social engineering*. Previously, if we wanted to build a mosque, we agreed to build it together. The same is like church. All helps each other. But now suddenly I saw mosques in the all Christian (owned) area. Suddenly there is a mosque that is built across Silo Church, etc. Christian do not feel they own the mosque any longer. [Even though], all existing mosques are not taken care of Christians. The architecture of the Grand Mosque [has been designed by] Christians, right.²³⁶

²³¹ See Antaranews.com, 8 June 2012 (<http://www.antaranews.com/berita/314891/presiden-buka-mtq-nasional-di-ambon>).

²³² Interview with Ambon City Religious Affairs Ministry Office official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²³³ Interview with Ambon City Police official, Ambon, 12 December 2012; see also discussion on provocation in Ambon conflicts in Barron, Azca, and Susdinarjanti (2012).

²³⁴ Interview with a traditional figure, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²³⁵ Interview with Ambonese Human Rights Activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²³⁶ Interview with Maluku inter-faith cooperation activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

The important philosophy behind the tradition of building religious places together is the sense of ownership on the religious places built. Nevertheless, mosques do not only belong to Muslims, but also Christian because they joined the construction. The sense of mutual ownership can become the foundation of mutual care and inter-community respect. The absence of respect for noble values and traditions has clearly eliminated the sense of ownership, sense of togetherness and brotherhood. In line with the above statement, a respondent stated that Muslim community “build mosques”, but no Muslim community member are there. [...] This also must be attended to. Because when building religious places but not recovering social [togetherness], it may become a potential for conflicts.”²³⁷

The last factor that is often considered being able to divide community is the growth of radicalism and strong religious symbolization in Ambon. Radicalism of religious understanding like this tends to oppose another understanding which becomes the Ambonese people’s unifying factor, namely pluralism and multiculturalism.

If in Maluku what we criticize is [the opinion] that we are not Muslim yet if we have not been Arabic yet. Similarly the Christians will feel not being Christians if they haven’t been the Dutch or Western people yet. And the clash of identities is very intensive. The cultural Islam has started to be shifted... The symbols are so strong. One community is showing the *hijab*, while the other community is showing the *shalom* off. It is like *hitting religion*, “This is my religion, that’s is your religion. Let compete which one is stronger!” The Muslim area is called PLO area, and [Christian] is called Israeli area. If you enter a Muslim area, there is always a sentence saying welcome in PLO area. And this things were much founded before the conflict.²³⁸

Islam Arabization and Christian Westernization not only eliminate Ambonese people’s traditional religious culture, but also caused the clash of identity between the two communities to escalate Arabization and Westernization of both religions are very obvious from the increasingly strong use and exposure of religious symbols in public domain. Consequently, cultural diversity of the Mollucan people is marginalized, and the potential for conflicts intensified; moreover if it is followed by competition of religious symbol strengthening in public spaces.

²³⁷ Interview with Ambon Human Rights activist, Ambon 14 December 2012.

²³⁸ Interview with Mollucan inter-faith cooperation activist , Ambon, 15 December 2012.

Post-Conflict Segregation, Violence, and Role of Security Personnel and Leadership

SEGREGATION AND EMERGENCE OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

BACKGROUND OF SEGREGATION

As explained in the previous chapters, one fact that is considered as general knowledge that Maluku including Ambon, historically is a segregated area. Ethno-religiously speaking, there were Dutch Protestant and Catholic groups, native Mollucan Christian and Catholic, Chinese group, Arabic group, native Mollucan Muslim group, and migrant Muslim group from other parts of Indonesia. Geographically, these groups were segregated and settled down in areas where they are ethnically and religiously similar. Eventually, the formation of villages with particular religious group identification became an integral and accepted part of a necessity, so that Muslim villages and Christian villages spread in Ambon area.²³⁹ Below is the visualization of segregated Ambon city in the map. The numbers representing each of the colors were the *range* of number of Muslim or Christian people in the area. The stronger both colors (green and red), the more dense and concentrated were people of both communities in the area/village (see Figure 24 page 143).

The spatial segregation was worsened by the Dutch colonial government policy that provided educational access only to Mollucan Christian and Catholic groups. This was done to prepare local civil servants to support administrative and security tasks. From here was born *ambtenaar* class, in which native Mollucan Christian and Catholic groups were identical to the professions of civil servants and soldiers.²⁴⁰ Another opinion said that in reality there were many Muslim figures who at that time received education from the Dutch, such as Abdullah Solisa (Opa Dullah). Beside that, many Muslims tended to avoid the Dutch education because the curriculum did not contain religious subject and Arabic language subject. However, such condition turned around during the Japanese invasion, in which Muslim groups received more privileges.²⁴¹

In the Dutch colonial period non-Protestant and non-Catholic in Maluku did not get equal treatment. As a result, social segregation becomes the consequences because access to the facilities provided by the colonial government more targeted *ambtenaar* families. The legacy from the *ambtenaar* class causes particular consequences on the job options, although Maluku has been part of Indonesia. Therefore, no wonder, the Christians only wanted to work in formal sector, especially civil servants.²⁴²

After the revolution period of the Indonesian independence, a number of Christian and Catholic group members affiliated to the Dutch emigrated to Netherlands. However, the socio-spatially segregated communities could survive. Inter-community social contract occurred, in which the brotherhood values of *Pela Gandong* becomes the norm that unifies their identity as the Mollucan people. According to a respondent:

Before the conflict, settlements in Maluku had been separated. None was mixed. So for example, Tial, Tulehu, Tengah-Tengah and Waai villages, they are mixed in cities. In Dutch [colonial] period, those who

²³⁹ Interview with Ambon Mayor, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁴⁰ Interview with Mollucan inter-faith cooperation activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁴¹ Interview with GPM Research and Development Head, Ambon, 5 September 2013.

²⁴² Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

wanted to become Christian, they were separated, for instance in Waai atau Hulaliu.... Since long time ago it was like that, while in the city, they mingled.²⁴³

Administratively, some government regulations have increasingly weakened the Mollucan people's cultural defense, such as Law No. 5 Year 1979 on Village Government. Even though the content accommodates and considers village condition and prevailing customary provisions, in practice the Law is considered harming the diversity because of the emphasis on village system uniformity.²⁴⁴ As a result, the people with *negeri* system under kings do not have wider space administratively according to their functions and positions in the eye of the society before the Law was enacted.²⁴⁵

Peaceful segregation without violence that had roots, in which inter-community society lived side by side,²⁴⁶ eventually led to destructive things when big conflicts occurred in Maluku between 1999-2003. Communities have strengthened their ethno-religious identity, especially when external parties outside Maluku were involved in violent conflicts. The big conflicts have affected almost all aspects of life and changed the Mollucan society's life structure, both with Muslim and Christian backgrounds. Before the conflicts, all communities trusted each other. But then, the conflicts changed all of it and caused widespread inter-community distrust.²⁴⁷

After Malino Peace Agreement was signed, negative peace²⁴⁸ could be maintained even though inter-community communications and interaction were not intensively conducted yet.²⁴⁹ Over the time, inter-community interaction started to intensify and trust started to be rebuilt by using holidays' moments or religious regular activities.²⁵⁰ Beside that, in daily activities such as in economic activities, they have mingled.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, post-conflict violence still often occurs. This is worsened by incomplete disclosure of violent cases by the authorities. According to a respondent:

... in my opinion, the problem is not Muslim-Christian [conflict], but only by [actions] of persons. But since the disclosure is not thorough, eventually it is generalized. People think that if the incident happens to a Muslim, then Christian [person] must do the [action]. If the incident in Christian, [...] the one who does it probably a Muslim. This happens because the incident is not well disclosed. We want to say it pure crime; then who does it? Maybe that is the problem for the people.²⁵²

POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND EMERGING VIOLENCE

Given that segregation becomes stronger during and after the conflicts, the condition has made violence likely to occur. As mentioned above, experiences during the conflict time may recur when inter-community violence takes place again. A respondent stated:

²⁴³ Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

²⁴⁴ Interview with Mollucan inter-fait cooperation activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁴⁵ Moreover, if seen from conflict experiences, group members in *negeris* will usually go back if they have traditional land. As a result, even though they experienced several conflicts in which their properties and houses were burned for several times, they would go back because that is their traditional *negeri*.

²⁴⁶ Interview with Moluccas Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012, and with one of peace activists in Ambon, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁴⁷ Interview with one refugee empowerment activist in Ambon, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

²⁴⁸ The "negative" peace concept refers to the idea of Galtung (1972), which means the peace is only limited to the absence of violence.

²⁴⁹ Interview with a refugee in Waringin due to September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁵⁰ Interview with one refugee in Waringin due to September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁵¹ Interview with Ambon City health affair official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁵² Interview with a village head in Ambon, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

In the previous conflict, Muslim community did not go out and remain there, and they formed a force in there (Air Salobar). So, they were in the middle of Christian community. When conflicts occurred Christian people who wanted to pass through Air Salobar had to take sea route on speed boat to go to another Christian area next to Air Salobar. For Air Salobar people who did not go out, if they wanted to go downtown like to Al Fatah Mosque, they had to take sea route on speed boat because they could not pass through their neighboring Christian area. So, when conflicts happened, like 11 September [2011] [conflict], the condition was the same as in the previous 1999 conflict. At that time, (11 September 2011) the border was guarded by the Indonesian Military (TNI). So, Muslim people in Air Salobar had to take speed boats to go to the back of Al Fatah Mosque, while the Christian in Amahusu also had to take speed boats to go to Benteng area. Or they had to turn behind the mountain there in order to go inside Ambon City here.²⁵³

Meanwhile, post-conflict violence was driven by some problems that emerged later on. For instance, uneven development between one community area and the other one.²⁵⁴ Therefore, it cannot be avoided that there would be demand for equal treatment, for instance the construction of facilities for one community must be followed by the construction of similar facilities in the other community. If it is not well considered, such problems are often used by particular parties to get advantage from them.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, in Ambon city there are areas with point of contact which may trigger conflicts, especially in the area where the people are ethnically heterogeneous, like Batu Merah, so that the potential for conflicts is difficult to detect.²⁵⁶

Once again, the intensified post-conflict segregation has contributed and played a particular role in generating violent cases. Field findings show that many post-conflict violent incidents occurred in border areas between Muslim and Christian communities. The following map shows the connection between segregation and post-conflict violent incidents.

According to respondents, there are several things that can trigger violence. *First*, external intervention that confront communities.²⁵⁷ Provocations by external parties can often trigger violence. Nevertheless, due to fostered communications relationship, in some cases, provocative efforts could be handled.

The second is less harmonious relationship between local people and migrants, especially in urban areas. A respondent stated that:

The problem [is] in urban areas because... the people mix with each other,... not really native Ambonese any longer. We as native Ambonese do not have any problem again. But the migrants, both from around Maluku Province or from outside, [are still problematic]. In city centers like Sirimau, Nusaniwe, [there are many migrants there]. Like what we see in Batu Merah, they have mixed with each other.²⁵⁸

Efforts to protect their own interests, both social, economic and political ones, can cause clashes between the group.

Thirdly, continuously-maintained suspicion of different community groups. In some cases, this directly created violence without any initial efforts to clarify the truth of news. A respondent said:

So, the relationship there (Waringin) has been filled with mutual suspicion, not like in the old days. Because the Muslims think that the Christians burned their houses. It's a must, it must be facilitated. The mothers there have proposed a dialog between them so that they have self-restraint and sense of security as well as communications or interaction.²⁵⁹

²⁵³ Interview with one peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁵⁴ Interview with one *imam* in Wayame, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁵⁵ Interview with one Team 20 Wayame member, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁵⁶ Interview with Ambon City Christian figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

Fourthly, border problems which still have potentials for violence. One respondent said:

Borders are borders and we dispute over them. But little was addressed, then dispute started again. This not only destroyed our properties, but also claimed lives. Who did the burning was not only [the people] who [lived] there, but also Muslims from outside.²⁶⁰

Fifthly, easily-mobilized mass. In some cases, easy massive mobilization of people can escalate the potential for violence although the mass of people did not understand too much the cause of an incident. This is the effect of the segregation; although lately with increasingly strong people's defense, the mobilization process will be very measureable so that the conflict will not spread to other areas.²⁶¹

POST-CONFLICT VIOLENT INCIDENTS

In general, violence occurred several times in post-conflict Ambon. Among the violence, there were three big violent incidents that caused big number of victims and damage, namely violence on 25 April 2004, 11 September 2011, and 15 May 2012. However, a brief explanation will only be given to the last two cases given the actuality.

a. The September 11, 2011 Incident

Inter-group violence occurring on 11 September 2011 was triggered by misunderstanding. According to the report by the Traffic Unit of the Ambon and Laese Islands Resort Police, the incident started from the death of a Waihaong motorcycle taxi driver, Darwis Saiman. It was further reported that:

Darwis had a traffic accident in Gunung Nona area on Saturday night and was helped by Tatuhey family who took him to the hospital, but Darwis died on the way to hospital.²⁶²

The incident is in accordance with the incident chronological report by the Police Headquarters.²⁶³

The death of Darwis then triggered suspicion and assumption among the community group that the Muslim victim was killed by Christians. Because of the assumption and suspicion, violence broke out between Muslim and Christian groups. According to the police report, in the incident 3 died,²⁶⁴ 24 heavily injured and 65 slightly injured.²⁶⁵ Another report said that people's houses in Waringin and Mardika were burned.²⁶⁶ Relating to the burnings of people's houses, a respondent explained:

Mardika as *katong* (we) call is "wick," every time there is a conflict, it burns. If the Muslim community houses in other areas are burned and they cannot take revenge, then the revenge will be in Mardika to get

²⁶⁰ Interview with Mardika Christian refugee, victim from September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁶¹ Interview with Ambon City Christian church figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁶² Traffic Unit Head of Ambon And Lease Islands Resort Police, AKP (Captain) Marinus Djati Antara.com, 11 September 2011 (<http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/275130/gubernur-maluku-pastikan-ambon-sudah-tenang>).

²⁶³ Head of Public Relations Division, Indonesian Police Headquarters, Inspector General Anton Bachrul Alam, 11 September 2011 (<http://regional.kompas.com/read/2011/09/11/19145665/Kronologi.Kerusuhan.Ambon>).

²⁶⁴ Then it was reported that seven people died (<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2011-09-14/korban-tewas-kerusuhan-ambon-menjadi-7-orang/93306>).

²⁶⁵ Head of Public Relationship Division, Indonesian Police Headquarters, Inspector General Anton Bachrul Alam, 12 September 2011 (<http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/09/12/340/501602/korban-kerusuhan-ambon-tewas-akibat-luka-tembak>).

²⁶⁶ <http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/09/12/340/501614/seratusan-rumah-hangus-warga-ambon-mengungsi>; and interview with a village head, 15 May 2013.

even. Mardika is like with Waringin, both are border areas. If there is a clash in any place, both location will be the revenge sites.²⁶⁷

According to one respondent who is village level official, some handling measures were taken by relevant parties:

At that time, the incident occurred at night, here. On the 12th we could not go in, then we [held] meeting with the Governor and all stakeholders, both from city and provincial levels. Then, on the 13th I went it, even though they really hated people from Kudamati because they always became attention.²⁶⁸

From the aspects of violence handling and prevention after the September 11, 2011 conflict, one respondent mentioned some measures taken:

After the September 11, 2011 riot we took some approaches to the people so that even after the riot, the communities could still mingled. In reality there was no problem inside. Maybe in the time of the conflict each of them returned to their communities. Usually the problem comes from outside. The last thing we did was to construct permanent posts. So far there have been BKO posts, but they use people's house. But since there were already four incidents, there were huge concerns from the people. The resort police is really nearby, [but] during the conflict yesterday, there was distrust among the people to the resort police that what happens now is [the need for] Indonesian Military/TNI posts. After the September 11, there have been permanent posts now, the sense of security has recovered.

b. The May 11, 2012 Incident

The violence on May 15, 2012 occurred at the celebration of the National Hero Day of Thomas Matulesy alias Pattimura. The clash occurred at around 05.30 WIT.²⁶⁹ The incident started when the Batu Merah village people took a torch relay from the torch burning place in Saniri, Tuhahan village, Saparua, Central Maluku, to Ambon City. However, one kilometer from the border of Batu Merah Village–Mardika, a group of Mardika young people blockaded the torch relay group and asked them to give the torch to be taken by the Mardika young people to the Pattimura Park. The blockade incident eventually ended up with inter-youth violence,²⁷⁰ which caused 3 houses and 5 motorcycles burned.²⁷¹ According to the Ambon City Health Office report and Maluku Provincial Health Office report, the violence caused 34 people to be hospitalized and other 44 people to receive outpatient treatment.²⁷²

According to a respondent, the May 15, 2012 violence implies some unfinished problems in the society:

... of course there are unfinished problems in the community on the historical context, because there is difference between the written history and oral history in the society. The Government does not settle the difference thoroughly so that this becomes continuous problem in the society... about the claim if Pattimura is Christian or Muslim. So far the discussions about rectifying the history have always been ignored by the government.²⁷³

²⁶⁷ Interview with Mardika Christian refugee on September 11, 2011 riot.

²⁶⁸ Interview with a village head, 15 May 2013.

²⁶⁹ Report from Merdeka.com (<http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tiga-rumah-dibakar-dalam-kerusuhan-di-ambon.html>)

²⁷⁰ Report from Tempo.co (<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/05/15/058403959/Sekelompok-Pemuda-Dicegat-Kota-Ambon-Tegang>)

²⁷¹ Head of Public Relationship Division of Mollucan Local Police AKBP (Lieut.Col) Johanis Huwae (<http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tiga-rumah-dibakar-dalam-kerusuhan-di-ambon.html>).

²⁷² <http://penanggulangankrisis.depkes.go.id/article/view/6/1630/KONFLIK-SOSIAL-DI-DELI-SERDANG.htm>.

²⁷³ Interview with a peace activist, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

The unfinished historical problem, along with other social problems between the post-conflict Ambonese community groups can trigger the emergence of inter-community violence. Similar incidents once happened before, between two other communities, but did not end up with violence.

There was information from friends that Mardika wanted to take the torch. It happened long time ago. Once, Suli did not want to give the torch to Passo and asked Passo to step back, but Passo did not want to. The King of Passo said: “*Why* should I step back? But if Suli wants to take the torch to Ambon, just do it, but no one will go home.” That *was* horrible too. Like it or not, the torch had to be passed. Every year the problem is the same.²⁷⁴

Like in the previous violent incidents, some parties believed that the violence was a product of engineering by particular parties who had agenda to make Ambon insecure. A respondent stated:

The incident was intentionally played by particular persons; that the Mardika people wanted to take the torch. The connotation is that the Mardika is Christian and Batu Merah is Muslim. Since I was a kid, the torch has been taken to Ambon City not by Mardika people, but the torch has been taken into the city by Batu Merah[people]. Not only because of traditional village, but the advice has been there, the torch is taken from Tulehu as far as Ambon, through what village, they (Batu Merah people) who take it.... There was no information from other stakeholders, soldiers, and police about the incident. It must be played by particular parties. The only one who knows it is intelligence. It is impossible for us to know. In reality, the riot was not in Batu Merah or Mardika, but in Galala and Hatiwe Kecil there. After all police has run up there, so the chaos occurred here.²⁷⁵

c. Responses on Both Violent Incidents

In response to both violent incidents above, a respondent expressed a suspicion that all was engineered to occur. According to this person:

There was a group playing there, but there must be something to prove their presence at that time. Like after the September 11, some bomb throws occurred for several times in some areas. Some groups were playing there. Then, a grenade throw occurred in Pattimura Day on May 15. [When] the perpetrator was caught, we knew that Wakano–Manuputy group captured in Latu–Hualoy was the player. They were products from Poso. There was another group. Beside that, dissemination of information using rotary formula and the others has become part of segregation factors.²⁷⁶

The suspicion above was supported by opinions from some respondents stating that the violent incidents were the engineering of external parties who wanted to make Ambon insecure. According to a respondent, this can be seen from the actions and economic motives done by a group of people so that the conflict is sustained:

... like the intentional circulation of photos in order that the conflict occur again. People can use conflicts as business opportunity... [...] but the impact is on the society.²⁷⁷

Both cases above also shows that Ambon is still vulnerable to the emerging violence which is sometimes triggered by unclear news and small inter-community problems which can escalate into huge violent incidents that claimed lives and properties.

²⁷⁴ Interview with a village head, 15 May 2013.

²⁷⁵ Interview with a village head, 15 May 2013.

²⁷⁶ Interview with Mollucan Christian church figure, 13 December 2012.

²⁷⁷ Interview with Team 20 Wayame Village member, 13 December 2012

THE ROLE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL IN HANDLING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

THE ROLE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL IN THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 RIOT

Although security personnel were on guard, burnings still occurred in Waringin. Some community members reported the burnings and proactively asked for guards from the security personnel, but it was not immediately responded.²⁷⁸ The following is the witness from a respondent:

Near Air Mata Cina[village]. All of it had the same location. It was close to the resort police; starting from there, Waringin was burned. Before that, there were mothers asking for guarding support to the resort police but it was not realized. The reason was that all police officers were deployed to SBB for securing the installation of the regent. There was military dormitory in there. They were asked [for guarding support], but the answer was: no coordination yet. The time range between midday after midday prayer until 4 o'clock it was burned, at 6 the troop came in. [The riot] ended at that time already. In the evening is *Mardika's* turn. There was a friend named Stanley, when his house was set on fire, he was still calling us. He went to the local police for several times, asking for guard support because Waringin was on fire. It is usual that both places become the targets. He asked for several times, but no security personnel came. Until the dawn, [still] burned.²⁷⁹

Absence of response from the security personnel related to the violence and burnings by a group of people made the people distrust the security personnel. Ironically, the burning location was very close to the resort police office so that there was a perception among the people that the presence or absence of the security personnel did not contribute anything to violence prevention. Beside that, there was accusation of letting the violence happen, either through intelligence party being inoperative or security personnel doing nothing.²⁸⁰

According to some respondents, the reason stated by the security personnel to the people for their slowness was the need for coordination between security guards. Their coordination took long time and eventually do much harm to the people, because when the security personnel came, the situation was already late; the violence claimed lives, properties were damaged.²⁸¹ In some cases, many security members even left their guard post when the violence started to break out.²⁸²

No wonder if many parties blamed security personnel on the occurrence of the violence. An Ambon city government official, for instance, firmly stated that the big mistake was on the police side so that the September 11, 2011 incident took place.²⁸³ This was seen from the difference between the statement made by the police and the facts that people got, for instance, concerning the cause of the death of a violence victim.²⁸⁴ Therefore, decreased trust among the people in the security personnel—in this case the Police—could not be avoided.²⁸⁵ Another factor that lowered people's trust is the fault of the police for doing anticipatory measures against violence. This occurred because the Local Police was considered not having enough knowledge on the anatomy of the Ambonese conflicts so that it

²⁷⁸ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012; and with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁷⁹ Interview with Mollucan Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁸⁰ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012; with Mollucan Christian church figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012; and with one Ambonese academician and peace activist, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁸¹ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 12 December 2012, and with *Mardika* Christian refugee, victim of the September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁸² Interview with *Mardika* Christian refugee, victim of the September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁸³ Interview with Ambon City Government senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

could not identify which area is the most prone to violence and must be isolated.²⁸⁶ Beside that, security personnel were regarded not to take effective actions to prevent the violence as they did in the big conflict time, such as minimizing mass mobilization to prevent inter-group clash from happening.²⁸⁷

Even though there were many criticisms on the security personnel's responses, there was a respondent who gave appreciation to the quick actions taken by the personnel to settle the violence, given the fact that Ambon is a post-conflict area.²⁸⁸ The quick security personnel anticipation to violence could overcome old-time issues which were being raised by a certain group who wanted to trigger the conflict.²⁸⁹

PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT

One thing that is worth considering in handling violence is the acceptance of particular security personnel rather than another security personnel. In some cases, police were less accepted and trusted by the people, so that the Indonesian Military personnel were deployed eventually.²⁹⁰ There was a perception in some communities that the Indonesian Military could act fast because of the response from the previous Local Military Commander in addressing people's reports.²⁹¹

Nevertheless, in some cases, the deployment of the Indonesian Military personnel could not be accepted because the people thought that the occurring violence was related to the people's security and order (*Kamtibnas*) which is the police's duty. Beside that, their area was not a military emergency area so that Indonesian Military involvement cannot be justified.²⁹² However, some community members did not reject the presence of the Indonesian Military's *BKO*, because this could overcome the issue of personnel unavailability which became the police's reason for being unable to respond to people's report.²⁹³ Concerning the *BKO*, a respondent said:

If the *BKO* here is under the command of the Local Military Command. Here the sectors have been divided, so if there is a conflict, each [troop] is already on *stand by* in their own sectors. The *BKO* in Waringin guards until the 500 meter radius. In Talake they secured the place around the radius. While [area] behind Warinin is secured by the Cavalry. If a mass of people gather, *beta* (I) will contact the head of neighborhood unit (*RT*), religious leader there, and ask where the people come from. If the mass of people come from Waringin, then community leaders, *RT* will take care of it. But if the mass of people are from outside, it will be taken care by the security personnel under coordination with the local leader and *RT*.²⁹⁴

Appointment of the *BKO* from the Indonesian Military for the guarding purpose as well as cooperation with grass-root leaders is considered fairly efficient in dealing with the emerging violence. Despite the fact that the people start to ask the existence, the Indonesian Military personnel under *BKO* are still needed to deal with security issues, given that information quickly circulates in the community.²⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the Local Military Commander stated that *BKO* was still needed because of some reasons, namely (1) conflict locations are located in outlying islands, (2) the presence

²⁸⁶ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁸⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activist, 15 December 2012; and with Mollucan Christian church leader, Ambon, 15 December 2012

²⁸⁸ Interview with youth organization leader, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁸⁹ Interview with one peace motivator, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁹⁰ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Interview with a village head, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ Interview with peace activist, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

²⁹⁵ Interview with Latupati traditional figure, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

of personnel can improve people's economy, (3) request from regent or local government, and (4) so that the soldiers can understand the local culture of other regions.²⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the presence of TNI's *BKO* does give an impression that the area is still not secure yet.²⁹⁷ Even some parties question the presence of *BKO* because they suspect that Ambon City is perceived and conditioned to be not secure so that *BKO* is still required.²⁹⁸ Such accusation of the conditioning was denied by a military official in Ambon because according to him the *BKO* existence in Ambon and Maluku in general was based on the mandate and request from the people through the House of Representatives.²⁹⁹

Even though the *BKO* existence is still deemed necessary, one respondent stated:

During the clash, the military troop came in, which was the *BKO*, but it turned out although guarded, there were houses burned. We can also say, the personnel also [has] projects or how? We really want safety and to live, why do we have to fight again and again? *BKO* always does not take actions on the grounds that there was no order. So, if there is clash, they are just *stand-by*. But if the houses are burned already and they still wait for command, the burning will continue. The *BKO* personnel asked us to step back, then all of a sudden smokes went up and our houses were burned. What we wanted at that time was a blockade or prevention from people coming in. This happened not only in the night, but also in the clear morning. If we are asked to step back, then our house get damaged or burned. And that happened repeatedly in 1999, 25 April 2004, 11 September 2011, and 15 May 2012.³⁰⁰

Some criticisms in general are addressed to the Indonesian Military institution. In some cases, the Indonesian Military personnel did not do anything when violence occurred. According to a respondent, the Indonesian Military members only gave advice and made documentation on the violence. In a case it was told how the Indonesian Military members who passed through an area being hit by violence laughed when they saw community members run for their lives.³⁰¹ Another criticism is related to the involvement of the Indonesian Military personnel in the attack of civilian's house, like in Poka.³⁰² The emergence of negative opinions is closely related to the assumption that the involvement of the Indonesian military in guarding Ambon was not right because in Ambon there are no armed separatist movement like in Papua, for instance.³⁰³

SECURITY PERSONNEL'S INVOLVEMENT AND PARTIALITY

Allegations on the involvement of security personnel in triggering violence fairly spread among the community members and have a long history in the conflict dynamics in Ambon. Some academic studies show that security personnel from both communities were indicated to get involved and/or play certain role in worsening the communal conflicts. However, until today the problem do not need handling and legal process has never been taken against those involved.³⁰⁴

People's suspicion on the security personnel's involvement in and the partiality in the conflict and violence are also caused by the history of conflicts and violence in the Maluku. A respondent stated:

The military personnel came in the big conflict and were indicated to help the Muslims. The mobile brigade (*Brimob*) personnel came and were indicated to help the Christian. In the previous [riot] that was [the

²⁹⁶ Interview with Mollucan peace activist and with Mollucan Christian church leader, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Mardika Christian refugees, victimized by the September 11, 2012 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

²⁹⁸ Interview with one Unpatti leader, 16 May 2013.

²⁹⁹ Interview with Mollucan military official, 17 May 2013.

³⁰⁰ Interview with Mardika Christian refugees, victims of September 11, 2012 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³⁰¹ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁰² Interview with Mollucan Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³⁰³ Interview with one Ambonese refugee empowerment activist, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³⁰⁴ See Azca (2006); Suaedy (2000).

situation]. So, no wonder if the Christians really hated the Indonesian Military and the Muslims really hated the Mobile Brigade.³⁰⁵

Such claim was supported by another respondent who stated that the person believed more on the Mobile Brigade rather than the Indonesian Military because the person happened to come from the Christian community.³⁰⁶ Some respondents who are refugees also stated firmly that “[In] every incident in Mardika, security personnel always sided with, both police and soldiers. In the incidents, we were asked to step back while they let them move forward.”³⁰⁷

As post-conflict area, Ambon is a violence-prone area so that troop deployment has been an inevitable issue. If the troop deployment is organized in an operation, the financial implication is real—every security personnel deployed here will get additional income whose funding is taken from the local budget. This is what some people believed as a respondent stated:

So like a conditioning.... so that operations are conducted. When there is operation it[means] money. That's the way to get money in Ambon... [like] Mutiara Operation [for the purpose of] recovery. From April to May... the Mutiara Operation [was executed, so that] there were helicopters everywhere. Because there was operation, there was money. Then the money was taken from the local budget—the local government paid for the security personnel... Seven billion also for Mutiara Operation. Then each personnel got only 50 thousand, multiplied by how many police personnel. If it was only for April 25, that was it; the local government money was used up for paying the operation.³⁰⁸

Therefore, no wonder if an official in Ambon has this assumption that the security institution wants the conflict to get bigger for their personal benefits.³⁰⁹ The existence of conflicts can offer opportunities for security personnel to get financial benefits through guarding and rescue actions which require big funds.³¹⁰ The motivation of the security institution to maintain conflicts for financial purposes has been the concern among all parties, because this will eventually given burden to the budget of the local government which cannot finance post-conflict development activities any longer.³¹¹

EVALUATION ON PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE IN DISCLOSING VIOLENT CLASES

One thing that becomes the attention of the people is security personnel's performance in disclosing violent cases in Ambon. So far the people have only gotten information that a case was being investigated, but the follow-up investigation that ends up in the court almost never happens.³¹² According to a respondent, unfinished investigation is caused by:

It was said that there was consideration that if [the perpetrator] was caught, the problem would spread. But if the perpetrator was not caught, such problem will continue as there was no a lesson, even though the action has cause many people to suffer.³¹³

Unfinished disclosure of violent cases is signaled due to the security personnel's partiality. According to a respondent:

³⁰⁵ Interview with an Ambon City Government senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁰⁶ Interview with a Christian pedicab driver, 22 May 2013.

³⁰⁷ Interview with Mardika Christian refugee, victim of September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³¹⁰ Interview with Mollucan Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

³¹¹ Interview with one Ambonese refugee empowerment activist, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³¹² Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³¹³ Ibid.

The Resort Police also once said, recently, it was very hard to settle the conflicts in Ambon. Because they side with one component or community, both Muslims or Christians. The people suspected the police like that. Because we once asked the Police before the Waringin incident, like Unpatti and Batu Gantung cases, and they replied it was hard to carry out investigation to the cases.³¹⁴

Another respondent also explained the roles of law enforcers and security personnel:

So what can we say then? All solutions are not clear. In my opinion, what kind of solution should be taken? We already met the District Military Commander, Resort Police Head, and also the Local Police Head, [reporting] about Kudamati driver who died here. We were also accused of; they said the Waihaong people killed the driver. If the murderer was really Waihaong people, I would be the front-line person who would help hand over the killer. I said that in the meeting with the security personnel. Also I said, “You have many intelligence staff don’t you, I permit them to come in to find out who killed him.” But until now, what is the proof? None has been revealed.... I once proposed to the Resort Police Head when he came in here, I said, “If you want to normalize the route, you must be very careful, Sir.” At that time a Kudamati public van entered this place, then it was chased by the people here. So you must be careful. But *insyaallah* (God’s willing) I guarantee it, by chance the current Local Police Deputy is from Waihaong, maybe possible, maybe possible to normalize the route.³¹⁵

From the police’s perspectives, prevention and handling of such violent cases encountered many obstacles. For prevention, although the police have conducted isolation to the waves of people, inter-group fights may get bigger and end up with burnings. This is partly caused by old-time trauma that show up again.³¹⁶ To disclose violent cases, a respondent said:

About the exchanged throws, it was the mass of people[who did it]. From the legal aspect, we are challenged with witness’ statement. Usually the witness that we ask does not want to talk. So if the case is related to the mass of people, we usually use the heaviest article to snare the persons, like what is resulted from the action. But we do need a witness, to [reveal] the case that involves mass of people. But here the people do not want to get involved if it deal with the police. So difficult is it, [the solution]? If the cases are like that, both parties like to claim that they are wrong, we are right, or vice versa. Or the witnesses that we ask are actually present in the location, but when we later ask, the witnesses say they don’t know. It is true that we have to take pressure initiatives so that the cases can be processed. The exchanged throws is common here in Ambon, but we see the resulting effects—either material [losses] or lives?—we will round them up.³¹⁷

The respondent stated that limited public participation in revealing violent cases, especially in giving witness, makes it very difficult for law enforcers’ movement in revealing those cases although initial investigation is executed initially. Law enforcers are aware that if they do not execute investigative efforts, they will receive public complaints.

Like the September 11, 2011 case, the perpetrators were the mass of people. But as I said earlier, we have done initial examinations, because we were afraid of being complained of not being responsive.... We have examined some witnesses, but many of them said they did not know. Even though we also wanted to examine the witnesses in the place they felt secure, compared to coming to the police station. But, like I said, they said they did not know and blame each other party.³¹⁸

From the statement of the respondents, a conclusion may be withdrawn that cooperation with law enforcers and the people is absolutely required to disclose violent cases. However, this cooperation still faces many obstacles. Therefore, more intensive approaches by law enforcing institution may seemingly enhance public participation in solving violent cases.

³¹⁴ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³¹⁵ Interview with a Waihaong public van (Lin 3), Ambon, 15 May 2013.

³¹⁶ Interview with Ambon and Lease Island Resort Police official, 23 May 2013

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

Relating to border area development, the construction of permanent security posts in the areas also become an important agenda. The construction of security posts in border areas, which are always identical to the violence and conflicts, is expected to be able to consistently prevent and reduce potentials for conflicts. But more than that, if the occurrence of violence and conflicts is really expected to be prevented, the local development should not focus only on the aspects of public facilities and security posts, but also the economic and the surrounding people's welfare aspects. Therefore, economic problems are often one important thing in the cycle of conflict roots.³¹⁹ Nevertheless, the construction of security posts still generates particular debates among Ambonese society's groups.

The people who live in border areas, for instance Waringin, tend to want the presence of permanent posts with some BKO soldiers there. Even in the Waringin context, the people independently widened and constructed the post. More than that, they also emphasized that they preferred and trusted BKO troops than the police.³²⁰ The trust in the soldiers more than in the police is also identified in Waihaong people. The soldiers are considered being more organized, faster and more responsive in handling violent cases in Ambon.³²¹

Nevertheless, in the context of September 11, 2011 riot some people who live in Waringin turned out to have opposite opinions. The presence of BKO did not give much contribution—they almost did not give assistance and only watched it.³²² When the violence broke out, the Mollucan Governor gathered all stakeholders and decided to build posts in border areas. However, there were some problems that would emerge if the posts were constructed. The first was the development fund for the post construction. The second was the pros and cons related to the construction among the people's elements. The third is issues related to the origins of the BKO personnel of whom the majority are from Java and Sumatra.

Another segment of Ambonese people, especially academicians, believed that the presence of BKO soldiers would not make Ambon condition secure and conducive but will only create chaotic situations. They opinioned that the people did not need BKO soldiers even though military party find the people still need their presence. The security tasks should be given to the police, instead of soldiers who are earmarked more precisely for war conditions. Beside that, similar to the previous opinion, soldiers coming from outside Ambon are often assumed to bring doctrines, ideology and behaviors that are different from those of the Ambonese community. In other words, such concerns basically emerge due to many soldiers not knowing the characteristics of the Ambonese people.³²³

People's partiality to BKO soldiers, as in the context of Waai village, is more caused by the closeness between BKO soldiers and the people. They tended to construct the posts in the center of the people, joined to construct religious place, collective work, etc. Meanwhile, the existence of the police office is relatively further. In this case, the problem lies more on the infrastructure construction and approach of security personnel in fostering intimacy with the people.

The Mollucan National Commission on Human Rights has organized a public discussion in 2011 on the issue of additional number of BKO soldiers which engages almost all segments of the society. The conclusion of the discussion emphasized, as mentioned by the chair, Ot Lawalata, that the addition to the number of BKO soldiers by the Mollucan Provincial Government was not wanted by the people because the presence of BKO soldiers was considered only making the people's trauma preserved. Beside that, the addition to the number of BKO soldiers will reconfirm that Maluku was not secure, comfortable and peaceful. Not only the discussion participants, the Mollucan Regional Legislative Council (DPRD) has expressed its rejection to the addition to the number of BKO

³¹⁹ Interview with one Mardika Christian refugee in September 11, 2011, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³²⁰ Interview with the people and street vendors in Waringin, Ambon, 20 May 2013.

³²¹ Interview with motorcycle taxi driver and street vendors in Waihaong, Ambon, 15 May 2013.

³²² Interview with one university student and activist in border areas, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³²³ Interview with one Unpatti leader, Ambon, 16 May 2013.

soldiers. For the Mollucan DPRD, the addition to the number of BKO will make Maluku increasingly terrifying.³²⁴

FACTORS OF LEADERSHIP, HARMONY AND POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

The leadership aspect is an integral part of the initiatives to maintain the harmony and prevent post-conflict violence. In general, leadership can be divided into three groups, namely the leadership of religious figures, the leadership of local leaders, and the leadership of traditional figures.

LEADERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES

The participation of religious leaders in the efforts to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence in Ambon is a necessity, given their strategic position in the society. Nevertheless, the participation still cannot prevent violence that claims lives yet.³²⁵ For the Christian community, efforts to prevent violence from spreading are supported by the centralized church leadership over the congregation. One respondent said:

Our command to the people is still listened to. I have a dialog with Muslim colleagues. They have limited figures to control [mass of people]... it's different from us. Some incidents could have gotten bigger if we did not ask them not to get provoked, [and] we handed it to the legal process. For instance, on May 15, most of the victims came from us. That was a big reaction at that time, but we said, "Don't! if we get provoked, we will lose again in the whole process we are doing. The players will be happy to see it." [In] the incident where Kudamati public van driver was stabbed, in the morning there [would be] a huge reaction [from the Christian community]. But we told them, "If we go into it, we will fail again: the player will be happy since they know how to fish." We were not sure if Muslims did the stabbing, not sure if the bomb thrower was Muslim, but there were people, either Christian or who was paid to so that we would fight each other. The large number of masses from the upper side (Christian areas) on May 15 [was] only a reaction—sometimes they just went to see, then [it looked] like concentration of masses.³²⁶

The Church's centralized leadership role becomes very strategic because with this, the synod leaders could be more effective in fostering communications with the masses or the society. This is done, for instance, to respond any violent incidents. A respondent stated:

Pastors and the assembly would go down to the congregation. It is my experience; when there was that conflict, we communicated it to the Church Leader, "Reverend, there is a group and mobilization of masses." So, the leader would communicate with the Synod. For instance, "Reverend, a throwing is happening here." We usually communicate this. As congregation, we cannot communicate with security personnel, or Local Police Head or Resort Police Head. So we communicate with the Assembly Chair or GPM Synod Head. Then the Synod Head will communicate with the Local Police Head, Local Military Commander, or Military Resort Commander. Well, after the September 11, (2011) incident there was an incident in Air Mata Cina where Muslims' houses got burned, approximately in October 2011. So, from there, we would communicate directly to the Church Leader.³²⁷

Given the huge masses and Christian congregation in Maluku being under the church coordination, the appeal from the church leadership is usually influential.³²⁸ The reason for this obedience is based on two things; not only because pastors are regarded as figures who convey God's words to the congregation, they also give services to the congregation, for instance by visiting congregations who are having family problems, and providing spiritual support. Therefore, when a pastor says something,

³²⁴ Siwalima.com., "Gubernur Diminta Batalkan Rencana Tambah TNI BKO," 11 October 2011. Taken from http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/gubernur_diminta_batalkan_rencana_tambah_tni_bko, on 25 November 2013.

³²⁵ Interview with a Mardika Christian refugee, victim of September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³²⁶ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³²⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³²⁸ Ibid.; Ibid.

the words will be listened to and followed by the congregation.³²⁹ According to a respondent's claim, for instance, if a church leader did not directly calm down the group of masses after the May 15 clash, the big conflict would happen again in Ambon. This may happen because church congregation has high fanaticism and strong root in church communities.³³⁰

In building communications with community members who are not active in church activities and very prone to commit violent actions, Christian figures also attempt for any approach. A respondent stated:

Not all Christians frequently go to church and not all Muslims go to mosque. I said to pastor colleagues that these people had to be embraced and asked to join religious services. They seldom go to church, but if something happens, their responses are bigger than the others—as if they wanted to defend church, even though defending church should not take that way. Defending [the] religion is by living good values. Even God does not need defending. Our task is really hard for this, [to raise awareness] among them who are in the streets.³³¹

The influence of church leaders over the congregation is admitted as one thing deeply useful in coordination efforts to prevent violence. This similar thing is unfortunately difficult to be built within the Muslim communities, due to various congregation's affiliations to Islamic leaders and organizations. This makes people's initiatives more dominant in the Muslim communities.³³² Nevertheless, Muslim leaders also do efforts to deaden flush of emotions and prevent violence. According to a respondent:

If our position at that time kept on cooling down the congregation [so that] they were not provoked—it meant, through religious sermons, television, newspapers, and through other occasions such as wedding advice, parties in the community.³³³

Besides the approach through informal forums, formal approach through education is also taken. The main goal is to calm down the emotion of the easily-provoked young people. Education is a very strategic part because it also takes part in preparing the young generation that can build their areas in the future.³³⁴

Cooperation among religious leaders is absolutely required to foster inter-community communications. However, some respondents regretted the lack in meetings of religious leaders which had been previously done frequently. These religious leaders have a strategic role in providing directions to their own communities.³³⁵ If available, the forum is usually sponsored by the local government.³³⁶ Therefore, reactivation of dialog forums with support from the local government and the community initiatives should be enhanced.

Inter-religious leaders forum should be followed by formal cooperation among religious institutions. The engagement of religious organizations can help disseminate peace values to religious congregations that have different religious organization affiliations. Nevertheless, efforts to build inter-institution relationship are not that easy. A respondent stated:

³²⁹ Interview with Mollucan Christian church figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³³⁰ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and Mollucan Christian figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³³¹ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³³² Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³³³ Interview with Ambon City religious affair official, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

³³⁴ Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³³⁵ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³³⁶ Interview with a village head, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

We can build institutional relationship with MUI. [For] individual relationship, I can contact Muslim figures for this... Institutionally, MUI and church are different. MUI is not structural institution existing until the grass-root level. If churches from the synod talk to their congregations, it is still one [voice], so does the Catholic church. So that, process in Lata runs well. It is different in Batu Merah; who can be relied on?³³⁷

Another respondent mentioned, MUI difficulty in participating in peace building is caused by the fact that MUI does not have structure or apparatus down to the grass-root level.³³⁸ Beside that, another problem that prevents MUI's movement from building dialogs between religious groups is the attitude that forbids pluralism. However, according to the respondent, the sermons' themes for MUI are arranged in such a way that they can give understanding among the people on the importance of bridging differences in order that peace is sustained. Meanwhile, for social movements, still according to the same respondent, what needs to get attention is Muhammadiyah because they are established in the education field, starting from Preschool, Elementary School, Junior High School to Senior High School.³³⁹

For young generation, a Muslim figure stated the importance of developing morals to prevent violence from recurring. The development consists of materials on peace, morals and faith. Beside that, it is necessary to build awareness to localize a violent incident so that young people from other areas are not involved in the violence.³⁴⁰ According to another respondent, engagement of seniors with the conflicting youth groups is required to prevent and stop violence.³⁴¹ This is because:

... seniors have emotional approach with their juniors and the process will surely happen. However, argumentation conveyed by the seniors, even if they can be accommodated, depends on the content. If it is good, we can accept because it is impossible seniors tell to just fight it. If the purpose is right and can be accommodated, then we can sit together, and we discuss it and decide it together and it is finished.³⁴²

From the finding above, it cannot be ignored that religious leaders still hold important roles in keeping peace and preventing inter-community violence from recurring. This is also reflected from an experience of a respondent when the September 11, 2011 incident happened. The respondent told:

In the first day, we took refuge in a mosque [...] near the house. Then, there were persons from outside Ahuru who had a big house. Then we stayed there for three days. We then returned when the King of Batu Merah went up to Petro, meeting with the pastor, then they disseminated information through church's loud speaker so that the people were not provoked and it was done too by the mosque's imam there. After that, we returned to our homes.³⁴³

LEADERSHIP OF LOCAL AND TRADITIONAL FIGURES

Local figures who hold positions both formal and informal ones, have important influence within the society. Even religious difference between the leaders and the people does not prevent them from doing their jobs without any discrimination.³⁴⁴ The leaders are in the Muslim and Christian communities, and actively participate in conflict-deadening initiative.³⁴⁵

³³⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian church secretary, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³³⁸ Interview with one IAIN lecturer, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³³⁹ Interview with one IAIN lecturer, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³⁴⁰ Interview with mosque's imam in Kebun Cengkeh, 21 May 2013.

³⁴¹ Interview with committees and members of Ambonese Muslim university student organizations, Ambon 15 May 2013.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Interview with one university student and community activist, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³⁴⁴ Interview with one Waringin Muslim refugee, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁴⁵ Interview with one Ambonese youth figure, 17 December 2012.

As an example, one Ambon City official was not reluctant to go to the field to calm down the people, although openly expressed his fear of being a victim of wrong shooting by security personnel.³⁴⁶ Beside that, ethnicity-based community figures also have key roles in influencing the communities, especially for political interest. This can be seen in the migrant community figures which benefit from having communities with a big number of members, such as in Waiheru, Waihaong, Talake, Batu Merah, Wara, and Ahuru areas.³⁴⁷

A respondent expressed an opinion on the Ambonese people's shifting point of view on traditional institutions. According to this person:

In general [participation of traditional institutions] still becomes a test because traditional leadership is not quite effective in overcoming various internal conflicts. This indicates that there has been actually a big shift in leadership orientation system within the society. So the people now actually live multi-values and multi-identities. It is proven that various local conflicts perceived as inter-village/inter-kampong, the traditional institutions cannot effectively settle them, [so that] they need security personnel, require local governments. But this reflects that the people have changed and they do not obey the traditional institutions.³⁴⁸

Beside that, traditional issues are often used by political elites to get legitimacy as representatives that intend to fight for the interest of particular traditional group even though this is actually just a maneuver so that they are selected as public officials or members of legislative bodies in the election. Beside that, traditional leaders are sometimes suspected of having economic motives in the traditional settlement of inter-group conflicts in the traditional society.³⁴⁹

Given the sociological aspect of the Mollucan people that still hold cultural tie, traditional leaders also have strategic roles in keeping peace and preventing violence.³⁵⁰ They do this by issuing announcement and disseminating it to the general public. Beside that, according to a respondent:

We did coordination with the Mayor for a meeting.... Here there were also MUI, GPM Synod, Catholics, but the functions were different. They made appeals to the congregations in the church, mosque, but we are traditional [institutions] including kings. Religious figures, pastors from Christianity and *imams* from Islam and we had discussion and immediately gave announcement to the people So, yesterday we took more roles [although] they also took a role... They made appeals, but we can get down to the grass-root level—*Latupati*—... We are, *Latupati*, could reach down. Including our brothers from other areas; they are here actually must obey our local tradition and culture.³⁵¹

One of the power sources of the local figures and institutions is easy consolidation so that traditional villages are more easily handled.³⁵² Nevertheless, despite big roles, traditional leaders must face some challenges. *Firstly*, lack in their legitimacy in the areas whose demographic characteristics are plural. A respondent stated:

In Ambon City, areas of contact can trigger conflict, because if in traditional *negeris* it is very easy to organize them, but Ambon City [...] the people have mixed with each other, so that we cannot detect any longer. For instance Batu Merah. I communicated with Batu Merah King, "Sir, we have things to deal with." But the King answered, "Sir, the people in Mardika (market) area and down to the lower areas cannot be controlled by us because they are not native Batu Merah."³⁵³

³⁴⁶ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁴⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activists, Ambon, 11 December 2012.

³⁴⁸ Interview with one FISIP lecturer at Unpatti, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ Interview with one Ambon peace activist, Ambon, 13 December 2012; and with Ambon City Resort Police official, 13 December 2012.

³⁵¹ Interview with *Latupati* Council traditional figure, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³⁵² Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and secretary to Mollucan Christian church figure, 15 December 2012.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*

Weak legitimacy in heterogeneous areas makes traditional leaders work hard to convince the people that local tradition needs to be considered in the conflict solution. The legitimacy issue is also caused by weak charisma of the kings among their people, so that their decisions may receive opposition and resistance. More than that, the kings are not immune from violent efforts conducted by the people against them. In several cases, the kings eventually have to obey to their people's desire.³⁵⁴

Secondly, many traditional leaders are suspected of being involved in political practices so that they cannot represent their traditional people. This, according to a respondent, will impact their sustained influence in the community:

This is what I always say to the kings (Latupati): their voices are listened to. But I am afraid if they are more involved in politics. I said that their tenure was only 10 years. The energy of regional autonomy has very negative effects for the kings. They are taken into an energy, namely in inappropriate political games. They are all involved in the stage of power.³⁵⁵

Of course, it is to be regretted that the kings only think about momentary interests and ignore negative consequences from their choices when they are involved in political practices.

Thirdly, the absence of Latupati rules that bind all the kings has made problems in the communities difficult to solved. In this case, latupati is only an institution that cannot implement a decision to deal with conflicts in the communities. Beside that, the emergence of people's suspicion of the participation of another king from another *negeri* solving their problems still occurs.³⁵⁶ A respondent stated:

The traditional institution, in my opinion, only has a perspective on how to solve a problem. Because if Latupati as a traditional institution [protects] all kings, they should have Latupati rules that bind all the kings. But if there is no rule, so it is just an formed institution.³⁵⁷

Given the big role and challenges faced by traditional leaders, cooperation among them and fostered interaction with the people have become a necessity. Therefore, their position in the communities can be protected in order to maintain people's harmony based on cultural and personal approaches.

³⁵⁴ Interview with Ambon City Resort Police official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁵⁵ Interview with Wayame academician, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

³⁵⁶ Interview with Ambon City Resort Police official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Roles of Various Elements of The Society in Handling Post-Conflict Segregation and Violence

VARIOUS SOCIETY'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

People's contribution is a crucial part in the preventive efforts of post-conflict violence. In general those efforts have been done through social, cultural, religious, political and economic aspects.

SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS

Persuasive efforts to support peace through religions have been done much; not only by religious leaders, but also by government and community leaders. There are several programs that are executed. For example, engagement of another religion's community in organizing religious events such as involvement of Muslim communities in the Church Choir Festival (Pesparawi) and Christmas or that of Christian communities in Quran Recital Competition /*Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran* (MTQ) and Ied-al-Fitr.³⁵⁸

Beside that, peace values in religion are also disseminated through education. Peace messages in religion are disseminated along with efforts to eliminate radical concepts circulated among the youth.³⁵⁹ The use of education sector is considered being quite effective in increasing community resilience in preventing provocative efforts done by particular parties.

In each religious holiday, inter-community cooperation is conducted to protect the security of the event implementation, as stated by the following respondent:

It is usually like that; Just before religious days we invite mosque youth and also young Muslim figures. We are in a united way. Dan as usual, just before Christmas and New Year, they will help guard and protect particular points, including churches. Mosque youth are all ready. If for instance in the previous Ied-al-Fitr, when they had Ied prayers, the area surrounding the location of the Ied prayers was guarded by GPM youth members. There were police officers and military personnel, but the event was guarded by GPM youth members. And we build this continuously, this community.³⁶⁰

A real description that I can illustrate here: like the tradition of Muslims in Ambon, in the recitation of laudation night before Ied-al-Fitr, the event was not only done by Muslim communities. Non-Muslim communities, especially Christian, joined the event in rejoice. I don't know whether it was motivated by the sense of rejoice or traditional relationship of *Pela Gandong*. We don't know. But that's not a lie. It's true. Then, in the previous Christmas (2011) I was here. It was like that. Muslim Youth Organizations (OKP) united in working together to guard the event of the Christian brothers. Like services in churches, those who do guarding, beside the security personnel, we also asked OKPs. They are willing to do it in rejoice.³⁶¹

Beside youth engagement, the celebration of religious holidays is also attended by local figures and leaders that use the moment to foster relationship with religious leaders that celebrate the days. For instance, in the Ied-al-Fitri the Ambon City Mayor and the city government officials and wider society visited Muslim communities. So was it done in Christmas.³⁶²

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Interview with one refugee empowerment activist and peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 17 December 2012, and with Head of Ambon City Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

³⁶⁰ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁶¹ Interview with Ambon City Resort Police senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁶² Interview with Ambon City Resort senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

So far engagement of various parties by utilizing religious aspects can build understanding between Muslim and Christian communities on the importance of peace keeping. However, dialog and communications forums that have been done for several years had to be terminated because of a halt to funds provided by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Consequently, inter-faith dialogs has not currently resumed again.³⁶³

Beside that, cultural aspect is also highlighted to keep peace. For instance a respondent stated:

There have been efforts. Recently even the Governor demanded that *Pela Gandong* would be reactivated by *panas Pela*. There has been some *panas Pela*. But there are some suggestions. The *Panas Pela* is only for local people. However, at present there are lots of migrants. This should also be considered. Not only *panas Pela* for native people; [for] migrants how? We are still looking for a way that can unite them.³⁶⁴

Efforts to maintain peace through cultural approach needs more support because it can be a foundation to the problem solution in the society. This is supported by people's awareness that conflicts will only bring about losses. Beside that, bitter experiences have also made people more aware of provocative efforts so that they will consciously participate in violence prevention.³⁶⁵ Awareness that all society members are essentially brothers and sisters has made communications among them not cut off despite previous conflicts.³⁶⁶ A respondent stated:

But there is collective awareness of the Mollucans, Ambonese, to resolve the conflicts. After the conflicts and in the emergence of the awareness, the Mollucans are really aware that the conflicts do not have any significance. We don't know what was the goal. Eventually the people are aware, and are supported by the local government and stakeholders in Maluku slowly resolve the conflicts.³⁶⁷

Based on the findings above, it is seen that the Ambonese society actually have got a strong basic asset to improve peaceful condition in their life. Their awareness of the general public on the losses due to conflicts and violence, as well as engagement of elements of the society in its prevention, implies hope for the establishment of stronger resilience of the society. In some cases, the society actively carries out preventive actions to anticipate any potential for violence. For instance, Pohon Pule community protects their border areas and checks outsiders who want to go in.³⁶⁸

The role of community leaders is also very important in preventing young people from involvement in violence. A respondent stated:

We protect and are open to each other, and this balance is maintained always. We advised the young people, if they want to live like refugees, they could join the conflicts. But if they want to live well and sleep on bed in house, let's maintain the security. If something happens here, let share information. We are old people here, if there is chaos, we provide guidance. If they got drunk, they will be handed to security personnel. This applies both in Muslim and Christian communities.³⁶⁹

Starting from the initiative of some young people, violence-preventing efforts can also be done virtually. The virtual movement is followed up by real actions to support peace-building efforts and prevent violence. Regarding the anti-violence youth movement, one respondent stated:

... Many now prioritize togetherness... through *website*, *Facebook*, and others. For instance, [through] "*kopi badati*" movement, they gather Christian and Muslim young people who carry out togetherness movement,

³⁶³ Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³⁶⁴ Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³⁶⁵ Interview with one refugee empowerment activist and peace activist in Ambon, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

³⁶⁶ Interview with Ambon Health Office official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁶⁷ Interview with Ambonese youth organization figure, Ambon, 12 December 2012.

³⁶⁸ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁶⁹ Interview with one mosque *imam* in Wayame, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

by giving coffee and tea to the posts set up in border areas. They do this to build communications and discuss with security personnel and Muslim or Christian friends in border areas. In social media there are campaigns for young to old people, like campaign “Let’s Stop Violence!”³⁷⁰

It seems that the use of various virtual media can be effective in mobilizing support to strengthen peace and prevent violence. In this case active involvement of the young people is a good news, so that their initiatives must be supported by all parties. These efforts can become a sign that there is still optimism among the youth to recreate a peaceful Ambon.

POLITICAL ASPECT

Another approach to building and keeping peace is by power distribution in the political domain. This approach receives support from the society because power distribution is deemed necessary so that every community has representation in governments and political decision making process. A respondent admitted that the measure intends to :

... to control the stability. Not absolute. Of course it is not regulated but actually there is a deal which we never promise at all. It means, we never promise that we proceed, [the one that becomes] the center of the local leader election has to be Muslim and Christian [figures]. We never promise. But that is the reality. So there is a kind of deal which we never deal, but it happens. If we dare to proceed in Ambon [local leader election] [by carrying] one community only, it is impossible to succeed.³⁷¹

If seen from the process and result of the local leader election in Ambon, the unwritten deal is able to create politically conducive atmosphere. Therefore, the people can believe that the policy made by the government will be inclusive and does not prioritize one particular group. However, composition of leadership which come from different communities can also bring about negative impacts if politically they must be split in the local leader election. In some cases, community representatives nominate themselves in the local leader election and compete with the incumbent. Beside that, if deal on power distribution among leadership candidates that represent different communities can be maintained, the negative impacts from the split can be avoided.

Nevertheless, political competition still has potential for causing conflicts because they bring the names of the groups, collectivity, and communal culture to the power rivalry. The current political practices adequately colors socio-political dynamics in Ambon City.³⁷² This elite-level competition eventually impacts grass-root level, especially when the competing elites starts to mobilize mass of people.

ECONOMIC ASPECT

Peace building efforts are indirectly conducted through economic activities. Given the fact that the people from a particular community still feel afraid of going to markets dominated by another community, the existence of surprise markets has become an alternative solution to the problem. To get the goods nearer to consumers, vendors make breakthrough by setting up surprise markets in another community’s area. Indirectly this has increased intensified interaction and dialogs between vendors and people from a different community. A respondent told:

... there is special surprise market [...] is set up in border areas, for instance. In general, we want to say that... those controlled the market are our Muslim brothers, in the riot time, but those who came here were not Muslims. Because they all sold things, who would buy? [...] The ones who usually buy were our people, the Christian. Therefore, we are afraid to enter the current markets—Mardika Market, Gotong-Royong Market. We are afraid to go there, so that the vendors put their goods nearer to Christian settlement. So appeared a market called peace market. Secure. [...] Bakubae Market... Why is it called Bakubae Market? Because in

³⁷⁰ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁷¹ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁷² Interview with one FISIP lecturer at Unpatti, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

there common interaction between vendors whose majority are Muslims and buyers whose majority are Christians.³⁷³

From the above information, we see how the economic aspect that directly contacts with many people's life needs has motivated the society members to accept the fact that they need each other, so that this will in turn have significant roles in the peace and brotherhood restoration.

Based on the field observation in May 2013 it can be reported that in Ambon City market, despite groupings of sellers based on the community, the economic transaction process ran well. One respondent explained the post-conflict social economic change phenomena in the society as follows:

... Christian women previously did not sell in markets, the seller were only Muslim [women.... Similarly the shops; previously shops were concentrated in port areas. But after the riot, shops and economics centers mushroom in Christian areas.....Initially was [it as] conflict impacts—at that time appeared surprise markets. Christians needed vegetables, fish and others, while Muslims cannot sell to Christian areas. The Mothers took initiatives to get fish from Muslim people for resale here. Christians needed vegetables, fish and others, while Muslims cannot sell to Christian areas. The mothers took initiatives to get fish from Muslim people for resale here while they bring vegetables to Muslim mothers for resale there. Over time they are used to it and the profession has changed. Yes at first it was forced situation or looking at opportunity. And over time it becomes their habit. Like the surprise market being evicted, they did not want it because it is comfortable and advantageous there. No other activities to get money [so that they kept on selling]—what is sold is basic commodities, and get money from that [so that] it gradually become part of their life.³⁷⁴

VARIOUS EFFORTS FROM CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS TO HANDLE POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND VIOLENCE

Civil society institutions and the general public play a strategic role in the effort to reduce the impact of segregation and intensified violence. To solve the segregation problem, some institutions carry out initiatives based on the orientation of the institutions. It can be said the initiatives are reactions to elite initiatives that turned out to be ineffective because they usually involve people within their circle.³⁷⁵ Initiatives are usually taken based on field analysis on whether an area needs intervention through religious approach, social approach, approach that involves women, or other approaches, because the characteristics of every area are different.³⁷⁶ Based on the data collected through interviews, in general the initiatives can be grouped into three categories, namely religious, social/educational and economic.

RELIGIOUS CATEGORY

Concerning the role of religious institutions, some respondents representing Muslim and Christian institutions include peace messages in their sermons and talks. "Intervention" into sermons' materials is usually carried out every two months.³⁷⁷ For Christian group, when tension occurs, the sermons will contain the themes of peace, love, loving your enemies as taught by Jesus, and offering your right cheek when your left cheek is slapped.³⁷⁸

For Muslim community, intervention is a bit more difficult to realize. This happens because Muslim institutions and Muslim praying places are not in one hierarchial structure so that intervention through one command is more difficult to conduct. Independency of each mosque and institution makes Muslim activists work even harder. For new areas hit by violent conflicts, they will intervene

³⁷³ Interview with Ambon City senior official, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁷⁴ Interview with Mollucan Catholic figure, Ambon, 13 May 2013.

³⁷⁵ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁷⁸ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Presbytery Chair of GPM Ambon, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

through coordination with Ambon City government officials. They sometimes do checks to all mosques in Ambon and try to replace *ustads* who usually deliver harsh sermons.³⁷⁹

In Muslim community, week consolidation in unifying and disseminating peace message is closely related to the less solid community tie with big Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The Muslim community in Ambon tends to refer themselves to NU or Muhammadiyah only in socio-historical fashion. It means, they will identify themselves as NU or Muhammadiyah people if that relates to their families with NU or Muhammadiyah background; or if what is being discussed is traditional problems or particular religious rites, such as *tahlilan*, *Qunut*, etc. If related to political matters, they can refer themselves to NU or Muhammadiyah or none of them but to traditional group, another civil society organization or even political party.³⁸⁰

In the effort to reduce the segregation and violence impacts, religious organization try to create interaction rooms through their activities such as dialogs, communal works, or health services. A respondent given an example of an activity:

Every day before the *lebaran* (Ied-al-Fitr) day in the fasting period, usually once a week they do collective breaking the fast event with Silo congregation and the surrounding people. We do it regularly every year. So, we cooperate with Muslim figures behind the Silo Church to conduct the activity. We regularly get funding for that. So, before the breaking the fast event, at around 5 or 5.30 pm, we organize discussion on the community condition or problems around us.³⁸¹

The 'collective breaking the fast' event is conducted to improve relationship with Muslim community around the church. This is conducted because historically the area was heterogeneous, even though the conflict has caused the people's demographic condition to suffer from segregation. Another activity is communal work to clean up cemetery location and distribution of assistance to victims of the August 1, 2012 floods.

Another important activity is seminars that invite figures of another religion to give understanding on their religious perspectives. This is done as a way to break negative stereotypes given by followers of one religion to other followers of another religion. A respondent provided this example:

Well, the newest [activity] that we organize on December 4, [...] we organized a seminar in Silo with a theme "Getting to Know Humanistic and Peaceful Islam." There we invited one expert of Islamic laws (fiqh) at IAIN Ambon [to] provide enlightenment of what is humanistic Islam like, so that no one will think that Islam is identical with terrorism or radical movements. But we also [cannot] set aside the fact [that] in Christian [community] here there is also indication leading to that such as radicalism. Everyone was surprised by the talk that the true Islam was like that, not like this.³⁸²

Activities that invite figures from another religion become very strategic in the effort to build peace because they can plant more thorough and reasonable point of view when identifying and describing another group with a different religion. Therefore, it is hoped that interaction and discussion spaces between community groups segregated due to the conflicts.

Religious institutions conduct some breakthroughs to reduce segregation impacts. One respondents describes the activity they have done:

One program named "Mollucan Children Meeting"; they used to play together without religious discrimination, but now due to this condition, they play in their own communities. [Therefore,] now we ask them to play together [again]. The Muslims learn about church, the worship place of their Christian friends, the Christians learn about mosque, the prayers place for their Muslim friends.³⁸³

³⁷⁹ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁸⁰ Interview with Christian Church research and development member, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁸¹ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁸² Ibid.; Ibid.

³⁸³ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church senior figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012.

At the internal level, religious institutions also implement initiatives useful to reduce segregation impacts, even though these initiatives are still local and adjust to the needs. For instance, in some churches, the internalization of pluralism values is not the priority because the congregation lives in the Christian-majority areas. The internalization of pluralism values is only conducted to the congregation which becomes a minority amidst a Muslim community.³⁸⁴ Nevertheless, for long-term period, the value internalization needs to be done for those who live in their own community which is the majority in an area. The goal is to internalize empathy to the community members to another community's members as anticipatory measures when there is friction.

Another initiative is conducted by organizing activities for teenagers who are vulnerable to calls for violence. For instance, the Silo Church organizes an activity called "Adolescents Creativity Week". In this activity not only Christian adolescents are involved, so are Muslim adolescents.³⁸⁵ Beside that, for Christian adolescents the church has done internal approach measures by:

... provide "Catechism" or teachings for teenager towards adulthood. So, there for Silo context we try to provide materials which is not only talking about religious issues given by a pastor, but also another social context such as anti-violence actions and materials for Human Rights. So there, the people who give the teachings were experts in the area. Even though the portion is more on the teaching/ materials on Christianity, but we have opened up spaces for understanding and education that is in line with the contexts of Silo and Ambon, Maluku entirely.³⁸⁶

SOCIAL/ EDUCATIONAL CATEGORY

Some initiatives through social and educational sectors have been done by various parties to reduce segregation impacts as well as strengthen society's resilience. In segregated areas, especially border areas, there is the need for increasing the number of peace activists so that they can work collectively and more effectively.³⁸⁷

Regarding the September 11, 2011 violent conflict, another initiative was also taken by one institution in Ambon to gather kings in Latupati Council to discuss the steps to be taken so that the conflict would not spread. This meeting was supported by the local government and generated concrete measures such as:

... *road show* to burned areas by using Damri buses. We went to Talake, and to market, port, then we visited Leihitu, walked together with kings. Well, we did peaceful campaign. We also brought Latupati announcement on Friday for Friday sermon (for Muslim group), and in church on Sunday services (for Christian group).³⁸⁸

The activity was considered being able to successfully localize violence so that the conflict did not spread to other areas. Nevertheless, one thing to note: in those activities, funds sometimes hamper the implementation. Therefore, non-governmental organizations currently put more focus on the efforts to build people's initiatives to carry out similar activities in self-supporting basis.³⁸⁹ This is also done because of awareness from non-government organizations to use minimum funds so that they can prevent the implementation of a program whose orientation is financial compensation. In this case community engagement is very useful to raise awareness among the community members that the activities facilitated by the institutions are for the interest of the community.

³⁸⁴ Interview with Mollucan peace activist, and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.; Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.; Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church Research and Development figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

The initiatives in the advocacy of policies is also conducted by non-government organizations. A respondent stated:

Together with the women network, we try to advocate policy on the execution of protection of women and children; and that has been stipulated through Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 2 Year 2012. It has been in the local sheet. Well, we have tried to advocate to districts/cities how this *Perda* to be implemented. We also set up service posts for violence victims handling [of women and children] in collaboration with the National Commission on Violence Against Women.³⁹⁰

Non-government organizations also cooperate with Bureau of Women Empowerment and Family Planning to help design gender-perspective budget. Beside that, there are still some other initiatives and activities such as advocacy of health service access like free birth delivery and *posyandu* (integrated health post) service, and educational services like Early Childhood Education centers (PAUD); help communities develop proposals for CSR program of some companies;³⁹¹ conduct facilitation in trauma healing activities through cooperation with some universities like University of Indonesia's Faculty of Psychology; conduct counseling for violence perpetrators to eliminate violent perspectives indoctrinated by their group. So far de-indoctrination activities have produced results, as seen from the transformed behaviors of the perpetrators.³⁹²

Beside the initiatives conducted by non-government organizations above, peace movement initiatives are also conducted through educational institutions. Breakthroughs through educational way have become very strategic as they are aiming at children and teenagers who are in formative period, so that positive teachings and experiences can make them generation that respects the groups' differences and cross-identity brotherhood values. For instance, some peace activists set up PAUD centers that accept children from Muslim and Christian groups. However, after PAUD center has officially been constructed by the government, the Christian students even moved there.³⁹³ Another respondent gives this example:

We set up the "*sister school*" that adopts *Pela Gandong* in which Muslim students can also study in the Christian community school through exchange system. Well, now the Mayor is ready to support our "*sister school*" program. Through this program, Muslim students can go to school in Christian community, and vice versa- for around two or three months. They not only go to school but also stay in Christian or Muslim settlement. So, we hope at minimum, that they can understand the life of their brothers and sisters there.³⁹⁴

When celebrating the 2009 Peace Day, *Peace Goes to School* activity was organized. The activity contained the screening of film on peace. Another activity was organized in Ambon Plaza to support the youth. The activity was also accompanied by musical programs. However, these initiatives could not be continued because of non-existent sponsor. Therefore, the roles of government and sponsors are absolutely needed for the sustainability of the positive activities.³⁹⁵

ECONOMIC CATEGORY

The initiative to reduce segregation impacts through economic sector is one of the strategic steps. The people are aware that conflicts will only worsen their quality of living due to increased unemployment and poverty. Therefore, society groups located outside city center foster

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Interview with one university student and community activist, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

³⁹⁴ Interview with Mollucan peace activist, and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon 15 December 2012.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.; Ibid.

communications and coordination between them to prevent any violence from happening in their place.³⁹⁶

Similarly, this applies to the community members who already have business and have fostered interaction with customers; they are worried if conflicts may happen in their area. That's why business people take the initiative to involve young people in all economic activities so that they who used to be jobless and carry out negative actions can do productive actions. One respondent said:

Now many of them are busy. Before now, they were just sitting and drunk in narrow paths, now they are busy [working as motorcycle taxi driver]. [I give working capital] in the forms of five motorcycles for young people to do taxi riding. Later, they will pay the installments... In markets, young people who did not work [we gave them jobs as keepers] of shops or *counter* [so that] they can return the initial capital [through] installments.³⁹⁷

Initiatives through economic path in segregated areas are also done by utilizing cooperation with foreign agencies. For instance, a cooperation program between non-government organization and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in four villages in Leihitu subdistrict and four districts in Salahutu subdistrict. Another example is a program related to credit disbursement in border areas between Waai, Tulehu, Suli, to strengthen women micro enterprises. This program is conducted after trainings are given to participants.³⁹⁸

Despite the cooperation with some NGOs by conducting peace building studies,³⁹⁹ the local government is still considered not doing maximum efforts to prevent potential for violence due to segregation. One of the biggest criticisms over the government program is that the design is only based on project although the term used here is community-based project. Because they are designed based on project, problems often occur, namely absent sustainability soon after the project completion because the program does not come from the community.⁴⁰⁰ Usually no agents live in the community to facilitate the program sustainability, at least for one year. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that community representatives trained as peace agents can carry out their tasks due to pressure from the community.⁴⁰¹

According to a respondent, a program must be taken into the community in which an agent functions as organizer together with his friends in neutral areas. Therefore, peace building program that is conducted will be community-based. For this purpose, the financing management, for instance for consumption, must absolutely be well managed because this relates to "daily relationship that must be maintained".⁴⁰²

Another criticism aimed to the government is frequent mutation in the institutions such as The Indonesian Military (TNI), Indonesian Police, and local bureaucratic institutions. This will definitely disturb advocacy process. A respondent stated:

...we we made a discussion, ... sometimes the participant was program bureaucratic leadership, but then the person is mutated, then we have to start over again. Well, this is tough. For instance we have often fostered communications to the Local Military Commmander (*Pangdam*) or Resort Police Head (*Kapolres*), suddenly they changed or are replaced. Then, our difficulty [is situation] that is in the bureaucratic system.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁶ Interview with women and children NGO activist , Ambon, 15 December 2012.

³⁹⁷ Interview with one contractor employer and Mollucan young employer and Mollucan young employer organization Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁹⁸ Interview with Mollucan Church Research and Development officer, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

³⁹⁹ Interview with Ambon City development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴⁰¹ Journalist and Mollucan Christian Church Research and Development, Ambon, 13 December 2012.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Interview with Mollucan peace activist and with Mollucan Christ Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

Another thing to consider is the motivation of government officials in supporting peace process in conflict areas. The process gets difficult due to lack of sensitivity among the officials in their efforts to build peace because they are more oriented to personal economic interest which has nothing to do with people's welfare.⁴⁰⁴

The trust in an NGO should also be considered during the peace building program implementation. In general, the level of people's trust in peace activist NGOs is quite high. This is because the facilitation efforts are conducted consistently so that the activities sponsored by NGOs receive positive responses from the society. For instance a respondent stated that:

They have organized dialogs, went in and out houses, and had meals together. In 2005, after the 2004 incident in Waringin, we tried to conduct inter-community dialogs there. Even we set up a PAUD center for both communities.

In the context of the activities told by the respondent above, the people have received facilitation for seven years so that the trust in the related NGO has been built. Therefore, NGO works have been easier because more initiatives to build peace come from the society then.⁴⁰⁵

WOMEN'S ROLES IN PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND SUPPRESSING SEGREGATION

The roles of women are very prominent in the efforts to reduce segregation and prevent violence. Involvement of women is considered effective in peace-enforcing process.⁴⁰⁶ Despite the need to involve men, the roles of women remain very crucial because they have attachment with family institutions. One of the efforts that require women's role is trauma handling due to prolonged conflicts. For this purpose, activities to gather mothers from both religious groups are organized for some communal actions for two weeks. Another activity is visiting refugees from each group to build awareness on the sufferings resulting from inter-group violence.⁴⁰⁷

A respondent shared a personal experience when trying to optimize women's roles in preventing conflicts and preserving peace:

The mothers groups... can generate understanding to their sons and husbands to suppress conflicts. What we did was that during and after the conflicts, we had dialogs and discussions to mothers [to] give understanding that the conflicts could make mothers become widows and children orphans, especially when the male members of the family [were victimized]. We did this and it was relatively effective to raise awareness in the family. For instance: in 2011 I also told mothers in the night after the riot to ask their husbands and sons not [to] return to Waringin to make revenge because they would die in vain, because we also did not know what really happened there.⁴⁰⁸

In the Ambon Local Leadership Election (*Pilkada*) process in 2011, many community members received illegal and unsigned leaflets containing rumors on Islamization and Christianization among the segregated society. A respondent told:

The discussions on the leaflets were conducted by mothers. I think it was very effective to talk about peace with mothers. So, [to] mothers in Waringin we said that, you as women maintained that there must be peace, but it must be discussed with men because it was the men who always did mobilization of mass of people. Has there been any [mobilization] from female group?⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.; Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Interview with mothers from Kayu Tiga, 20 May 2013.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

Even though they do not play a role in the mobilization of mass of people, women at least can prevent their family members from participating in violent actions done by their group against another group. The women's significant roles can be seen in several places such as Kayu Tiga, Ahuru, THR 2, Air Besar, and Waiheru.⁴¹⁰

Waringin's refugee mothers have made breakthroughs through education where they build peace in their place of origin. Respondents mentioned:

In Waringin we have a play group. There are also Christian children who go to it. So, Muslim-Christian [children] go to the same school, It is one thing that we want to develop in Waringin so that we can unite again, [...] so that they trust each other. In order that people from outside can see it, that some Christian children can enter Islamic school. So, somebody has pioneered it.⁴¹¹

The breakthrough should receive support from various parties including the government, and especially for funding purpose. Based on respondents' testimonies, operational funds for the Early Childhood Education Center (PAUD) are collected from children's tuition fees and irregularly-disbursed fund support from the Education office.⁴¹²

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM: EVALUATIVE APPROACH

PERCEPTION ON OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The key thing that often becomes the highlight and source of question related to credibility of an NGO is about issues related to fund raising and fund use for their programs. One respondent stated:

... sustainability of activities for these humanitarian works must [be conducted by] those who are really volunteers and do not have any interest. But I cannot avoid the fact that the institution needs donors, needs funds. But what is really needed is voluntary spirit.⁴¹³

Volunteerism spirit according to a respondent now have vanished because many NGOs works are project-oriented. However, what is needed from the peace activists is their dedication and militancy in helping the society.⁴¹⁴ The decreasing spirit of this volunteerism is worsened by many donor agencies that just channel funds without looking at the sustainability of a program when the project is completed. Another thing to consider by some parties is weak driving force in all lines because few people are voluntarily willing to maintain and safeguard peace process dynamics, including in religious institutions.⁴¹⁵

Meanwhile, in the NGOs the issue of credibility has become inevitable problem. For instance one NGO that has problems with funding sources must accept negative labeling from other NGOs. A respondent who is also the NGO activist stated:

Well, within NGO groups we are labeled as "red-plate NGO ". But I said for the conflict works we cannot always position ourselves as opposition. We also have to see which we should criticize, what we must support and cooperate with the government.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Interview with Waringin refugee mothers, 14 May 2013.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴¹⁴ Interview with Mollucan Christian Church Research and Development figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012; with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

The statement clearly shows how funding and budgeting become sensitive issues. Related to this, a respondent stated:

I also must say that many colleagues in NGO with much budget [must] be transparent to the community. [Transparency] that we have budget at this much and how about community involvement, it is still lacking. Colleagues at [NGO that] when there is funding, they are reclusive and when they run out of funds, they just leave the community. Whereas, but actually the fact is that either there is or there is no fund, we should make strategic plans to implement joined activities to build the strengthening of [inter-community solidarity]. And we hope the society can be more independent to advocate their rights.

Another criticism that highlights some NGO activists that have motivation to seek financial benefits through social activities that can lead them into being civil servants or political party members. A respondent who is concerned over the problem stated:

... Now many NGOs/LSMs whose [funds] do not really come from donors any longer, but they are oriented [to] what they can get through officials or local leadership. [To get fund disbursement] they usually set up this forum [or] that institution. That's the point which ends up with asking for money to local officials. If the officials do not give them, they said there will be case disclosure or demonstration.⁴¹⁷

Beside that, some NGO activists are indicated to get involved in activities full of political interests. Usually, by utilizing seniority approach and ethnic/ family approach, they pursue financial benefits from officials.⁴¹⁸

PERCEPTION ON PEACE PROGRAMS EXECUTED BY NGO

One problem resulting from NGOs being mainly involved in project-oriented programs is low sustainability of a program. An NGO activist stated:

If the NGO is project oriented, when a program is completed, they will also finish. But if [for] the program [they] think up to the sustainability phase, they will think about the sustainability after the program is not funded any longer. So that, the sustainability can eventually [build] the society [which] can be more independent. So, [they work] not because of many funds or less.⁴¹⁹

This concern actually implies a deep criticism of the works and agenda of peace activist NGOs in Ambon. A respondent who conducted evaluation on peace programs in Ambon stated, many things among the programs were not participatory because the initial ideas did not come from the people.⁴²⁰ Nevertheless, facilitation efforts were still done by NGOs and peace activists in Ambon. The facilitation was mainly done to build trust between the groups involved in the conflicts and violence. According to a peace activist, the taken measures were:

... to carry out approach to key figures there for joint activities (like communal work). But what I proposed was things that faced us such as conflicts, peace, etc. If I proposed things that were not real issues here, the figures (like in Petra Church) would think that the suggestion was not useful. Usually my strategy for implementing the joint activities: we coordinated with the Neighborhood Unit (RT) Heads, after that we did approach to the Pastor in Petra.⁴²¹

One obstacle that usually occurs in the field coordination is reluctance of some parties to participate in self-supporting activities and without external funds. Another obstacle is the difficulty in raising understanding among community figures on the importance of the to-do activities. Beside

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Mollucan peace activist; and with Mollucan Christian Church figure, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ Interview with women and children LSM activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ Interview with one university student and community activist, Ambon, 14 May 2013.

that, involvement of women also encounters some obstacles such as the difficulty in building awareness among low-educated mothers because their interest is also low, as well as mothers' hustle and bustle of daily activities to do such as household chores, selling, and other things. Faced with such obstacles, one of the breakthroughs taken by peace activists is by implementing approach through *majelis taklim* (women's gathering for religious teaching and performance). Through this gathering the husbands do not have any reason for forbidding their wives from joining religious activities.⁴²²

⁴²² *Ibid.*

Conclusion and Recommendation

CONCLUSION

Since long ago Ambon has been recognized as one of the areas in Indonesia with the characteristic of strong segregation both socially and spatially, between Christian and Muslim communities. When there was a social conflict in 1999, the resolution was taken through post-conflict reconstruction policy. The policy has indirect and unintended consequence in the form of new socio-spatial segregation. The pattern of post-conflict segregation emergence mainly originates from refuge process and refugee solution mechanism, especially relocation.

When the social conflict broke out in Ambon (1999-2002) between Christian and Muslim communities, many people from both communities took refuge to the areas where the people ethnoreligiously have similar identity with them. They did this to get the sense of security. When the conflict abated, the people are reluctant to return to their places of origin. The consequence is that the areas which were relatively heterogeneous before the 1999 social conflict has now become more homogeneous.

Apart from the above mechanism, the growth of post-conflict segregation is also closely related to the relocation process initiated by the government. The heavy task taken by the Ambon City government is to deal with refugee management which until today still becomes an issue; starting from the validity of refugees data, absence of refugee empowerment, uneven distribution of assistance, still deteriorating physical and health condition, inhabited land dispute, population problem, return of civil rights on abandoned assets, land certification, until the government's claim that the refugee management had finished in 2009.

Some options offered by the government as the solution to post-conflict refugees, namely returning to their places of origin, relocation, and settling down in refuge areas. Among those options, relocation was the choice of most refugees at that time. However, unintentionally and indirectly, those relocations have contributed to the establishment of segregated new community concentrations because the refugees tend to choose relocation sites nearby or around the community with the identity similar to theirs. Three key reasons why the refugees tended to choose relocation sites like that are their identity as minority group in the places of origin, absence of guaranteed security if they return to their places of origin, and failed process of returning to the places of origin.

Some policies then become local government's priorities in the effort to rebuild Amon, both physically, infrastructurally and psychically. Beside that, various efforts continue to be taken in order to deal with rapidly developing segregation since the 1999 conflict. Among the various policies and efforts, beside thorough refugee handling are reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie, opening of new heterogeneous settlements, trauma handling, children counseling, social harmony, and development of brotherhood (*orang basudara*) curriculum. Many of those programs are clearly contained in the 2006-2011 and 2011-2016 Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plans (RPJM) as well as, especially, the 2006-2026 Ambon City Long-Term Development Plans (RPJP).

Some post-reconstruction policy programs have so far been relatively realized in a qualitative fashion, such as reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie both through gatherings, joined organizing of religious events, and inter-faith dialogs and cooperation; construction and development of new heterogeneous areas; development of public spaces for inter-community meetings, such as reconstruction of Mardika Field; Social Harmony; development of brotherhood (*Orang Basudara*) curriculum; development of border areas; trauma handling.

Nevertheless, beside lengthy refugee handling, some critical-evaluative notes are aimed to post-conflict development programs and other programs that have not been realized at all. *Firstly*, the 2006 Social Harmony Program suffered from many fund leaks and did not accord the target community, as well as had many project results that have been damaged and not functional. *Secondly*,

trauma handling did not run optimally. Moreover, the constructed *Center for Trauma* is not functional any longer. *Thirdly*, public spaces development for inter-community meeting only focused on Mardika Field, and there is almost no development of other public spaces. *Fourthly*, development of *Orang Basudara* (brotherhood) curriculum was still in the concept/ idea and no real implementation was done. *Fifthly*, construction/ renovation of traditional markets was not fully realized. *Sixthly*, development of border areas which often constitute the hot spots of violent conflicts has yet to be executed at all, both economically and socio-culturally. *Seventhly*, post-conflict children counseling tended to sporadic-ceremonial. *Eighthly*, frequency of joint organizing of religious events was still low. Beside those problems, special attention should be given different perceptions among community segments on the urgency of permanent posts construction in border areas and presence of the Indonesian Military (TNI) under *Bawah Kendali Operasi* (BKO) in Ambon.

Generally, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon are said to run relatively well, and particularly, inter-community relationship and interaction may be said to run quite well. Well-restored relationship is strengthened by shared awareness on conflicts and inter-community cooperation in managing conflicts/ violence which occur after the conflict. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that certain community segments still feel trauma, fear, or discomfort when they enter or visit particular areas where the majority of the population used to be their enemies, especially at nights. In this case, we see particular things still often become walls of obstacle for inter-community relationship so that this requires more intensive and serious handling, especially trauma handling and mutual trust building between communities.

Some violent incidents occurred sporadically after the 1999 conflict and involved both communities, the Muslim and Christian ones. However, those incidents could be localized and relatively quickly handled, even though the legal process against the perpetrators still experienced failure. Strengthened post-conflict segregation has played a particular part in the process of the emerging violent cases. Some elements have been identified as the triggering factors of such violence, and have some connection with, or constitute indirect effects from, segregation. Some of the elements are intervention from external parties including provocation or playing both communities off against each other; social disharmony between new comers and indigenous people; suspicion between groups resulting from post-conflict effects; vulnerability of border areas as hot spots of emerging violence; and the society that is vulnerable to be mobilized by using religious sentiments against a particular group.

The role of security personnel, particularly the Police, in preventing and handling post-conflict violence receives particular critical-evaluative spotlight. In general, the society thinks that security personnel tend not to be responsive and slow in preventing and handling post-conflict violent incidents and even tend to fail in the legal process. Consequently, the level of society's trust in security personnel decreases, especially after the September 11, 2011 incident which occurred not far from the police guarding post. Such condition has an impact on the society's preference in security personnel. They tend to prefer TNI to the police because TNI is considered faster and more responsive in handling violence. However, there is also another segment of the society which rejects the existence of TNI/BKO in Ambon because the occurrence of the violence is deemed to be related to the society's law and order which is the police's duty instead of military duty. The role and existence of TNI/BKO in Ambon has so far still triggered controversy among the society, especially because there is allegation related to TNI personnel partiality and neutrality in handling inter-community violent cases.

Some strategic efforts have been taken by the society in general to prevent and handle conflicts and post-conflict violence. From the socio-cultural and religious aspects, those efforts cover involvement of another religious community in organizing religious events, strengthening peace values through education and reactivation of *Pela Gandong*. From the political aspect, those efforts include inter-community power sharing. From the economic aspect, the society has set up a kind of markets in other communities, which very much enable the inter-community interactions and communications. Beside that, group leadership, including religious figures, local leaders and traditional figures also takes an important role in preserving harmony and preventing post-conflict violence.

In preserving peace and handling post-conflict violence and segregation, various elements in the society have demonstrated their roles both direct and indirect ones including the civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and women's group. Efforts taken by several civil society organizations such as MUI Ambon, Diocese of Amboina, GPM Silo, LAPPAN, National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM), and the others have given contributions from the religious, socio-educational and economic aspects. The contribution of women's group in preserving peace in Ambon is relatively significant, including by assisting in the handling of trauma from prolonged conflicts, visiting refugees from respective groups to strengthen awareness on conflicts, setting up educational facilities for children, etc.

Leadership aspect is an integral part of the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence. This aspect generally can be divided into three categories, namely leadership of religious leaders, leadership of local leaders, and leadership of traditional figures. Participation of religious leaders in Ambon in the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence is a necessity, due to their strategic position in the society, even though such participation is not fully able to prevent violence yet. From Christian community's perspective, efforts to prevent the spread of violence have been supported by centralized Church leadership in the congregation. Unfortunately this is not easy to be found in Muslim community due to various people affiliations to religious leaders and Islamic organizations. This has caused the people's initiative to be more dominant than that of the leaders in Muslim community.

Local figures who hold positions both formal and informal ones, possess important influences in the community under their responsibility. Even, religious difference with the community does not prevent them from carrying out the tasks without any discrimination. The leaders exist within the Muslim and Christian communities and are directly involved in suppressing the conflicts. Beside that, ethnic-based leaders play major roles in influencing their communities, especially for political interest.

Similarly with traditional leaders, they also have strategic roles in maintaining peace and prevent violence. They do this by issuing announcement and disseminating it to the public. However, there are some challenges faced by traditional leaders, such as limited legitimacy in the areas with pluralistic demographic characteristics, many traditional leaders getting involved in political activities so that they cannot represent traditional communities, and absence of Latupati rule that binds all kings, making problems in the communities hard to resolve.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the findings in the study, some recommendations can be formulated as follows:

HANDLING OF POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION

1. Policies on post-conflict relocation have clearly created new segregation and homogeneity of areas which used to be mixed. To handle the existing segregation, the Ambon City Government should create strategic and more creative reconciliation programs so that both different communities, the Muslim and Christian communities, especially staying in relocation/ refuge areas, can interact and communicate each other more intensively. Beside that, the city government is expected not to develop programs that tend to be ceremonial and temporal.
2. Spatial planning or construction of physical infrastructures and settlements must be sensitive to de-segregation and conflicts, and be oriented to the creation of civic engagement model. Old conflict-handling policies offered by the local government which eventually have implication in the present time must be seen proportionally because in the past the local government did not have many options. However, the past outcomes can and must be immediately dealt with through the design of new Ambon spatial plans, which enable high intensity of cross-identity community meeting. In this case, it definitely requires good will, political will, and courage to find and realize a way out (breakthrough) which is oriented to the interest of the more secure and comfortable life of Ambonese society in the future.
3. Some important policies on post-conflict development need revitalizing and improving by the Ambon City Government, covering (1) revitalization of trauma healing center and

provision/training of experts to handle trauma; (2) increasing the number of public spaces—beside Mardika Field—for inter-community interactions/ communications (*civic-engagement*); (3) developing and implementing *Orang Basudara* curriculum at schools by inserting contents of local wisdom values, especially *Pela Gandong*; (4) setting up traditional markets for inter-community meeting and development of border areas which often become hot spots of violence; (5) improving inter-community cooperation in the execution of religious activities; (6) improving the implementation of *Biking Panas Pela* consistently.

4. Ambon City Government and competent society social organizations need to conduct media campaigns in a sustainable fashion to introduce and institutionalize symbols of togetherness, and prevent the use of sectarian symbols.
5. Ambon City Government and non-government organizations are faced with increasing cross-community live-in activities, especially for school students and other concerned stakeholders. Therefore, those activities can grow expected de-segregation process and overcome spatial segregation.
6. Beside the above reconciliation efforts, Ambon City Government needs to develop special programs to strengthen mutual inter-community trust (trust-building). This needs to be taken in order to overcome trauma, fear or discomfort felt by some society members when entering or travelling to particular areas in particular time. Beside that, this is also important to give balance to the tendency of Ambon City Government which emphasizes more on post-conflict physical development.
7. Agencies related to education and manpower must take concrete actions to reduce/ eliminate negative perspectives concerning discrimination in accessing education, various public services, health access as well as jobs and promotion in government agencies in Ambon City.
8. In the above context, Ambon City Government needs to consider “power-sharing” of both communities, socially, economically and politically, by still prioritizing the principle of competency. Beside that, Ambon City Government also needs to take measures to suppress identity politics among political elite that tends to increase group tension and sentiment, and unwittingly, open up spaces and opportunities for potential inter-group clashes at the grass-root level.
9. In the past, the Maluku, especially Ambon had a number of figures who were accepted, listened to, and respected by anybody. Nowadays, Ambon has lost such figures. Therefore, one of the important approaches to manage the life of the already-segregated Ambon City society is to promote the characterization process of a number of persons to become local figures.
10. Ambon City Government needs to continuously strengthen and build society’s psychological capacity and knowledge, especially those living in segregated areas, that Ambon conflicts occurred not because of the difference between Christian and Muslim communities, but because of intervention of particular group’s interest. Therefore, it is right and proper that they live together peacefully just like before the 1999 conflict.
11. Given the strategic position of society organizations, especially religious and traditional organizations, in preserving peace in Ambon, it is proper that the Ambon City Government invite them and foster relationship and coordination with them in the implementation of each policy and activity intending to gather both communities.
12. Ambon City and Maluku Provincial Governments are expected to synergize in executing post-conflict development programs, and do not let the programs run separately. Such condition is required to maximize the results and targets of the development.

HANDLING OF AND RESOLUTION TO REFUGEE/ RELOCATION PROBLEMS

1. Fulfillment of refugees’ rights which is presently still a prolonged problem should be solved by Ambon City Government in wise and swift manner. If not, such condition could become a trigger of inter-community dispute which ends up with the emergence of violence. Such problem may also be utilized by irresponsible parties to create chaos and violence in Ambon.
2. Ambon City Government needs to take intervention in the empowerment of relocated communities/ refugees and should not avoid the responsibility for them.

3. Ambon City Government also needs to help settle various land disputes related to relocation and provide legal certainty on them, and should not tend to avoid responsibility. Beside that, Ambon City Government also needs to solve various population problems (for instance, problems related to Identity Card/*KTP*), land certification, and return of civil rights of the refugees to the abandoned assets.
4. Ambon City Government needs to develop special agenda which enables meetings and interaction between refugees and host community in the place of origin. For Muslims who once stayed in Batu Gajah, for instance, could organize an activity like “*Batu Gajah Panggil Pulang*”. Thus, attached sentiment of the refugees to their places of origin is preserved, even though nowadays they do not stay in one place as one community any longer.

SECURITY PERSONNEL AND HANDLING OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

1. TNI/BKO troops should be withdrawn gradually by adjusting to the needs and conditions of particular area in Ambon. So, the police needs to be more dominant and professional in controlling security in Ambon City.
2. Every emerging violent case must be processed through law in fair and professional fashion. Such firm action is needed to maintain and improve Ambon City stability after the conflict in the security, social and economic aspects. Thus, security personnel must be responsive and professional in handling every emerging violent case.
3. Ambon City Government and security personnel needs to take preventive measures to keep on guard against and handle some factors that often become the trigger of violence such as intervention from external parties, provocation or playing both communities off against each other, disharmony of social relationship between new comers and indigenous people, inter-community suspicion as post-conflict effects, vulnerability of border areas as sources of violence, and easy mobilization of the society by utilizing religious sentiments. Thus, the role of intelligence and early warning must be more strengthened to anticipate potential violence.
4. To reduce potentials for post-conflict violence, it is proper that Ambon City Government focuses on the creation of job opportunities in order to reduce unemployment, and create various youth activities, including sports, arts and music, etc.
5. Given the fact that border areas often become the hot spots of post-conflict violence, Ambon City Government needs to prioritize the local development, in the areas of social, educational and economic development, by creating various job opportunities, build and renovate schools and organize various youth activities which can connect inter-community young people.

In general, to eliminate post-conflict violence, Ambon City Government needs to develop self-defense mechanism built in the social structures to avoid people’s engagement in violent actions. For this purpose Ambon City Government can utilize the roles of traditional organizations and religious organizations including organizations which can gather joint cross-identity activities such as sports, music, and arts in general, and etc. Beside that, developing inter-culture dialogs also becomes a very crucial need.

Bibliography

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

- Adam, J. (2008). "Forced Migration, Adat, and a Purified Present in Ambon, Indonesia." *Ethnology* 47(4): 209-225.
- Adam, J. (2010). "Forced Migration and the Ethno-Territorial Effects of Customary Tenure." *Jurnal Development and Change* 41(3): 401-419.
- Altheide, D. L. (2000). "Tracking Discourse and Qualitative Document Analysis." *Poetics* 27: 28-299.
- Amirrachman, A. (Ed.). (2007). *Revitalisasi Kearifan Lokal: Studi Resolusi Konflik di Kalimantan Barat, Maluku dan Poso*. Jakarta, Indonesia: The International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP).
- Amirrachman, A. (2012), "Peace Education in the Mollucas: Between Global Models and Local Interests." Disertasi, University of Amsterdam.
- Azca, M. N. (2006), "In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security forces in the Communal conflict in Ambon." In *Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 34(3):431-455.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1984). *The Dialogic Imagination* (trans. by C. Emerson & M. Holquist). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Barbra, L. (2009). "Resettling Peoples, Redressing Histories: Challenging Answers to the Land Question in Namibia and the Netherlands." *Macalester International* 22:1-25.
- Barron, P., Azca, M. N., & Susdinarjanti, T. (2012). *After the Communal War: Understanding and Addressing Post-Conflict Violence in Eastern Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Center for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS Books).
- Bartels, D. (1977). *Pela Alliances in the Central Moluccas and in the Netherlands: A Brief Guide for Beginners*. Taken from <http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/99/0326/nat4.html>
- Bartels, D. (2003), "The Evolution of God in the Spice Islands: the Converging and Diverging of Protestant Christianity and Islam in the Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods." Article was presented at *The Frobenius Institute of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University* in Frankfurt/Main, 14 December 2003.
- Bartels, D. (2003b). "Your God is No Longer Mine: Muslim-Christian Fratricide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) After a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity." Article was presented in the Fifth Conference on the Mollucas, in Darwin, Australia, 2003.
- Beale, B., Cole, R., Hillege, S., McMaster, R., & Nagy, S. (2004). "Impact of In-Depth Interviews on the Interviewer: Roller Coaster Ride." *Nursing and Health Sciences* 6:141-147.
- Berger-Schmitt, R (2000) *Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement, towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement*. A TSER-Project funded by the European Commission. Mannheim: Center for Survey Research and Methodology.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005). "Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes." *Public Administration and Development* 25(1):3-14.
- Braithwaite, J., Braithwaite, V., Cookson, M., & Dunn, L. (2010). *Anomie and Violence Non-Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peace Building*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Buchanan, C. (Ed.). (2011). *Conflict Management in Indonesia: An analysis of the conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso*. Geneva, Switzerland: The Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Current Asia and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Chang, W. (2002). "Regarding Ethnic and Religious Conflict." In C. S. Bamualim, K. Helmanita, A. Fauzia, E. Kusnadinigrat (Eds.), *Communal conflicts in contemporary Indonesia* (pp. 33-42). Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya.

- Chapman, T., & Roeder, P. G. (2007). "Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 101(4):677–691.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2006). "Post-Conflict Risks." *CSAE Working Paper Series 2006-12*. Oxford, UK: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Davidson J. S. (2003). "The Politics of Violence on an Indonesian Periphery." *Southeast Asia Research*, 11(1), 59-89.
- Denzin, N. K. (2001). The Reflexive Interview and a Performative Social Science." *Qualitative Research* 1(1):23-46.
- Diprose, R. (2007). "Passing on the Challenges or Prescribing Better Management of Diversity? Decentralization, Power-Sharing and Conflict Dynamics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia." *CRISE Working Paper No. 38*. Paper presented at A CRISE Policy Conference, July 9-10, 2007, Oxford, UK.
- Dinas Pendidikan Kota Ambon (2009). *Kurikulum Pendidikan Orang Basudara Maluku, Buku Ajar Guru: Psikososial*. Ambon
- Diprose, R. (2009). "Inequalities and Indirect Conflict Interventions: The Evidence on Perceptions of Difference, Social Cohesion, and Sub-National Variations in Violence in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 2:95–147.
- Djajadi, I. (2004). "Kekerasan Etnik dan Perdamaian Etnik: Menelaah Penyelesaian Tindak Pidana Lintas Etnik di Kalimantan Barat 1999-2003." *Jurnal Sosiologi Masyarakat* 13.
- Djana, A. et al. (2004). *Interaksi Sosial Pasca Konflik Horizontal: Studi Kasus pada Komunitas Islam-Kristen di Kecamatan Tobelo Utara Kabupaten Halmahera Utara*. Makasar, Indonesia: Jurnal Pascasarjana UNHAS
- European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). (2002). *ECRI General Policy Recommendation N°7: National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination*. Strasbourg, France: Author.
- Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90.
- Fearon, J. D & Laitin, D. D. (1996). "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90(4):715-735.
- Galtung, J. (1985). "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses." *Journal of Peace Research* 22(2):141-158.
- Hadi, S. (2005). "Enhancing Local Governance through Decentralization Policy in Managing Conflict Affected Regions in Indonesia." In United Nations, *Decentralization: Poverty Reduction, Empowerment and Participation (Unedited Version)* (pp. 117-129). New York, NY: Author.
- Hendrix, C. (2010). "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(3):273–285.
- Holtzman, S., Elwan, A., & Scott, C. (1998). *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Huber, K., Tindjabate, C., Waru, D., Watson, R., Rahmawati, A., Umrah, Y., Amaya, R., & Indriani, F. (2004). *Menuju pembangunan damai: Membangun kohesi sosial dan rekonsiliasi Sulawesi Tengah dan Maluku Utara (Kajian Tematis)*. Jakarta, Indonesia: UNDP.
- Kaufmann, C. (1996). "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." *International Security* 20(4):136–175.
- Klinken, G. V. (2007). *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. Washington: Routledge.
- Klinken, G. V. (2001). "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back in," In *Indonesia* 71:1-26.
- Kosasih, L. S. (2010). "Chinese Indonesians: Stereotyping, Discrimination and Anti-Chinese Violence in the Context of Structural Changes up to May 1998 Riots." Unpublished master's thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
- Krug, E. G., Dahlberg, L. L., Mercy, J. A., Zwi, A. B., & Lozano, R. (Eds.) (2002). *World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.

- Kumar, K. (1987). "Conducting Focus Group Interviews in Developing Countries." *A.I.D. Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 8*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Kumar, K. (1989). "Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries." *A.I.D. Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 8*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Kusdijono. (2006). "Evaluasi Program Pemulihan dan Pembangunan Pengungsi Madura Pasca Kerusuhan di Kalimantan Barat: Studi Kasus di Tiga Satuan Relokasi di Kecamatan Sungai Raya, Kabupaten Pontianak." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
- Lambourne, W. (2004). "Post-Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation." *Peace, Conflict and Development* 4:1-24.
- Mawdsley, N., Tanuhandaru, M., Holman, K. (2002). *Report of the EC Conflict Prevention Assessment Mission: Indonesia*. Brussel, Belgium: European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit.
- Olzak, S., Shanahan, S., & McEneaney, E. (1996). "Poverty, Segregation, and Race Riots: 1960-1993." *American Sociological Review* 61(4):590-613.
- Pamuji M., N., Horiba, A., Miqdad, M., Gogali, M., & Sipasulta, L. (2008). *Success Story Mekanisme Komunitas dalam Penanganan dan Pencegahan Konflik: Studi Kasus di Desa Wayame (Ambon) dan Desa Tangkura (Poso)*. Jakarta: ITP-FES.
- Pariela, T. D. (2007). "Political Process, Public Policy, and Peace Building Process: Case of Ambon City, Maluku." In K. Matsui (Ed.), *Regional Development Policy and Direct Local-Head Election in Democratizing East Indonesia* (pp. 101-123). Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (3rd Ed.)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Qadeer, M. A. (2003). "Ethnic Segregation in a Multicultural City: The Case of Toronto, Canada." *CERIS Working Paper No. 28*. Toronto, Canada: CERIS.
- Ratnawati, T. (2006). "Antara Kekerasan dan Kontestasi Politik: Membangun Demokrasi Pasca Konflik Kasus Ambon." In T. Ratnawati & N. Kleden-Probonegoro (Eds.). *Wacana Politik dan Budaya di Masa Transisi* (pp. xxx-xxx). Jakarta: LIPI.
- Reskin, B. F., & Bielby, D. B. (2005). "A Sociological Perspective on Gender and Career Outcomes." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(1):71-86.
- Rozi, S. et al. (2006). *Kekerasan Komunal: Anatomi Resolusi Konflik di Indonesia*. Jakarta, Indonesia: P2P LIPI dan Pustaka Pelajar
- Sambanis, N. (2000). "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War." *World Politics* 52:437-483.
- Sihbudi, R. (2001). *Bara dalam Sekam: Identifikasi Akar Masalah dan Solusi atas Konflik-Konflik Lokal di Aceh, Maluku, Papua & Riau*. Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka.
- Smith, C. Q. (2005). "The Roots of Violence and Prospects for Reconciliation: A Case Study of Ethnic Conflict in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia." *Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, 23. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Suaedy, A. (2000). *Luka Maluku: Militer Terlibat*. Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi.
- Sunarto, K., Nathan, M., & Hadi, S. (2005). *Overcoming Violent Conflict (Vol. 2): Peace and Development Analysis in Nusa Tenggara Timur*. Jakarta, Indonesia: UNDP
- Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2004). "Civil Society Engagement and Communal Violence: Reflections of Various Hypotheses in the Context of Indonesia." *Politics Administration and Change* 42:1-18.
- Tanasaldy, T. (2007). "Politik Identitas Etnis di Kalimantan Barat." In H. S. Nordholt & G. Van Klinken (Eds.). *Politik Lokal di Indonesia* (pp. 461-490). Jakarta, Indonesia: Buku Obor & KITLV Jakarta.
- Tomsa, D. (2008). *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era*. New York: Routledge.
- Trijono, L., & Djalong, F. D. (Eds.). (2006). *Masyarakat Sipil dan Pencegahan Konflik Bersenjata: Dari Reaktif ke Preventif (Workshop result in Solo 1-2 December 2005)*. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: CSPS, UNDP, & Bappenas.

- Varshney, A., Panggabean, R., & Tadjoeeddin, M. Z. (2004). "Pattern of Collective violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)." *UNSFIR Working Paper 04/03*. Jakarta, Indonesia: UNSFIR.
- Weidmann, N. B., & Salehyan, I. (2010, May 1). "Violence and Ethnic Segregation: A Computational Model Applied to Baghdad." Paper presented at *The New Faces in Political Methodology III Conference*, Pennsylvania State University.
- Wiseman, J. P., & Aaron, M. A. (2001a). "Observation." In E. Ksenych & D. Liu (Eds.), *Conflict, Order and Action: Reading in Sociology* (pp. 443-447). Toronto, Canada: Canadian Scholar's Press.
- Wisudo, B. (2010). *Bertaruh Nyawa Merajut Damai: Kisah Gerakan Peringatan Dini Konflik di Ambon*. Jakarta: Yayasan Tifa.
- Yuwono, D. B. (2008). "Wayame: Gerakan Multikultural di Tengah Konflik Ambon." *Harmoni: Jurnal Multikultural Multireligius*, 7(27).

DOCUMENTS, REPORTS, NEWSPAPERS, AND MAGAZINES

- Ambonekspres.com, "1066 KK Pengungsi Belum Terlayani." Accessed from <http://www.ambonekspres.com/index.php?option=read&cat=46&id=40569>, on 14 February 2012.
- Antaraneews.com., "Gubernur Maluku Pastikan Ambon sudah Tenang." Accessed from <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/275130/gubernur-maluku-pastikan-ambon-sudah-tenang>, on 19 May 2013.
- Bappenas. (2009). *Pidato Kenegaraan Tahun 2009*. Accessed from <http://bappenas.go.id/node/42/2158/pidato-kenegaraan-tahun-2009/>, on 5 June 2012.
- Bappenas. (2010). *Lampiran Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 5 Tahun 2010 tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) Tahun 2010-2014*. Jakarta: Author.
- BPS Sensus Penduduk 2010.
- BPS Kota Ambon, 2012.
- BeritaMaluku.com, "Sepi Pembeli, Pasar Valentin Ambon Tidak Layak." Accessed from <http://www.beritamaluku.com/2013/03/sepi-pembeli-pasar-valentine-tidak.html>
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), *Task-Framework: Post Conflict Reconstruction*, Mei 2012.
- Depkes.go.id., "Kerusuhan Sosial di Kota Ambon, Maluku." Accessed from <http://penanggulangankrisis.depkes.go.id/article/view/6/1630/KONFLIK-SOSIAL-DI-DELI-SERDANG.htm>, on 12 May 2013.
- International Contact Group. (2012, February 13). *Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon (Asia Briefing No. 133)*. Jakarta/Brussels: Author.
- Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Directorate General for Social Protection and Assurance (2012). *Petunjuk Teknis Kekeragaman Sosial Berbasis Masyarakat*.
- Kompasiana.com, "Bentrok Maluku, 5 Tewas." Accessed from: <http://regional.kompasiana.com/2012/12/30/bentrok-maluku5-warga-tewas--520821.html>, on 14 February 2013.
- Kompas.com., "Kronologi Kerusuhan Ambon." Accessed from <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2011/09/11/19145665/Kronologi.Kerusuhan.Ambon>, on 19 May 2013.
- Kompas, "Damai Tak Tergoyahkan di Wayame", 21 May 2004.
- Report on Verification Team on Data of the Remaining Number of Social Conflict Refugee Victims in the Molucan Province, June 2012.
- Merdeka.com., "Tiga Rumah Dibakar dalam Kerusuhan di Ambon." Accessed from <http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tiga-rumah-dibakar-dalam-kerusuhan-di-ambon.html>, on 18 May 2013.
- Okezone.com., "Korban Kerusuhan Ambon Akibat Luka Tembak." Accessed from <http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/09/12/340/501602/korban-kerusuhan-ambon-tewas-akibat-luka-tembak>, on 17 May 2013.

- Okezone.com., "Seratusan Rumah Hangus, Warga Ambon Mengungsi." Accessed from <http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/09/12/340/501614/seratusan-rumah-hangus-warga-ambon-mengungsi>, on 19 May 2013.
- Ambon City Local Regulations (Perda)*, No. 4 Year 2006, on *Ambon City Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP)*, Years 2006-2026.
- Ambon City Local Regulation (Perda) Kota Ambon* No. 2 Year 2006.
- Primanita, A. (2012, Januari 17). "Konflik Komunal dan Politik Mewarnai Tahun 2012-2014." Berita Satu. Retrieved from <http://www.beritasatu.com/hukum/26381-konflik-komunal-dan-politik-mewarnai-tahun-2012-2014.html>
- Radioaustralia.net.au., "Korban Tewas Kerusakan Ambon Menjadi 7 Orang." Accessed from <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2011-09-14/korban-tewas-kerusakan-ambon-menjadi-7-orang/93306>, pada 19 May 2013.
- Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJM)*, Years 2006-2011.
- Santoso, A. (2006). "Ambon Ulang Tahun Damai, tapi Pengungsi Masih Terabaikan" (Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, 06 September 2006). Accessed on 6 June 2012 from <http://www.mail-archive.com/berita@listserv.rnw.nl/msg01119.html>
- Siwalimanews.com, "November, Penanganan Pengungsi Tuntas." Accessed from http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/november_penanganan_pengungsi_kota_ambon_tuntas, on 14 February 2012.
- Siwalimanews.com, "Gubernur Diminta Batalkan Rencana Tambah TNI BKO, 11 Oktober 2011." Taken from http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/gubernur_diminta_batalkan_rencana_tambah_tni_bko., on November 25, 2013.
- Tempo.co, "Sekelompok Pemuda Dicegat, Ambon Tegang." Accessed from <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/05/15/058403959/Sekelompok-Pemuda-Dicegat-Kota-Ambon-Tegang>, on 17 May 2013.
- Law No. 20 Year 1958 on Establishment of Autonomous Region Level 1 of Mollucas.

Index

- personnel 42, 74, 83, 92, 106-114, 118, 122, 126, 128, 153, 162, 168
Arabization 94
- Batu Merah 6, 19, 25, 27, 29, 31, 39, 42, 44, 54, 62-63, 72, 85-88, 100, 103, 105, 120-123
BBM (Butonese, Bugis, Makassarese) 3, 25
Biking Panas Pela 89, 90, 165
BKO xiv, 13, 103, 108, 109, 110, 115-116, 161-162, 168
Brimob (mobile brigade) 111
- enclave* 5
de-escalation xi, 7, 44, 56
deconstruction 84
de-segregation 58, 59, 164, 165
discrimination xiv, xv, 28, 72-77, 83, 121, 163, 166-169
- ethnicity 5, 10, 15, 23, 74
- forced segregation* 8, 11-12
- Gandong* 20, 29, 30, 60, 64, 81, 89, 90, 96, 126-127, 150, 162, 165
GMKI ix
Golkar 22
GPM xvi, 21, 45, 65, 68, 81, 83, 91, 96, 118, 123, 126, 145, 163
- heterogeneous xii-xiii, 31, 41-42, 45, 57, 92, 100, 124, 146, 159-160
HMI ix
homogeneous xii, 31, 41-42, 45, 159
- Islam(ic) xii, xiv-xvi, 3, 6, 16, 19, 27-28, 31-33, 42, 58, 63, 73-74, 76, 78-79, 83-84, 86-87, 89, 91-97, 99-100, 104, 112-113, 117, 119, 121, 123, 126-127, 129, 131, 145, 147, 155, 159, 163, 166
Islamization 30, 154
- violence xi-xii, xiv-xvi, 1-5, 7-13, 16, 20, 23, 25, 30, 38, 39, 41-46, 68, 70-71, 80-81, 83, 86, 88, 92, 97, 99-115, 117-125, 127-129, 131, 145-146, 148-155, 158, 161-165, 167-169
inter-faith violence 2
Police 16-17, 102, 107-108, 162
Social Harmony iv, xiii, 60-63, 140, 141, 160
colonial 28, 95, 96
Komnas HAM (National Commission on Human Rights) 36-37, 39, 54, 116, 163
conflict xi-xvi, 1-14, 16-21, 23-36, 38-50, 53-57, 59-61, 63-72, 76-86, 88-94, 96-97, 99-113, 115, 117-118, 122-125, 127-128, 130-131, 145-151, 153-154, 156, 158-169
1999 conflict 4, 33, 36, 38-39, 41-43, 46, 48, 56, 68, 70-72, 76, 78-81, 83-84, 86, 88-90, 92, 160-161, 166
Ambon conflict 1, 3, 33, 45, 50, 69, 92, 107, 166
Violent conflicts xi, 1-2, 4, 16, 30, 97, 145, 148
Christian xii, xiv-xvi, 3, 6, 16, 19-23, 25-33, 39, 41-43, 45, 49, 53, 58, 60, 63, 67, 70-71, 73-76, 78-79, 81-97, 99, 100-105, 107-111, 113, 115, 117-120, 122-123, 125-126, 128-131, 137, 141, 143, 145-150, 152-153, 155-157, 159, 161, 163-164, 166
Christianization 30, 154
Kudamati 6, 19, 21, 31-32, 42, 53, 86-88, 103, 113, 117

Latupati xvi, 18, 92, 109, 123, 124, 148, 149, 164
NGOs xvi, 4-5, 12, 15-16, 23-24, 28, 33, 42-45, 47, 68, 69, 101, 106-107, 113, 119, 131, 151-158, 163

Mardika xiii-xiv, 19, 25, 46, 49, 63, 66-67, 72, 74, 80, 88, 101-107, 109-111, 115, 117, 123, 130, 142, 160-161, 165
civil problems 44, 53
majority xiv, 27, 29, 32, 42, 44-45, 72, 74, 85-86, 88, 116, 130, 147-148
minority xiii, 30, 31, 39, 43-45, 72, 147, 160
Muslim xii, xv, 7, 19, 20-21, 23, 25-32, 39, 41-43, 45-46, 49, 53, 60-61, 63, 67, 70-71, 73-76, 78, 79, 82, 84-91, 93, 95, 96, 99, 101-102, 105-108, 110-111, 117-121, 125-126, 128, 130, 145-146, 147-150, 161, 163-164, 167

Orang Basudara iv, xiii-xiv, 63-66, 160, 161, 165
New Order 1, 21, 29

market xiv, xvi, 7, 15, 19, 25, 31, 66, 69, 72, 74, 84, 88, 123, 130-131, 142, 149, 151, 161, 163, 165
Mardika Market 19, 25, 74, 88, 130, 142
Velentin Market 74, 88
PDI-P 21-22
Pela 20, 29, 30, 60, 64, 65, 81, 89-91, 96, 126-127, 150, 162, 165
Pela Gandong 20, 60, 64, 81, 89, 90, 96, 126, 127, 150, 162, 165
development xiii-xiv, 3-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 22, 24-25, 28-29, 33-34, 40, 53, 56-64, 66-69, 71-72, 80, 82, 93, 99, 100, 103, 112, 115-116, 152-153, 160-161, 164-169
government xi-xii, 2-5, 7-8, 10-13, 15, 25, 28-29, 32-44, 48, 50, 52-56, 59, 61-62, 65, 67-69, 73-74, 83, 93, 95, 96, 104, 120, 122, 125, 127, 129, 149-153, 155-156, 159-160, 164-165
refugees xii-xiii, 3-4, 7, 9-13, 16, 19, 21, 32-41, 43-50, 52-55, 73-74, 79, 85, 89, 91, 97, 101, 106-112, 115, 117, 120-121, 125, 127-128, 154-155, 159-160, 163, 167
peace vii-viii, xv-xvi, 1, 8, 10-11, 16, 23, 26-27, 38, 47, 53, 56, 61, 65, 70-71, 75, 78, 80, 82, 89-91, 93, 97, 99, 104, 107-109, 118, 120-123, 125-131, 145-148, 150-158, 162-164, 167
women xvi, 42, 44-45, 47, 68, 91, 101, 106-107, 113, 119, 131, 145, 149, 151-155, 157-158, 163
Malino Peace Agreement 3, 97
inter-community meeting xiv, 57, 160-161, 165
persaudaraan xiii, 57, 60, 66-67, 69-71, 80, 86, 89-91, 93, 96, 131, 150, 160
local leadership election (pilkada) 22, 23, 129, 154
local leader xv, 117, 126, 157, 163
power sharing 23, 77
project-oriented 156

Reform 1, 21, 28
reconciliation xiii, 9-10, 12, 56-57, 66, 160, 164, 165
relocation xii-xiii, 2, 4, 10, 12, 33, 38-41, 43-48, 54, 72, 74, 85, 86, 159-160, 164, 167
representation 129

Salam 6
Sarani 6
segregation xi-xii, xiv-xvi, 2, 4-13, 16, 27-28, 30, 32-33, 42, 44-45, 57-60, 63, 67-68, 70, 72, 75, 89, 92, 95-96, 99-101, 105, 131, 146-148, 151-153, 159-165
post-conflict segregation xi-xii, xiv, 4, 7, 9, 16, 33, 45, 57, 60, 63, 100, 159, 161, 163
social segregation 6, 96
socio-spatial segregation xii, 8, 159
spatial segregation 68, 75, 165
segregation in mind 6, 31

land dispute 1, 40, 167
land certification xii, 159, 167
Sirimau 17-20, 22, 25, 29, 58, 68, 100
Soeharto 1

TNI (Indonesian Military) xiv, 16-17, 99, 103, 108-111, 116, 152, 161-162, 168
traditional figures xv, 16, 32, 92, 109, 117, 123, 163
religious figures xv, 16, 27, 109, 117, 120, 125, 146-147, 163
trauma xiii-xiv, xvi, 19-20, 39, 42-43, 49, 59-60, 68-72, 77-78, 82, 85-86, 88, 113, 116, 150, 154, 160-161, 163,
165-166
trust xiv, 82, 86, 161, 166
trust-building xiv, 161, 166

UNDP 64, 127
UNICEF 64, 65
unintended consequences xii, 4, 33, 159
Unpatti (Universitas Pattimura) 22, 64, 74-77, 86, 90, 109, 113, 116, 122, 130

Waihaong 6, 21, 31, 32, 42, 45, 87-88, 102, 113, 115, 122
Waiheru 42, 122, 155
Waringin 30-31, 45-46, 49, 52, 54, 79-80, 83, 87-88, 92, 97, 101-103, 106-110, 113, 115, 120-121, 153-155
Westernization 94

Annexes

ATTACHMENT 1: FORM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Interview # :
Interviewee(s) :
Age :
Gender :
Occupation :
Affiliation :

Date and time :
Location of interview :
Researchers :

ATTACHMENT 2: INTERVIEW HOST

RESEARCH QUESTION NO. 1:

How did segregation emerge/grow after the peace in Ambon?

Related Informants

Local academicians; NGO activists related to social issues especially peace; religious figures; traditional figures; conflict actors (previous perpetrators and conflict victims)

Interview questions:

—For non-actor conflicts (local academicians; NGO activities related to social issues related to peace; religious figures; traditional figures tokoh adat)

1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?
2. How do you see the inter-group relationship and/or inter-community relationship before and after the conflict?
3. According to you how can these groups be formed?
4. How do you see the solidarity built among group/community members?
5. According to you, how does identity of each group increasingly get strong compared to before the conflict?
6. What are the factors that contribute to the unification of the existing groups? Ethnicity? Religion? Geography? Others?
7. What are the factors that contribute to the division of the existing groups? Ethnicity? Religion? Geography? Others?
8. How does the division of the groups grow after the conflict?
9. How do you see the dividing process of the groups after the conflict?
10. How do you describe the type of group division after the conflict?
11. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and distinction in this area on the services provided to them?
12. What are discriminatory experiences already reported by groups in this area in the economic sector? Social sector? Political sector? Educational sector? Health services and others?
13. For the present time, how is the geographical distribution of the groups after the conflict?
14. What are the motivations and interests that support the existence of each group?

—For conflict actors (previous perpetrator, conflict victim and/or whose group is segregated)

1. In brief, could you describe your role and position in the society/ your group?
2. How do you see your group identity in relations with that of the other group?

3. According to you, why is your group separated from another group after the conflict? How do you see this?
4. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and distinction in this area for your group?
5. How do you see the division process of your group with another group after the conflict?
6. How do you describe the type of division between your group and another group after the conflict?
7. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and in this area on the services provided to your group?
8. What are discriminatory experiences already reported by your group in this area in the economic sector? Social sector? Political sector? Educational sector? Health services and others?

RESEARCH QUESTION 2:

What are the impacts of post-conflict development reconstruction policy on the emergence and strengthening of segregation in Ambon?

Relevant Informants:

Government elements (mayor, Local Development Planning Board/Bappeda, Social Affair Office, Religious Affairs Office, Spatial Planning Office, Health Office, Education Office, etc.); Security elements (TNI and Police, civilian security task force); economic elements (sellers and business people); society elements accessing health, education services, etc.

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?
2. What are the programs already implemented after the conflict by government, LSM, or private sectors/ employers?
3. What are the key priorities of post-conflict development?
4. In your opinion, is the determination of the priorities in line with the society's needs in general?
5. In your opinion, how have the post-conflict development programs created group segregation?
6. Could you describe or give examples of particular development programs that have contributed to the creation and strengthening of group division after the conflict?
7. In your opinion, why is group division conducted as integral part of post-conflict development?
8. How do you see that the post-conflict development has only benefited particular groups?
9. What are the executed development programs but according to you are not conducive in the post-conflict situation?
10. What kind of programs should have been implemented, but have not been realized/ have not been realized yet?
11. In your opinion, among the divided groups, which one has bigger access to services and/or "cake" of the post-conflict development?

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 3:

How is the relationship between segregation and emergence of violence in post-conflict Ambon?

Relevant informants:

Local academicians, security elements; traditional elements; religious elements; youth elements

Interview questions:

1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?
2. How do you describe frictions between groups/ communities in the area?

3. What are the factors that incite the post-conflict frictions?
4. How do you see the violence occur between groups in the area after the conflict?
5. How does the group division trigger inter-group violence? How often does it occur?
6. How is the competition between the groups in accessing development programs?
7. How far does the competition increase tension and even violence against the other group? Why?
8. To what extent does the division hamper inter-group communications and interactions?
9. How can you describe lack of or absence of inter-group communications and interactions as the result from division policy which increases tension and/or brings about inter-group violence after the conflict?
10. What are the roles of each group in maintaining calmness and peace in the area? How do all the groups work together to defent such thing?
11. How effective is the role of group leaders in calming down their members in the occurrence of inter-group violence? What are the measures taken by them to calm their members down?
12. How much do group members believe in their leaders? What are the factors that make them believe?

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4:

What are the roles of civil society organizations (LSM) in handling segregation and the impacts on the emergence of violent conflicts in Ambon?

Relevant informants

Religious elements (FKUB, Muslim society organizations, and Christian society organizations, etc.); civil society elements (LSM activists related to social issues, especially peace); youth elements (youth leaders, *karang taruna*, etc).

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?
2. How big is the society's trust in the organizations which they considered helping the establishment of post-conflict conducive situation? Government organizations? Law enforcing organizations? LSM? Communications Forums?
3. What are the organizations that actively participate in the creation of peaceful situation?
4. How is the role of your organization in reconciling the conflicting parties?
5. How would you describe your organization's preparedness in preventing inter-group violence in the area?
6. What are the methods used or applied by your organization to prevent and handle the post-conflict violence?
7. What has your organization done in managing the group division problems in the area?
8. How do you see the position of your organization in overcoming the emerging inter-group problems?
9. In your opinion, what are the interest, goal and purpose of your organization in handling segregation and violence resulting from it?
10. So far, in your opinion, how effective and/or successful are the efforts taken by your organization to handle such segregation?
11. In your opinion, how are cultural values and local traditions utilized by your organization or other organizations in helping overcome inter-group tension and in the area?
12. How far has your organization involved women's role in handling inter-group differences and violence?
13. How do you see women's roles in widening or bridging inter-group differences and violence?

Profile of Research Team

Mohammad Hasan Ansori is a researcher at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of the sociology department at Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta. He obtained his Ph.D. in sociology from University of Hawaii, Manoa, USA in 2011. His research focus includes conflict and peace studies, social movements, consumerism and culture of classes, as well as ethnic relationship.

Rudi Sukandar is advisor to SNPK team and lectures at STIKOM London School of Public Relations-Jakarta (LSPR). He obtained his Ph.D. from School of Communication Studies, Ohio University, Athens OH. The research topic includes inter-personal, organizational and communal communications and conflicts.

Sopar Peranto is a research at SNPK-THC program. He completed his bachelor degree in Sociology Department of University of Indonesia's Faculty of Social and Political Science (FISIP). His researches mainly focus on conflict and violence issues in Indonesia.

Fathun Karib is a research at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of Sociology Department at Jakarta Islamic State University, and of International Relations Department at Paramadina University. He completed his master degree in South-east Asian Studies in University of Passau, Germany in 2013. His study interests include development, natural resource conflicts, disasters as socio-political phenomenon.

Sofyan Cholid is a researcher at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of Social Welfare Science Departement at University of Indonesia. He got his master degree in Geography from the University of Indonesia. His research interest includes social planning sector.

Imron Rasyid is the *project manager* of SNPK-THC program. He completed his bachelor degree in Anthropology at the Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He has interests and is active in various studies on conflicts and violence. He engages in various program evaluations in various organizations.

THE HABIBIE CENTER

The Habibie Center was established by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and the family in 1999 as an independent, non-government and non-profit organization. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society based on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values. The missions of The Habibie Center are, firstly, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects and promotes human rights, to carry out studies and advocacy to issues on progress of democracy and human rights, and secondly, to improve effective human resource management and dissemination of technologies.

Address: Jl. Kemang Selatan No. 98, Jakarta Selatan 12560, Indonesia
Ph. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7211 | Fax. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7212
E-mail: nvms@habibiecenter.or.id | www.habibiecenter.or.id
[@habibiecenter](https://facebook.com/habibiecenter)

NATIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING SYSTEM (SNPK)

SNPK is a breakthrough in the information system which provides data and analysis on conflicts and violence occurring in various regions across Indonesia. The SNPK projects are led by The Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, with support from World Bank and The Habibie Center. The main activities of SNPK are *firstly*, detailed and regular collection of data on when, where, how and why violence occurs and what the impacts are. The SNPK's data have been collected since 1998 and updated on monthly basis and presented through SNPK portal (www.snpk-indonesia.com); *secondly*, analysis on the data collected and researches on conflicts and violence. SNPK is earmarked as a reference to the development of policies and programs of violence handling and prevention.

To date, SNPK covers thirteen regions, namely: Aceh, Lampung, the Greater Jakarta, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Papua, West Papua. Currently expansion of the coverage is underway in order that violence data from all parts of Indonesia will be made available in the future.