Post-Conflict Democracy, Violence, and Peace-Building in Aceh and Maluku

NATIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING SYSTEM (NVMS/SNPK)
THE HABIBIE CENTER (THC)

Post-Conflict Democracy, Violence, and Peace-Building in Aceh and Maluku

NATIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING SYSTEM (NVMS/SNPK)
THE HABIBIE CENTER (THC)

RESEARCH TEAM

Mohammad Hasan Ansori
R. Praditya Andika Putra
Johari Efendi
Sopar Peranto
Rudi Sukandar
Imron Rasyid
Sofyan Cholid
Fathun Karib
Vidya Hutagalung

The Habibie Center

SNPK SISTEM NASIONAL PEMANTAUAN KEKERASAN INDONESIA

POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRACY, VIOLENCE, AND PEACE-BUILDING IN ACEH AND MALUKU

National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK)
The Habibie Center (THC)

Research Team
Mohammad Hasan Ansori
R. Praditya Andika Putra
Johari Efendi
Sopar Peranto
Rudi Sukandar
Imron Rasyid
Sofyan Cholid
Fathun Karib
Vidya Hutagalung

Cover photo retrieved from umdah.co dan siwalima.com.

Preface

Studies on democracy development and peace-building in post-conflict areas in Indonesia have been conducted with consideration that beside halting conflicts and reaching peace deals, maintaining peace by preserving political dynamics and development is very important and challenging. Beside that, many recent studies were conducted with more focus on the dynamics of conflicts and violence during the conflict and post-conflict periods. There are few studies that focus on how post-conflict democratization is sustained to preserve developmental process and maintain peace. The study is expected to fill in such gap.

All of the views in this publication are those from the Habibie Center's NVMS research team and do not reflect the view of other program partner institutions.

Finally, we hope this research would be useful and contribute to the discourse of democracy development and peace-building.

Peace,
NVMS-THC Team

List of Abbreviation and Acronym

AMM : Aceh Monitoring Mission

APBD : *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (Local Government Budget)

Bappeda : *Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah* (Local Development and Planning Agency)

Bawaslu : *Badan Pengawas Pemilu* (General Election Supervisory Body)

BBM : Buton, Bugis, and Makasar

BPS : *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics)

BRA : *Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh* (Aceh Reintegration and Peace Agency)

Caleg : *Calon Legislatif* (Legislative Candidate)

CSO : *Civil Society Organization*

Depag : *Departemen Agama* (Ministry of Religious Affairs)

DKPP : *Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu* (Election Organizers Ethics Council)

DPR : *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (House of Representatives)

DPRA : *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh* (Aceh Legislative Council)

DPRD : *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (Local Legislative Council)

DPT : *Daftar Pemilih Tetap* (Permanent Voters List)

FKUB : *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (Inter-Faith Forum)

Gakkumdu : *Penegakan Hukum Terpadu Pemilihan Umum* (General Election's Integrated Law Enforcement)

GAM : *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Aceh Freedom Movement)

Golkar : *Golongan Karya* Party

GPM : *Gereja Protestan Maluku* (Maluku Protestant Church)

H20 : Humam-Hasbi

HAM : *Hak Asasi Manusia* (Human Rights)

IAIN : *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (State Islamic Institute)

IGI : Indonesia Governance Index

IPM : *Indeks Pembangunan Manusia* (Human Development Index)

ITDM : *Institut Tifa Damai Maluku* (Maluku Peaceful Tifa Institute)

JKA : *Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh* (Aceh Health Insurance)

JKRA : *Jaminan Kesehatan Rakyat Aceh* (Aceh People Health Insurance)
Kesbangpol : *Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik* (National and Political Unity)
KIP : *Komisi Independen Pemilihan* (Independent Election Commission)
KKN : *Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme* (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism)
KPPS : *Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara* (Voting Organizing Group)
KPU : *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (General Election Commission)
KPUD : *Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah* (Local Election Commission)
KTP : *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (Identity Card)
LAIM : *Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku* (Maluku Interfaith Institute)
LSM : *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* (Non Governmental Organization)
Migas : *Minyak dan Gas Bumi* (Oil and Natural Gas)
MK : *Mahkamah Konstitusi* (Constitutional Court)
MoU : Memorandum of Understanding
MUI : *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Indonesian *Ulama* Council)
NGO : *Non-Governmental Oragnization*
NU : Nahdlatul Ulama
Ormas : *Organisasi Masyarakat* (Community-Based Organization)
PA : *Partai Aceh* (Aceh Party)
PAD : *Pemasukan Asli Daerah* (Local Revenue)
Panwaslih : *Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan* (Election Supervisory Committee)
Panwaslu : *Panitia Pengawas Pemilu* (General Election Supervisory Committee)
Parlok : *Partai Lokal* (Local Party)
PDA : *Partai Damai Aceh* (Aceh Peaceful Party)
PDIP : *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PDRB : *Produk Domestik Regional Bruto* (Gross Regional Domestic Product)
Pemda : *Pemerintahan Daerah* (Local Government)
Pemilukada : *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah* (Direct Elections for Local Leaders)
PKB : *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party)
PKS : *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party)
PLN : *Perusahaan Listrik Nasional* (National Electricity Company)

PNA	:	*Partai Nasional Aceh* (National Aceh Party)
Polda	:	*Kepolisian Daerah* (Local Police)
Polres	:	*Kepolisian Resort* (Resort Police)
PP	:	*Peraturan Pemerintah* (Government Regulation)
PPK	:	*Panitia Pelaksana Kecamatan* (Sub-district Implementing Committee)
PPP	:	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity Party)
PPS	:	*Panitia Pemungutan Suara* (Voting Committee)
RMS	:	*Republik Maluku Selatan* (South Maluku Republic)
SARA	:	*Suku, Agama dan Ras* (Tribe, Religion and Race)
SBT	:	*Seram Bagian Timur* (Eastern Seram)
SD	:	*Sekolah Dasar* (Elementary School)
SDM	:	*Sumber Daya Manusia* (Human Resources)
SIRA	:	*Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh* (Aceh Referendum Information Center)
SKPD	:	*Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah* (Regional Administrative Working Unit)
SMA	:	*Sekolah Menengah Akhir* (Senior High School)
SMP	:	*Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (Junior High School)
SMS	:	*Short Message Service*
SNPK	:	*Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan* (National Violence Monitoring System)
TPS	:	*Tempat Pemungutan Suara* (Polling Station)
Unpatti	:	*Universitas Pattimura* (Pattimura University)
UUPA	:	*Undang-undang Pemerintahan Aceh* (Aceh Government Law)

Executive Summary

Nowadays conflicts and violence have been one of the most crucial global agenda and received deep attention from the world leaders, especially after the colonialism and the Cold War. In the context of Indonesia, after the fall of the New Order in late 1990s, conflicts took place consecutively in Central Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, starting in December 1996. All the conflicts experienced de-escalation, if not significantly settled, at the end of 2002, except for the Aceh conflict that was settled through Helsinki Peace Agreement in August 2005. The post-conflict election was then considered a strategic instrument for conflict settlement and peace-building (peace-settlement) in the post-conflict regions.

In the academic horizon, post-conflict direct elections for local leaders are a creative innovation taken by the second generation of peace-keeping operations and expand after the end of the Cold War. Various studies on elections and post conflicts have been taken. However, few initiatives or studies focus on the interaction between post-conflict election and peace-building and the generated effects in a deep and systematic manner, especially in Indonesia. Theoretically and technically speaking, some important factors/issues related to the study of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders are governance, institutional infrastructure of the implementation of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders, and potential violence/conflict.

Based on such issues, some questions are formulated as follows. 1. In which level post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku can help build democracy and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) or on the contrary? 2. How does post-conflict governance help build democracy in Aceh and Maluku? 3. To what extent is the institutional and social preparedness in the implementation of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku? 4. How do conflicts and violence occur in the post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku? Such questions above provide an explicit and brief picture of the study's goal, namely to explain and describe the condition and dynamics and challenges of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders; post-conflict governance which is the product of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders; institutional infrastructure of implementation of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders; potential for and threats of conflicts and violence that often accompany post-conflict direct elections for local leaders.

Methodologically, based on the NVMS data on the incents and impacts related to direct elections for local leaders in Indonesia (2005-2013), the study decided to carry out comparative analysis on two different cases namely post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku. The NVMS data has become a kind of pathway to the establishment of the thematic study. The study's in-depth qualitative approach serves as basic rationale for adopting interviews as the primary method of data collection. Beside the primary data, the study also uses secondary data, including the data stored in general data archive, special collection, publishing company, public report and documents as well as academic publication. Based on the strategy of purposive sampling strategy and in-depth consideration of distribution of various informant dimensions, the study has collected a total number of 68 informants (Aceh=34 people and Maluku=34 people) during two phase field activities between June and November 2014.

In summary, the findings of the research show that the implementation of the post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Maluku is in general relatively better than in Aceh, with various dynamics and unique challenges in each region. This condition is considered to be a reflection from different conflict characters in both regions. From the technical/procedural aspects of implementation, both ran smoothly according to the general standard for the implementation of direct elections for local leaders. However, many criticisms were addressed to the implementers of the direct elections for local leaders in Aceh that were regarded being not neutral. Such condition was much caused by the KIP Aceh selection done by DPRA. Then, in at a particular level, the implementation of direct elections for local leaders can be regarded as relatively helpful for consolidating and building peace in both regions. However, criticisms were addressed to the level of peace in Aceh which is considered not to have touched the substantial issues of peace. An important factor that is considered as support to build peace and Aceh and maintain the stability is the victory of Aceh Party (PA) which then places many of its cadres in various centers of power in Aceh, both in legislative and executive ones, and specially in the position of Aceh Governor. Meanwhile, in Maluku the issue refers to power sharing which is the local creative initiative, cultural entity "*Pela Gandong*", and post-conflict increasingly strengthened public awareness.

Some criticisms related to the post-conflict development of democracy in Aceh cover 1. many threats and intimidation; 2. Unfairness and partiality of organizers of direct elections for local leaders, including *KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS*; 3. Increased *money politics*; 4. Intervention by those in power on the elections results. In Maluku, the issue refers specifically to the increasingly strong *money politics*. Money politics is considered to gain more strength after the conflicts. Besides that, in Maluku there is still partiality among some or-

ganizers of the direct elections for local leaders, as seen in some certain cases. The threat of instability in the execution of direct election for local leaders in Aceh tends to take the form of inter-civilians conflicts and violence, both between Aceh Party supporters and non-Aceh Party supporter and between the supporters or between Aceh Party elites. In another hand, the threat and potential of disability in Maluku tend to refer to political provocations during the elections by using religious variables, both via SMS or leaflets. From the aspect of actors, the threat of disability may come from individuals or groups or particular community organizations.

In the governance context, accountability in Aceh is still considered poor. Even, the growing public opinion says that there is no difference between the non-GAM leaders and former GAM. The assessment was caused by several factors. The elected authorities (1) are considered to lie much and not to keep their promises; 2. tend more to enrich themselves than to think about the people and make the people prosperous; 3. do not want and cannot listen to public aspiration and voices; 4. do not make much changes; 5. apply lots of violent methods. Comparatively speaking, accountability in Maluku tends to be better. In relation to corruption issues, both regions are relatively similar, in which law enforcement related to corruption is relatively weak. Then, public transparency is still an issue and an object of many criticisms in Aceh and Maluku, both transparency related to recruitment of public officials and projects' tenders as well as local governments' finance. Related to public participation in the post-conflict local election both provinces almost shared the score and reduced dynamics. Overall, public participation in the post-conflict local election in both regions is relatively good. Lastly, the law enforcement in Aceh is considered to be poorer than in Maluku, especially in relation to violent issues and violations in the post-conflict local election implementation.

With regard to the institutional infrastructure readiness for post-conflict local election, KIP Aceh and the Maluku Local Election Commission (KPUD) have similar issues related to the human resource capacity and integrity at the grass root level. Another issue is related to the neutrality of the organizers. However, Maluku is considered to be better in responding to the problem. The issue in Aceh rather moves to the mechanism of KIP selection by DPRA. Especially for Maluku, limited physical infrastructures become a significant obstacle for post-conflict local election organizing institution. Maluku's archipelagic condition has made it difficult for KPUD and General Election Supervisory Body (*Bawaslu*) to do mobilization because of limited sea transport. The limitation has impacted the distribution of ballot boxes. Less adequate communications infrastructure has become an obstacle for them to foster inter-area coordination. The mobilization and communications difficulties are also experienced by the Police as their role is important in

order to maintain the conducive implementation of post-conflict local election. Related to the role of political parties, Aceh and Maluku share the same problem. There are three functions of parties that need improving. They are less sustainable reorganization capacity, internalization of democratic values in getting powers and ability to handle conflicts.

In the dimension of security and violent occurrence, the post-conflict local election in Maluku is relatively safer and stable compared to that in Aceh which are filled with violence, intimidation as well as horizontal conflicts. Even the violence and intimidation tend to rise and almost spread evenly, instead of reduction, in the post-conflict local election in 2012. Therefore, there is some degraded implementation of *pemilukada* in Aceh. In Maluku, sporadic violence can only be spotted in Southeast Maluku, Tual City, and SBT (Eastern Seram). Competition among former GAM personnel is considered to have made the intensity of post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh higher both in term of quantity and impacts. The supporting factor for the occurrence of violence in Aceh is the wide circulation of arms. In Maluku, even though there is no information on the circulation of arms, the violence that uses arms in post-conflict local election does not occur at all. The most incidents are torture and fight between the success team and supporters of different candidates. At the grass root level, the bitter experiences of the Acehnese and Maluku people have motivated them to prioritize peaceful environment and stability rather than conflict and violence.

Daftar Isi

PHOTOS

PICTURES

GRAPHICS

Introduction

I.   BACKGROUND

Nowadays phenomena of conflicts and violence have been one of the most crucial global agenda and received deep attention from the world leaders, especially after the colonialism and the Cold War (e.g. Connor 2004; Bakwesegha 2004; Hechter 2004; Hale 2008; Horowitz 1985). Such attention is obvious from various efforts from scientific disciplines to explain conflict issues (e.g. Dahrendorf 1967; Coser 1967; Collins 2008; Oberschall 1978; Rex 1981; Bernard 1950; Robinson 2001; Schulze 2004, 1997; Aspinall 2009, 2008, 2005; Fearon & Laitin 1996; Miller 2009; Cramer 2007; Mancini 2008; Stewart 2008), dan menyelesaikan konflik (e.g. Jeong 1999; Isenhart & Spangle 2000; Moore 2003; Mayer 2000; Fisher, et al. 1991; Schellenberg 1996; Fisher, et al. 1994; Ury 2000).

Conflict analysts regard Indonesia, Thailand, The Philippines, and Myanmar as countries of a long history of conflicts and violence in Southeast Asia. In particular, Indonesia having more than 250 million of people and more than 300 ethnical groups is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world (Mancini 2008, p. 112; Malley 2002, p. 172; Ross 2005, p. 36). This heterogeneity is then reflected in a current national model of Indonesia that is often perceived as a product of negation of various interests, both ethnicity and religion (Bertrand 2004, h. 4). However, various forms of large-scale violent conflicts emerged drastically in the archipelagic country in the fall of the New Order in late 1990's. Conflicts took place consecutively in Central Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, starting in December 1996 (Bertrand 2008, p. 425). All the conflicts experienced de-escalation, if not significantly settled, at the end of 2002, except for the Aceh conflict that was settled through Helsinki Peace Agreement in August 2005 (Bertrand 2008).

One of the conflict settlement forms including post-conflict peace-building (*peace-settlement*) is the execution of post-conflict election. Elections and democracy are regarded as one of the conflict management forms on the assumption that the benefit of this democratic competition will become a strategic instrument to manage tension and conflicts in the society including post-conflict society. (Przeworski 1991, in Reilly 2008). With various reasons, post-conflict elections are widely regarded as an integral part of the main process and method for peaceful end to violence/war and state-nation building

(Reilly 2008; Korth, 2011). In other words, post-conflict elections become validation for peace-building (peace-settlement) by the society and simultaneously become the foundation of the democratization process (Oliva 2011).

Democratic intervention in simultaneous violence/conflict settlement and peace-building started to become stronger at the end of the Cold War and fall of Soviet Union in early 1990s that brought about a huge impact on the victory of liberal democratic ideology and spread the wind of democratization across the world. Besides that, contextually the end of the Cold War was then followed by an eruption of various wars and conflicts countries. Jarstad and Sisk (2008) even emphasized that no post-Cold War civil wars that were settled by peace agreements had followed regional partition process (regional proliferation). It must be admitted that new states that emerged after the Cold War were not products of peace agreement negotiation. Timor Leste, for instance, is a negotiation result between Indonesia and Portugal, instead of peace agreement result between Indonesia and Fretilin.

Contextually speaking, the term of post-conflict election is a creative innovation taken by the second generation of the peace keeping operations and then expands after the halt of the Cold War. Jarstad and Sisk (2008, p. 2) emphasized that since 1990's democracy has been an integral part of international peace-building missions during the widespread eruption of civil wars. Namibia and El Salvador are the first states that applied the method (Oliva 2011). Besides those two states, the states that have applied post-conflict elections were Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Irak, etc. Even Kuhne (2010) further added between 2010 and early 2011 there were more than ten post-conflict elections conducted in various countries. In the Indonesian context, Aceh is the post-conflict region in which the execution of post-conflict election was an integral part of the contents of the Helsinki Peace Agreement (see Reilly 2008; Awaluddin 2009; Kingsbury 2006). In other post-conflict regions like Maluku, the execution of post-conflict elections was more an effect of decentralization policy implementation.

The core behind the execution of the post-conflict elections is two processes that are actually different but mutually linked (*interacting twin processes*), namely democratization through elections and peace-building. Democratization refers to the open process of political space, including improvements in contestation, participation and human rights. Democracy is considered a system in which various different interests are managed through continuous negotiation and accommodated through legitimate agencies. Even though various conflicts are sometimes fully settled, democracy is assumed to be able to settle them in a peaceful manner. At this level, democracy and peace support one another. Democracy can be consolidated when peaceful conflict-managing ways are acceptable. Similarly, sustainable peace requires good

governance, in which various interests, complaints, and disappointment are accommodated through negotiation and compromise (e.g. Jarstad 2008, h. 18-19; Lyons 2002, h. 5; Reilly 2008).

Besides that, decentralization which is essentially devolution of power, is often regarded as one of the key instruments in handling conflicts and improving peace in Asian countries (Larsen & Selim 2009, p. 1). Specifically, Indonesia has applied it since 1999 through Law No. 22 Year 1999 which was reviewed into Law No. 32 Year 2004 on Regional Government. In general, regional autonomy is expected to be able to strengthen political representation of marginalized groups or stakeholders. However, all still depends on how the regional autonomy is managed. If devolution mechanism is no more than replicating forms of exclusion and imbalance, peace-building through regional autonomy will fail (Larsen & Selim 2009, p. 2).

A general assumption emphasizes that democracy implies peace and vice versa (*mutually beneficial processes*). However, in reality there are many paradoxes/contradictions or dilemma in the implementation process in the field. Democracy as a political system is identical to peaceful management of conflicts, both conflicts in a country or between countries. The post-conflict democracy path is often steep and accompanied by various conflicts and violence (Jarstad 2008, p. 19). In a simple way, post-conflict election process can contribute to the promotion of sustainable peace, but it can create an entry to emergence of conflicts and violence and generate new post-conflict tensions (Ansori 2012). The condition is much shaped by competitive situation that contains dichotomic elements of win and lose. Furthermore, this instability may harm the sustainable peace promoting process (Korth 2011, h. 9; Reilly 2008; Ansori 2012, 2010; Kuhne 2010).

The dynamics of conflict resolution and democratic transition is clearly different. Meanwhile behind the post-conflict election the spirit is the strong expectation of the realization of the two goals. It must be admitted that the burden to be carried by the post-conflict elections is so heavy. As part of the peace agreement, post –conflict elections are considered as the main instrument of agreement implementation. Simultaneously, the election is expected to strengthen democratization process and becomes a way-out which will then generate a series of rules, institutions and new multi-political parties. Therefore, success in reaching one goal, let's say the halt of conflicts/absence of violence and/or peace building, are not automatically successful in democratization process (Lyons 2004, in Reilly 2008, p. 158).

One of the domino effects of the inherent contradiction in post-conflict elections is the emergence of violence or new conflict forms. The implementation of democracy in post-conflict regions, which are generally considered as still vulnerable to conflicts and violence, often triggers conflicts and violence

(Reilly 2008; Kuhne 2010; Lyons 2008; Korth 2011; Larsen & Selim 2009). Meanwhile, non-violent conflicts are the main condition that is necessary for democracy; violent conflicts will harm the function of democracy. Electoral violence and of course other types of violence will become real threats to political order, civilian safety and Human Rights (Jarstad 2008, p. 19). In a simple form, Korth (2011) emphasized that election accompanied by violence will not unify but will divide instead. In the Indonesian context violence in elections is more dominant in post-conflict areas rather than non-post conflict areas, of course except for Papua that is still considered unfinished. This is shown by SNPK data (2005-2013) below (Graph 1).

Various studies on election and post-conflict conflicts have been done; with a focus on post-conflict elections and international community engagement (Kumar 1998; Wallensteen 2008; Sivapathasundaram 2004); autonomy and post-conflict solutions (Wirsing 2004); post-conflict election and electoral polarization (Moreno 2004; Ansori 2012); post-conflict elections and violence (Guelke 2004; Larsen & Selim 2009; Cederman, et al. 2009; Hoglund 2008; Brancati & Snyder 2011); post-conflict election, challenges and institutional readiness (Zenenga 2011; Oberschall 2007; Nelson 1998; Kumar 1998; Tomsa 2009; Clark & Palmer 2008; Kuhne 2010; Barnes 2001); post-conflict election and dynamics of voters behaviors (Oliva 2011; Cyllah 2011; Harris 2002; Gallagher & Schowengerdt 1998; Jarstad 2008; Kovacs 2008; Clark & Palmer 2008); post-conflict elections and the role of media and civil society (Frere 2011; Belloni 2008). Besides that, some researchers are involved in the assessment and discourse on post-conflict elections and peace-building (e.g. Call & Cook 2003; Flores & Nooruddin 2011; Lyons 1998, 2002; Jarstad 2008; Reilly 2008; Sisk & Risley 2005).

However, few efforts have been done to see deeply and systematically how far is the interaction between post-conflict elections and peace building and the generated effects, especially in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, some studies/researches on post-conflict elections have been done. However, the studies have focused more on institutional readiness and dynamics of voting behaviors (e.g. Tomsa 2009; Clark & Blair 2008; Aspinall 2008). Besides that, the completed studies are related to the dynamics of conflicts and violence occurring during conflicts and after conflicts. Not many studies have been conducted with focus on how post-conflict democratization exists to maintain developmental process and preserve peace as initiated by the study. By considering various aspects, as explained in the methodology section, the study takes Aceh and Maluku, in which post-conflict duration in both regions has reached approximately one decade, as case studies. In this context, Scwartz (1991) emphasizes that one decade is period of time required to see and evaluate how change has taken place after conflicts.

Graph 1: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in Local Election (*Pemilukada*) in All SNPK-Monitored Areas (2005-2013)

■ Incident   ■ Death   ■ Injury   ■ Damaged Building

II.   GOAL OF RESEARCH

Related to the above issues, the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK) team of The Habibie Center conducted the research to answer some questions which can generally be formulated as follows.

1. To what extent do post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku help build democracy and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) or vice versa?
2. How does post-conflict-governance help build democracy and peace in Aceh and Maluku?
3. How do conflict and violence emerge in the post-conflict local election processes in Aceh and Maluku?
4. To what extent is the institutional and social readiness in the implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku?

Thus, the research intends to (1) describe and explain the strategic position of post-conflict local election implementation in relation to peace building and democracy development in post-conflict regions and the challenges; (2) to describe and explain the condition of post-conflict governance and its role in consolidating peace and democracy; (3) describe and explain the emergence of phenomena and potential of violence in the post-conflict local election implementation process; (4) describe and explain institutional readiness or social infrastructure for post-conflict local election implementation.

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

a. Post-Conflict Elections: Between Democratization and Peace-Building

Post-conflict elections are a central concept in this study. For this study purpose, post-conflict elections are defined as elections are organized/take place after peace agreements or during the stopping period of a conflict, both vertical and horizontal one (e.g. Harris 2002; Garber 1998; Kumar 1998; Flores & Nooruddin 2011). Post-conflict elections are a unique concept and phenomenon that cannot be treated the same as elections organized in normal condition. Post-conflict elections are usually designed to facilitate conflict settlements (Garber 1998) and/or as efforts to rehabilitate areas that are destroyed due to civil wars (Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1), although many decision makers and analysts debate the effectiveness and efficacy of elections that are organized after conflicts (Garber 1998, p. 1).

At this level, it can be concluded that there are in general two goals of the post-conflict elections, namely as instruments for conflict resolution cum peace-building and simultaneously to build democracy and legitimate government (*democratization*), although both may not always walk abreast (e.g. Kumar 1998; Garber 1998: Lyons 2002; Korth 2011; Sisk & Jarstad 2008; Fogg 2005). In this relation, elections are regarded as strategic instruments of conflict resolution and peace-building because the essence behind elections and democracy is the distribution of power, rare resources, status, etc. in a fair and elegant manner. On the other hand, the conflict itself is a disagreement between two or more people or groups on status, power or rare resources (Coser 1967, p. 26).

When researched in academic horizon, studies on post-conflict elections are an effort to fill in the gaps in various academic researches. In one hand, many of the researchers only focus on democratization issues, while the other researchers focus on peace-building issues. Behind both issues is an assumption that democracy assumes peace and vice versa (Jarstad 2008, p. 20-21; Call & Cook 2003). Therefore, this study can be said to be relatively new.

It must be admitted that the hope for successful post-conflict elections is so high. Unfortunately, often times the condition is not supported by the necessary pre-condition. Post-conflict societies are generally known as those still being vulnerable to conflicts and violence (war-torn societies). Such societies are still very easily fragmented and polarized. Issues in the societies are often related to political, social, and economic stability as well as institutional and social infrastructures (voters' behaviors), especially in the context of political will as winner or loser. Particularly, election's institutional infrastructures are often not ready or still vulnerable (extreme fragile). Even, electoral competi-

tion can be an extended polarization in the previous conflicts (Kumar 1998, h. 6-8).

There are some characteristics of post-conflict elections: firstly, most of the elections occur after peace agreement negotiation; secondly, post-conflict elections always involve the role of external actors; thirdly, the elections occur in the initial reconstruction process, in which many displaced people have not returned to their hometown (Garber 1998).

b. Post-Conflict Elections: Goal and Realization

In general, as emphasized by previous analysts, the goal of post-conflict elections is not only for democracy development in post-conflict areas, but also peace-building in post-conflict areas. Both are assumed to have constitutive/mutually beneficial relations. In this context, debates are often raised by the analysts on to what extent post-conflict elections meet the expected goals. Korth (2011) clarifies some goals included in the frame of the two major goals of post-conflict elections above, namely (1) to validate sustainable peace promotion (*peace settlements*); (2) to generate new sovereign authority; (3) to legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) to generate symbolic cut-off from the past to a new life; (5) to improve civil society development; (6) to support public participation in various political processes; (7) to stimulate people to generate various initiatives.

Then the question is how far a post-conflict election is considered to be successful or to fail, and even further than that, on what factor/dimension the election is considered to be successful or to fail. In this connection, the fundamental thing is what it means by being successful in that context. If post-conflict elections have various goals, the evaluation must be based on each of the relevant goals. There are several post-conflict elections that are regarded a failure including that in Angola in 1992. There are also some elections that are considered (more or less) successful including those in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, etc. (Kuhne 2010). Apart from that, many post-conflict elections lie in between the two extremes. In other words, the elections have reached some of sustainable peace promotion and peace. Besides that, in some cases, elections have resulted in stability and peace without democratic legitimacy such as in Cambodia in 1993, or grown democracy with a little stability, or several combination of both (Korth 2011, p. 13-14) (Picture 1). Then, how about the post-conflict elections in Indonesia?

Jarstad (1998) adds that often times the two goals of post-conflict elections, namely democratization and peace-building, collide one another or experience dilemma. The failure to manage the dilemma or contradiction can cause destructive impacts and harm long-term process of democratization and

peace-building. Therefore, for him, if the option is between the promotion of sustainable peace or improving democracy, the promotion of sustainable peace must be prioritized. If both goals have contradictory impacts, four kinds of dilemmas will show up.

Picture 1: Post-Conflict Elections: Successful or Failed

The first is the horizontal dilemma relating to the group issue that must be represented in the peace and democratization processes. For instance, rebels or particular groups will feel that peace is too expensive if they have to be marginalized from the future government. The next is the vertical dilemma (generally between elites and mass) relating to a hard option between effectiveness and legitimacy. Legitimacy is hoped to strengthen when the people are involved in every phase of peace processes, while elites tends to non-public processes which are considered more effective. The third is systematic dilemma that refers to ownership issue, namely between local control and national/international control in the democratization and peace building processes. The last is temporal dilemma which deals with negotiation between long-term and short-term impacts in the democratization and peace building processes. Democratization initiative in the short time period will increase the risk of violence. Similarly, peace-building may be involving some freedom limits such as freedoms of the press and demonstration (Jarstad 1998, p. 21-25).

c. Post Conflict Elections and Violence

In the study conducted by Brancati & Snyder (2011), the link between the implementation time of post-conflict elections and the risks of re-emergence of violence must be thoroughly considered. A direct election after peace is reached has high possibility of the re-emergence of violence especially because the election infrastructure is still relatively weak. At the same time, the election is generally dominated by former combatants who are not fully

demobilized and politicians that often raise the sectarian/group aspects by claiming pro-democracy (Reilly 2002; Mansfield & Snyder 2007). Tension and violence will be more obvious especially if former combatants suffer from defeats in elections (Brancati & Snyder 2011).

In line with Brancati & Snyder (2011), Jarstad (1998) adds that post-conflict election vulnerability to the emergence of violence is related to the legacy of the previously-impacting conflicts (*legacy of conflict*). Usually weapons still scatter. Trauma of violence and fear of the return of violence has enabled mobilization of mass of people based on extreme ideological lines which contain exclusion-inclusion. Flores & Nooruddin (2011) in particular highlight the roles of politicians/elites in connection to the emergence of violence in post-conflict elections. Both emphasize that inability of politicians to credibly respect peace and democracy can intensify tension and violence.

The assumption is that democracy and peace should be mutually supportive. Democracy can only be consolidated if conflicts are managed in peaceful ways. Similarly, sustainable peace can only be realized in democratic governance. However, various studies on democracy and democratization show that the path towards democracy is often steep and full of conflicts, even violence. Electoral violence will become a particular threat to the peace-building process (Jarstad 1998, p. 29; Hoglund 1998; Kuhne 2010). Korth (2011) believes that post-conflict elections can help build peace, but also can be an entry point to violence because the competitive character of elections is "win-lose" dichotomy.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

a. Research Proposition

Propositions of the research are taken from a broad knowledge on post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku as well as general theoretical studies (*theoretical framework*) on post-conflict elections. The propositions mentioned here are generally defined as a series of statements or sentences on what the research expect to show from the collected data. In this context, proposition statements are understood as truth bearers (Shapiro 2009), which will show relation dynamics between post-conflict elections, peace-building, democratization, and potential for emerging violence, which can be true or false.

The study is specifically built from a series of propositions as follows.

- *Proposition I*: Post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku help build sustainable peace (*sustainable peace-settlement*) in both post-conflict regions.
- *Proposition II*: Post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku help build and strengthen democracy in both post-conflict regions.

- *Proposition III*: Implementation of post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku is followed by emergence of various forms of violence.

There will definitely be implications/consequences for the theory of post-conflict elections if such propositions are true or false.

b. Research Approach and Case Study

Qualitative approach is selected for this study because the characteristic of the analyzed problems require qualitative approach rather than quantitative-extensive one. The characteristic of qualitative approach is believed to be helpful and reliable (adequate) in understanding and explaining issues of post-conflict elections and peace building in Indonesia given the fact that qualitative approach is considered very suitable for exploring such complex issues in an intensive manner (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Marshal & Rossman 1989, p. 43; Creswell 1994, p. 21; Kvale 1996, p. 179; Charmaz 2006; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 1).

A qualitative approach simply means a non-numerical data collection (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). According to Marshal & Rossman (1989, h. 43), qualitative approach also applicable for locating important processes and relations. In general, qualitative research strives to collect data intensively and deeply to understand social behaviors and principles as well as law that regulate those diverse behaviors. Qualitative research generally deals with the questions of 'why and how' according to the research character, and not only the questions of what, where and when, which are generally in accordance with quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Kvale 1996, h. 179).

Furthermore, the selected case studies are believed by SNPK-THC team to provide good opportunity for understanding and explaining the characteristics and complexity of post-conflict elections and peace-building. An in-depth investigation on a particular phenomenon is regarded as the main goal of a case study. In reality, a case study is generally aimed to explore a case in order to find principles or assumptions operating behind the phenomenon (Yin 1994). According to Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221), a case study has two roles in understanding human behaviors, namely to produce the type of knowledge that is dependent on the context and, as the consequence of the knowledge that is dependent on the context, possibilities that can emerge from theoretical-epistemic construction.

However, nowadays debates among scientists often refer to scientific generalization issues. Qualitative investigations are much criticized due to its inability to make generalization. However, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221) thinks that such criticisms are no more than one of the five misunderstandings or over-simplification on the essence of case studies (see also Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). First, theoretical knowledge (*context-independent*) is more valu-

able than concrete and practical knowledge (*context-dependent*). Secondly, someone cannot make generalization based on one case study. Thirdly, various case studies are only useful to withdraw several hypotheses, or only in the initial phase from the entire research process. Fourthly, case studies contain biases through verification. Fifthly, often time it is difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and theories based on case studies. Such misunderstandings are generally found among natural science's epistemology adorers within social science.

Therefore, it is a mistake to emphasize that someone cannot make generalization. This is based on the selected case studies and how the case studies are selected. Different from Flyvbjerg (2006), Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, p. 261) question more on the urgency and relevance of generalization in case studies. For them, pragmatic, constructive, and discursive approaches are more acceptable in social science, which is also a mode of understanding and action that are contextualized socio-historically in a social world. In other words, at a certain level, this goes into post-modernism perspective. Amidst the classical debates between the objectivist-positivist and subjectivist-interpretative, Bourdieu (1984, p. 5), for instance, who showed up in the rise of Marxism and shared some particular views with Giddens (1976), constructed his knowledge by criticizing Cartesian social ontology that divides subject and object, intention and cause, materiality and symbolic representation. Eventually, such study findings will later be able or unable to apply in post-conflict regions in Indonesia and generally outside Indonesia. More than that, the characteristic of the study does not require any prediction as macro-level studies generally make, or positivist perspective and natural sciences do.

c. Research Strategy: Comparative Method

Various studies on post-conflict elections have so far focused more on or been identical with post-conflict regions which are more caused by vertical conflicts (state–rebels) or between states (*inter-states*) (see Call & Cook 2003; Flores & Nooruddin 2011; Lyons 1998, 2002; Jarstad 2008; Reilly 2008, 2002; Sisk & Risley 2005; Brancati & Snyder 2011). Hardly none of post-conflict studies that tries to look at this issue in the context of post-conflict regions caused by horizontal conflicts. Therefore, the study tries to use a comparative strategy by taking two cases of post-conflict regions that have different characters, namely the Aceh Province (vertical conflict) and Maluku Province (horizontal conflict).

In general, the strategy will focus on two different post-conflict regions (*spatial comparison*) to later look at various differences and similarities in relation to some research questions (see Przeworski & Teune 1970; Heiden-

heimer, et al. 1983). In this study context, two post-conflict regions, Aceh and Maluku, were selected as comparative cases with some reasons. First, Aceh and Maluku have the biggest incidents and impacts of violence in *pemilukada* compared to other post-conflict regions, as shown by the SNPK data (2005-2012) below (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in Pemilukada
in Post-Conflict Regions (2005-2013)

Graph 3: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in *Pemilukada* in Aceh and Maluku
(2005-2013)

Even though violence occurred more dominantly in both provinces compared to other post-conflict provinces, there are variations of incidents and impacts in both provinces as shown in SNPK data (Graph 3). The data

generally shows that from the aspect of death impact, violence in *pemilukada* in Aceh is more deadly (7 deaths) than that in Maluku (1 death). However, the impact of building destruction in Maluku (76 damaged buildings) can be regarded worse than in Aceh (159 damaged buildings) by taking into consideration the number of violent incidents in each province. Secondly, *pemilukada* in Aceh were organized twice, while in Maluku three times.

Furthermore, both post-conflict regions have different conflict character backgrounds. The Aceh conflicts are more vertical, while the Maluku conflicts have horizontal character. Besides that, even though both conflicts are settled by peace agreements- Aceh was settled by Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005 and Ambon by Malino II Peace Agreement in 2002- the background of post-conflict elections in Aceh is an integral part of MoU of 2005 Helsinki Agreement, while post-conflict elections in Maluku more constitute the implementation of national policy on decentralization. The following table shows a comparative dimension of the two post-conflict regions (Table 1):

Table 1: Aceh and Maluku: Comparative Dimension

Dimension	Aceh	Maluku
Scale of Violence in *Pemilukada* (2005-2013)	First	Third
Character of Conflict	Vertical (Aceh vs Government of Indonesia)	Horizontal (Islam vs Christianity)
Instrument for Settlement	Helsinki Peace Agreement	Malino II Peace Agreement
Status of Post-Conflict Elections	Integral part of Helsinki Peace Agreement	Part of national policy on decentralization
Frequency of *Pemilukada* Implementation	2 times (2006 and 2012)	3 times (2003, 2008, and 2013)

Lastly, the NVMS data on the incidents and impacts of violence in post-conflict local election in post-conflict regions in Indonesia (period 2005-2013) (see Graph 2) really shows that North Maluku is in the second rank. However, NVMS-THC team decided to choose Maluku as one of the case studies in this research, rather than North Maluku, with a consideration that the Maluku Province has stronger friction dynamics between Christianity and Islam, as well as power sharing issue (*power-sharing*) between Moslem and Christian communities, in relation to post-conflict local election compared to North Maluku. Electoral contestation in North Maluku stands more on the aspects of governance, corruption, improvement in people's living standard, etc. (NVMS-THC 2014; Tomsa 2009; Jones 2010). In this context, frictions in post-conflict local election in Maluku tend to be a strong extension of the previous conflict legacies.

d. Data Collection Method

Qualitative approach becomes the basic rationale for adopting interviews as primary method of data collection. Charmaz (2006) emphasizes that interviews have been long and much used for collecting data in various types of qualitative researches. Interview itself is an effort to understand the world or a phenomenon from a point of view of research's subject, to open the meaning of their experiences (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 1). In this context, an interview is held to find understanding at the factual and meaning levels even though it is sometimes harder to find them at the meaning level. An interview is very useful to get access to stories or information behind the experiences of participants, both with direct focus on the issue (funneling) and storytelling (*story telling*) strategies (Minichiello et al. 1995). A deep interview generates special benefits useful to improve interpretation of the research's subject on the experiences (Charmaz 2006). The relation between interviewer and interview's subject can be described as mutual relations (*inter-view*) (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 2).

Then, the semi-structured data collection method, instead of the structured one, is adopted in the research. A structured interview generally has a series of formal and limited questions, or previously-structured ones. Semi-structured interviews, however, tend to be more flexible and extensive. In other words, it can open new questions raised during an interview as a result of what is told by an interview's subject (Lindlof & Taylor 2002). Traditional perspective of semi-structured interviews will particularly provide an opportunity for getting rich information on direct experiences and perspectives of the Acehnese and Maluku people related to the dynamics and process of post-conflict elections, peace-building, violence that occur in post-conflict local election, and social-institutional readiness.

Actually an interview is something that is contextual and negotiation, which means that the story or explanation in an interview does not reproduce previous reality. However, the story or description gives an explanation with a particular point of view that has particular purposes. Therefore, the result takes the form of construction or reconstruction of a reality (Charmaz 2006, p. 27). In other words, interview result is a construction o reality, and not the reality itself. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, p. 82) add knowledge is constructed through interaction through an interaction between an interviewer and interview's subject. Therefore, interview is a social product of knowledge; in this study context, it is a social production of knowledge on post-conflict elections and peace-building in Indonesia.

Another important thing that needs to be known is that an interviewer must have awareness on power issue and status of the interviewed subject. This often has an important influence during an interview period. In this

relation, Charmaz (2006, p. 27) emphasizes that professionals and people who have power (leaders and elites) will probably control and direct the interview condition, both by changing interview questions in order to suit their purpose or by scheduling time and venue as well as duration of the interview. Another issue is that leaders/elites probably tend to make rhetoric and public statements rather than conveying their genuine personal points of view. This is relevant because the study will also involve many interviews with elites/leaders, professionals, and academicians. Another issue is related to distrust and suspicion of research's subject, especially in the study like this, namely the study that talks about conflicts and peace. In this regard, Charmaz (2006, p. 27) emphasizes that such suspicion is often related to the sponsor institution, research's purpose as well as the use of research's results. The suspicion can make the study's prospective subject refuse or less enthusiastic to answer the raised questions.

In the interview process, NVMS-THC team digitally recorded all the interviews. Each interview would last for around one hour. The use of digital recorder during an interview gives benefit, namely an opportunity to get more detailed data and keep eye-contact, concentration, as well as focus (see Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 179; Charmaz 2006). However, SNPK-THC team consistently continues to write down important points and reflection as long as this does not disturb interview process and flow.

Besides the primary data of the interview result, NVMS-THC team also used secondary data, including data stored in general data archive, special collection, publishing companies, reports and public documents as well as academic publications (Heaton 2004, p. 5). Beside that, SNPK-THC team would explore other information or data concerning process and dynamics of post-conflict elections and peace-building, etc, by exploring local and national newspapers and magazines both printed and online. Secondary data can be used as cross validation to support primary data analysis. Mixed analysis taken from interviews and documents specially intended to avoid vulnerability to mistake that is connected to a particular method (Thorne 1994; Patton 2002, p. 248). Besides that, secondary data significantly contribute to what we can learn directly from the data. More importantly, secondary data gives us stimulus to further explore other issues concerning post-conflict elections and peace-building as well as emergence of violence in Indonesia.

e. Sampling Strategy

NVMS-THC team carried out interviews with various types of different subjects to get character of various information and/or points of view. To get the research subject, in line with the research approach, NVMS-THC team used qualitative sample selection strategy, or non-probability sample election

strategy. Purposive sample selection strategy is considered to give the team a space to get an expected research subject. The point of this sample selection strategy is to choose informants that can give the best answers to the research questions. Therefore, an effort to choose research subjects randomly is not necessary (Creswell 1994, p. 148). With such goal, then the team selects informants based on their characteristics and the study's requirement (Patton 2002, p. 45; Ritchie & Lewis 2003, p. 77). Thereby, informants of this study were selected with a consideration that they are considered to have particular characteristics and information that meet the research's goal.

Besides that, in the informant selection process, NVMS-THC team tied to pay good attention to the distribution of informants, with special consideration on dimensions of their religion, tribe, gender, location, and social status. The following is the list of potential informants chosen based on various consideration above (Table 2):

Table 2: List of Research Questions and Prospective Informants

No	Research Questions	Type of Informants (Priority/Non)	Expected Output
1	In what level do post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku help build democracy and strengthen peace (*peace-settlement*)?	Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of elections and peace-building; community leaders (traditional or religious); politicians; local journalists; bureaucrats; former combatants; security elements (Indonesian military/police); general public	• Identification of various contributions of elections to peace building and local democracy. • Includes (1) validating the promotion of sustainable peace (*peace settlements*); (2) generating new sovereign authorities; (3) legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) generating cut-off from the past to a new life; (5) improving civil society development; (6) supporting public participation in various political processes; (7) stimulating people to generate various initiatives. • Evaluation on post-conflict election policies.
2	In what level do post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku harm or worsen the peace building prospect (*peace-settlement*) and democracy stability?	Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of elections and peace-building; community leaders (traditional or religious); politicians; local journalists; bureaucrats; former combatants; security elements (Indonesian military/police); general public	• Identification of various negative impacts of elections on peace building and local democracy processes. • Includes (1) validating promotion of sustainable peace (*peace settlements*); (2) generating new sovereign authorities; (3) legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) generating cut-off from the past to a new life; (5) improving civil society development; (6) supporting public participation in various political processes; (7) stimulating people to generate various initiatives. • Evaluation on post-conflict election policies. • *Problem-solving*

No	Research Questions	Type of Informants (Priority/Non)	Expected Output
3	How do conflicts and violence emerge in post-conflict election processes in Aceh and Ambon?	Local academicians; NGO activists related to *pemilukada's* issues of violence; community leaders (traditional or religious; politicians; local journalists; bureaucrats; KIP/KPU; former combatants; security elements (Indonesian Military/police); general public	• Problem analysis on violence in post-conflict elections. • *Problem-solving*
4	How far is the institutional and social readiness for the implementation of post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku?	Local academicians; NGO activists related to elections implementation; local journalists; community leaders (traditional or religious; politicians; bureaucrats; KIP/KPU; general public	• Identification and evaluation on institutional readiness (election's organizers and political parties). • Identification and evaluation on society (*voting behavior*) (participation, transparency, willing to accept defeats, etc.).

Based on the above sample selection strategy and deep consideration on the distribution of various dimensions of informants, SNPK-THC team chose/obtained 68 informants during two phase of field visits to Aceh and Maluku, as summarized in Table 3 as follows:

Table 3: Recapitulation of Informants and Phases of Field Visits

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2
Aceh	24 people (19-27 June 2014)	10 people (26 October-1 November 2014)
Maluku	21 people (21-28 August 2014)	13 people (16-21 November 2014)

Conditions of Democracy Development and Peace-Building in Aceh and Maluku

I.   ACEH

a. Brief Description on Demography of Aceh Province

Aceh Province is a province with a special autonomy regulated by Law No. 18 Year 2001 and Law No. 11 Year 2006. Aceh Province is located on the tip of Sumatra Island, exactly in $01°$ 58' 37,2"–$06°$ 04' 33,6" North and $94°$ 57' 57,6"–$98°$ 17' 12,2" East (2014 Aceh Province BPS). The province has a total area of 57.948,94 square km; 39.9% of the area is forested. The Aceh Province is bordered on the south by North Sumatra, The Indian Ocean on the west, as well as the Malacca Strait on the north and east. The capital city of the province is Banda Aceh.

Aceh Province has 18 districts and 5 cities. The number of sub-districts reaches 289, with 761 *mukim* and 6.464 *gampong* (village). In term of people's territorial administration, Aceh has a slightly different structure compared to that in other provinces. In this province, there is an administrative territory that has some *gampongs* under it, called *mukim*; Some *mukims* are under one sub-district. *Mukim* is one of Aceh's specialties, including the addressing of village as *gampong*.

Based on the 2010 population census, the population in Aceh Province is at 4,494,410. The 2013 population projection by the Aceh Province Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) reached 4,791,924, with population density of 84 people per km² (2014 Aceh Province BPS). But, the population distribution in the province is uneven. Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, and Langsa are the three cities with the highest population density; each has 4,451 people per km², 1,189 people per km², and 773 people per km² respectively. In total there are 13 cities/districts that have population density under 100 people per km².

b. Conflict and Peace in Aceh: A Brief Description

In general, the history of conflicts in Aceh can be seen in three major periods. The first period is the resistance to the Dutch colonialism in 1873–1903 (Aspinall 2004). The second period is the resistance to Japan in 1942 (Reid

2006). The third period is the resistance to the Indonesian government started from 1953 as manifested in rebellion. The conflicts with the Indonesian government can be categorized as vertical conflicts. During the conflict with the Indonesian government, the conflict period can be seen based on the political regimes ruling in Indonesia namely the Old Order (1953–1956), The New Order (1976–1998), and The Reformed Period (1999–2006) (Susan 2009).

In the Old Period, the actor of the conflicts in Aceh was Darul Islam. From the Indonesian government's point of view, this conflict can be called "Darul Islam rebellion". The conflicts were triggered by revocation of the special autonomy by the Indonesian government from Aceh. This incident generated firm attitude from the Acehnese people against the Indonesian government that did not enforce the Islamic *Sharia* (Aisyah et al. 2008). Darul Islam Aceh was led by Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureu'eh, a prominent *Ulama* in Aceh. The conflict was settled through a negotiation initiated by Aceh students and community leaders in 1956.

In the New Order, conflicts reoccurred as a reaction to imbalanced development implemented by the Indonesian government. The New Order government exploited Acehnese resources without giving significant developmental results to Acehnese society. The resources were utilized more for developmental activities at the central level. Aceh only got 20% of their exploited natural resources. The number was still deemed less; coupled by intensified corruption that made the development in Aceh even worse. As a result, many Acehnese communities lived below the poverty line and were low-educated; the local identity of Aceh was shattered (Susan 2009). This condition made Hasan Tiro who claimed being descendant of old Islamic Aceh Kingdom declare the resistance to the Indonesian government by forming the Aceh Free Movement (GAM). According to them, Aceh was not part of Indonesia. Indonesia was the former Dutch colonized territory while Aceh was legitimately never a part of the Dutch colony. On the other hand, the New Order government with its coercive politics regarded GAM as the national development stability spoilers. Military approach taken by the New Order government in order to maintain stability caused escalated and prolonged conflicts (Table 4).

Table 4: GAM Life-Cycle[1]

Phase	Operating Year	Active Member	Victims
Establishment	1976–1979	25–200	>100
Revival I	1989–1991	200–750	2.000–10.000
Revival II	1999–2002	15.000–27.000	4.364

---

1 Rose (2005).

After the fall of the New Order regime, the discourse of the Indonesian democracy increased. Military approach was not so dominant in settling conflicts in Aceh. The Indonesian government started to mobilize democratic developmental strategy for conflict resolution in Aceh (Miller 2004). New actors started to show up and provide conflict resolution discourse through democratic way, one of them was SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Center). During the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Aceh conflict resolution through democratic way started to be implemented. President Yudhoyono took one political strategy as a conflict resolution measure in Aceh (Sujatmiko 2012). The 2004 tsunami disaster which caused both groups to lose their resources for maintaining conflicts increasingly supported the path towards peace. Then, On August 15, 2005 both parties agreed to sign the Helsinki Peace Agreement in Finland.

The Helsinki Agreement grants some special entitlements to Aceh. There are six main points regulated in the agreement, namely[2] (1) Aceh government, including laws on Aceh government, political participation, economy and law enforcement, (2) Human Rights, (3) amnesty and reintegration, (4) social security, (5) formation of *Aceh Monitoring Mission* (AMM), and (6) fights settlement. Some among the points explain that Aceh is entitled to have 70% of all the hydrocarbon reserve and other natural resources.[3] All the people involved in GAM will be given amnesty and regarded as citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.[4] Besides that, the agreement also regulates the formation of local political parties in Aceh.[5] These local political parties in the developments are dominated by former combatants. It was the local political parties that became the main actors in the post-conflict local election dynamics in Aceh.

c. Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election in Numbers

Post-conflict local elections in Aceh were conducted in two periods. Especially for post-conflict local election of governor and vice governor were organized in 2006 and 2012. A local political party dominated by former GAM combatants is Aceh Party that officially made its contribution in the 2012 post-conflict local election. In this period, elected candidates were those nominated by Aceh Party. In details, the description of Aceh post-conflict local election implementation can be seen in Table 5 as follows:

---

2 See 2005 Helsinki MoU.
3 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 1.3.4.
4 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 3.1.1 and 3.2.1.
5 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 1.2.1.

Table 5: Post-Conflict Local Election of Aceh Province of Governor and
Vice Governor in 2006 and 2012[6]

	2006	2012
Number of round	1 round	1 round
Number of voters in DPT (Permanent Voters List)	2,632,935 people	3,453,703 people
Number of voters that exercised their voting right	2,104,739 people	2,453,703 orang
Number of candidates running for election	8 pairs	5 pairs
Name of winners	Irwandi Yusuf and M. Nazar (independent)	Zaini Abudullah and Muzaki Manaf (Aceh Party)
Number of winners' votes	768,745	1,327,695

Table 6: Gained Votes in 2006 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and
Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs[7]

No	Name of Pairs	Gained Votes
1	Iskandar Hoesin dan M. Saleh Manaf	5,54%
2	Tamlicha Ali dan Tgk. Harmen Nuriqmar	3,99%
3	A. Malik Raden dan Sayed Fuad Zakaria	13,97%
4	A. Humam Hamid dan Hasbi Abdullah	16,62%
5	M. Djali Yusuf dan R. A. Syauqas Rahmatillah	3,26%
6	Irwandi Yusuf dan Muhammad Nazar	38,20%
7	Azwar Abubakar dan M. Nasir Djamil	10,61%
8	Ghazali Abbas Adan dan Salahuddin Alfata	7,80%

Table 7: Gained Votes in 2006 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and
Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs[8]

No	Name of Pairs	Gained Votes
1	Tgk. H. Ahmad Tajuddin Abs dan Teuku Suriansyah	3,33%
2	Irwandi Yusuf dan Muhyan Yunan	29,18%
3	H. Darni M. Daud dan Tgk. Ahmad Fauzi	4,07%
4	Muhammad Nazar dan Nova Iriansyah	7,65%
5	Zaini Abdullah dan Muzakir Manaf	55,78%

In 2006, there were eight pairs of candidates running for post-conflict local election of governor and vice governor. In this period, former GAM combatants did not have an established political organization yet. Candidates from former combatants group were represented by two pairs, namely Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar as independent candidates, and A. Humam Hamid–Hasbi Abdullah supported by PPP. In this period, the competition was won by Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar. In 2012 former GAM combatants

---

6 Processed from Aceh KIP and 2014 Political Statistics (BPS 2014).
7 Processed from Aceh Province KIP data.
8 Processed from Aceh Province KIP data.

managed to win the post-conflict local election. From five candidate pairs in the election, Zaini Abudullah and Muzakir Manaf won the election. In Table 6 and 7 we can see the names of the candidate pairs in 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local election.

d. Condition of Economic, Social and Cultural Developments

In 2013 Aceh Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB) oil and gas reached IDR.103.05 trillion. The PDRB value was higher than in the previous years, namely IDR 96.16 trillion in 2012 and IDR 87.99 trillion in 2011 (Aceh Province BPS 2014). In general the biggest contributors to the Aceh economy are the agricultural sector (22.7%), followed by trade, hotel and restaurant sector (17.66%), then construction sector (11.67%). In general, the Aceh revenue increased in the last three years. However, if seen from the economic growth rate in 2013, Aceh growth performance was not so high as the previous years. This is described in Graph 4.

Graph 4: PDRB Growth Rate based on Constant Price with Oil and Gas Aceh Province, Years 2010–2013 (Percentage)[9]

The above graph shows that from 2010 to 2012, the trend of Aceh economic growth rate rose. But in 2013 the number was not as high as those in the previous two years. The number of poor people in Aceh was at 17.72%, with poverty line of IDR 348,172,- per capita per month (Aceh Province BPS 2014). From the people's economic gap, Gini coefficient rate in Aceh was 0.32 in 2012 (Bappenas 2013). If compared to other provinces, the Aceh Gini coefficient rate sat in the 32nd position or ranked the third from the bottom among all provinces in Indonesia (Bappenas 2013). This shows that the level

---

9 Cited from http://bps.go.id.

of Acehnese people's economic gap is not so high compared to most of the other provinces in Indonesia, as seen explicitly in Graph 5.

Graph 5: Aceh Province's Human Development Index Year 2010–2013 (Percentage)[10]

In the social development aspect, the Aceh Province's human development index increased since 2010 up to 2013. The genuine rate of educational participation in Aceh was 81.03% (Elementary School, Junior High School, Senior High School, and the equivalent level) (*bps.go.id*). Related to the regional image, coffee is the mascot of the Acehnese people. If generally seen, coffee shops are the most popular venue for social interaction. This venue becomes the most influential public sphere in Aceh.

Aceh is known as the "*Veranda of Mecca*". The tight Islamic values mixed with the local culture have made Aceh known by that name. Islam is the religion embraced by the majority of the Acehnese population. There are eight local tribes which we can identify in this province. They are tribes of Aceh, Gayo, Alas, Aneuk Jamee, Simeulu, Kluet, Singkil, and Tamiang. The majority of them are Moslems. There are also some migrating tribes such as Batak, Nias, Chinese, Java that are Christian, Buddhist, or Confucian but the number is minor. The dominant Islam is closely related to the strong historical influence of Islamic Aceh kingdoms in the past. The strong Islamic values can be seen in the application of *Sharia,* which becomes one of the Acehnese specialties. The law application is supplemented by some supporting institutions such as *Sharia* police and *Sharia* court. The Aceh *Sharia* court functions as Islamic law justice institution that is regulated through local regulations.

---

10 Cited from http://bps.go.id.

II.   MALUKU

a. Brief Description on Demography of Maluku Province

Maluku Province is an archipelagic province located in the eastern part of Indonesia. The province has 559 islands. Based on the astronomical position, Maluku Province is located in the coordinate of 2˚30'–9˚South and 124˚–136˚East (Maluku Province BPS 2014). The province borders Seram Sea on the north, Indonesia Seas and Arafuru Sea on the south, Islands on the east, and Sulawesi Island on the west. The Maluku's area is at 581,376 square km (Ministry of Forestry). Most of the region is sea (90.7%), while the width of land is only around 54,185 square km (Ministry of Forestry tt). Therefore, sea transportation becomes the most important aspect needed for inter-area mobilization in Maluku. The capital city of the Maluku Province is Ambon city.

Maluku province consists of 11 districts/cities, 118 sub-districts, and 1,169 villages (Maluku Province BPS 2014). People's settlement pattern in Maluku is very much segregated by religious communities (NVMS-THC 2014). Moslem and Christian communities tend to live in different neighborhoods. Some customary communities which are called *negri* tend to live in their own areas, and generally each customary community is identical to a particular religion. In urban areas, especially in Ambon City, segregation pattern is increasingly formed after conflict period. Many displaced people tend to live in the areas with the same religion they embrace. For instance, Batu Merah and Jazirah Leihitu are identical to Moslem communities, while Passo and Kudamati are identical to Christian communities. However, there are also areas that are open to both religions such as Waringin area, even though social interaction between Moslems and Christians in that area is less solid compared to the period before the conflict.

The 2010 population census recorded that the number of Maluku population was 1,533,506. The 2013 projected Maluku population was 1,628,413 with population density of 30 people per square km (Maluku Province BPS 2014). Maluku can be said as a province that has a low number of population. Most of the people are concentrated in Ambon city with population density of 1,007 people per square km. Tual city is the second most densely populated city after Ambon with population density of 252 people per square km. The other nine districts/cities only have population density of under 50 people per square km.

b. Conflict and Peace in Maluku: A Brief Description

The outbreak of conflict in Maluku is closely related to the context of the end of the New Order regime. The New Order's coercive politics made latent

conflicts between the two groups, Moslems and Christians, which did not break when the regime was in power. (see Bauchler 2009). The conflict was caused by gaps of opportunities owned by each group so that this generated jealousy and negative sentiment between the two groups. Historically, the gap had been formed during the Dutch colonialism. The Maluku people who decided to embrace Christianity were given wider opportunity to education and government affairs rather than Moslem communities. Moslem people lived in suburbs of Ambon city and were poor, while most of Christian people lived in the center of Ambon City which served as the government center at that time.

In the independence time, the emergence of many Islamic movements in Indonesia resulted in negative perception among the Maluku Christian communities. Besides that, Moslem community's progress in education level made the community's bargaining power increase. The high influx of migrants from outside regions, who mostly were Moslems, also caused changes in the population composition in Maluku especially in Ambon. Besides that, an increased number of Moslem people who assumed positions in government intensified negative sentiment among the Christian communities in Maluku who thought that their positions in the government were threatened. The strategic position of the majority of Moslem groups made Christian groups feel marginalized in the politics during the New Order.

The emergence of issue on South Maluku Republic (RMS-Republik Maluku Selatan) separatist movement which was connected to the Christian community set up a particular negative perception in the Moslem communities against the Christian communities. The Moslem communities' negative sentiment against the Christian communities also rose because the history of colonialism on proselytization. The latent conflicts eventually broke out into open conflicts at the end of the New Order. Weakened role of the military after the New Order caused sentiments between the two groups to break out into violence in 1999.

Riots occurring in Maluku started from fights in Dobo, Aru Islands,[11] and Batu Merah, Ambon, between Moslem and Christian young people. The riot eventually developed into retaliatory actions until the initial goal of the conflict faded. The retaliatory actions made the conflict prolong and last for at least four years. The riots eventually spread quickly to some islands around Ambon such as Haruku, Seram, and Saparua. Based on the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK) data, the riot that lasted for almost four years has claimed 2,793 lives, injured 5,054 people and destroyed 13,843 buildings (NVMS-THC 2014).

---

11 There was an incident of clashes in Dobo at the end of 1999 so that security personnel, especially the Maluku police's mobile brigade was deployed to the area. At that time riots broke out in Batu Merah.

On February 12, 2002 peace started to materialize between the two conflicting groups, marked by the signing of Malino II Peace Agreement in Sulawesi. The signing of the agreement made violent actions reduce significantly, in which 87 were reportedly killed between March and December 2002 (Barron et al. 2012, p. 10-11; see also Goss 2000, p. 8; Schulze 2002, p. 57; Tomsa 2009, p. 2-4). The Malino II Agreement contains 11 points on the termination of any potential violent conflicts and inclusive access for both groups. In details, the Malino II agreement is explained in Table 8.

Table 8: Points of Malino II Agreement[12]

1. Ending all forms of conflicts and disputes.
2. Uphold the supremacy of law in a equal and impartial manner. Therefore, security personnel must act professionally at duty.
3. Refuse all kinds of separatist movements such as South Maluku Republic (RMS).
4. As part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), all people are entitled to live and earn a living in Maluku, by considering local culture.
5. All forms of armed organizations, groups, or militias with no permits in Maluku are prohibited and must surrender their weapons or will be disarmed and be processed according to the prevailing laws. Outsiders who cause trouble in Maluku must leave Maluku.
6. To carry out all the legal provisions, it is necessary to set up a national independent investigating team to thoroughly investigate the January 19, Maluku Sovereignty Front, RMS Christians, Jihad Militia Force, Christ Militia Force, and forced shift towards another religion.
7. To return displaced people in phases to their pre-conflict places of origin.
8. The government will help the people to rehabilitate economic and public facilities, such as educational, health and religious facilities, as well as people's housing so that the future of all Maluku people can move onward and get out from hardship. Along with that, all forms of limitation of people's movement should be lifted so that the economic and social life may run well.
9. In the effort to maintain order and security of all areas and people, the cohesiveness and firmness of Indonesian Military and Indonesian Police according to their functions and duties are required. Along with that, all Indonesian Military facilities will immediately be rebuilt and return to its functions.
10. To maintain relations and harmony of all people, Moslems and Christians, all efforts and missionary work must uphold laws and other provisions without any force.
11. To support rehabilitation especially University of Pattimura, under the principle of shared progress. Therefore recruitment and other policies should be implemented transparently in equality principle and meet the equality requirement.

---

12 Centre for Human Dialogue Switzerland (2011).

At that time, the implementation of peace process was led by the central government. The central figure was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the Coordinating Minister for Political and Justice and Jusuf Kalla as the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. The agreement was attended by each representative from Moslem and Christian communities, totaling 69 people (Centre for Human Dialogue Switzerland 2011, p. 25). The Malino II Agreement became the foundation for peace-building in Maluku. But in its developments, the eleventh point of the agreement was widely interpreted by most of the people in Maluku. They felt that the equality concept must be applied not only in the access of education but also in every aspect of the people's life in the form of balanced representation of both groups. The balance factor has, in turn, a fairly significant role in the political dynamics in Maluku including in the implementation of post-conflict local elections

c. Maluku Post-Conflict Local Election in Numbers

Post-conflict local elections in Maluku were organized for several times. Especially for the election of Maluku governor, post-conflict local elections were conducted three times, namely in 2003, 2008, and 2013. However, in 2003 the implementation of *pemilukada* was conducted indirectly by DPR. The implementation of direct *pemilukada* was conducted in 2008. For comparison purpose, the study will only discuss the implementation of direct post-conflict local elections in 2008 and 2013. Detailed implementation of the governor post-conflict local election in Maluku is explained in Table 9.

Table 9: Implementation of 2008 And 2013 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and Vice Governor in Maluku[13]

	2008	2013	
Number of Rounds	1 round	2 round	
Number of voters in DPT	963,519 people	Round 1	Round 2
		1,185,661 people	1,117,694 people
Number of voters that exercised their voting right	728,521 people	Round 1	Round 2
		850,632	788,208
Number of candidates running for election	4 pairs	5 pairs	
Name of winners	Karel Albert Ralahalu and Said Assagaf	Said Assagaf and Zeth Sahuburua	
Number of winners' votes	452,117	389,884	

In 2008 *pemilukada* was won in 1 round by the pair Karel Albert Ralahalu and Said Assagaf who gained more than 60% votes. Karel was the incumbent Maluku governor when the post-conflict local election was

---

13 Processed from Maluku KPUD data and Political Statistics (BPS 2012).

executed. Before that, Karel Albert Ralahalu was the governor with his vice Governor Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina, from 2003 to 2008. However, Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina did not pair with Karel in the 2008 post-conflict local election. He joined the election and became the governor candidate with his pair, Eduard Frans. In the 2012 post-conflict local election, Said Assagaf as the incumbent vice governor joined it and nominated himself as governor candidate together with Zeth Sahuburua. The 2012 post-conflict local election was conducted in two rounds. From five pairs in the first round, the pairs Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas and Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua were entitled to compete in the second round. Initially, the pair Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas got more votes than the pair Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua. But in the second round, the condition reverted. The pair Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua managed to surpass the pair Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas. In details, the name of the pairs and gained votes can be seen in Tables 10 and 11.

Table 10: Gained Votes in 2008 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Couples[14]

	Names of Pairs	Gained Votes
1	Karet Albert Ralahalu and Said Assagaf	62.14%
2	Abdullah Tuasikal and Hematang Septinus	26.37%
3	Aziz Samual and Lucas Uwuratuw	5.35%
4	M. Abdullah Latuconsina and Edward Frans	6.14%

Table 11: Gained Votes in 2013 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs[15]

No	Round 1		Round 2	
	Names of Pairs	Gained Votes	Names of Pairs	Gained Votes
1	Abdullah Tuasikal dan Hendrik Lewersissa	18,85%	Abdullah Vanath dan Marti Jonas Massapaittela	49,60%
2	Jacobus F Puttileihalat dan Arifin Tapi Oyihoe	13,67%	Said Assagaf dan Zeth Sahuburua	50,40%
3	Abdullah Vanath dan Marti Jonas Massapaittela	23,56%		
4	Herman A Koedoeboen dan Daud Sangadji	21,57%		
5	Said Assagaf dan Zeth Sahuburua	22,74%		

14 Processed from Maluku Province KPUD data.
15 Processed from Maluku Province KPUD data.

d. Condition of Economic, Social and Cultural Developments

The Maluku Province Gross Domestic Product (PDB) with oil and gas in 2013 was IDR 13.25 trillion. The number increased compared to in 2012 at IDR 11.46 trillion, in 2011 at IDR 9.6 trillion and in 2010 at IDR 8.04 trillion (Maluku Province BPS 2014). The biggest contributing sector in the Maluku economy were trade, hotel and restaurant (29.26%), then agriculture (28.22%) and service sectors (20.81%). The economic growth rate in Maluku was fluctuating as seen in Graph 6.

Graph 6: Maluku Province's Economic Growth Rate (with oil and gas) Years 2010–2013[16]

Graph 7: Maluku Province's Human Development Index, Years 2010–2013[17]

The above graph shows that the Maluku economic growth in 2012 increased compared to the previous year. But in 2013 the economic growth performance was not higher as in 2010. The poverty rate in Maluku Province was 19.49%, with the poverty line at IDR 298, 778, - per capita per month (BPS 2013). The community's gap rate in the economic aspect based on the calculation of Gini coefficient was 0.38 in 2012 (Bappenas 2013). If compared to other provinces in Indonesia, Maluku Gini coefficient rate sat in the 17th position. In the social development aspect, the human development index rate of Maluku Province experienced an increase since 2010 to 2013 (Graph 7).

16 Cited from http://bps.go.id.
17 Cited from http://bps.go.id.

The genuine educational participation rate in 2013 was 71.63% (Elementary School, Junior High School, Senior High School, and its equivalent) (bps. go.id).

The customary communities in Maluku are still very strong. The Maluku people consist of more than 700 customary communities called *negri*.[18] Each *negri* has a leader called king. The *negris* are institutionalized into one institution called Latupati Assembly (Photo 1). The Latupati Assembly (*Majelis Latupati*) functions to coordinate the *negris* located in Maluku in any customary affairs.

Photo 1: Head Office of Latupati Assembly (Majelis Latupati)

If seen from the post-conflict condition, since 2003 the focus on peace-building between the two parties in Maluku had a special attention. Religious institutions started to open interfaith communications forum between them to mutually maintain brotherhood tie. The construction of Peace Gong Monument in 2009 became a symbol of collective memory from the Maluku people in order to keep maintaining peace.

18 Interview with Head of Latupati Assembly, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

Post-Conflict Local Election, Peace-Building and Democracy Development as Well as the Challenges

Post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku are generally designed to facilitate conflict resolution (Garber 1998) and/or as an effort to rehabilitate both regions (Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1). As emphasized earlier, the goal of post-conflict election in both regions in general serves as an instrument for conflict resolution and also sustainable peace promotion (conflict resolution/peace-building) and at the same time, to build democracy, even though both do not always walk abreast (e.g. Kumar 1998; Garber 1998: Lyons 2002; Korth 2011; Jarstad & Sisk 2008; Fogg 2005). As post-conflict regions, Aceh and Maluku are considered still vulnerable to conflicts and violence (war-torn societies/regions). Such communities are easily fragmented and polarized. Issues in this kind of society are often related to political, social and economic stability. Even, electoral competitions in both regions can become an extended polarization that occurred in the previous conflicts (Kumar 1998, p. 6-8).

This section is designed specifically to analyze various theoretical issues with a focus on two post-conflict local election cases in Aceh and Maluku. In detail, the chapter is divided into four sub-chapters namely (1) condition of post-conflict local election implementation in post-conflict regions; (2) the role of post-conflict local election in peace-building; (3) the role of post-conflict local election in democracy development; (4) potential and threat of instability in peace-building. This chapter is closed by comparative analysis on the post-conflict local election implementation in two regions by referring to various themes or issues already mentioned.

I. ACEH

a. General Condition of Post-Conflict Local Election Implementation

Apart from various issues occurring in the implementation, post-conflict local elections in Aceh are generally regarded as a success. Especially in the

international community, and if compared with post-conflict local elections in other post-conflict regions/states like Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Irak, etc., the post-conflict local election must be admitted as a particular accomplishment.[1] Besides that, in formal-procedural manner, it is regarded as being suitable to the prevailing rules, and therefore, on this level it is relatively democratic. Below are the expressions stated by some informants:

> Procedurally speaking, we think it is democratic. I mean, the post-conflict local election process is in accordance with the existing rules. According to the selection of KPU. In a certain context, it is successful.[2]

> I think it already run optimally nowadays although some technical problems and political education to the people are not yet fulfilled.[3]

> According to me, I think it's very good. If people said there is intimidation, I think it is not only in Aceh and it is normal for future improvements. Other areas with no conflicts may have ones. Well, I think it is great and extraordinary. It can be a sample that it is democracyi.[4]

Especially, Irwandi Yusuf, the former Aceh Governor made an interesting assessment on the implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh by comparing it with local elections in normal areas (not post conflict areas in Indonesia. According to him, if the reference is USA, the post-conflict local election is still far. However, if we look at local elections in other Indonesia regions, it is relatively a success as stated by him below[5]. As he emphasized below:

> Well, the democracy agenda started to exist in 2006. The landmark in the post-MoU democracy in Aceh was in the 2006 post-conflict local election. At that time, I participated in it and won in the 2006 post-conflict local election. Based on the US standard, our post-conflict local election was still poor but for Indonesia it was excellent. There was no money politics because the winner did not do it. I don't know about the others.[6]

> Yes, especially in 2006. It was the first stage of transition to democracy. That was the best post-conflict local election in the history of Aceh. It was the first and direct. There were independent candidates. Thirdly, combatants were given their voting rights and could nominate themselves.[7]

---

1 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
2 Interview with one of peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
3 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
4 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
5 Interview with Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
6 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
7 Interview with one of senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

The landmark of democracy development in post-conflict Aceh started in 2006 through the implementation of the first post-conflict local election after the 2006 Helsinki Peace Agreement. The post-conflict local election was regarded as the best and eventually placed Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar in the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial positions. Besides that, the 2006 post-conflict local election was considered to have created a particular history by staging pairs of gubernatorial and vice gubernatorial candidates from independent pathway, namely Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. It is deemed historical in the macro context of post-conflict local election in Indonesia because the independent pathway was the first initiative taken in the Aceh post-conflict local election. The 2006 *Pemilukada* ran relatively safely and in a stable manner,[8] if compared to the 2012 post-conflict local election. Even the 2012 post-conflict local election was regarded as very hot because since the beginning there were internal conflicts in the Aceh Party (PA).[9]

In the first post-conflict *pemilukada* there are some challenges and obstacles. The first was infrastructure readiness. When tsunami in 2004 hit, many buildings were damaged, including election organizing offices. Secondly, it deals with population data for producing the DPT (List of Permanent Voters). When Tsunami hit Aceh many Acehnese left their houses. Thirdly, it relates to the very tight readiness of post-conflict local election regulations.[10]

However, there were people who gave various evaluation and critical feedbacks on the post-conflict election implementation in Aceh. At a certain level, the post-conflict local election was considered less democratic because of some "non-democratic" factors or actions. One of the main highlighted issues was the partiality of post-conflict local election organizers to certain candidates or parties. This condition was confirmed, for instance, by one of the negotiators of 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement:

> But, I reemphasize here that democracy in Aceh is less perfect. Why? Because of non-democratic condoned actions. The selection of KPU members took sides; the KIP took sides. So, this made chaos and it was condoned. For instance, when we took a case to the Constitutional Court. The Court stated that there were irregularities, but the Constitutional Court said it was normal in the post-conflict situation.[11]

The selection process and post-conflict local election organizers' partiality issues have become a particular spotlight and common concern among activists and supporters of democracy development in Aceh. The partiality of

---

8 Interview with a former Aceh KIP Chief, Banda Aceh, 2o June 2014; and with commissionaire of Sabang Panwaslu Sabang, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
9 Interview with Governor's Expert Assistant for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
10 Interview with Governor's Expert Assistant for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
11 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

post-conflict local election organizers originated from the main problem of the screening and selection processes by DPRA. Often times in these processes there were certain parties who intervened so that the people in the organizers' structure would take action in accordance with and/or fight for their interests.[12] Critical attention to the organizers is given to their low capacity and characters, especially to much dishonesty done by post-conflict local election elements such as KIP, PPS, PPK, Panwaslu, dsb.[13]

Another critical note which drew the attention of many parties was widespread intimidation both verbal and physical, and which can be said to be visible in all parts of Aceh region, both in the areas that used to be GAM basis or non GAM basis. Even Sabang was included even though during the conflict this area was relatively peaceful due to relatively heterogeneous composition of the population. But in the 2012 post-conflict local election, intimidation was a common scene there.[14] In general, the intimidation is aimed to influence, and at a certain level, tends to force voters to vote for a particular party or candidate.

> [In the 2006 post-conflict local election] I know who was behind the attack and burning as well as grenade throwing to 16 PA offices at that time and 15 damaged cars. I know who did it and that would ruin democracy too. There were many foreign election observers coming at that time but intimidation existed but not by us... So, democracy started to break on the eve of 2911-2012 post-conflict local election. Therefore, related to…. Well, that's the course of elections in Aceh. I think it already went away from the principles of democracy. Yes, extraordinary intimidation. They banged on people's doors in hamlets during the day to vote for their candidates.[15]

> There was fear. We just had this *Pemilukada* for the first time. So this is an issue of people's feeling. For instance, if in this area A did not win, that would have an impact. But it cannot be proved. This becomes traumatic feeling.[16]

> This was what usually happened in hamlets: in the forums usually the people were informed that if PA did not win, that would be war... But in 2012 we could feel it. Many people actually had their own choices, but due to the terror, they did want to take risks because the police did not guarantee the security.[17]

---

12 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
13 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairs, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
14 Interview with Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
15 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
16 Interview with one of the Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistant, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
17 Interview with one of the local journalists, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.

Intimidation happened both in 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections. However, the 2012 post-conflict local election was considered as the peak of a huge number of intimidations. Especially, verbal intimidations were more dominant, such as "If you don't vote for this party, we will always be colonized,"[18] "It's obvious, if you don't vote for it, we will be in trouble again, Aceh will be in chaos, no more,"[19] and there are still many other verbal-intimidating expressions. Many verbal threats make use of the people's traumatic condition to the conflicts in order to pressure or force people to vote for a particular party, both directly or via SMS. A message through SMS says: "We want you not to vote for the candidate you support. You must choose our candidate if you want to be safe."[20]

In general, many intimidating efforts were directed against Aceh Party (PA), and especially occurred massively in the 2012 post-conflict local election, as stated by an informant:

> If we mentioned a PA member, they will never be in the structure. But they are sympathizers. That has been set up that there will be no player in the SK and they are free. Recently, I looked for several confirmations to PA members themselves. They said they were sympathizers. The sympathizers' work is not related to the party. They enter hamlets. If in a hamlet PA used to lose, then they will come and say, "We have one stamp seal for this hamlet. If we lose again in this village, don't ever expect our government to give funds to this hamlet."[21]

Intimidating actors were mostly related to PA sympathizers. Interestingly, PA did not deny that many intimidating behaviors were conducted by its sympathizers. However, we cannot expect a confirmation from PA that it was a structural instruction. One of the PA spokesperson, for instance, emphasized that such intimidation was a normal thing especially in the post-conflict region.[22] Massive intimidations conducted by PA withdrew a particular attention from one of the founders/former secretary of GAM, Husaini M. Hasan, who said:

> Not only feeling ashamed, I don't know where to hide my face. I am very disappointed… just look in the election, it was a democracy, but why were there intimidation and imposition of will... I feel sad why they (Acehnese elites) did not prioritize the interest of the Acehnese people. Instead, they only thought about their own interest.[23]

---

18 Interview with a Gayo resident, Banda Aceh, 22 June 2014.
19 Interview with a local Bireuen NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
20 Interview with Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
21 Interview with one local journalist, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
22 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
23 Merdeka.com, 4 December 2014. "Ex-GAM State Secretary accepts NKRI, but disappointed with Acehnese leader". Taken from id.berita.yahoo.com/eks-sekretrais-negera-gam-terima-nkri-

For Husaini M. Hasan, intimidation was a form of PA elites' behaviors that tended to think about their own interest and sacrifice the people.

In generally Intimidation physically takes the form of violence and terror targeting certain groups. Especially in 2012, it is predicted that many cases of violence accompanied the implementation of post-conflict local election.[24] Interestingly, cases of violence were higher in the 2012 post-conflict local election than in the 2006 post-conflict local election. In 2006, there were not much violence, and often times terrors occurred because at that time PA did not break yet, as stated by some informants below.

All violence was taken in order to win PA in 2012. Acehnese people even did not dare to go out at night. That was just on the brink of post-conflict local election. In Bireuen a Javanese was shot, in Banda Aceh a doll seller. Javanese was intentionally targeted so that Jakarta would pay attention. This was purely done to cancel the *pemilukada*.[25]

2006 and 2012. The same. Well, we also monitored the violence in the general election, I mean *pemilukada*. We had lots of findings; in 2012 there were around 112 cases that we found. And for us, from the two actors of post-conflict local election, the 2012 was the gravest. Because in 2006, the level of violence was not so high. It was only terror. And PA was still solid. Between Irwandi and PA groups.[26]

Based on some statements of the informants above, the important points to be taken are that the gravest and massive violence occurred in the 2012 post-conflict local election, assumed as the effect of PA disunity (PA vs PNA). Based on the data from a local NGO, there were an estimated number of 112 cases of violence. More that, Yusni Saby, former BRA-Aceh (Aceh Peace Reintegration Agency) Chairperson emphasized that"... here and there were violence and conflicts, but they did not end up riots. There was still aroma of conflicts during post-conflict local election."[27] At this level, he sees the emergence of violence in the Aceh post-conflict local election process was more a nuance of the previous conflicts that do not fully disappear.

However, in the eye of the international community, some violent incidents that claimed lives in the post-conflict elections processes in Aceh are considered as a normal and tolerable thing. Even on At a certain level, by considering the long duration of the conflicts in Aceh, such violence is considered a

---

tapi-kecewa-105440264.html, pada 25 Desember 2014.

24 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

25 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

26 Interview with one of the Bireuen NGO figures, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

27 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

normal thing and therefore, with international standard and comparison, the implementation of Aceh post-conflict local election is very good.[28]

b. Post-Conflict Local Election and Peace-Building

The important thing to consider in this section is that post-conflict post-conflict local election in Aceh is an instrument for implementation of UUPA (Aceh Government Laws), which is explicitly a derivative from the Helsinki MoU (*Memorandum of Understanding*). Thus, this post-conflict local election is not only an integral part of peaceful agreement between GAM and the Government Of Indonesia but also one of the *strategic* instruments to build peace, as emphasized by some informants below.

> When peace occurred on August 15, 2005 there was a high hope among the people that peace really happened. Then, when post-conflict local election or general election took place, the people did not want to lose it again and thought that the election was for peace… there was political dynamics. But it did not harm the process in general. The peaceful condition that was reached, see the dynamics from 2012 and 2006 did not give influence. I think it was still in the corridor of left-right conflicts. It was normal. It was a normal political dynamics. It did not influence the peaceful condition. I am optimistic it would continue. My biggest concern is not about politics but economy.[29]

> I think democracy in Aceh is only an instrument, and not a satisfier of people's aspiration towards individual welfare and stability. It is only an instrument so that in Aceh people don't fight for the cake of power. Through post-conflict local election. we will see how resources in Aceh will be distributed peacefully and democratically.[30]

> Post-conflict local election is a peace consolidation, apart from internal conflicts between them. But then their relation with Jakarta keeps strong. If we talk about vertical conflicts in Aceh, the relation is still good. So far Jakarta under SBY government has spoiled GAM, I think.[31]

Post-conflict local election is a consolidation, instead of instrument for generating new conflicts. If some conflicts, fights and violence occurred in the post-conflict local election implementation, that was only the general dynamics of inter-elites political competitions, which has so far supposedly not harmed the peace building process. Through post-conflict local election,

---

28 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
29 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO figures, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
30 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
31 Interview with one of the Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

Acehnese resources can be distributed in an equal and democratic manner through economic development. Therefore, the important thing that is feared to harm peace-building is not the post-conflict local election with various negative effects, but the economic development and improvement in the Acehnese people's welfare.

Concerns specifically related to the economic development are addressed to former combatants, most of whom are not still integrated yet. With the incompletely stable economic condition and driven by a feeling that they are the real main "share holders" of peace in Aceh,[32] they can be the spoilers of post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh.[33] The peace challenges are reflected in the statement of a former BRA-Aceh Chairperson:

> At macro level, it is already achieved. But at micro level, the effectiveness of peace can been seen from the people who have returned to their habitat. There should be no group's arrogance nor domination. No more former GAM, former combatant, former conflict victims; because they could become a new problem. What exists is the people of Aceh. Aceh needs development and special attention in the development. It is important. When there is a tender, people bearing the name of his group will intervene to get share and benefit from the cake of development.[34]

Widespread pressure by certain groups as former GAM members is an expressive form of peace share owner, who at a certain level has not benefited from the share. As the impact of this disappointment, they could become potential threat to the peace-building.

So far the peace-building in Aceh can be said to be relatively good,[35] although some post-conflict *pemilukadas* were accompanied by conflicts, violence and other problems. If analyzed more deeply, there is interplay relation between political factor and opportunity to economic access which plays an important role in making the *pemilukada* relatively peaceful and the peace in general runs well. The first is the victory of former GAM group through Aceh Party (PA), which is definitely not deliberateness, even though it received lots of spotlights by the public due to intimidating ways in the 2012 post-conflict local election and various issues. The victory then placed many PA cadres in various power positions in Aceh, both in legislative and executive positions, and especially the position of Aceh Governor. This condition can be said to have helped Aceh

---

32 Detik.com, "*Rapat Paripurna Penetapan Pimpinan DPR Aceh Ricuh*". Diambil dari detik.com/news/read/2014/12/09/012421/2771443/rapat-paripurna-penetapan-pimpinan-dpr-aceh-ricuh, pada 25 Desember 2014.

33 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

34 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

35 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014, with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014, with one of the former KIP Aceh commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

relative "silent" and conducive. Nevertheless we don't have the right to imagine if the post-conflict local election was since the beginning won by non-former GAM. This would create "noises", social, political and economic noises. Some informants emphasized this matter:

> Now, the established peace, in my opinion, is just political. For instance, they who were involved in wars now get positions and are then given opportunities for getting this and that projects. This is a kind of a price to be paid for a peace.[36]

> Not yet into fundamental things. After the conflict, the first thing to be fixed is integration. This relates to combatants in order that they can return to normal life. This can trigger conflicts.[37]

> It has become peaceful so far because one party is accommodated. The previous party, Irwandi Nazar, both people involved directly in conflicts and peace, after that Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf, and many other PA cadres in the government. With their presence, I think there will be an impact.[38]

Secondly, still related to the first, it is the wider economic access for former combatants after they are in power. Many of them have relatively good economic incentive and have won many development tenders in Aceh with various ways (Ansori 2011; Aspinall 2009). Even though it must be admitted that there are still particular elements among the former combatants alienated from the core group and who feel that they did not get the proper portion.

With the generally well maintained and relatively well running peace,[39] as well as ripple effect from the assumed power in Aceh by former combatants, then the question is how far and what is the condition and dynamics of peace-building nowadays? Below are some views of informants on the current peace-building condition which can be analyzed more deeply:

> So far, according to Jhon Galtung, it is still in the negative peace position. The absence of violence. Equality does not exist, nor equity. Event though it has been raised in several UUPA (Aceh Government Law), but the realization is nothing. It is merely planning. No active and positive participation from the grass root. Not an cumulative participation. There is no management system for aspiration coming from the grass root... In government affairs, there is no *good governance*. It is all the same: what happened before the conflicts and after the conflicts. However, post-con-

---

36 Interview with one of the Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
37 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
38 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
39 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

flict communities have more access and opportunities and are free to go anywhere.[40]

In terms of security, yes, the communities can go out at night to watch football together. But in terms of comfort, we cannot feel it yet because there are illegal weapons. In some elections there were shootings. That has not showed the face of peace.[41]

Critical evaluations on the current peace-building condition in Aceh are related more to macro basic elements, namely unrealized socio-economic justice, equality, pubic participation and positive and active participation access. Similarly, good governance is still considered incompletely good.[42] At this level, peace in Aceh—lending Jhon Galtung concept (1985)—is still in the "*negative peace*" phase, or only at the level of violence absence. More than that, peace in Aceh still negates comfort. Such condition is more caused by the presence of illegal arms. This condition is also reconfirmed by Irwandi Yusul, the former Aceh Governor, who underlined that with reference to the 2012 post-conflict local election, there were many GAM groups that still hold arms. In the 2012 post-conflict local election, Irwandi Yusuf's group often became a target of armed terrors, but he advised not to retaliate even though they also had arms.[43]

It must be admitted that to make post-conflict local election better and in general peace-building in Aceh more mature, longer process ad timeframe are required. So far there have been two leadership shifts in post-conflict Aceh, namely the Irwandi–Nazar and Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf periods. Several conditions are assumed to become the cause of less optimal development in Aceh. They are (1) limited number of competent Human Resources; (2) Most of the government top officials were new comers; (3) Massive poverty in various areas.[44]

c. Post-Conflict Local Election and Democracy Development

In general, it is assumed that democracy development tends to prioritize institutional changes and two other changes namely representative change and (more substantial) functional transformation will automatically follow them. Di Palma (1990) emphasized that democracy development can essentially be referred to the crating of new institutions (general election, new political party

---

40 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
41 Interview with one of the Women's NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
42 Based on IGI ranking (*Index Governance Indonesia*) year 2012, Aceh ranks the 18th with score of 5.82, which means *medium*.
43 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
44 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

and executive-legislative relation) (Faulk 1999). Implementation of democratic general elections is considered as the first step of democracy development (*first sign and step of democratization*). However, it must be admitted that this condition does not just run. Many general elections are utilized to sustain the non-democratic regime. In this context general elections can be used to cover dictatorship like general election in Ghana and Tanzania (*dynastic succession*) (Faulk 1999).

The implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh, both theoretically[45] and empirically, is intended not only to strengthen peace-building, but simultaneously develop democracy even though it is just within the limit as "*first step and sign of democratization*". The next question is how far post-conflict local election in Aceh to build peace? In general it can be said that post-conflict local election in Aceh at a certain level especially the formal-procedural and institutional development, help build local democracy, as expressed by some of the informants below.

> Well, formally speaking we have run it well. I mean the *pemilukada* ran well. Even after the conflicts, we chose Mr Irwandi. In the second election, we chose "Zikir" (Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf—ed). Then we recently did legislative elections. Formally they ran. Right, there is democracy, which sometimes threats exist. We don't know if the committee had lied. Who knows. Here and there, there is money. Yes, whenever it is needed, it will be there. But not that massive. Formally there was no riots. We could still smell conflicts aroma. We hope it is getting better day by day. Another issue is the organizers. Not only the people, KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS may be wrong.[46]

> The Acehnese people perceive democracy through elections, I guess. But it is still not in the substantive issue. So they don't talk about freedom of expression, then how the minority groups are protected. We haven't reached there except for Banda Aceh city.[47]

> The democratic festival have not shown the maturity of the people involved. For instance, After the conflict, there was intimidation process. Election organizers, political party supporters and others should have been able to develop democracy in Aceh. But we saw that the organizers harmed the elections. For instance, some KIP took the role in winning one of the candidates. The proof and facts are available.[48]

---

45 See the conceptual and theoretical framework, in the Introduction.
46 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
47 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 Junei 2014.
48 Interview with one of the Women's NGOs activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

The first step of democracy development is through the good and smooth implementation of post-conflict local election. If we analyze more deeply the statements of some informants above, the post-conflict local elections in Aceh have so far run well, using multi-party system and some local parties. The general public, including former combatants and non combatants, have equal rights to vote and to be voted.[49] Therefore, post-conflict local election can be said to play an important role in helping peace-building in Aceh. However, there are some weaknesses to be improved, namely (1) many threats and intimidations; (2) dishonesty and partiality of post-conflict local election organizers including KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS; (3) increase in *money politics*; (4) intervention from rulers on post-conflict local election results, etc.

In this context, democracy development in Aceh is still in the formal-procedural phase or moving towards institutional development, which still has many "holes". Various weaknesses can cause post-conflict local election not to be "*genuine competition*" (fair and just competition) (Faulk 1999). Besides that, democracy development in Aceh has not fully entered more substantial functional transformation such as freedom of expression, minority protection, equality in social and economic development, respect for differences, etc., as emphasized by an informant below.

> We push for better democracy process even though many parties have not position democracy accordingly. So, the perceived context of democracy is still partial. Democracy issues should cover welfare, education, basic rights that must be met. We see them partially addressed. For instance, it is only by fixing good governance on locality.[50]

In a separate occasion, the informant highlighted more the issue of understanding on democracy among the rulers and Acehnese in general. Democracy is not fully understood with only reference to formal-procedural rules, good governance, and local symbols. Democracy in Aceh is perceived to have not much touched substantive issues such as welfare and people's education, which are the ultimate goal of the development of democracy.

Once again, the substantive important value of democracy that received many critical spotlights in Aceh is the respect for differences in values, point of views and opinions in the society. Another important value is the respect for equality, including protection o the minority both in religious and tribal aspects, as emphasized by some informants below:

> So, they don't talk about freedom of expression, then how the minority groups are protected. We are not there yet, expect for Banda Aceh City.

---

49 Interview with one of the Acehnese senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
50 Interview with one of the Women's NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

But if compared to other regions that are strict to…. I think democracy in Aceh is more about, I vote, I am involved in the democratic processes.[51]

The substance of democracy, namely the respect for differences in values or respect for equality, is not much practiced yet nor trained yet. Democratic values have not been adequately set up. If there is a different opinion or point of view, the people easily get into conflict and debate and even this leads to violence.[52]

Furthermore, the Acehnese society is regarded as easy to take shortcuts of violence, intimidation and terror, when dealing with different opinions and points of view.[53] Democracy in Aceh, therefore, can be said to be relatively in the phase of "*first step and sign of demcratization*", in which democracy prioritizes more the formal-institutional aspects of success and smoothness of post-conflict local election implementation. Higher levels, namely internalization and practice of democratic values should become the agenda and priority of the future democracy development. In reality, democracy development is not an instant one-night process. Besides, there is no country in the world that is fully democratic (Faulk 1999).

Another criticism to the democracy development in Aceh is related to the treatment of minority groups in Aceh especially referring to various minority tribes there. Based on the testimonies of some informants, fair treatment and protection to minority tribes have not been much done. Such condition is very visible from the existing developmental discrimination. In general development is more prioritized in the areas where the majority Acehnese tribe live, especially in the eastern coastal areas,[54] as emphasized below:

There is difference in physical infrastructure development between certain areas and the others. For instance, the asphalt construction in the eastern coastal areas (GAM basis) is very smooth and tight while the other areas are smooth with a few holes and slightly thin. This is contradictory to democracy.[55]

The discrimination is not only related to the unbalanced infrastructure construction, but also to the recruitment of public offices. Such condition was then realized by Irwandi Yusuf when he was the Aceh Governor (2006-2011). Then he recruited and took people from Central Aceh with the majority of

51 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaire, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
52 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
53 Interview with one of the Aceh DPRA from Golkar Fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
54 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014; with one of the Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014, with one of the Gayo people, Banda Aceh, 22 June 2014.
55 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

people of Gayo tribe to sit in the Aceh government. However, unfortunately this policy was ignored by the current Aceh leader, Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf.[56]

Another emerging problem in Aceh is related to gender equality and equity. In general, representation of women is not much visible both in the post-conflict local election implementation process and political recruitment process. Even though there is an increase, but it is not even.[57] The position of local heads in Aceh assumed by females, for instance, is only one, namely the Deputy Mayor of Banda Aceh. The position was even granted after the death of the previous mayor so that she was automatically promoted as the mayor. However, there are a few positive developments in the legislative area, namely an increased role of women as the impact of the general election's requirement set by KPU.[58] Overall, the number of females that have seats as DPRA is currently 12 people(Aceh Party= 3 people; Golkar Party =4 people; National Mandate Party =2 people; Democratic National Party =1 person; Aceh National Party = 1 person; Gerindra Party =1 person).

Issues on gender equity are not only related to the domain of political recruitment, but also gender-sensitive development. Based on the testimony from one gender activist in Aceh, gender-sensitive or female-sensitive development programs are in general not much practiced, especially during the period of Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf. In the current leadership of both leaders, access and partiality to females are even more closed and limited, especially in the application of Islamic *Sharia* accompanied by various *qonun* which not only limits the movement, but in general discriminates women in Aceh.[59]

Apart from various issues and weaknesses of the democracy development above, post-conflict democracy development in Aceh is currently considered to still have better quality if compared to democracy implementation before the 2005 Peace Agreement. During the conflicts era, many people came to the ballots rather because of fear of the central government than coming in their own initiative. Fear was very dominant and massive, not only during the election but also in the daily life.[60]

Interestingly, another perspective is given by an informant in looking at the process and dynamics of post-conflict local election implementation and democracy development in Aceh. The post-conflict local election model as applied in Aceh is considered not suitable with the real culture and condition of Acehnese people. At a certain level, it can even harm the peace process.

---

56 Interview with one of the Acehnese senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
57 Interview with one of the Women's NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
58 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014
59 Interview with one of the women activists, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
60 Interview with Chairperson of Aceh Traditional Council, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

The current democracy model is considered to be too "*western style*". The democracy model should be more based on "*concensus-building*" on the values and culture of the Acehnese people. Besides that, Aceh condition as post-conflict region is much related to the issues of former combatants and peace agreement trade-off.[61]

Apart from the critical issues and debates on the democracy model in post-conflict Aceh, major challenges that need to be immediately tackled is the gap of knowledge on democracy between the people living in Banda Aceh and outside Banda Aceh. The spotlight is mainly aimed to the process and mechanism of political education which is still far from the expectation, as emphasized by an informant.

> Let's say many of us are democracy-literate. But not all of the people understand it, especially those living in villages…The challenge is to give education, for instance political education. This is not the responsibility of the government, right? We all have to be there, but we haven't gotten there.[62]

In the future, the important aspects in the democracy development in Aceh are improvement and strengthening of the understanding of democracy, both in the formal-procedural dimensions and its substance. Political education is a strategic foundation to improve people's understanding on democracy, especially those living in isolated rural areas, in which access to media and education is still very limited. However, according to the informant's testimony, political education is still very rare here. Education should be the shared task and responsibility of all democracy stakeholders in Aceh, including local government, CSO, political parties, etc.

d. Pemilukada and Threat of Instability in Peace-Building

Studies on post-conflict local election especially become interesting because there are dilemmas often faced in the post-conflict local election implementation process. In general, as emphasized earlier, the post-conflict local election implementation in post-conflict areas have two important goals (*double goals*), namely as the peace building process and an first step to democracy development. However, this condition can produce contra-productive thing in which post-conflict local election is not helping, consolidating and strengthening accomplished peace, but it creates fictions and conflicts and threats to instability given the fact that the inherent character of election is competition.

It must be admitted that the threat to instability in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh exists. Such threat in general takes the form

---

61 Interview with one of the former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
62 Interview with one of Aceh DPRA from Golkar Fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.

of conflicts between Aceh Party supporters and non-Aceh Party supporter, and between supporters, or Aceh Party elites. In the 2006 post-conflict local election violence and intimidation were less than in the 2012 post-conflict local election; political frictions still revolve between Aceh Party supporters and non-Aceh Party supporter. However, entering the 2012 post-conflict local election, the levels of violence, terrors and intimidation tend to increase and accompanied by the emergency of new political friction in the macro Aceh political constellation, namely between Aceh Party (PA) and Aceh National Party (PNA) whose supporters of both parties are GAM supporters. It needs considering that the emergence of escalated violence in the 2012 post-conflict local election is the impact of division in Aceh Party.[63]

Various forms of potential threats to instability in the post-conflict local elections, and generally in the peace-building prospect in Aceh can be seen in the following informant's statements:

> The perpetrator is free. I did not say who the perpetrator was, but people who are used to violence, the habit is transferred to the current democratic festival. They feel they are immune. This applied to the yesterday's post-conflict local election. So, they do one thing to show their interest, and feel that they feel they have the rights in the power in Aceh after their long struggle.[64]

> So, the law enforcers must explain this. For instance a PNA house is demolished. It must be clarified who attacked the PNA personnel and burnt the car. The current government thinks that security counts. No problem with a small number of deaths. Internationally speaking, this thought does not exist. What matters is Aceh is safe. In its democracy, if there are some small holes, that won't be a big deal. It's normal. Okay, they have changed the clothes and been disarmed, but their thoughts are still there, do not disappear. The idea of independence is still in the heart of Acehnese people.[65]

One of the forms of potential threats in Aceh so far is inter-civil society violence. This condition is worsened by the absence of proper resolution (*rule of law*), especially in the context of prevailing positive laws. Then it becomes a bad precedent as it will create revenge and opportunity to carry out the same thing. If so, violence and intimidation in the post-conflict local election in Aceh may become the "cycle of evil". Violence is not definitely something strange for former combatants who have just descended from mountains. The "culture of violence" and intimidation may not fully disappear from

---

63 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
64 Interview with one of the Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
65 Interview with one of the former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

their ways, and proves to be taken to the political competition domain, as emphasized by one of the Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaires. "I think intimidation becomes a trend. Why? Because it is an effect from conflict areas."[66] Transformation of combatants, both economically and socially, can be said to be not completely finished yet, especially if the idea of Free Aceh is always boiling in their minds.

Another factor which can trigger tension, conflicts and violence is the role of mass media. It must be admitted that media also plays an important role in shaping and aggravating instability because often times media reports negative and provocative things, which in their perspective are more interesting to readers and potentially increase their turnover. Besides that, people's economic condition also plays a crucial role in triggering instability. Less employment opportunities and high poverty in Aceh have made it easy to mobilize the people for the interest of a particular party, and even to do violence. Besides that, many of the people ran for legislative candidates with high political cost. Consequently, anything will be done, including violence and terror, for victory.[67]

From the aspect of actors, the group of former elite combatants is often accused of being the cause of conflicts and threat to instability of post-conflict local election and peace-building process.[68] *Pemilukada* then becomes the sales product of the elites. For instance, many of them stated in an intimidating tone and threatened that if they lost, the peace would be in jeopardy and chaos would return again.[69] They did such ways merely because they understood that many of the Acehnese people still felt traumatic and feared conflicts. This traumatic condition is often utilized by the former combatants' group,[70] even though potential for returning to wars as before was nil. However, the government is still traumatic for the return of GAM, as stated by some informants.

> Yes, in my opinion it is already nil. But the government is traumatic to the 1990s incidents when GAM was regarded as already finished, but they returned with full force. Well, the government feels afraid there.[71]

> What for will they rebel? Because currently they have enjoyed the cake of peace. The cake of power and they can threaten people to get projects. If he does not get the cake they won't rebel… Yes; if they are not given food

---

66 Interview with one of the Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
67 Interview with one of the former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
68 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
69 Interview with one of the senior Acehnese journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014, and with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
70 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
71 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

how will they survive up in the mountain? They used to survive there because people brought them food.[72]

Condition for the return to the past time and involvement in conflicts is not something that can easily happen. Not only because their arms have almost completely been gone but also because former combatant group is considered to feel comfortable with their current power position and enjoy "the cake of development", at least at their elites level. The threat to return to the conflict period and create chaos may be just a camouflage for short-time political goal.

The threat of instability that comes the concerns of many parties above can be regarded as relatively weak. In reality, the implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh is relatively conducive and stable, although with various weaknesses that require improvements. Stability and smoothness of post-conflict local elections in Aceh are actually much helped, and at a particular level, owe to the reality of Aceh Party's victory in the two periods of post-conflict local elections, as stated by some informants below.

In my opinion, elections is related to conflicts because the actors are PA who are GAM elite. They also took an important role in the Aceh conflict contest. In the previous post-conflict local election, when I was in office, the internal conflicts were strong, between PNA and NA. NPA was represented by Irwandi… If Aceh conflict used to be vertical one. But today it started to be horizontal because of the internal conflict between PNA and PA. They are still the strong actors, influential actors in the stream of conflicts in Aceh.[73]

It did trigger new conflicts, for instance local parties. Within the Aceh Party itself. Between PA and NPNA. Various tender and nepotism problems have generated conflicts, which cause one another to become hostile and this became a particular threat in the previous post-conflict local election. Luckily, Aceh Party won at that time. It is the basis of GAM militant supporters.[74]

Apart from the disunity between supporters of Aceh Party which then created a new party, the Aceh National Party (PNA), the victory of Aceh Party (PA), that can be said to the representative transformation of GAM, is helpful and becomes one of the important factors for strengthening the post-conflict local election stability in Aceh. In this context, various violence, intimidation, terror and conflicts occurring in the society did not manage to

---

72 Interview with one of the PNA (Aceh National Party) spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
73 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
74 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

cancel the post-conflict local election implementation or even threatened the prospective peace-building in the region. The situation might have changed if Aceh Party had lost and the center of power in Aceh disappeared from their hands. However, the key behind the victory-defeat of Aceh Party in the post-conflict local election and its impact on the potential instability is the behavior of the Party Aceh's exponents,[75] especially democratic attitude or character, as emphasized by Kumar (1998, p. 6-8), namely be willing to accept defeat with a big heart.

II. MALUKU

a. General Condition of Post-Conflict Local Election Implementation

Post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku was in general relative safe and stable. In the post-conflict local election implementation process, various forms of conflict, violence, terror of intimidation were rarely found.[76] Violence can be said to have only taken place in some post-conflict local elections at the district level, especially post-conflict local election in Eastern Seram district (SBT), as stated by some informants below.

> Thanks God, that in the most recent developments, Maluku is still safe and secure. However, some exceptions are in some villages because of internal conflicts. For instance Polto and Aria; the problem was related to water source. It was not because of post-conflict local election, but the post-conflict local election in general ran smoothly. So, both elections of regents, governors and legislators and presidential election.[77]

> In general the post-conflict local election condition in Maluku province and our government ran as usual. There was one or two conflict but they did not explode because they could be curbed. There were people who try to stir the people to return to the year of 1999, but we were not tempted to it because we have learnt from experiences.[78]

> It was safe. People did campaigns and it was Okay. I think the people were aware and not easily triggered by those things. Actually the government both the governor or mayor have given awareness, (and also religious and local leaders), that if you found those things, you should not be tempted.[79]

---

75 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
76 Interview with the chairperson of Latupati Council, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
77 Interview with *Kesbangpol* Maluku, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
78 Interview with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
79 Interview with one of Women's NGO, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

Both Maluku local government and the people seem to agree to emphasize that the post-conflict *pemilukada* has so far run safely and smoothly although it must be admitted that there were some conflicts and violence in certain districts. However, that did not create agitation and concerns in Maluku at the macro level.[80] Besides that, there were also inter-hamlet conflicts, but they were more caused by non-post-conflict local election issues.[81]

Stability and security in post-conflict local election are not only realized in Ambon, the capital city of Maluku, but also in another islands such as Central Maluku.[82] The *pemilukada* in Central Maluku was not only safe and stable, but also the people did not care about various conflicts involving the elites. Besides that, in the 1999 conflict period, the condition in Maluku was not as bad and complex as in Ambon, as emphasized by one of the Central Maluku figures as follows:

> In Central Maluku I wanted to say that the people did not care about the elites' conflicts. They never knew what the elites wanted. Again the people did not think about things related to the prolonged conflicts occurring after the post-conflict local election.[83]

However, comparatively, the tension and competition of the provincial post-conflict election tended to be stronger than those in the districts or other islands in Maluku.[84] From the security aspect, the post-conflict local election implementation was considered conducive and stable, especially if compared to the neighboring province, North Maluku. There was nothing significant that required the police to work hard, as emphasized the Maluku:

> The security situation related to completed post-conflict local election in Maluku was fairly conducive. We feel it because we look at other regions like North Maluku, in which the post-conflict local election was still going on. *Alhamdulillah* all have run smoothly. So there was nothing too significant that required the police to work hard. On the other hand, the people are already aware of the importance of security so that the security personnel did not have to work extra for guarding.[85]

The Maluku local police itself admitted the security and stability of the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku. The evaluation is es-

---

80 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Inter-Faith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
81 Interview with one of Central Maluku figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
82 Interview with the head of Central Maluku KPUD, Masohi, 20 November 2014, and with Central Maluku *Bappeda*, Masohi, 20 November 2014.
83 Interview with one of the Central Maluku figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
84 Interview with one of the Maluku PDIP figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
85 Interview with the Maluku local police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

pecially supported by the reality that the Maluku local police did not have to work extra hard or had to deploy so many personnel for the guarding process because there was almost no violence in the Maluku post-conflict local election.

Interestingly, there is one important factor which is often referred to as the supporter of the security and stability of the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku. The factor is the people's awareness that includes local wisdom in religious life both between the Christian and Moslem communities, in order not to get involved in the inter-communal conflicts, especially the conflicts that drag religious variables. Both communities are more aware that the 1999 conflicts between them was basically the product of external intervention. They feel that they used to only be "engineered" by particular parties who wanted to divide them. The awareness, if analyzed further, more builds on and is supported by the Maluku traditional wisdoms, namely "*pela gandong*", "*aini ain*" and "*siwalima*".[86]

So far the raising awareness as mentioned early has been conducted by various society elements such as government, traditional leaders, religious leaders, NGOs, etc. Many forms of awareness such as local wisdom of the society are expressed in various statements such as "Never try to provoke in Christian communities as if it is from Moslems, so you will get it first. At present Christian people will not easily believe it and Moslems won't too."[87] Many parties have tried to provoke again the groups that used to be involved in conflicts using religious variables, especially through SMS and leaflets, but almost all of it did not work. The people's awareness is considered to start grow maturely.[88] From the political party's point of view, for instance, the effects of the 1999 conflict and strong segregation do not have significant influence as long as the approach they use is nationalism, instead of religion.[89]

From the implementation side, the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku is considered to run smoothly, according to the rules and procedural phases of post-conflict local election implementation. Particular cases, as an exception, are the post-conflict local elections in Central Maluku and Tual City, which are the proliferated areas. Both post-conflict local elections were conducted simultaneously on June 9, 2013. There were tensions and technical problems, especially in the post-conflict local election in Tual City, which resulted in the postponement of the post-conflict local election until June 17, 2013. Such postponement resulted from some already-opened ballot boxes before the post-conflict local election implementation time scheduled

---

86 Interview with the Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

87 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

88 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014, and with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.

89 Interview with one of the Maluku PDIP figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

for June 9, 2013. Clashes broke between the supporters of the candidates. It was suspected that there was an involvement and partiality of KPUD (Local General Election Commission) to the incumbent candidates.

Another case occurred in post-conflict local election in Eastern Seram (SBT). It was suspected that there were many irregularities done by post-conflict local election organizers. The organizers were regarded as partial to the incumbent candidate. Even, the vote calculation process had to be repeated. Consequently, five commissionaires of the KPUD and three members of Eastern Seram *Panwaslu* were dismissed by DKPP (Election Organizers Ethics Council) in August 2013 because they were considered to violate the code of conducts. Then, the Eastern Seram KPUD was taken over by the Maluku Provincial KPUD, while the Maluku Provincial *Bawaslu* (General Election Supervisory Body) established a new *Panwaslu* (General Election Supervisory Committee) in the district. The disappointed supporters of the incumbent candidate (*incumbent*), Abdullah burned the DPRD and sub-district office.[90] This also happened in post-conflict local election in Aru Islands. The KPUD commissionaires were evacuated by the police. The dissatisfaction of the candidates and the supporters were triggered by a suspicion of KPUD partiality.[91]

Dissatisfaction with the post-conflict local election results is not absent. Many dissatisfactions with the post-conflict local election results ended up in the Constitutional Court. This condition is regarded as a good progress, because the existing dissatisfaction is not channeled into violent ways or clashes.[92] Dissatisfaction occurs as a reaction over the independency and neutrality of the post-conflict local election organizers that are questioned by the candidates' supporters. Based on the observation of one Maluku DPRD member, the KPUD and *Banwaslu* independency is relatively good in general. However, it must be admitted that there were certain parties that try to do political intervention so that it harms the fairness in *pemilukada*.[93]

b. Post-Conflict Local Election and Peace-Building

Once again, local election (*pemilukada*) conducted in post-conflict regions is not only intended to build democracy, but also to develop and consolidate peace in the regions. Among the Maluku leaders develops a strategic point of view that the political process —post-conflict local election—must be part of the integral process towards peace-building Maluku, as intended by one of the informants:

---

90 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014, and Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
91 Interview with Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
92 Interview with Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
93 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 2014.

The political process after the conflict is one of the reconciliation instruments. That there is a slice of religions is not too significant for me. Because people have new awareness that this process must be guarded together. People return to the agreements that existed long before the conflicts; if the regent is Christian the vice regent is Moslem; the governor is Christian, the Vice Governor is Moslem; the Governor is Moslem, the Vice Governor is Christian. There have been unwritten agreements like in the old days.[94]

Looking at the fact that several post-conflict local elections implemented in Maluku ran relatively smoothly and stable, it can be assumed that so far the post-conflict local elections play an important role in helping to build peace in Maluku. The nuances of inter-religious frictions are relatively visible in the surface, either intentionally or not, but that does not influence much.[95] The building and consolidation of peace through this political process increasingly show the maturity. Therefore, the post-conflict local election implementation and the important role in the peace-building in Maluku can be said as a particular success.[96] In this context, one of the Maluku DPRD member emphasized that "how to measure the success of post-conflict local election can be seen from the appearance of the results and the process. The democracy process indeed runs relatively safe and quite well."[97]

The frequently-referred thing as the political foundation of peace-building through post-conflict local election is the power sharing between the Moslem and Christian groups, as emphasized by some informants below.

After conflicts, then the candidates should be from Moslem and Christian groups. This did not exist before. People did not pay attention to this. Whether the candidates were from Moslems or Christian, there were no rules about that in the old days. But after the conflicts, there is unwritten rule that if the governor is Moslem, the vice governor is Christian or if the governor is Christian, the vice governor is Moslem.[98]

For me, the chance is still there. The chance of building peace is still there as long as there are, for instance, candidate representations. Back to balance. Back to representation. The candidate representations will have different models from the representations but this will build dialogs at the

---

94 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
95 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) chair persons, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
96 Interview with Maluku PKB figure, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
97 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
98 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

grass root level. And I am convinced the dialog would be positive. That would depend on the practitioners.[99]

The power sharing is not definitely a formal regulation for post-conflict local election implementation, but more a local initiative of the Maluku people so that it can be said as "unwritten agreement"[100]. Concretely speaking, the power sharing takes the form of candidate pairing that combines Moslem and Christian candidates both at the district and provincial levels. At a particular level, the sharing is regarded as a form of community or group representation, which has basically been established, even before the 1999 conflict broke out.

Of course, the combination of elected candidates does not automatically bring peace in Maluku. Therefore, the problem is how far this combination is not only a symbol of representation, but also implemented in the sharing of the equal development program, as well as more productive dialogs and inter-community interactions, as stated in the statement of an informant below.

> There is development... [...] None of the government's development programs is oriented to how the peace grows powerfully, by the society. No orientation to prevent conflicts, to keep on building peace.[101]

Some criticisms are directed against the local initiatives and ideas above. One of them underlines the shift of point of view of the Maluku society that the elected candidates should not be based on religious or tribal variables, but on their track records, including the experiences, capabilities and integrity, as emphasized by an informant below.

> It is said that the current governor is from Bugis, outsider of Maluku, but the majority of voters are Christians. Then the question is that why Christians do not vote for the Christian candidate. For this fact, they can differentiate who is the most likely to be the leader.[102]

> Our consideration is that if the sharing of power becomes an indicator for setting up a government or an organization, the competent persons will be eliminated due to the power sharing factor, for instance.[103]

There is a shift of people's point of view in determining choice to a particular candidate. Electing a candidate is not merely based on the religious similar-

---

99 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

100 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

101 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

102 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

103 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

ity variable but also on the competency aspect,[104] which means the candidate's "track-record". Therefore, Christian community does not automatically tend to elect Christian candidates, but it is most probably that they elect Moslem candidates if the candidates are considered to have good track record, be able to develop Maluku and maintain peace. The currently-elected governor can be put in this case category because the voters' basis is Christian communities. However, symbolization of power sharing is seldom considered still necessary given the fact that not all of the people share the similar thought, and many of them prioritize religious variable.[105]

To a certain level, power sharing helps to build peace and unite the Maluku community's common sense as the united and peaceful communities, especially the grass-root communities whose points of view are still traditional/conservative. At another level, the mechanism sometimes does not run fully, even fails. Not all candidate pairs that use power sharing strategy can win post-conflict local elections. At the same time some candidates use the same strategy, the voters generally will shift to track-record and integrity aspects of the candidate pairs.[106] Especially the figures that are considered to have vision and missions of peace-building and development of Maluku will be superior.[107]

The condition that needs to be understood in this relation is that the candidates elected through power sharing (combination of Moslem and Christian) do not automatically. A more substantial problem is how the elected candidates can implement policies and programs that target peace-building and welfare of the Maluku society in general.[108] In another word, how the local leader pair can become leaders that are able to build peace-related good governance in Maluku. At this level, power sharing is not fully significant and automatic, but merely a first prospective step.

Another important influential factor is the society's huge passion and feeling of not being involved in various forms of conflicts. The people feel fed-up with the sufferings resulting from the 1999 conflict, as intended by one of the informants below.

---

104 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

105 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

106 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) chair persons, Ambon, 25 August 2014; with one of the refugees' figures, Ambon, 23 August 2014; and with one of the Maluku MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

107 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014; with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; and with one of the Christian refugees' coordinators in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 24 August 2014.

108Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; with one of the Christian refugees' coordinators in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 24 August 2014; and with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

So, through general election we do not want to live hard any longer. Without being instructed, being instructed by leaders or officials, the people here feel being called to refuse to do such things so that naturally.… Because people feel tired, tired. How can we eat everyday? So that, in their own initiative they do not want to listen to any issue. Such awareness may make people not willing to do anarchic things any more.[109]

Such feeling above then becomes a type of public awareness and hope to avoid various forms of anarchism which can emerge due to tension and competition in post-conflict local elections. The people have more interest in peaceful and conducive condition and avoid all actions and involvement that can create conflicts.

Lastly, the mass media also plays an important role in helping to condition post-conflict local elections and consolidate peace in Maluku. The media has so far been regarded as helpful to reduce tension by not blowing up or covering things that are considered provocative. Mass media is regarded as relatively wise in offering news that may trigger inter-group tensions.[110]

c. Post-Conflict Local Election and Democracy Development

Procedurally speaking, the post-conflict development of democracy in Maluku has run relatively well. In this case, various rules and process of the post-conflict local election implementation have been well implemented.The security and stability conditions are well maintained. Almost no massive and bloody violence nor clashes were found except in Easter Seram district (SBT) and Tual city. In this context, an informant emphasized:

Procedurally speaking it was good. All of the people were involved and there was no discrimination. All had the same right. We saw it from the rights of the voters and the nominees. The procedures and technical implementation was in accordance with the rules of post-conflict local election implementation. It ran safely, in orderly manner and smoothly. Maluku is actually a former place of identity conflicts, but the nuance of identity-based competition has started to fade.[111]

One of the important characters of the democracy development process is inclusiveness (Faulk 1999), in which all components of the society are included in the public decision –making process. In other words, all of the people have the same rights to vote and to be voted in post-conflict local

---

109 Interview with Central Maluku KPUD, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
110 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
111 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

election, or to influence public decision-making processes through the post-conflict local election process. However, it must be admitted that there are still technical-procedural issues in the post-conflict local election implementation. For instance, voters do not have voter invitation letter nor give their rights, vote counting irregularity, etc.[112] The successful post-conflict local election is part of the first step of the overall democracy development. Besides that, substantively the people are free to channel their aspirations, opinions, and voices without any pressure. They are free to stage a demonstration as long as it is according to the standard permit and security.[113]

Inclusiveness of democracy development is also related to the issue of gender equality, both in the political domain and other public spaces.

> We should first make balances such as between women and men. For gender issue we have to make it in the same aspect, in the aspect of employees' affairs and positions and others. In the aspect of business this has been considered; we are going to that direction, Sir. Slowly. Last year we developed gender-responsive budget development planning.[114]

> Gender equality is being developed by the provincial and city governments through their programs which are claimed to be gender responsive; integrating those differences into their programs. But we are with women; again we find that the issue has not finished yet.[115]

The Maluku local government is very much aware of the importance of equality and equity among all the components of the society in every aspect of life. Gender equality becomes a special attention of Maluku local government in development planning as managed by the Development and Planning Agency (*Bappeda)*. The important domain of the gender-responsive development is related to budgeting, employee affairs, and public offices. The Maluku local government admitted that the strategy runs slowly but the effect or impact may not be fully felt by the women at present.

One of the important post-conflict democracy developments in Maluku is the gradual fade-out of identity politics. Before the 1999 conflict the identity politics was quite tight and strong. Related to this, there is a shift in paradigm of determining candidates. Many people do not tend to choose leaders based on identity variables such as tribe, religion, area, etc. any longer, although significance of these variables does not completely disappear. Nevertheless, the paradigm shift is a development which is worth appreciation. Some informants below emphasized the condition.

112 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
113 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
114 Interview with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
115 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

We don't vote for leaders based on tribe, religion and race. The people seem – some of them because I think if 100% is impossible- some of the society have move away from the traditional thought and start to move towards the modern one.[116]

The life in Maluku is very democratic, Sir, but when it is already deals with belief… many people think that God the Allah needs to be defended. But such tendency has started to fade in the political sphere. The people have growingly understood which is the political interest or religious affairs.[117]

So, religion is not the background. Why? If I am in brotherhood with Christians, let's say a Christian is the leader, but I love Moslem brothers, why should we choose the others. It depends on the figures, both Moslem and Christian, but the performance, appearance, approaches are good, that's all.[118]

It can be said that the 1999 conflict has caused an extraordinary social change in the Maluku society (Coser 1967, p. 26), especially with growingly mature behaviors of diversity and inter-fait tolerance as well as political choice which is not always based on religious identity but more on rational considerations.[119] It must be admitted that it is one of the positive developments in post-conflict Maluku. Even an informant explicitly emphasized that at this point the post-conflict local election is better than the *ones* before the conflict.[120] A concrete example is as follows.

A Moslem child who used to live here (Suli/a Christian community area), in the post-conflict local election he got votes from here. It means, we cannot see whether the person is Moslem or Christian but we see that the person will be the one that will pay attention to us and consider people's aspiration. That means there is no partition.[121]

Yes; so, after the conflict, automatically the people are still segmented. Therefore, there is a will among the people that still think of democracy in a traditional manner, that still determine their political choices based on tribe, religion and others. There is emotional closeness. There people will hand down their political preference. But after improvements take place in the campaign period, when the candidates communicate their vision and

---

116 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
117 Interview with Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
118 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
119 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
120 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
121 Interview with Kind Suli and Latupati committee, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

missions and others, then changes start to occur gradually; slowly there have been changes.[122]

The change takes place indirectly and not automatically after the 1999 conflict, but gradually. In the initial period of the post-conflict local election, in which the people were still relatively "segmented", the majority of the people still handed down their choice based on religious variable so that the emotional dimension was tight. However, in its course, the Maluku people started to tend to consider their choices based on the factors of capability and experiences of the candidates. This paradigm shift occurs definitely due to support from various stakeholders of democracy development in Maluku.

Nevertheless, although the paradigm shift is a positive progress of development, not all the people share the thought. Still there are many Maluku people who determine their choices based on the identity consideration. The condition definitely slices with local initiative development in the form of power sharing which develops and is chosen as a strategy by many candidates of local leaders. Behind the power sharing is the awareness of political actors of the still strong identity politics within the society. With the power sharing, they hope to win the votes from traditional voters who still tend to base their choices on identity. The rooted identity politics was revealed by an informant below.

> If I were Moslem. If I were the candidate of governor or regent, I would also know by heart the words of Bible, when I visited a Christian community and talked about the words. O..they would be very happy. If I were Christian, I would know by heart the *Al Fatihah*, then the Moslems would be happy. Or for instance, the person visited a Moslem community. That's the experience in my hamlet. He talked and entered with *Al Fatihah.* The people were happy and came. On the D-day for voting, the person got many votes…. We here, for the level of acceptance, cannot deny that for Maluku the religious factor is one of the variables. Tribe is also a variable.[123]

One of the characteristics related to the strong identity politics is the tight religious symbolization. For the above example, even though a candidate is Moslem, but if he can mention Bible's verses when visiting Christian communities, it is almost sure that the people will be happy and tend to give their votes for the candidate.

Still related to the identity politics issue, one of the unique dynamics in the Maluku post-conflict local election context is the relation between *pela*

---

122 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
123 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

and vote support. In general, it is assumed that one community that have *pela* relation with the candidate from another community will "morally" give the votes to the candidate, as emphasized by an informant below.

Like this; community A of a *negeri* with the community B of a *negeri*, the person is *pela Gandong*, morally they will support. Morally, they support because that's the way it works, "*Oi ela*," the social slogan, "E, That's my *ela*, so it's ok.." But, we can see how far the percentage of the support and I would say it is relative.[124]

Interestingly, even though morally a candidate should get support from another community that has *pela* relation with the candidate, but in reality this does not always happen. It turns out that not all communities that have *pela* relation with particular candidates would give their votes to the candidates. For instance, if a candidate comes from Lehitu, morally the candidate will get support from Saparua, because both Lehitu and Saparua has *pela*. At least, when doing political dissemination or campaign, a candidate tends not to enter a community that has *pela* with their contender.[125]

Critical spotlight to democracy development in Maluku is addressed to the issue of strong money politics.[126] This is not Maluku's typical issue but a national issue in the democracy development process in Indonesia. Related to the condition, some informants revealed:

We can say it is safe. But the level of awareness and understanding of the people on the democracy may be right or wrong. Now, with only IDR50,000, it will work. That's the reality. With this kind of system, are the people not yet ready to implement *pemilukada* as being implemented now? Because people want to win it and have money, so they will get elected.[127]

Yes, for the post-conflict local election, the level of grass-root people's acceptance is similar to those in other regions. If you want to be successful, you must have money; You may be well-known but the strategy you have must be good and it needs money. This is even stronger after the conflict.[128]

In the context of democracy development in Maluku, a critical problem that should be considered in the future is money politics, which is regarded

---

124 Interview with Central Maluku community figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
125 Interview with Central Maluku community figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
126 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
127 Interview with one of the Maluku refugee empowerment activists, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
128 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

as increasingly strong after the conflict. Money politics, and corruption in general, is regarded as a serious democracy pathology beside violence, authoritarianism, ethnical or particular group discrimination, etc. (Warren 2004). Democracy in Maluku can be graded relatively sterile from various pathologies of the democracy development except money politics and corruption.

d. *Pemilukada* and Threat of Instability in Peace-Building

Theoretically, post-conflict local elections become a particular issue because they need different treatments from the *pemilukadas* in normal regions. This becomes an issue that requires a particular treatment because on one hand post-conflict regions still tend to be vulnerable to conflicts and on the other hand, intrinsic character of a post-conflict local election is competitive (Kumar 1998, p. 6-8). Therefore, once again, post-conflict implemented post-conflict local elections can create instability and violence in a region. At a certain level, if not well managed, post-conflict local elections can threaten the recently-gained peace.

In the context of post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku, potential for threat of instability is considered likely to come from individuals, groups or particular community organizations that often conduct political provocations using religious variable. The community organizations are in general affiliated to a particular religion and radical in the character.

> From Moslems: "Don't vote for Christians; This is RMS." Also from Christians: "Don't vote for this; this person is *Laskar Jihad*." So, it is very dangerous, but we know it very well. But we fear if there is a certain group that blows up the issue even more strongly.[129]

> What we fear now is that there are some other issues brought by any people or community organizations that influence the people's mindset through provocation, leaflets and SMS.[130]

> That can become a fuel. *Why making and sending* SMSes anywhere? I think these people have better knowledge and perspective and know that the move may become a timed bomb that can explode. What do these people aimed at, without even thinking that this will be used by provocateurs?

---

129 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
130 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.

Recently, two months ago there was a news that the people sending SMSes would get sentenced but until now it is not realized yet.[131]

The main challenge of post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku, related to the threat to instability, is to deal with many communal provocations which at a certain level are no more than a kind of inter-faith conflict-creating efforts. The actors involved in the provocation can be individual and groups/organizations. The common media includes leaflets and SMSes. Like the above example, the people are advised not to choose Christian candidates because they are members of RMS (South Maluku Republic), or not to choose Moslem candidates because they are members of *Laskar Jihad*. *Kesbangpol* added that if there is provocation or inter-faith conflict-creating efforts carried out by a community organization, usually the organization is not registered in *Kesbangpol* yet.[132]

Analytically speaking, provocations that use religious issues and generally are intended to discredit a candidate, originate from a point of view that religious issues are still considered sexy and strategic to win votes without considering the consequences and risks at the macro level.[133] On the other hand, *primordialism* is still a threat to the peace-building in Maluku.[134] However, for another informant, provocations that use variables of tribe and hamlet are not less dominant and have the risk of threatening the process of peace-building rather than religious variable.[135] The SMS case that uses *SARA* issues, for instance, never involves a certain political party elite, as emphasized by an informant:

> For instance, there is a political element from the Head of Ambon City Golkar Party Local Leadership Council (DPD) whose SMS *targeting SARA* issues. We will push that that should be legally processed and in the winning team, he should be dismissed from the position of the winning team leader. Because he can disturb the social stability.[136]

Nevertheless, the above provocations occurred in particular areas. In Central Maluku, such provocations were relatively rare during the post-conflict local election. The condition is more caused by increasingly strong awareness

---

131 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
132 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
133 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014, and with Maluku KPUD Chairperson, Ambon, 25 Augustu2014.
134 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014; and with riot victim community in Waringin, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
135 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairpersons, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
136 Interview with peace and democracy NGO activist, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

on diversity and inter-community tolerance so that any candidates that use religious issues are believed to get difficulty in winning *pemilukada*.[137]

In response to the above potential instability, some strategic steps were conducted by Maluku local government especially through *Kesbangpol*. To keep Maluku conducive in the post-conflict local election, *Kesbangpol* actively coordinated with the police, intelligence agency, etc. as emphasized by *Kesbangpol*, "so, we usually have meetings in *Depkominda* or usually in *Kesbang* office every three months. Even when it is urgent, we will require it."[138] The strategic steps are very helpful to keep the implementation of post-conflict local election in Maluku safe and conducive.

Beside the response and anticipation from the Maluku local government, public initiatives and responses are also strategic in preventing various threats to instability. Some statements of the people below describe various initiatives and efforts below.

> The people are sometimes are provoked but there is a counter by making counter-leaflets. We make counter-SMSes. Peaceful provocation, the one that we use, and media provocation. If there is another provoking SMS, we will make another counter, and that will continue.[139]

> That's a provocation, but Ambon people, Maluku people have known it exactly and are not provoked. I already told when voting for Mr. Karel to the kings that before the election there should be no instruction that we Christian must choose Christians; on the contrary, for Moslems. That's what I mean by local wisdom that after the riot, people realized why we had to do that; eventually we all looked back to our history that we were all one.[140]

One of the creative initiatives taken by the society or community organizations is to make a kind of counter provocation which is called peaceful provocation. Such provocation is disseminated through mass media and intends to counter various interfaith conflict-bringing provocations. Besides that, the very helpful factor is the increasing strong and mature awareness of people on community differences. The awareness is often called as "local wisdom".[141] Awareness or tradition-based "local wisdom" —*pela gandong*—becomes a

---

137 Interview with Central Maluku *Panwaslu*, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
138 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol* (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 2014; and with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
139 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
140 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
141 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August; and with riot victims in Waringin, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

kind of strategic counter to various threats to instability in post-conflict lo-
cal election.[142]

III. POST-CONFLICT PEMILUKADA, PEACE-BUILIDING AND DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT, AS WELL AS THE CHALLENGES IN ACEH AND MALUKU: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In general, the implementation of post-conflict local election in Maluku
is relatively better compared to that in Aceh, although each has various dy-
namics and unique challenges. The condition is a reflection for the different
conflicting characters between the two. However, in the international point
of view, post-conflict local election in Aceh remains a particular success. For
instance, from the security dimension the post-conflict local election in Ma-
luku is relative safe and stable compared to that in Aceh which are filled with
violence, intimidation as well as horizontal conflicts. Even, the violence and
intimidation tended to increase and almost spread evenly, instead of decreas-
ing in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Therefore, there is degradation
of post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh. In Maluku, sporadic
violence is only found in Southeast Maluku, Tual City and SBT (Eastern Se-
ram). Many dissatisfactions with the results of the post-conflict local election
in Maluku ended up in the Constitutional Court. The condition is regarded
as a good progress as disputes were not channeled in violent ways or clashes.
From the technical-procedural aspect, both ran smoothly according to the
general standard of post-conflict local election implementation. However,
many criticisms were directed against the post-conflict local election organiz-
ers in Aceh who were often considered not neutral. This condition was much
more caused by Aceh KIP selection that was conducted by DPRA.

At a particular level, the implementation of post-conflict local elections
in Aceh and Maluku can be regarded as relatively helpful to consolidate and
build peace in both regions. This condition is strengthened by economic
and political stability as well as increasingly solid social relation and interac-
tion. However, criticisms are addressed to the level of peace in Aceh which
is believed not to have greatly touched the substantive problem yet, such as
socio-economic equity and equality especially inter-region and tribe, public
participation, access to participation, and good governance in general. The
peace in Aceh is still in the negative peace (absence of violence) level.

Important factors regarded as helpful to build peace in Aceh and maintain
the stability are political, opportunity, as well as inter-play economic access.
The first is the victory of the former GAM groups through Aceh Party (PA).
The victory places many cadres of Aceh Party in various offices of power,

---

142 Interview with Maluku PKB elite, Ambon, 17 November 2014.

both in the legislative and executive positions, especially the position of Aceh Governor. The condition can be regarded as helpful to make Aceh relatively "silent" and conducive. Secondly, it is still related to the first, namely wider economic access and opportunities to former combatants after they are in power.

The important factor regarded as helpful to build and consolidate peace in Maluku is power-sharing, which is a local creative initiative. Of course, the power sharing does not automatically build peace in Maluku. Therefore, what is more important is how far the combination is not only a symbol of representation, but also is realized in various equal developmental programs and inter-community dialogs. However, at least, the power-sharing initiative can unite the common sense of Maluku society as a united and peaceful society, especially the grass-root communities whose points of view still tend to be traditional/conservative. Other factors are a cultural entity of "*pela gandong*" and increasingly strong post-conflict public awareness.

In the perspective of democracy development, the implementation of post-conflict local election in both regions above is considered to have formally-procedurally run well and smoothly. In this relation, various rules and process of post-conflict local election implementation have been well implemented. However, it still must be admitted that there are still technical-procedural problems in the post-conflict local election implementation. For instance, there are voters who don't get voting invitation letters or cannot exercise their rights, vote-counting irregularity, etc. In other words, institutional democracy development is the first step of democratization which can be regarded as a particular progress.

Substantial democracy development in Aceh is believed to have not been achieved yet, such as the freedom of expression, minority protection, social and economic development equity, respect for differences in values, points of view, and opinions, etc. The Acehnese people are still believed to easily use violence, intimidation and terror as a shortcut to deal with different opinions and points of view. In this context, Jarstad (1998, p. 21-25) emphasized that one of the dilemmas of post-conflict democracy development is that peace-building will probably involve some limitations of freedoms, such as freedom of the press and demonstration. Another substantive factor is related to fair and balanced treatment to minority groups in Aceh, which specifically refer to various minority tribes. On the other hand, substantively the development of democracy in Maluku is still regarded as better, in which the people are free to channel their aspirations, opinions and voices without any pressure, intimidation, nor terrors. Besides that, inter-community and inter-tribe justice and equality are better. Below is one of the examples of

demonstrations conducted by Maluku society to voice their aspirations. (Photo 2).

Photo 2: Demonstration to Express Aspirations in a Free Fashion

From the aspect of post-conflict democracy development, there are some weaknesses believed to require improvements in Aceh, namely (1) There are still many threats and intimidations; (2) Dishonesty and partiality of post-conflict local election organizers, including *KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS*; (3) Increased number of money politics, (4) There are still ruler's intervention on the post-conflict local election results. The challenges of democracy development in Maluku are especially the strong money politics, which is even considered to have increasingly strengthened after the conflict. Besides that, there is still partiality of some post-conflict local election organizers, as found in some particular cases.

In relation to gender equality, gender equality and equity in Aceh is considered relatively poor. Gender problems in Aceh are not only related to the political recruitment, but also in gender-sensitive development. Even in the current period of Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf leadership, access to and partiality of women are believed to be more closed and limited. On the other hand, gender equality especially has become the attention of the Maluku local government. The important domain of gender-responsive development is related to budgeting, employee affairs, and public offices.

The threat to instability in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh tends to take the form of inter-civil society conflicts and violence, both between Aceh Party (PA) supporters and non-Aceh Party supporters and inter-supporters or elites of the Aceh Party (PA). In the 2006 post-conflict local election, political frictions still revolved between Aceh

Party supporters and Non-Aceh Party supporters. But, entering the 2012 post-conflict local election, the levels of violence, terror and intimidations tended to increase, and new frictions occurred in the Aceh macro political constellation namely between Aceh Party (PA) and Aceh National Party (PNA). This condition is even worsened by the absence of proper dispute resolution (*rule of law*), so that it becomes a bad and repeated precedent. From the aspect of actors, former combatant elite group is often referred to as the cause of the emerging conflicts and threat to instability in post-conflict local election and peace-building process in general. However, the threat to instability can be regarded as relatively weak because it does not cancel the post-conflict local election implementation or threatens peace-building prospect in the region.

On the other hand, the threat to and potential for instability in post-conflict local election implementation and peace-building Maluku is believed to potentially come from various types of actors, both individuals and groups or particular community organizations. In general, the potential for the threat takes the form of political provocations by using religious variables, both via SMSes and leaflets. In response to this threat, *Kesbangpol* actively coordinates with the police and intelligence agency in every post-conflict local election implementation. Similarly, creative initiatives that are taken by the society or community organization; they make a kind of counter provocations which are called peaceful provocations. The growingly strong and mature public awareness on diversity in Maluku also plays an important role as the counter to various provocations.

Post-Conflict Local Election, Governance, and Peace-Building

As explained earlier, the goal of post-conflict general elections is not only to develop democracy but also to build in post-conflict regions. Both are assumed to have constitutive/mutually beneficial relation. Korth (2011) clarifies that some goals included in the frame of the two major goals of post-conflict general elections namely (1) to validate peace strengthening (peace settlements); (2) to generate new sovereign authority; (3) to legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) generate symbolic cut-off from the past to the new life; (5) to improve civil society development; (6) to support political participation in various political processes; (7) to stimulate people to generate various initiatives. Besides that, as developed by the World Bank, there are six dimensions that are often referred to as the form of good governance, namely (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and lack of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption.[1]

This section is especially designed to discuss various variables/indicators of the above post-conflict local elections. However, by considering the limited space in the section, some indicators will be analyzed more deeply such as issues of violence and political stability, as well as civil society development. In detail, this section will consists of four sub-chapters namely (1) post-conflict local election, accountability, and corruption, (2) post-conflict local election, transparency, and public service, (3) post-conflict local election and political participation, as well as (4) post-conflict local election and rule of law. This section will then be concluded by a comparative analysis between the post-conflict local elections in Aceh and in Maluku with reference to the four issues.

---

1 Generally The World Bank defines governance as the entire traditions and institutions in which authority or power of a government is practiced. This includes three domains, namely (1) election, control and power shift processes, (2) government capacity in formulating and implementing good policies, and (3) to get recognition from the citizens on the institutions that manage economic and social interactions between them. See Mastimo Mastruzzi, et al. (2010). World governance indicators: methodology and analytical Issues. Policy Research Working Paper 5430, The World Bank. Development Research Group, Macro-Economics and Growth Team.

I.   ACEH

a. Post-Conflict Local Election, Accountability, and Corruption

One of the key goals of the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh is to get accountable and legitimate government and authority that are not involved in and/or commit corrupt actions. Theoretically, one of the variables of democracy development and promotion of sustainable peace in post-conflict regions is the election and availability of leaders both legislative and executive ones who are accountable and legitimate (Kumar 1998, p. 6-8; Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1). Because of the strategic roles of local leaders as decision and public policy makers, accountable and legitimate leaders are expected to help and facilitate democracy development and promotion of local sustainable peace.

In the Aceh context, "new" leaders elected through post-conflict local elections have not so far been able to meet the big expectations of the people yet. Various problems and negative things are directed against them. Statements from some informants below show the condition:

They promised to give trainings, for instance in this sector and that sector, but no realization ever. True liars. In term of knowledge, they lie. Morally they lie too. Eventually what would they work on? That's the current DPR... so they become burglars. The people get angry at them. Now, they have Billion. And they feel 1 Billion treasures are not enough. Let's look at them all.[2]

I think there is no change. We cannot entrust our hope to these people... they, the elites, are the ones who get prosperous; not the people that have voted for them. Even though they are all former combatants. No difference. The people have hope and this hope has not been met. For instance, in Buloh all. There is no electricity until today in the area, even though the budget is always abundant every year. But with the abundant fund, such need cannot be met.[3]

The leaders elected through post-conflict local elections are regarded as less able and willing to listen to people's aspirations, but they know more how to secure the next power.[4]

Leaders such as regents, governor, *DPRD* are considered to have brought little change and welfare, or even to eliminate poverty. Even, there is no

2 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
3 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
4 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

difference between the directly-elected regent and indirectly-elected regent. Many of them try to prioritize their own interests. Those who controls and get many benefits are their relatives and colleagues.[5]

From such statements above, it can be emphasized that some problems and/or negative predicate addressed to the current Aceh leaders has made the level of public acceptance to them relatively low. Firstly, many among the current Aceh leaders are often considered to lie and break their promises. Secondly, the leaders tends to enrich themselves rather than to make the people prosperous. At a certain level, they are believed to tend to be greedy. Then, the leaders do not want to listen to the public voice and aspiration. Some of these problems get the most spotlights and attention from the Acehnese people.

This condition becomes a particular blow in the Aceh context, in which the majority of the elected leaders are former combatants. Initially, many people hoped their participation to the center of power would change the face of Aceh and make the people better and prosperous. However, the reality is below their expectation.

This will then impact the level of participation. The people do not trust any longer. No trust any more. Because the end will be like this. It's all the same. It is a kind of gradually decreasing level of trust.[6]

The current widespread public opinion is that the leaders from nongame and former GAM are no difference – they are all the same. This condition resulted in the reduced level of trust to former combatants, especially to Aceh Party (PA). The reality can be seen from the gained seats of PA in *DPRA* (Aceh Legislative Council) which more and more decreased in 2012 period even though until now PA is still the majority in *DPRA*. Besides that, the condition also impacts the gradually decreasing level of political participation in post-conflict local election if seen from the comparison between the 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections, as emphasized by an informant as follows.

Resistance and trust to PA more and more decreased by looking at the indicator of their decreasing gain votes in Aceh parliament (from 33, that have 69 seats, it got 48 percent; now it has only some 30 percent). The condition is more caused by the condition and fact that they are all "the same" and cannot be expected to do much. The relatively significant seats were gained by fraudulent ways. They have many complaints like under spent, then it is easy for them to change the cabinet and replace office

---

5 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
6 Interview with a former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

head. You know what…to get the position of office heads, it needs money. Some come from Muzakkir Manaf's link, and some from governor's link.[7]

The decreasing trust to former combatants, once again, has a significant impact on the decreasing number of their votes, from 48% down to more or less 30%. Efforts to gain the votes were already done by various methods including cheats and various intimidating actions.

Analytically, the key problem of the leaders who are mostly former combatants is euphoria of winning post-conflict local elections after going down from mountains without nothing. Then they feel they don't have to listen to the society expect their group, because in their point of view all of this is the result of their struggle. The following is one of the analytical interesting reviews from an informant.

> Like this; If I look from the aspect of quality, I am not satisfied, frankly speaking. I talk about it in a fair way, from the aspect of quality, I am not satisfied. And we cannot deny that they had euphoria for sure; they just went down from mountains, having nothing, how could they listen to others. They would listen to their own group first… In general they are uneducated in the state administration system; they don't know about democratic system. They still have military spirit in their heart.[8]

Another problem is the majority of combatants are uneducated after they go down mountains. Consequently, their competency, capability, and knowledge on leadership and governance are often doubted. Such problem brings a major impact on their performance when governing Aceh.

More concretely, some reasons for the decreasing trust to them are (1) they often commit violent ways, (2) low budget absorption, (3) *KKN* (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) in the recruitment of office heads, (4) They are believed not to have done many changes—"*just as usual, no change*"—or no breakthrough. On the other side, the people dare to conduct performance evaluation and give "sanction" through reduction of seats in the legislative body or reduction of votes for the executive candidates.[9] Furthermore, in the context of comparison between Irwandi Yusuf's leadership period and Zaini Abdullah's leadership period, the people prefer to accept the leadership of Irwandi Yusuf with various programs and policies.[10] However, it is not fair to compare the leadership of Zaini Abdullah that has not completely finished and is still running, with the leadership of Irwandi Yusuf.

---

7 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
8 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
9 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
10 Interview with one of the journalists, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.

b. Post-Conflict Local Election, Transparency, and Public Service

Transparency and public service are some of the key dimensions and indicators for peace-building and democracy development in post-conflict regions. Post-conflict local elections are a strategic part in the election and leadership shift processes, which definitely becomes the first and main step of governing (Mastruzzi, et al. 2010). Furthermore, how far the elected leaders who are entrusted with the development of public policies and decisions which are not only accountable but also can implement the government in a transparent manner and provide public services in an effective manner. The last-mentioned two things are key dimensions of good governance (Mastruzzi, et al. 2010).

In the post-conflict Aceh context, it must generally be admitted that transparency is still hard to find; public access to public service is still a rare product, although it does not mean that there is no public services at all. The services exist but are still far from people's expectations.[11] Important points can be seen in some statements of the following informants.

I think, related to public services, or public service sector, the current government is not serious or does not understand. For instance, regarding the SPM (minimum service standard) agenda and the like. They do not apply the minimum service standard seriously. And we feel that, for instance, in some service providing units the services do not run well. This is what we experience in community health center, sub-district office. I look at the government vision. The government has a political background and is filled with former combatants. They don't understand the problem even though it is the responsibility of the local government.[12]

A group of unprofessional people enter infrastructure world and impose their will to win tends, then in Aceh many office heads were hit. Many auction committee heads were terrorized only because the unprofessional people want to win. No open tender, nor transparent and open recruitment of government employees or office positions.[13]

Based on the experiences of the informants above, the post-conflict public service in Aceh seems not to be fully good and needs many improvements. The sources of problems may vary such as absence of political will of the public officials to provide public services or lack of understanding among the public officials. Besides that, the issue of transparency needs special at-

---

11 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
12 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
13 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

tention. Many tender processes of post-conflict construction projects were not conducted in a transparent and open manner. Particular groups that are assumed to have network with the government often impose their will to win tenders. They can even beat a particular office employee who does not want to win them. It was emphasized by an Aceh Traditional Council chairperson, "Now it is not, you are close, there is KKN, there are family members, how come? We try by ourselves."[14] Recruitment of office positions is still much dominated by nepotism and closeness factors.

Transparency of employees is considered as far from the good governance standard, and of course, far from the expectations of many Acehnese people. It is hard to find transparent recruitment procedures and process for employees and officials. In this relation, a peace activist in Aceh emphasized,

> Good governance and especially transparent recruitment does not exist. All is the same between before and after the conflicts. But in the post-conflict situation the people have many more accesses to jobs and opportunities and are free to go anywhere.[15]

The problem of transparency is seemingly not a typical post-conflict condition problem. It means, this problem occurred frequently before. Therefore, it can be said that in this context there is almost no change at all. The different condition is only the access to jobs and wider freedom in the post-conflict period.

Actually, post-conflict public service problem becomes one of the homework of Aceh Provincial Government. The problems of public transparency and public service often blame the capacity and vision of the existing human resources.

> I see the same. The previous regent in Bireuen did not understand public service affairs. More or less the same. It is too far, if compared with Jakarta, Solo. Our district is still left behind. Because of what? The capacity and vision and understanding of the local government is still low for those affairs. They still believe that this political position should be manage politically. Sharing of development's cakes and the like. What will it become? And this is actually the same with what happens in some other districts in Aceh.[16]

Public service in Bireuen district is believed not to have met the people's expectations yet. It is still almost the same with the previous regent's leadership, and not so different from other districts in Aceh. The capacity and

---

14 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
15 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
16 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

knowledge of the public officials on good governance is still low. Many of them think that their positions are political ones, so that they must be managed politically by prioritizing their political groups and coalitions rather than public interests and needs. The condition is also confirmed by one of the women activists that stated, "They must obey the interests of certain parties instead of the interests of the public."[17]

The bureaucratic reform program launched by the Aceh government is actually a form of awareness to improve the quality of public service and bureaucratic transparency. Unfortunately, bureaucratic reform has not been implemented yet seriously in various districts. Besides that, the problem is not in the agenda, but in the placement of the right and competent people to carry out the tasks. The program exists, including the program to deal with unemployment, but the execution and implementation are nothing at all.[18]

Lastly, the dynamic political constellation in post-conflict Aceh has invited community elements to often compare the performances of both Aceh governors Irwandi Yusuf (2006-2011) and Zaini Abdullah (2012-2017), especially on the transparency and public service. Some informants shared their testimonies and experiences on the leaderships of both governors as follows.

> Comparison of both periods is almost the same. However, the Irwandi period had fit and proper tests in the recruitment and office position tender processes. So, in general governance is better during Irwandi's period; and in Zaini Abdullah's period it is completely nothing at all and tends to be closed. Despite fit and proper test, in Irwandi's period the test was not serious and only became a camouflage.[19]

> It was far better in Irwandi's period; many people believe that. For the current government, I haven't seen it yet. Many programs from Irwandi's era are continued by the current government. JKA has a new name as JKRA. But the problem is on the management.[20]

> Irwandi's era was very good. Now it has gone. Another quality of Irwandi is that he conducted tender of official positions. It does not exist anymore. He placed an advertisement in Serambi newspaper. Any Acehnese who wanted to become Aceh officials were welcomed to register. All was through tender. Acehnese from universities and outside Aceh came. They were screened and selected to be office heads. Even though he still used Baperjakat records, Irwandi recruited many Central Aceh people. That's

17 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2012.
18 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
19 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
20 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

not conducted any longer. Whatever Irwandi did is rejected by the current leadership.[21]

Irwandi's government is better. The current bureaucracy has not improved yet. We hope he who has been in Europe (Zaini Abdullah—ed.) can improve good governance. Mr Irwandi knows people in the districts better. Officials were once selected through fit and proper test. Not any more now. The change in officials is more frequent than it used to be.[22]

If various statements above are learned more deeply, in terms of program and transparency, it is clear that the majority of informants believed that Irwandi Yusuf leadership era is relatively better than that of Zaini Abdullah. In general, Irwandi Yusuf's leadership is considered more open through fit and proper test mechanism that he used to recruit public officials, even though some parties thought the mechanism were less serious. Besides that, public service during Irwandi's time is regarded as better especially related to the JKA (Aceh Health Insurance), which is renamed as JKRA (Aceh People Health Insurance) in Zaini Abdullah's era. The JKRA program management is believed to be poor. With these all considerations, many parties conclude that at macro level the governance during the Irwandi Yusuf period is better than Zaini Abdullah. Apart from debates on the transparency in the periods of both governors, at macro level it must be admitted that based on the Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) in 2012 (p. 67) Aceh local government got a score of 3.39, which means poor.

c. Post-Conflict Local Elections and Political Participation

Political participation is one of the important variables of the successful post-conflict local elections, and also an important dimension in solidifying domains of election and leadership change in the good governance. Even political participation is believed to be one of the important connectors in the relation between a state and civil society, beside citizenship and political culture (Sherman & Kolker 2000, p. 145-162). In general, political participation is defined as various forms of mechanisms for the public to express their opinions with the goal of influencing political decisions (Orum 2001). In the context of this study, such participation is seen and limited more to the voting in the post-conflict local election rather than all forms and hierarchy of political participation.[23]

---

21 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
22 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh Chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
23 Form and hierarchy of political participation includes taking political positions, looking for similar positions, active membership in an organization, passive membership, political pseudo-

In the context of post-conflict local elections in Aceh, political participation is generally considered good. Political participation tends to be stable at around 70 percent. Nevertheless, some informants saw the decreasing participation in the two post-conflict local election periods.

> I think it decreases. Why? People expect general election would bring better change. If so, it declines here. It keeps on reducing in relation to the government. Corruption. Officials who don't provide service. Poor bureaucracy.[24]

> Honestly speaking, the people are apathetic already. When the 2006 hope was broken. In 2006 people were enthusiastic. Five years after that, we saw a decrease. The number of *golput* [not participating] voters was high. The people put too high hope of change and of the elected people. When the hope is not realized, the people think like this: our people who lead us, why the pattern is like strange people?[25]

Learning from the above statement, there is a perception that political participation experience decrease between the 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections. Some factors are believed to be the causes. Firstly, the level of public trust to public officials drastically drops. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, the Acehnese people hoped better change. Unfortunately it did not materialize. Even worse than that, the behaviors and performance of the public officials are not better than before, especially in relation to corruption, bureaucracy and public service. The people feel that"... what happens is that we get out from crocodile's mouth and get into tiger's mouth."[26] There is no difference between the leaders from former combatants and non-combatants.[27] Public disappointment can be understood if we refer to the basic drive of the Acehnese people to choose local party, namely their closeness to the offered figures and legislative candidates, security factor, as well as symbol of fight against the pressure of the central government that has not granted the rights of Acehnese people yet, in relation to the sharing of mining products.[28]

However, another informant who is a DPRA member has an opposite perception. He thought that participation is not only stable but also experiences an increase in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Similarly, the composition of voters is believed to increase especially the participation of young voters

---

active membership, general meeting, hearing, demonstration, informal general meeting, and voting. See Anthoni Orum (2001). *Introduction to political sociology*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
24 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh Chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
25 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
26 Interview with former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
27 Interview with one of the DPRA members from Golkar fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
28 Interview with one of the researchers on peace building in Aceh, Jakarta, 29 January 2015.

from senior high school.[29] However, based on the KIP (Election Independent Committee)'s official data, the participation of Acehnese people in the post-conflict local elections does decrease. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, the participation reached 79.9%, and in the 2012 post-conflict local election, it decreased to 76.6%. If analyzed more deeply by looking at the real number and increase of the number of voters in the Permanent Voters List (DPT) of 2012 post-conflict local election, the decreasing number can be said to be quite significant. In 2006 post-conflict local election, the number of voters in DPT was 2,632,935 people and those who used their voting rights were 2,104,739 people. Therefore, the total number of those who did not use their voting rights was 528,196 people. In the 2012 post-conflict local election, the number of voters in DPT was 3,453,703 people and those who used their voting rights were 2,453,703 people. Therefore, the total number of those who did not use their voting rights was 1 million people. In other words, the decline in the number of participation in the 2012 post-conflict local election is almost twice.

There are various reasons that encourage the people to participate in both post-conflict local elections. Firstly, the people want to participate again because they feel to get benefit in various forms, both from a leader or a particular party. The forms may vary including road construction, infrastructure construction, financial incentive, etc. Secondly, they want to participate because they feel acquainted with or have relation with particular candidates or party.[30] Thirdly, they want to participate because of pressure and intimidation from a particular party. For this group, participation is expected to bring a sense of security. The choice tends to be given to the dominating party.[31] Fourthly, participation is due to mobilization by particular people or group and not fully an initiative from the voters themselves. In other words, their participation is more passive.[32]

Apart from various motivations and reasons for people's participation, various problems that need to be considered concerning the participation is that in the conflict period people come to TPS (Polling Stations) is caused more by fear, especially of the government, while in the post-conflict period, they are more driven by the sense of trauma and fear, especially if a particular party (Aceh Party) lost in their area.[33] Political education and socialization is also very minimum, especially in villages. Consequently, participation tends to be passive and commodified. Many of voters participate and vote for particular people based on requests or instructions from charismatic figures such

---

29 Interview with DPRA member from PKS fraction, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
30 Interview with one of the former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
31 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
32 Interview with one of the women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
33 Interview with one of Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.

as *tengku* or *teuku*, and particular village heads.[34] However, the government effort to improve the condition is considered less maximum yet.[35]

d. Post-Conflict Local Election and Rule of Law

Rule of law is one of the important variables in the democracy development and peace-building in post-conflict regions (see Kumar 1998). In the perspective of governance, rule of law is one of the important dimensions as prerequisite for good governance.[36] In the macro context, rule of law is not only a foundation of democracy but also one of the important characteristics of a democratic state, beside the minimum and legal use of force, representative government controlled by constitution and impartial bureaucracy, existence of various centers of power, access and channel to public decision-making, etc (Sherman & Kolker 2000). In this relation, Weber emphasizes that law which is established based on common agreement contract (*nature of rule*), is an impersonal instrument of state authority. Therefore, rule of law will by itself support the standing of a democratic state (Majumdar & Singh 1999).

So far rule of law in Aceh is believed to be far from people's expectations. Many of the Acehnese people still feel disappointed with the law enforcement conditions in Aceh, especially in the post-conflict local election implementation, as stated by some informants:

> I see that law enforcement factor is a huge problem because there is no law enforcement process. So there is an impression of condoning violence perpetrators and terrors. But on the other hand, the police probably do not want their strict attitude or policy to influence political dynamics which can change this condition just like before. So they have a strong reason. One of the reasons is to maintain the peaceful process.[37]

> Political socialization and education are very low. All are conducted in a formal manner and no impacts on the society. The negative thing is there. Law certainty is absent.[38]

> That's the failure of law implementation. That's all. Law enforcer should follow up one incident; who is the perpetrator and take concrete actions. Well, that will not be completed there. We can see partiality so that the national Indonesian police needs to come here. Why not the local police? Why we need national Indonesian police? The national police will not

---

34 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014, and with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

35 Interview with one of Aceh *Panwaslu* expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.

36 See more details *PB (Policy Brief)-National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS)*, The Habibie Center, Edition 08/November 2014.

37 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

38 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

let the perpetrator go free. Omission, you can interpret it. I see this as a failed rule of law.[39]

Various statements above emphasize that the rule of law condition still disappoint people a lot. Various violence and terrors that accompany post-conflict local election processes tend to be omitted. Often times what people dub as"omission" occurs. This intrinsically means an intention. In this regard, rule of law is believed to be one of the failures or even weaknesses that need improving for the advancement of democracy development and peace-building in Aceh.

The police, especially the Aceh local police, become the target of criticism of all the failed rule of law in Aceh. The roles of security elements are deemed to be still weak. Various analyses are mentioned by the people. One of the causes that are believed to be weakening the roles of the police is the appointment process of the Aceh police chief through DPRA and on the approval of governor, as regulated in Law No. 11 Year 2004. The process is regarded as very vulnerable to "bargaining" which can weaken the position of security personnel.[40] As also emphasized by an informant who said, "Law No. 11 Year 2004; of course there is political deals. 'Don't mess with me. If you do, I will propose another one". [41]

Settlements to some violent cases related to the post-conflict local election implementation are also deemed unfair and tends to be political. If violence perpetrators are announced and judged before the post-conflict local election, the condition will become a pressure for a certain party and cause the reduction of the party's votes—in this context generally referring to Aceh Party (PA).[42] Thus, the method is by buying time of arrest and court until the completion of post-conflict local elections. However, the many of the court processes end up only in superficial actors, instead of the masterminds.[43]

Another factor related to the bad law enforcement is a technical issue. Law violation, especially in post-conflict local election, is difficult to follow up due to the fact that many of the reporters do not want to witnesses or withdraw. Many people fear intimidation, pressure, violence and other action even though law enforcement is always based on proofs and witnesses, as stated in the testimonies of some informants:

If we do something, there are reports from them. 31 people reported on frauds, organizers, intimidation, hidden campaigns. Just like that. But when we want to confirm, we make report to *Banwaslu*; when confirmed to *Banwaslu*, they are afraid. That happened, bro. No one wants to be a

---

39 Interview with former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
40 Interview with Governor's Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
41 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
42 Interview with Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
43 Interview with Governor's Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.

witness. Legally speaking we should have proofs and witnesses, where we see that and all those things. Then, it is over at last.[44]

They feel very afraid and worried because there are cases of shooting. So the people get worried. And that applies to all areas in Aceh? But, it is hard for us to get a kind of testimony because someone wanted to confess but did not want to be a resource person or witness and many of these cases are reported to the supervisory committee (*Panwas*) because nobody wants to be witness.[45]

It is clear that the main obstacles in the law enforcement against various violations and violence related to post-conflict local election are the fear and reluctance of the people or reporters to become witnesses. It can be assumed that people or reporters that become witnesses often get pressure, threats and intimidation, which to a particular extent can threaten their own and their family's safety. However, if analyzed more clearly, the cause of their reluctance to witness again to security elements is weak. People are reluctant to become witnesses more because of the absence of security certainty given by the security elements.

The problem not only ends with the reluctance of the public and CSOs to become witnesses of various post-conflict local election violations. *Panwaslu* (election supervisory committee) itself is considered to fail in the settlement of various post-conflict local election violations even though the case becomes one of their main tasks, as criticized by an informant below.

Even according to my experience, *Panwas* (supervisory committee) cannot do anything against the violations in the post-conflict local election. In 2012 they could not do anything. I was part of the selection team for the election supervisory committee, and most of the old personnel joined. I asked why with so many violations only one case, the Batubo destruction was tackled. What about murder, torture, shooting? There are no reports on them. That means they are powerless. They don't dare to.[46]

In other words, many violations occurred in post-conflict local elections in Aceh. However, it is deeply regretted that the *Panwaslu* itself is considered to fail in conducting their main task to guard post-conflict local elections, even it is deemed powerless and afraid to settle various violations. In general, it is known that in conflict areas, general election organizers such as KIP and *Panwaslu* tend to be the target of intimidation.[47]

---

44 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
45 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
46 Interview with Governor's Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
47 Interview with Sabang *Panwaslu* commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.

The absence of law handling on a violation case brings ripple effects, namely repetition of other law violation cases. Absence of sanctions against law breakers has made other parties tempted to repeat and/or carry out the same thing. Firm sanctions must be imposed both on the people and post-conflict local election-participating political parties that do violations such as violence, intimidations, terrors, etc and on various levels of post-conflict local election organizers that commit frauds, partiality, etc.

Besides that, other important problems related to rule of law is discrimination in Aceh as revealed in a testimony by an informant that took a case of the Islamic *Sharia* implementation in Aceh.

> Unmarried couples from security elements, free. If they come from ordinary people, they will be whipped. Many *Sharia* violators are official functionaries. But why are they left free? They can go free. Yesterday, the violator is the adjutant of Banda Aceh Mayor. That person was free. The people see the *Sharia* is just a game. So, the state's law and religion is the same. People do not trust legal rules. So, that's it. I see the formulation is already mismanaged and the implementation is discriminatory.[48]

Law enforcement in Aceh still tends to be discriminatory, "sharp downward but upward blunt". Nevertheless, this may be not a typical problem of Aceh but the macro/national problem of Indonesia. In the context of Islamic *Sharia* law implementation, some violations done by security personnel or officials are never processed legally and the perpetrators are free. However, if the violators are ordinary people, they will be whipped or sentenced in jail.

II.   MALUKU

a. Post-Conflict Local Election, Accountability and Corruption

One of the important goals of the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Maluku is to get "new" accountable leaders that are acceptable to all the people (legitimate), and are not involved and/or do not commit any corrupt actions. Particularly, the new leaders are expected to bridge both communities that were fighting in the conflict period namely Moslem and Christian communities. In the previous subchapter it is explained that one of the positive developments or trends that occurs in the post-conflict democracy development in Maluku is the election of leadership that is not based "fully" on variable of identity both tribe and religion. Indirect effect of the development is that many elected leaders both legislative members and local leaders have so far been accepted by the people or communities whose religion is different from them, as emphasized by an informant.

---

48 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

> In general they are accepted, but we don't know it for detail. However, in a personal discussion, even though they accept a person as a leader, but the person is not their choice. Especially, if the leader is from their community. The community will just accept the person. Or maybe in the case of the current governor, both communities tend to accept him.[49]

> He is really a figure that really wins the people's heart, is close to people and works well. He wins the heart of the people living in isolated areas. Especially if the leader does not commit any KKN practices and many of the programs are good.[50]

The main factor of a person to be elected and accepted by the communities is hard work and can wind the people's heart by being close to the people and developing policies and programs that make the people prosperous. Another important factor to be considered is that the leader is not involved in *KKN*. Another factor is the ability to stand between Christian and Moslem communities.[51] In particular, the evaluation is given to the current governor, Said Assagaf, a Moslem, who tends to be widely accepted by the Maluku people, as emphasized by a Christian informant, "Yes, we have to elect him because we don't think about religion, but it is about his skills and capacity and experience in bureaucracy, so we have to choose the people like that".[52]

Accountability of post conflict public authority is very much dependent on how the leader can realize the promises in the campaign. Disappointment often occurs with the elected candidates, but then they forget their constituents so that the people feel that they have only been used for their advantage.[53] Furthermore, public acceptance to their leaders is also related to the capacity of the leaders in carrying out tasks and responsibilities, besides their behaviors that are close to the people, good and free from corruption.[54] Maluku people's satisfaction to post-conflict new authority is relative. Particular communities may be very satisfied, while other communities are not so satisfied,[55] as revealed by an informant.

> Yes, many people are less satisfied, less satisfied. Why? Because when they become leaders, they don't care about their constituents, the ones that elected them. They don't think about them anymore. Less attention.

49 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
50 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014, and Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
51 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
52 Interview with Christian refugees coordinator, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
53 Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
54 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
55 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

People say like this: "It is useless that we chose them, because after they reach the top, they forget us."[56]

Once again, satisfaction and the level of acceptance of an elected leader through post-conflict local election are relative and subjective. In other words, in the context of Maluku, the level of legitimacy or acceptance of the leader is still different between one community segment and another.[57]

Another thing to be considered is a critical evaluation on the accountability of performance of the leaders elected through post-conflict local elections. One of them is the absence or not much change in the improvement in the mentality and character of the current leaders:

> This still requires decisions, but not many substances have been made. No significant changes. There is change in mentality that tends to prioritize the interest of their group and families, change in the character of leaders that are not corrupt.[58]

> I feel sorry to almost all the candidates of local leaders in Maluku and those who have become local leaders. Why feeling sorry? Their intention is not for accomplishment. Their vision is materials-oriented; that does damage the region. At last- I am sorry- local government "officials" in Maluku do not generate any accomplishments.[59]

Spotlight is also addressed to the behavior and character of officials or leaders that are considered to prioritize the interests of their group, party or family. As leaders, they are expected to prioritize the interests and prosperity of the general public.[60]

Besides that, the criticism is also aimed at the corrupt behaviors of the officials. This point of view is definitely not aimed to generalize that the majority of the leaders in post-conflict Maluku are corrupt. At least the statement assumes corrupt behaviors by the leaders. This fact is not only confirmed by the Maluku political elites, especially in the post-conflict local election implementation,[61] but also by the people.[62] Corruption problem is believed to be widespread in Maluku, even more open and frank in the post-conflict period. Massive corruption is assumed to break out especially after many post-conflict construction projects in Maluku. In the projects,

---

56 Interview with Central Maluku *Panwaslu*, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
57 Interview with Maluku printed media journalist, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
58 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairs, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
59 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
60 Interview with King Suli and one of the Latupati Council committee members, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
61 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
62 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

many developmental funds are taken illegally, as revealed by some informants below.

> Corruption is massive. Now it is more open than before the conflict. More open. KKN is widespread.[63]

> But if we analyze variables of governance in general, for instance corruption and law enforcement, they remain unmoved. Law enforcement to corruptors remains unmoved. Then, for instance, there are findings from Maluku Provincial BPKP and inspectorate that identify state's loss due to corruption. Many cases.[64]

> Sometimes we find our officials make use of conflicts. For instance, people say when many projects come to Maluku there will be many corruptions. But, after the post-conflict local election, such transaction is common. There are many law enforcements against corruption problems. For me, the post conflict era, the corruption is massive but there has been no integrated corruption eradication.[65]

Unfortunately, law enforcement and corruption eradication have so far not met the people's expectation. Corruption becomes massive after the conflict not only through funds of post-conflict reconstructions as assumed by informants, but also through funding of various post-conflict local election processes. In other words, after the conflict there is degraded governance in Maluku, especially related to corruption.

Many party cadres or leaders failed in the following election due to corruption case.[66] Besides that, in general the officials do not have significant accomplishments or success as leaders, and use many negative ways when registering their candidacy. These negative ways may include use of thugs, intimidation and inter-religious or inter-tribal division.[67]

b. Post-Conflict Local Election, Transparency, and Public Service

In general Maluku local government realizes the importance of good governance and particularly the weakness in the transparency issue. Based on the 2012 *Indonesia Governance Index* (IGI) (p. 76), in relation to the government transparency, the Maluku local government gets score of 2.88 which means poor. Therefore, the Maluku local government has so far been trying hard

---

63 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairs, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
64 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 June 2014.
65 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
66 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
67 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

to carry out improvements related to transparency especially transparency in the recruitment of employees or public officials. Some statements of the informants below describe the condition.

> So I think, this Maluku, it is time to do improvements? There are 8 areas of changes that we are implementing, starting from the rules. We have changed the governance process. The accountability is now more transparent. And we improve the management and I think slowly but surely. The hard thing is one, namely *mindset*.[68]

> In my opinion, it is getting better day by day. The Ambon City Government, for instance, in their website, we can access various things including financial management. But as far as the people can access it, I think the government should be wise too. Opening something to the public must have good consideration.[69]

As emphasized by Maluku local government through its *Bappeda* (local development and planning agency) and *Kesbangpol* (national and political unity) unit, that the local government has made many improvements related to the transparency of employees and management as well as the quality of public service. The progresses of such improvements are confirmed by the people. Some of the community elements admitted that there are improvements in the public information transparency. For instance, much information on Maluku local government can be accessed through their website, especially related to the finance, budgeting, public services, etc. however, some other segments doubted and even criticized the transparency issue in Maluku. This condition may be caused by different dimension and perspective of evaluation as emphasized by some informants below.

> Transparency in government affairs has not existed yet. With the indicator of transparency, the local revenue has not been publicized. That is the right of the people to know. They have this right in the DPRR as called budgeting. That's the rule and it must be open to the public. But it does not exist yet. So it is not transparent. In the employee recruitment all the project tenders are just engineered, but it is hard for us to prove it.[70]

> I am supporting the participatory approach. For instance, we don't see transparency in the region. It is very poor.[71]

---

68 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014, and with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
69 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
70 Interview with one of the mass media journalist and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
71 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institution) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

Transparency in the government is believed not to have fully recovered, instead of saying that it has not existed yet. One of the indicators of the absent transparency is the unpublished Maluku Local Revenue (PAD). Criticisms are also directed against the process of employee recruitment which is still considered less transparent. Similarly, many project tenders are deemed to have been engineered in such a way. Lastly, the spotlight is also given to the Maluku development planning process which tends to be less participatory (*bottom-up*). Many development programs are planned behind the desk instead of directly visiting people in the field. In this context an informant emphasized:

> But let's say they go down to the field. They must to learn well what is the people condition after the conflict because what they will do will impact on the community. Rather than, they make programs based on what they have in the office, within their environment.[72]

In response to the criticisms related to the recruitment of public officials, the Maluku local government emphasized that they have used the principle of transparency in the recruitment process by informing to the public through Maluku local government website and explain in details all the necessary requirements. The step is taken especially to avoid any suspicions or clashes in the society. If there are people who fail, we can prove it through the existing system.[73] Related to this, some of the people think that the provincial recruitment is relatively good in the aspect of transparency, but this has not applied to the district level such as in Central Maluku and SBT (Eastern Seram), and SBB (Western Seram).[74] One of the highlighted real cases is the dismissal of 10 employees by SBT regent because they were part of the old regent's regime.[75] However, access to information in general is more transparent after the conflict compared to before the conflict. For instance, if there is a case or problem made by an official, the information will be disseminated quickly to mass media.[76]

Responding to various attention to public officials without competency who are recruited by the governor and based on tendency to show gratitude,[77] Maluku local government through *Kesbangpol* and *Bappeda* emphasized that the selection was the governor's prerogative right and it has been conducted through open discussions where journalists could observe. In general the

---

72 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
73 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
74 Interview with one of Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
75 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) Chairs, 25 August 2014.
76 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
77 Interview with one of the mass media journalist and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014, and with one o the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

governor determines public officials based on two key factors, namely competency and loyalty, and also based on the power sharing element although it must sacrifice competency.[78]

In the context of public service improvements, the particular attention of Maluku local government is the mindset of public officials. Many public officials have the mentality of 'waiting' or acting passively. The level of initiative and creativity is still considered low. The particular spotlight is directed to the culture of being served instead of serving the society. The Maluku local government realizes that the change in the level of mentality definitely requires a long process. The change is already there, but not significant yet.[79]

In term of public service, Maluku local government has conducted a breakthrough in the form of public service performance dissemination program aimed to motivate the *SKPDs'* officials to work optimally. The applied method takes the form of reward and punishment system. Reward is given to SKPDs that are considered to be competent in and good at providing public services. The reward can also take the form of award or even job promotion.[80] The public service dimension can be said to receive much more appreciation from the people than the dimension of transparency in public information and employee recruitment as stated by some informants below.

> Yes, in general for the province and Ambon city and some areas, the public service affairs have run relatively well.[81]

> Not anymore. The charge will occur depending on those who manage it, but in general the head emphasizes there is no charge. Yes, the arrangement process is quick, like yesterday with the ID card arrangement. So far the Mayor has been warning that bureaucracy should be genuine. But we don't know what happen in the field but it is fairly good. No more difficulty that prevents the arrangement process.[82]

> In Ambon city, it has been running well. When we go to a sub-district health center, we are served. The point is that it runs well and it is a success. We must give appreciation to Ambon, for instance.[83]

The above statements at least shows public satisfaction related to public service in Maluku, even though the judgement is relative. Particularly, the good public services taken as an example is the ID card arrangement and

---

78 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014, and with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.

79 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

80 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

81 Interview with one o the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

82 Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.

83 Interview with Maluku printed-media journalist, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

health service in sub-district health center. Of course there will always be different judgements from other society segments that have different experiences in the public service. Interestingly, there is a gap between the people's and government's claims on public service improvements. Meanwhile, the local government often claims that they have done many improvements and advancement of public service quality. The people or public tend to think the opposite.[84]

Besides the aspect of public satisfaction, there are some critical evaluations that need to be considered for the future public service improvements. The critical evaluations are conveyed by some informants below.

> Sometimes because of limited professionalism, eventually the quality of public service is sacrificed. The important thing is that public service is available, but the more important thing is to provide quality public services.[85]

> We have friends and younger brothers. So if we want to get things done quickly, we can contact them. Everything is the same but we can be prioritized. So, here the full service is not done well yet. Sometimes, people get mad too saying that I came first, but why does this person get served first.[86]

> In the province, it is already better. In Ambon, it is good. In the districts, it is not maximum yet especially in the districts that are far from the provincial capital city.[87]

Based on the above statements, we can conclude that the main problem in the context of public service in Maluku is related to (1) competency and professionalism of public service providers that need improving—as a result, often times service quality is sacrificed; (2) discrimination in public service provision—someone who has family relation or friendship is often given priority; (3) there is a gap in public service between Ambon city and other cities/districts, especially those far from Ambon—public services in the regions are considered not maximum yet.

c. Post-Conflict Local Election and Political Participation

Political participation is one of the key indicators for the successful post-conflict local election and democracy development in general. In the context of Maluku, political participation in the post-conflict local election is gener-

---

84 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
85 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
86 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
87 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

ally considered to be relatively good. Some informants shared relatively similar opinions and emphasized that the participation is quite good.

> The people have the freedom to vote, openness and comfort. There are no pressures. It is more enjoyable now. The people enjoy it more. But it is up to them.[88]

> The participation is good. People went in the campaign they are involved. They were invited to discussions we held. They raised questions to the candidates, etc.[89]

> Participation in the post-conflict local elections in every district in Maluku and the province is 75%. 75%. 75%...so for those in Maluku is 75% with fairly high participation.[90]

Based on the official Maluku KPAD data, political participation in the 2013 post-conflict local election was 71.74% in the first round and decreased drastically by 66.92% in the second round. In the first round the number of voters in the Permanent Voters List (DPT) was 1,185,661 and those who used their voting right totaled 850.632. In the second round, the number of voters in the DPT was 1,177,694 and those who used the voting right totaled 788,208.[91] Compared to the participation in the Maluku gubernatorial post-conflict local election in 2008, which was at 76.78%, the participation in the 2013 post-conflict local election had a decline. In the 2008 post-conflict local election, the number of voters in the DPT was 963.519 and those who used the right were 739,750 (BPS 2012).

In reality, the high political participation is accompanied by the feeling of freedom and comfort in determining choice or giving votes. It can be said that there is almost no significant pressures nor intimidations found. Pressures are only found in particular isolated areas such as SBT.[92] Probably the condition is caused by excessive enthusiasm after the proliferation as a new district.[93] More than that, political participation is not only limited to giving votes, but also in the involvement in campaigns, public discussions, political education, etc. however it must be admitted that most of the political participation is limited to giving vote only.[94] Theoretically speaking, the condition can be regarded as general reality in the political participation pyramid (Rush & Althoff 2003).

---

88 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

89 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

90 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

91 KPUD Maluku

92 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

93 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

94 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

Then the question is which factors encourage the people to participation? To know various motivations behind the participation, it is important to look at the opinions and judgements of some informants below:

> The wrong leader wins but cannot control peace, the situation will be chaotic. For instance, a fanatic leader such as in a particular religion, he assumed top position, the region may be in confusion. Another aspect is that because they know the leader. For instance, the leader knows me and familiar with me. So if the person does not participate in, then I will arrest the person.[95]

> They go to TPS (Polling Station) because they want to vote for someone. That's it. So who will be the leader is the person the people like and know.[96]

> The candidate is nominated based on the affiliation to the party. Affiliation from the same region. Then the figure. About the program I think the people do not quite understand on the programs; it is only for the elites who understand that. So I think because of the desire to carry out change, then the general election becomes the means.[97]

From various statements above it can be concluded that various factors influence the political participation of the people. The first one is the public awareness on the elected leaders, especially in relation to peace-building and pro-people development. The people are afraid if the elected leader is somebody which is considered wrong and even harm the peace.[98] Secondly, the knowledge on track record of a candidate. Thirdly, the candidates are considered to be familiar.[99] Next is an affiliation to parties, regions, tribes or even extended families/kinship.[100] Fifthly, there is awareness on the duty as citizen to participate and join it. Lastly, there is a desire to a change in Maluku, in which post-conflict local elections are deemed as the most strategic facilities to realize the change.

The opposite question is why some of the people do not want to participate or apathetic? First, it is because a name of a person in DPT is not registered. In this case, the person did not bother himself to process or register his name. Secondly, because there is a perception that anyone who is elected as leader will not bring a significant impact on the life of voters. If the person is a driver, anyone who is elected, this person will still become a driver. Thirdly, the factor

---

95 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
96 Interview with one of the Maluku *Panwaslu* commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
97 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
98 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum), 25 August 2014.
99 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
100 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors), Ambon, 22 August 2014.

is related to the time and business of a person that cannot be left behind.[101] Lastly, the factor is related to the lack of information on post-conflict local election due to poor socialization especially among the people who live on islands. Poor political socialization on islands territory becomes a particular spotlight because it is not supported by proper funding.[102]

One of the unique phenomena related to political participation in Maluku is the identification of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) with the Christian community, even though explicitly PDIP is a nationalistic party. Moslem community tends more to be divided into various parties. Besides that, the awareness and participation of Christian community are considered stronger. There is stronger togetherness among Christian communities to choose candidates nominated by PDIP.[103] Besides that, traumatic aspect following the 1999 conflict has not fully disappeared. In the post-conflict local election situation, in which political temperature is boiling and tension is high, Christian community feel worried to come to Moslem areas; and the opposite.[104]

d. Post-Conflict Local Election and Rule of Law

It is widely known that law enforcement is the foundation of democracy development. Moreover, in the context of post-conflict local election, rule of law is one of the important variables and indicators to evaluate the level of success (see Kumar 1998), and one of the good governance domains (see Mastruzzi et al. 2010). Related to the focus of the study, how has the condition of post-conflict rule of law in Maluku been so far?

In post-conflict Maluku, the rule of law has so far, despite being relatively conducive, been not in accordance with the people's expectations yet, as revealed by some informants below.

> Yes, more careful. We need to look at the law enforcement again. There are many general violations. Violators are well handled, they have been seriously handled. Sometimes in driving vehicles, for instance, people do not bring their driving license.[105]

> More cases are still pending. Many corruption cases are pending. We push them. Abraham Samad has been here…. There are not many cases of theft and violence. A chain of thefts occurs.[106]

---

101 Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
102 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
103 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairpersons, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
104 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
105 Interview with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
106 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors), Ambon, 22 August 2014.

If observed from both statements from the perspectives of the Maluku local government and community figures above, there seems to be a kind of agreement that law enforcement in post-conflict Maluku has been quite good, especially related to crimes. The main problem in the law enforcement in Maluku has been so far related to major cases especially related to two communities, corruption and law enforcers.[107]

The first problem is related to law enforcement to some major cases that tend to be sensitive due to involvement of two communities, Christian and Moslem. Some of the cases are not well resolved due to some reasons. An informant explained:

> The stab of Kudamati driver in Waihaong has not been revealed yet now; *ojeg* rider in Benteng village, we don't know what happened. The police must reveal all of these; what happened? What triggered September 11 conflict? Even though the local police chief is from Waihaong, until now in the traffic in Waihaong, Kudamati vehicles cannot pass through. So, the pubic expectation to the police is still weak. It means that the people hope for more transparency; what happened should be revealed especially to the police.[108]

The case with major highlights was the stab of Kudamati driver (Christian area) in Waihaong (Moslem area). The next was the death of Darwis Saiman, a motorcycle rider of Waihaong. Darwis' death allegedly caused by traffic accident triggered suspicion from both communities. Rumors said Darwis who was Moslem was killed by Christian community. Poor treatment of the cases triggered a bigger riot on September 11, 2011, which claimed 3 lives and injured 24 people heavily (NVMS-THC 2013). The concern is the unsuccessful legal aspect revelation of the September 11 riot. This is worried that this will become a bad precedent of law enforcement. In this context, police performance received many criticisms. Even one of the Maluku figures emphasized that "public satisfaction with the police with scores from one to ten, the scoring is at the satisfaction level of 4."[109] Of course, this must be a particular attention in the law enforcement improvement agenda in the future and the promotion of sustainable peace in general.

Maluku local government through its legal bureau admitted that the riot case was not settled although it should have been settled well by considering the interest of peace-building in Maluku. The reason for the failed law enforcement of the case is more technical, namely absence of legal proofs for

---

107 Interview with one of the peace building and democracy development NGO activists, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

108 Interview with one of mass media journalists and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

109 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

processing. This reason has generated many critical spotlights to the police. The Legal Bureau admitted that the unsettled case handling could be a bad precedent with possible repeated similar cases in the future.[110]

The next critical evaluation is related to rule of law in the corruption field, which at a certain level remains unmoved or is not much addressed. Corruption is believed to be fairly massive in Maluku, and even tends to be more dominant in post-conflict era. Some informants shared their concerns below:

> Law enforcement against these corruptors remains unmoved. Then, for instance, findings of indication on state's loss are due to corruption from Spoktorat and BPKP. There are hundreds of thousands cases of the city development.[111]

> It is not too perfect because again information is not too clear in Maluku and the central level so that this make the law enforcers here not too serious because they know that the central level does not know it. So, sometimes here law enforcers do not settle the cases. I think the current law enforcement like ATM. There are many in the newspaper but people say there are few law enforcements.[112]

One of the future law enforcement focuses should be aimed at corruption handling, although the problem is a national one, and it must be admitted it is not typical of Maluku. Corruption cases become everyday meal in the newspaper. But unfortunately, massive coverage on corruption is not parallel to the reality of law enforcement. The spotlight is mainly aimed at law enforcers who are regarded as less serious and playful due to being far from central-level monitoring or KPI in Jakarta. It is not surprising if the general public has been so restless with corruption condition in Maluku and hopes that KPK can directly go down to Maluku.[113] An alternative to control corruption whose rule of law is believed to remain unmoved is through the power of CSO (Civil Society Organizations) in Maluku, both through mass media, universities, and NGOs or other community organizers.[114]

For Maluku local government, in order that the law enforcement run better it is necessary to have synergy among various stakeholder. Inter-stakeholders synergy has so far not fostered yet. The Stakeholder includes Local Police, Local Military Command, Justice, Local Government, etc. if some of

---

110 Interview with Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
111 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
112 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
113 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors), Ambon, 22 August 2014.
114 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

stakeholders can collaborate and gain public support, it is predicted that law enforcement will predictably run far better.[115]

e. Post-Conflict Local Election, Governance, and Peace-Building in Aceh and Maluku: Comparative Analysis

In the context of post-conflict accountability, the Acehnese society feels that the elected authority has not met their huge expectation. The current widespread public opinions are that the leaders from non-GAM and former GAM are no difference, or the same. Based on the *Indonesia Governance Index* (IGI) in 2012 (p. 67), in the area of accountability, the Aceh local government gained a score of 3.79, which means poor. Qualitatively, the evaluation is caused by some factors, namely elected authority (1) who are believed to lie much and not break promises, (2) have more tendency to enrich themselves than think about making people prosperous, and to a particular level, tend to be considered being greedy, (3) do not want to listen to the voice and aspiration of the general public, (4) do not make many changes, (5) do many violent actions.

Meanwhile, the post-conflict government accountability in Maluku can be accepted by some segments of Maluku people. More than that, there is a tendency when a leader can be accepted by communities outside his religion or tribe. Some reasons for a leader not being accepted by the people is the leader's tendency to prioritize the interest of his/her group's interest party and family rather than the interest of the public. Based on the 2012 Indonesia Governance *Index* (IGI) (p. 76), in terms of accountability, the Maluku local government gets a score of 5.15, which means medium. So the post-conflict government accountability in Maluku tends to be better than in Aceh. In relation to corruption, both regions relatively similarly experienced the problem. This is strengthened by the weak law enforcement in corruption area, as seen in the Table 12.

Public transparency still becomes a problem and object of many criticisms in Aceh, both transparencies related to the recruitment of public officials and project tenders and finance of the Aceh local government. Many post-conflict construction project tender processes are not conducted in a transparent way. Seldom are found transparent recruitment procedures and process of officials or officials, except in the period of Irwandi Yusuf with his fit and proper test that is removed in the era of Zaini Abdullah. Based on the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) (p. 67), the Aceh local government got a score of 3.39 for its government transparency, which is poor, while the Maluku local government, based on the 2012 IGI (p. 76) got a score of 2.88, which means

---

115 Interview with Maluku *Bappeda*, Ambon, 27 August 2014.

poor. The Maluku local government admitted the weaknesses in the transparency issue; and therefore, they try to carry out improvements especially in relation to the transparent recruitment of employees and management as well as quality of public service through the official Maluku local government website. However, it cannot be avoided that there are still many criticisms from the public which are aimed to the recruitment process of employees and project tenders because they are considered less transparent. Therefore, the condition of transparency in both regions tends to be almost similarly poor. Based on the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) (p. 16), the rate of accountability aspect for provincial local governments across Indonesia tends to be better than the accountability aspect.

Table 12: Accountability and Corruption Conditions: Comparative Analysis

Province	Accountability condition	Causal factor	Corruption
Aceh	• Elected authorities have not been able to meet the huge expectation of the Acehnese people so far yet. • No difference between the leaders from GAM and non-GAM. • Tend to be poor.	• Much considered not to keep promises. • More tend to enrich and prioritize themselves. • Not willing and cannot listen to the voice and aspiration of the public. • Do not make many changes. • Commit many violent ways.	• Corruption tends to be massive. • Law enforcement is considered week.
Maluku	• Particular segment of the society can still accept. • There is tendency to accept authorities in different community. • Tend to be medium or better.	• Tend to prioritize the interest of group, party or family more than the public.	• Corruption tends to be massive. • Law enforcement is considered weak.

In relation to public service, the Acehnese society considers the public service in Aceh does not fully meet the expectation. Some problems can be identified related to this matter, namely the absence of political will of public officials to provide public service, poor capacity and knowledge of public officials, as well as gap of public service between Banda Aceh City and outside Banda Aceh. Comparatively, the Maluku local government has attempted many improvements to enhance public service quality. These efforts specially refer to reward and punishment system. Reward will be given to SKPD that is considered competent and good at providing public service. The reward is also aimed to the improvement in the mindset of Maluku public officials so that they are proactive in providing public service. Some criticisms are aimed

to the improvements in public service in Maluku, namely (1) competency and professionalism of public service providers need improving; (2) there is still discrimination in providing public service; (3) there is still gap in public service between Ambon city and outside Ambon, especially in the areas quite far from Ambon. Table 13 gives a summary of the condition of transparency and public service in both provinces.

Table 13: Condition of Transparency and Public Service: Comparative Analysis

Province	Condition of Transparency	Condition of Public Service
Aceh	• Many post-conflict construction project tenders are not carried out in a transparent way. • Government finance (budgeting) is not transparent. • Recruitment process of particular employees or officials is not transparent, especially in the Irwandi Yusuf's era (2006-2011). • Tends to be poor.	• Still not fully meet public expectations. • Absence of political will among public officials to provide public service. • Poor capacity and knowledge of public officials. • There is gap in public service between Banda Aceh city and outside Banda Aceh. • Tends to be poor.
Maluku	• Recruitment of employees is believed to be still not transparent. • Project tenders are also considered not transparent. • There is awareness of the local government on the poor transparency. • Still tends to be poor.	• Competency and professionalism of public service are still low. • Local government's programs take the form of reward and punishment system for public service improvements. • There is still a gap of public service between Ambon city and outside Ambon. • Relatively medium with various improvements.

Related to the political participation in the post-conflict local election, Aceh and Maluku provinces share the score with almost similar reduction dynamics. Overall, political participation in the post-conflict local elections in both regions is relatively good, namely 79.9% (2006) and 76.6% (2012) in Aceh, as well as 76.78% (2008), 71.74% (first round in 2013), and 66.92% (second round in 2013) in Maluku. From the numbers it can be seen that political participation experiences a decrease. Some factors are assumed to be the cause of decreased participation in Aceh, namely reduction in the level of public trust to public officials due to absence of changes expected by the people as well as the behaviors and performance of public officials which are not considered better than the previous ones, especially related to corruption, bureaucracy and public service issues. In Maluku, the decrease is more supported by a common perception that anyone elected to be leaders will not bring many changes to the life of the poor people, lack of information on post-conflict local election due to poor socialization especially to the com-

munities living on islands and other technical problems such as someone's name being not registered in the DPT (Permanent Voters' List), business or jobs that cannot be skipped, etc.

Related to the motivation of participation in Aceh, several factors can be identified, namely (1) having enjoyed benefits beforehand, including road construction, financial incentives, etc., (2) Feeling acquainted or having relation with particular candidate or party, (3) pressure and intimidation from certain parties, (4) mobilization done by particular individuals or groups. In the context of Maluku, the factors include (1) public awareness on policies to be taken by elected leaders, especially policies related to post-conflict peacebuilding, (2) knowledge on track record of a candidate, (3) the candidate are regarded as familiar, (4) affiliation to party, region, tribe, or even kinship/extended families, (5) awareness on obligation as citizens to participate, (6) desire for change in Maluku, in which post-conflict local elections are considered the most strategic means.

In Aceh, the people still feel disappointed with the existing law enforcement condition, which is believed to be still worrying especially in the post-conflict local election implementation. Various violence and terrors accompanying post-conflict local election processes tend to be ignored. The absence of law enforcement against a violation case has ripple effect in the form of repeated cases of other law violations in Aceh. In the context of Maluku, even though in general law enforcement is relatively conducive, it has so far been considered not to meet the public expectation yet. Generally, law enforcement against crimes is relatively good. Many criticisms are aimed to law enforcement against corruption which at a particular level is considered to remain unmoved, and against major cases, especially September 11 riots. Table 14 presents the condition and dynamics of participation in Aceh and Maluku.

Law enforcement problems in Aceh relating to the role of security personnel are also still considered weak. Many law violations, especially in post-conflict local elections, tend to be ignored. One of the causes which is considered to weaken the role of police personnel in Aceh is the process of appointment of Aceh Police Chief that must go through DPRA and on the governor's approval, as regulated in Law No. 11 Year 2004. The second thing is reluctance of reporters of law violations to become witnesses due to absent security guarantee. Even election organizers, KIP and *Panwaslu* tend to be the targets of intimidation. The last is law enforcement in Aceh still tends to be discriminatory, sharp downward, blunt upward, especially related to Islamic *Sharia* which is much considered to discriminate women. The law enforcement problems in Maluku generally include cases that involve variables of religion or race and corruption, and weak security

personnel. Generally, law enforcement runs relatively well after the peace, especially related to criminal problems. However, both provinces are still considered very weak in law enforcement against corruption. Table 15 summarizes the condition and challenges of law enforcement in Aceh and Maluku.

Table 14: Condition and Dynamics of Political Participation: Comparative Analysis

Province	Level of Participation	Motivation of Participation	Dynamics and Challenge of Participation
Aceh	• In 2006 post-conflict local election was 79.9%. • In 2012 post-conflict local election was 76.6%. • Relatively good.	• Already enjoyed benefits beforehand, including road construction, infrastructures, financial incentives, etc. • Feel acquainted or have relations with particular candidates or party. • Pressure and intimidation from particular parties. • Mobilization done by particular individuals or group.	• There is tendency in reduction between 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections. • Various causes of decreased participation: 1. Reduced level of public trust to public officials due to absence of the expected changes; 2. Behaviors and performance of public officials who are not considered better from the previous ones, especially related to corruption, bureaucracy and public service.
Maluku	• In 2008 post-conflict local election was 76.78%. • In 2013 post-conflict local election (first round) was 71.74%. • In 2013 post-conflict local election (second round) was 66.92%. • Relatively good.	• Public awareness on policies to be taken by elected leaders, especially policies related to post-conflict peace building. • Knowledge on track record of a candidate. • The candidate is considered familiar. • Affiliation to party, region, race, or kinship/extended family. • Awareness on obligation as citizens to participate. • Desire for change in Maluku, in which post-conflict local election is regarded as the most strategic means.	• There is tendency in the decrease between the 2008 and 2013 post-conflict local elections. • Various causes of decreased participation: 1. Public pessimism about better changes; 2. Lack of information on post-conflict local elections due to poor socialization, especially to the people living on islands; 3. Other technical problems such as someone's name being not registered in DPT, business or jobs that cannot be skipped, etc.

Table 15: Condition and Challenges of Rule of Law: Comparative Analysis

Province	Condition of Rule of Law	Challenges of Rule of Law
Aceh	• Law enforcement against violation and violence in post-conflict local elections tends to be less satisfactory to various parties. • Role of Aceh local police and in general security personnel is still considered weak. • Law enforcement is still considered to tend to be discriminatory. • Not deal with corruption problems very much.	• Reluctance of reporters of law violation to become witnesses due to absence of security guarantee. • General election organizers (KIP and Panwaslu) tend to be the target of intimidation.
Maluku	• Law enforcement is relatively good, especially in relation to crimes. • Not deal with corruption problems very much.	• Inclusion of variable of religion in particular law violation s such as the September 11, 2011 riot case in Waringin.

Post-Conflict Local Election, Institutional Infrastructure and Political Dynamics

The concept of institutions discussed in this chapter is a system of norms or particular opinions which formally describe procedures and are organized to reach a goal.[1] Scott (2012), by a perspective of new institutionalism,[2] defines institutions as a group of regulations, normative values and cultural-cognitive elements related to activities and resources in order to implement stability, and have a significance to the social life. The perspective of new institutionalism not only looks at the institutional roles and functions, but also the social dynamics within them. Institutionalism does not refer to one unit of particular group of units, but also to social relation system among organized units. The units are conceptually called association. Association functions to mobilize the system of opinions in institutionalism. But, to facilitate the understanding of the empiric reality, the concept of association in this discussion will be called "institutions" while the ongoing procedural system is called "institutionalism". Thus, institutionalism of post-conflict local election is a system that regulates how the people at the local level (province and city/district) can access the power in a political manner through a particular mechanism. The institutionalism of post-conflict local election has a set of formal regulation and general norms recognized by the people and influenced by a local cultural context. Technically, an institution cannot run by itself. Every activity of an institution is influenced by another institution. Similarly in the institutionalism of post-conflict local election, there are particular units in another institutionalism which is probably formally not directly related to the mechanism of post-conflict local election, for instance traditional, social, religious institutions, and others, but has contribution in the ongoing post-conflict local election system.

---

1 Horton and Hunt (1999), concisely emphasize that "Institution is a system of norms to reach a goal or activities that the people consider important, or, formally, a set of habits or conducts related to a human main activity.... institution is always a system of ideas or behaviors that are organized within the behaviors."

2 Is a new perspective of seeing an institution. Is a development of old institutional perspective (institutional approach). The perspective sees how institutions must be inclusive to collective interests (Scott 2012: 56).

In post-conflict regions, an institution has its own characteristics. Institutional process in post-conflict regions can be seen through the concept of democratic conflict governance (Susan 2009, p. 128, 214). Democratic conflict governance regulates the mechanism for existing actors and institutions to create inclusive politics with democratic values-based governance intended to create and maintain peace. Post-conflict local election institutions in post-conflict regions must be designed based on the principle in order to maintain peace stability. Post-conflict local election institutions in post-conflict regions must be able to accommodate interests of various groups inclusively in term of power authority resource, so that reconciliation among previously-fighting groups can be generated.

Disputes about control over resources are one of the triggers of conflicts; similarly it applies to power. In post-conflict regions disputes about control over resources may become motives for elites to mobilize masses by using memory of old conflicts for obtaining power. This situation can recreate instability. Therefore, post-conflict local election institutions in post-conflict regions must be designed to accommodate interests of various groups in an inclusive manner. Institutions are formed in such a way to create distribution of power among many groups of interests within the social system. This is done in order to prevent one group from ruling in a government, because if that happens, the group tends to be despotic to the people, which may generate new conflicts (Heslin 2006).

I.   ACEH

a. Readiness of Post-Conflict Local Election Institution

Post-conflict local election agency is an association or key unit to carry out post-conflict local election system. The agency that is responsible for the implementation of post-conflict local elections, starts from the planning, implementation, supervision, voting through result determination phases. In the context of Aceh, the implementation is regulated in Law No. 11 Year 2006 which is supplemented by Qanun[3] Aceh No. 5 Year 2012. The post-conflict local election organizing agencies in Aceh structurally are different from organizing agencies in other provinces. The implementation function is conducted by an agency called Election Independent Commission (KIP), while the supervisory function is conducted by Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslih*). Based on the prevailing rules, organizing agencies in post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh can structurally be explained in Picture 2 as follows:

---

3 Qanun is a special term that refers to local regulation (*perda*) in Aceh.

Picture 2: Implementing and Supervisory Functions

Implementing Function	Supervisory Function
Provincial KIP	Aceh Panwaslih
District/City KIP	District/City Panwaslih
Subdistrict Election Committee	Subdistrict Panwaslih
Voting Committee	Field Election Supervisor
Voting Organizing Group	

1. Independent Election Commission (KIP)

Aceh KIP is the main institution that is authorized in carrying out general elections in Aceh. Historically, the discourse of KIP formation for the election of local leaders is regulated in Law No. 18 Year 2001 On Aceh Governmenth. In 2001 the discourse of KIP establishment evolved. But due to conflict condition, the institution that was formed specially to organize direct election of local leaders in Aceh was realized in 2004. In 2009 KIP was officially dissolved into one with Aceh Provincial KPU, but still uses the name of KIP. Structurally KIP is part of the National General Election Commission. In term of authority, Aceh KIP is equal to provincial KPU. Aceh KIP office is currently located in Jl. T. Nyak Arief, Kompleks Gedung Arsip Banda Aceh (Picture 3).

Many parties see that in terms of administration and general technical matters the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Aceh has run accordingly. However, KIP as the organizer is regarded as less independent in carrying out the tasks. Their position is believed to be biased in favor of the interest of the dominant group in the Aceh political context. This is caused by the fact that in the KIP recruitment system, candidates must be proposed and selected by the Aceh Local House of Representatives (DPRA). Consequently, rumors saying that when selected, the candidates will tend to bring the interests of the dominant group in DPRA occur.

The process of selection of election committees is not fully democratic because of intervention from particular parties that impose their will. So, that will make bias in the political interest enter the selection process.

That's the problem. So, the people who enter the institution are those that meet their interests. I think this has harmed our democracy at present.[4]

In my opinion the problem is because KIP is selected by the Aceh House of Representative. The district KIP is selected by the District Legislative Council. This is cooptation. And now, there is Aceh Party on board. So, the interest of Aceh Party willy-nilly is in ….. even KIP is now very visible.[5]

This issue becomes very strong in the Aceh society. However, the problem is that there is no legitimate evidence yet on the rumor. KIP gets less legitimacy from some of the society as a neutral institution. A socio-political observer cum former GAM combatant and political practitioner in Aceh sees that the problem lies in the space for cheating in the existing recruitment system. The dominant party in Aceh *DPRD* can recommend candidates for KIP members according to their interests. Thus, the proposed candidates are expected to side with them in post-conflict local election and win the candidates nominated by the dominating party. The condition may create instability in the society. The level of people's trust in KIP institution is very low. Apart from the verification of the non-neutrality, the system that imposes the formation of KIP through *DPRA* triggers a perception that KIP commissionaires vulnerably side with the interests of the dominant group in *DPRA*. This perception eventually changes into a public rumor in a view of the fact the dominant parties in *DPRA* are the local parties that have less good reputation in the society.

Picture 3: KIP (Independent Election Commission) Building, Aceh

Another important thing to analyze is the socialization of general election education for the Acehnese people. KIP chairperson admits that this program is very crucial due to the fact that the public awareness on general election is still very low. However, to realize it, KIP as the organizer feel to find obstacles with regard to very low budget funding. The poor understanding on the general election education gives impact on the behaviors of the people who still want to accept money politics and regard the general election as less important.

> It's fair. The implementation is fair. The phases are fair. But when we talk about dissemination how can we say it is done fairly well or not quite well? So, how should we view? The impact is that the people can easily be interviewed; people are easily involved in money politics, and then some people feel "I do not need post-conflict local election." The second and the fourth had. The upper middle class people decided to escape from post-conflict local election so that they have gone to Jakarta long before post-conflict local election, bought air tickets with their families to Jakarta, to Medan or other destination. That's the impact because they do not know about general education. It was as if the election would force them to vote for the local leader candidates nominated by a political party.[6]

Another challenge is related to the human resource in the election organizing agency at the grass root level, such as Sub-district Organizing Committee (PPK), Voting Committees, down to Voting Organizing Groups (KPPS). The capacity of the committees' knowledge at the grass-root level is very poor in the aspect of understanding of regulations and technical implementation. Besides that, their profession that is not only organizing committee makes them not fully concerned to learn technical rules. Most of them believe that profession as committee is only a side job. The honorarium they get is believed very low so that many people are less interested in becoming committee members at the grass root level. It seems that profession for some people is taken in order to supplement the income only. This of course causes many problems such as unregistered people in the *DPT* and other problems related to the procedures for *TPS* organizing that are not in accordance with the rules. Actually, as implementers they are the front-line executors in the post-conflict local election process.

> The second challenge is, let's imagine we have to admit that election organizers at the village level like KPPS, PPS and PPK are those with senior high school educational background on average. Then, with only one time budget, what can we do to give technical guidance to them. What can

---

6 Interview with Aceh Provincial KIP Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 27 October 2014.

we hope from the human resources with average high school background under one-time budget allocation for technical guidance? How can we expect them to be perfect?[7]

2. *General Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslih)*

General Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslih*) is an institution that functions to carry out supervision on the general election implementation. The goal is that the general election can be realized according to the prevailing procedures. The *Panwaslih* is regulated by special low on Aceh namely Law No. 11 Year 2006. The task and authority as general election supervisory agency is only valid during the governor and mayor/regent's elections.[8] The agency is *ad hoc* and active for three months during the post-conflict local election. *Panwaslih* that changed into General Election Supervisory Body (*Bawaslu*) in the national election occupied the building of and used facilities of *Bawaslu* in Jl. Arakundo I Guece, Kompleks Banda Aceh (Photo 4).

Photo 4: Aceh *Bawaslu/Panwaslih* Building

Similarly with KIP, *Panwaslih* commissionaires are selected and elected by DPRA. The condition makes the people believe less in *Panwaslih*. The people consider *Panwaslih* as partial implementing institution. *Panwaslih* is often believed to ignore various fraud actions. Apart from the evidence verification that *Panwaslih* is not neutral, like KIP, the *Panwaslih* recruitment mechanism through DPRA also creates suspicion on the tendency of *Panwaslih* to side with the dominant party in DPRA.

Even though we cannot ensure it, but I am not sure if they are more neutral because there is political element in it, right? For instance, when

---

7 Interview with Aceh Provincial KIP Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 27 October 2014.
8 For national election, both legislative and presidential elections, supervisory institution remained to be called *Panwaslu* with different system from that of *Panwaslih*.

today, we are recruited by *Bawaslu*, we do not owe any gratitude to the recruiters. If for instance you are in *DPR*, you are from a particular party. When we both become members of *Panwas* (supervisory committee) that you recruited, I am not sure I dare to enforce law. That explains why violations are not followed up.[9]

Another thing that becomes the problem of *Panwaslih* is the lack of authority in handling the existing cases. One of the challenges is structural. No law enforcers' element within *Panwaslih* is believed to cause less maximum and quick law enforcement against violations in the field. Mechanism and procedures for violation handling force *Panwaslih* to report to related parties such as attorney office or police through Gakkumdu[10] along with strong evidences. Panwaslih cannot directly take action against the violators in the field. If they have to wait, often times the violators cannot easily identified again so that the case will be unresolved. Therefore, many parties feel that involvement of law enforcing elements within the supervisory body is very important.

> The supervisory committee (*Panwas*) is powerless nowadays. I think so. It cannot execute case directly. So not all things from the past are bad. Just go back to the old days, in which supervisory committee has law enforcing elements. There should be police officers, prosecutors. When they have taken an action against a case, who dares to give money if the person has been handled? So, today again I am talking about improving the regulations.[11]

> ... So far in *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*), violations must be reported first. Is the general election safe or not? The one that deals with general election is the police and attorney office when *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*) have some reports of violations. Why *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*), Why are we often mad at *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*)? Because in the old days, *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*) were still one. But now, *Bawaslu* stands alone, sir. Like this: there is a violation, "Wait a second. I am taking a bath now." Not good. *Bawaslu* (*Panwaslih*) is also not loyal. There are no campaigns in *Bawaslu*.[12]

Besides that, the ad hoc status that will end after three months makes *Panwaslih* unable to build a strong network that can support their job. This network is deemed very important by some parties as part of investigation related to the supervisory activities done. The 3-month structural official

---

9 Interview with Sabang City *Panwaslu*, Sabang, 30 August 2014.
10 Gakkumdu (Integrated Law Enforcement of General Election) is a collective forum consisting of election supervisors, police, and attorney office to discuss general election's criminal violation cases. Quoted from www.rumah pemilu.org.
11 Interview with DPRA Fraction A member from non-Local Party, Banda Aceh, 28 October2014.
12 Interview with intelligence subdivision of Aceh Local Police, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

period makes them only able to conduct formal procedural supervision during the election implementation period. Indeed, they cannot carry out deep investigation in the short period. Another problem related to the lack of quality human resources within the supervisory committees at the grass root level, such as sub-district and village level supervisory committees. They are considered to have limited understanding of the technicality and regulation related to their tasks as post-conflict local election supervisors.

3. Local Government

Local government in the post-conflict local election institutional perspective is the main vehicle in the post-conflict local election implementation. The main goal of post-conflict local elections is to get local government leaders, both at the provincial and city/district levels. Ideally, the government can support post-conflict local election implementation fully by implementing agencies in their respective regions. The support can take the form of budget resource through Local Government Budget (*APBD*), infrastructure, security and others. Explanation in this section will focus on how far is the readiness of Aceh local government in the post-conflict local election implementation. The intended local government is the local government beside election agencies.

In the institutional perspective of post-conflict local election, the role of local government must be neutral.[13] Local government has no right to do any interventions. However, in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh the local government is believed to be not neutral by some parties. Local government tends to side with one of the dominating parties which by coincident is dominant in the government, to maintain their status quo. This indication is identified in the DPRA institution. As explained before, in the prevailing laws, DPRA has the role in electing KIP commissionaires and *Panwaslih* members. In the commissionaire recruitment process, many parties found some indication of partiality due to closeness to commissionaire candidate with the dominating party in DPRA. It has a goal in which the implementing institution will later prioritize the interest of the dominant party. This partiality indication can be seen from the less transparent recruitment process based on the majority votes which of course are dominated by the dominating party.

> Yes, it's huge. Today, in Aceh, today in Aceh, last time, yes the last period when we elected KIP members for this election. Yes, in that period, the candidates were elected, selected by Commission A. and our anatomy, Aceh DPRA has the majority membership from the local party. So that

---

13 Richard Scott (2012) identifies regulations and norms become some pillars that build institutional elements.

elected KIP members on average are the ones close to DPRA and know them.[14]

Another problem is related to the role of security elements which is believed less maximum in the law enforcement. In some violent cases related to post-conflict local election, the police personnel is considered by some parties to conduct omission. This omission is believed to be as the form of local police chief's partiality to a candidate. Of course this has made people's trust to security personnel low. Another data shows that the challenge in handing general election violation cases is more caused by the existing system. The system obliges *Panwaslih* to report to the police through Gakkumdu, while Gakkumdu must learn first whether the case falls under the category of their authority. If not, the case should be forwarded to the General Criminal Investigating Division. This system makes the case handling less responsive. Besides that, the due date of reporting time, namely five days since the incident also makes many cases unable to be handled. The deadline is deemed to be too short, given the fact that reporters need fairly much time to collect evidences first.

> This Gakkumdu must handle cases which can help me. There is agreement on the cases that can be handled by Gakkumdu. Not all cases, even though they are not related general election. If the examination is calculated, and Gakkumdu is considered less competent, it will be swiftly settled and taken to the court; being taken over. There is regulation on what to be handled Gakkumdu. Reporting a case, if it is already more than 5 days, it cannot be accepted.[15]

4. Political Parties

Political parties are community institutions that have the goal of obtaining power.[16] Political parties also have a role in collecting and simplify so many aspirations of the people into one vehicle. Therefore, political parties are important actors in a democratic system. In Law No. 12 Year 2008 article 56 explains that even though candidates of local leaders and the deputy are individuals, political parties or a group of political parties can propose candidates that will participate in the competition of post-conflict local election. Therefore, the influence of political party's interest is very

---

14 Interview with DPRA member of Fraction A from non-local party, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014. Informant is one of the judges in the selection and election of provincial KIP and *Panwaslih*.
15 Interview with Sub-Division of Intelligence of Aceh Local Police, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
16 Profesor Miriam Budiarjo (2008: 403-404) believes that "political party is an organized group whose members have same orientation, values and dreams. The goal of the organized group is to get political power and win political positions (usually) through constitutional ways to implement the program."

strong. Similarly in Aceh, readiness of political parties in the political dynamics is very important to be analyzed further. Characteristics of local political parties in Aceh which are the transformation of separatist movements aggravate the complexity of competition among them.

Generally, the capacity of cadres within the party is considered very low. Cadres are recruited just before the election so that there is no sustainability. The implication is that the function of political education by parties runs less maximally. So far cadres have only been trained on the ways to get power, while education on the democratic values is still minimum, even though it is very important to maintain political stability.

> Political party should be like a school. At school the national cadres learn about politics, not only power. How can we educate people from political party so that they feel that they are Indonesians? But here the goal is how to get a position, not for education. Some of them play with money. This is not good. It does not provide education on political party. It should be like a school of politics, not only how to get power, but how to do good politics.[17]

> Cadres are also recruited just before general election. We know the capacity of the cadres. So it is impossible to entrust our hope to these political parties in Indonesia.[18]

Socialization on political education is deeply required to teach democratic values to the members. The goal of political parties is to get power, but democratic values are very important to be internalized so that the ways to get power are in line with the principle of democracy. The fact is that violence is still much done by members who are affiliated to political parties such as success teams, supporters, and political party's cadres. The SNPK's data identify that most of violent incidents related to elections of provincial, district and city official positions are conducted by those affiliated to political parties (Graph 8).

The data above shows that most of the violence is conducted by those affiliated to political parties. Based on the data, it can be said that the function of political parties in mediating conflicts through democracy channels is not maximal yet. Political parties are still unable yet to control their masses well. Some of the violence also occur due to competitions among local parties in Aceh.

Of all provinces in Indonesia, Aceh has a uniqueness as the only region that has local parties. This is one of the conflict resolution implementation

---

17 Interview with one of the Aceh IAIN professors, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
18 Interview with one of the Democracy NGOs in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

in the Helsinki peace agreement. These local parties occurred around 2008, and are dominated by former GAM combatant elites. Two local parties that have dominating force in Aceh are Aceh Party (PA) and National Aceh Party (PNA), but recently there is a new party in the government, namely Aceh Peace Party (PDA).

Graph 8: Actors Identified to Conduct Violence Related to Elections of Provincial, City and District Official Positions in Aceh Province 2005-2014 (n= 263)[19]

- Citizens
- Government
- Political Party
- Community organization (secular)
- TNI
- Students

93,16%

Local parties are formed to accommodate people's political aspirations and to fight for Acehnese interests. But for some local parties, it seems that the democratic values have not been realized fully. One of the parties is Aceh Party (PA). The memory of old-time struggle is still implanted in the PA ideology, so that it is deeply focused on fighting the unrealized points of Helsinki Agreement such as government regulation on Aceh authority, flag raising, local symbols, etc. The unrealized points of Helsinki agreement have made the PA elites think that GAM struggle has not finished yet. The Government of Indonesia is believed intentionally not to meet those points.

> For instance, there is devolution of central authority to Aceh in 6 cases. We know the 6 cases, right. I think the urgent thing is the government regulation of Aceh authority. In the regulation, Aceh can govern itself through *qanun* and its own governance, or local symbols, and also with any form of government. Then, there should be government regulation on oil and gas in which the central government and Aceh will manage it together. As said in the forum, Aceh does not know exactly the income from oil and gas. We are just given the portion. This month's portion is seventy percent.[20]

The elites of PA claim as the parties that have the legitimacy from the people to fight for the Aceh freedom. PA is the evolution of GAM to continue

19 National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK), dalam www.snpk-indonesia.com
20 Interview with one of the Aceh Party cadres, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.

the unfinished struggle. Aceh should not be cheated by the Government of Indonesia as previously. They think that the Government of Indonesia has long cheated Aceh with promises given since the independence period until now. The realization of Helsinki agreement is believed as the product of GAM's services that did fights so that Aceh gets its special status from the Government of Indonesia. Therefore, PA as GA representation thinks that PA is the only party that has the rights to get the right for authority seats of power due to its past-time services.

> Actually we are more oriented to Aceh. I think all Acehnese people are committed to reaching the desired dreams, by looking at the goal of the current democratic political goal. All components of Acehnese people are still committed. From the agreement between both parties, to fight for what GAM used to [fight]. Why do the people still support PA? As part of GAM group symbol in the conflict period, because they still believe that the struggle of democracy will be realized. Aceh will be free from poverty, stupidity, and reach its prosperity. It turns out the obstacles are from the points of the agreement.[21]

The current condition of the local party becomes one of the causes that make democracy in Aceh is less maximal. It seems that Aceh Party intends to monopolize the political power. Old-time struggles become the claims over the current right to authority. If there is someone who threatens the struggle, they will have many ways to maintain the struggle including those that are not in accordance with democratic values such as violence and intimidation. This perception spreads into some elements of the Acehnese society. This condition is very vulnerable and potential for generating instability in Aceh especially in relation to the existing political competitions.

b. Political Dynamics and Friction/Conflict Generation

Institutional perspectives not only look at the roles of institutions' units in carrying out their respective functions. As explained earlier, institutional perspectives also look at the mechanism of system and dynamics among the institutions in carrying out the existing system (see Horton and Hunt 1999). Understanding on the political constellation and map in a region is very important in identifying how structure of power applies. From the structure of power we can understand how the relation of each party in political domain is. Of course, this becomes important for post-conflict local election system, both ongoing and future ones. The political map will describe the forces of parties that politically have authorities over a region.

---

21 Interview with one of the Aceh Party cadres, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

Political condition in Aceh is closely related to the transformation of former GAM combatants in the political domain. According to Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005, GAM participated in the 2006 post-conflict local election. Therefore, there were two pairs of candidates from GAM, namely Humam–Hasbi supported by PPP and Irwandi–Nazar as independent candidates. Photo 5 shows a list of candidate pairs in 2006 Aceh post-conflict local election.

Photo 5: List of Candidate Pairs of Governor and Vice Governor in 2006 Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election


This condition shows the internal disunity within GAM at that time but the tension was not so high. The disunity only took the form of the division of GAM votes into two to vote for GAM candidates who will lead Aceh in the future. Humam–Hasbi tended to be supported by GAM top officials while Irwandi–Nazar tended to be supported by GAM members who fought in the field. At that time, many GAM top officials spread abroad so that to give influence in votes collection in the field was less effective. The competition tension was not so high because the ideological perception between them was relatively similar. Many of the former GAM members did not have political orientation yet. Besides that, political organization resulting from structural transformation of former GAM combatants was still not established yet. This condition made Irwandi-Nazar superior to Humam–Hasbi.

Although from GAM, there were two pairs namely Irwandi–Nazar and H2O (Humam–Hasbi) from PPP, Humam dan Hasbi. Then, PPP, but Hasbi is a neighbor supported by GAM seniors; GAM top officials supported H2O, field-based GAM members supported Irwandi–Nazar. But at that that, it can be said there was no clash nor conflict. GAM top officials were weak. The position was abroad. No basis here, so that the massive campaigns were conducted by Irwandi–Nazar's group.[22]

The competition tension got higher when GAM combatant started to be politically structured with the establishment of PA. PA was established and legalized in 2008; initially it was named GAM party. Then, it was changed into Aceh Party. The PA is the first local party established by former GAM elites. If we analyze 13 statements on why selecting Aceh Party that is published in our official PA website, the core ideology of PA is to continue the GAM struggles politically.[23] Aceh Party dominates the fair number of seats in DPRA as seen in the Graph 9 as follows.

Graph 9: Gained Seats in DPRA in 2009 Legislative Election[24]

The above data shows that two local parties get seats in DPRA. They are Aceh Party and Atjeh Sovereignty Party. Besides PA, there are other local party in Aceh, namely Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (*Partai Aceh Aman Seujahtra*), Aceh People's Independent Voice (*Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh*), Aceh People Party (*Partai Rakyat Aceh*), Aceh Unity Party (*Partai Bersatu Atjeh*), etc. However, in the 2009 legislative election, only two local parties got seats namely PA dominated by former GAM combatants and Aceh Sovereignty Party (*Partai Daulat Atjeh*) dominated by Islamic school students (*santri*).

On the eve of 2012 *pemilukada*, the Aceh political map changed again. The main actors were controlled by former GAM combatant. Competition occurred between GAM top officials and Irwandi Yusuf. Disunity was triggered by the fact that Irwandi Yusuf was not supported as the governor

22 Interview with Aceh Province Governor's Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
23 Lihat www.partaiaceh.com/2014/04/13-alasan-mengapa-memilih-partai-aceh.html diakses pada 12 October 2014, time 16.44 WIB.
24 National Violence Monitoring System, www.snpk-indonesia.com

candidate in the *pemilukada*. The cause was the weak political communications by Irwandi Yusuf in the domain of the elites and provided a negative image for GAM seniors in the mass media.[25] This made GAM top officials reluctant to support Irwandi. Another factor is the lack of Irwandi Yusuf's orientation to fighting for the unrealized points of Helsinki agreement so that GAM top officials believed Irwandi Yusuf did not bring along the key ideology of the group which is the new form of GAM struggle through political path.

Photo 6: Pairs of Governor and Deputy Governor Candidates in 2012 Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election

Eventually Irwandi nominated himself as an independent candidate. This created a debate in the Constitutional Court with regard to whether or not independent candidate was allowed in the post-conflict local election. As a result, post-conflict local election execution was delayed until 2012. The post-conflict local election was won by Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf supported by PA. Competition intensified in 2012 because former combatants were structured within PA, top officials had access to give command and influence to former combatants, and in this period, many former combatants wanted political positions.[26] Photo 6 shows pairs of governor and deputy governor candidates in 2012 Aceh *pemilukada*.

Looking at the decreasing political support, Irwandi Yusuf invited some parties to establish a new local party called Aceh National Party (PNA) in

---

25 Interview with Aceh Province Governor's Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
26 Interview with Aceh Province Governor's Expert Staff, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.

2012. PNA is dominated by former GAM elites that were divided due to different orientation from other GAM leadership. PNA has an ideology that prioritizes the interest of Aceh based on the democratic values and Islamic values. PNA also has orientation at the national level. It can be seen from a statement of "Manifesto of Basic Struggle Values of Aceh National Party" as follows:

> PNA as a vehicle for all Acehnese people, who are not only in Aceh but also in all parts of *nusantara* (Indonesia) and world, feel committed to create fundamental changes in the efforts of realizing healthy and democratic political system and to realize people's dignified prosperity.[27]

The emergency of PNA generates a new pattern of competition. PA regards PA as their biggest political threat given the fact that Irwandi was former governor and has fairly strong network among former GAM people in the field. This situation has made the competition between PA and PNA become fierce until now. However, in reality, after the 2014 legislative election, PNA gets much lower number of seats than PA. This can be seen in the Graph 10 below.

Graph 10: Gained Seats in DPRA in 2014 Legislative Election[28]

The above data shows that three local parties get seats in DPRA in the 2014 legislative election. They are PA, PNA, and PDA. PA has a decline in the number of seats at 12% if compared to the 2009 legislative election. This is related to the decreased trust in PA that is rumored to often carry out intimidating and arbitrary actions against the people. So that the votes moved to PNA that has Irwandi's figure as the governor in the previous period. The Aceh Local Party (PDA) is the transformation of Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Atjeh) which got seats in the 2009 election. The party changed its name due to technical problem. This party is dominated by Islamic boarding school students (*santri*).

If compared between PA and PNA which are equally dominated by former GAM elites, according to some parties PA is considered more radical than PNA. Some people perceive PNA as GAM's intellectual circle. They struggled

---

27 "Manifesto Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan Partai Nasional Aceh," can be seen from www.pna. or.id/profil/manifesto/#.VDpgNCj-JDs accessed on 12 October 2014, at 18.13 WIB.
28 National Violence Monitoring System- Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com

through diplomacy before the peace agreement era. PA prioritizes GAM old time struggles which are not fully realized yet. The intended struggles are the struggle against the injustice of Government of Indonesia in treating Aceh. Old-time ideology is still brought by PA, but their struggling ways have changed from armed struggle to political struggle.

> Aceh Party is a reincarnation of GAM in a peaceful era, that changes its armed struggle into political struggle. 3. Since Helsinki MoU was born after GAM leaders signed it. After it got peaceful, GAM established KPA which then gave birth to Aceh Party. Therefore, Aceh Party is recognized as GAM's representation successor in peaceful period.[29]

> Yes at the intellectual level. But the command lies on the former GAM combatants. Yes, like Sofyan Daud, he is GAM spokesperson. Sofyan Daud is the PNA party leader. [30]

> PNA is represented by Irwandi. Even though there was no PNA yet, PA by GAM colleagues becomes hardliners. Eventually conflicts occurred when they asked Irwandi to delay post-conflict local election.[31]

Some people identify that patron relation among internal PA is still very strong. The patron relation is dominated by former GAM leadership. GAM leaders still have strong influence within PA so that the candidates of local leaders from GAM elites must share the vision with the former GAM leaders. Besides that, most of PA members are currently not GAM members who used to struggle before the peaceful era. Most of PA members who used to be GAM members were fired as they supported Irwandi who nominated himself in the 2012 post-conflict local election, which was in conflict with the wish of GAM leadership.

c. The Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Local Election

Civil society is an important part in the democratic system. Democracy cannot run well without civil society (Fukuyama 2005), which particularly takes part in creating social capital.[32] Besides that, one of the important variables for the successful post-conflict local election is active engagement of CSO in the implementation process (Korth 2011). Conceptually, assessment of the role of CSOs (civil society organizations) or dubbed as NGOs (*non-*

---

29 13 reasons for electing Aceh Party," taken from www.partaiaceh.com, on 3 January 2015.
30 Interview with Aceh Province Commissionaire Chairperson, Banda Aceh 27 October 2014.
31 Interview with former KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
32 Social capital is a set of values and norms that enable human being to work together to fight for the interest among them (see Fukuyama 2005).

govermental organizations), in democracy development anywhere is closely related to the work of Alexis de Tocqueville entitled *Democracy in America*. The work becomes a kind of "*seminal work*", a work that is much quoted by the next researchers. In summary, Tocqueville emphasizes that foundation of democratization in America in the 18th century includes equality, freedom and established social infrastructures with the foundation of associations (CSO). Through these associations the people are free to associate and express their opinions and aspiration equally (Tocqueville 2003). Therefore, theoretically CSOs become a kind of competing centers of power or alternative sources of power, beside states that are primary locus of power. The existence of centers or alternative sources of power is one of the conditions and important characteristics of a democratic state or territory.

Post-conflict local elections in Aceh are intended not only for building peace but also local democracy. Democracy development can only get better if CSOs are getting stronger and growing. Based on the observation and experience of various informants, the participation and engagement of CSOs in the post-conflict local election implementation and democracy development in Aceh is still fluctuating, not consistent, and especially dependent on the existence of fund sources, as stated by a peace activist in Aceh and a former chairperson of a CSO:

> The power of CSOs is very fluctuating too, very much determined by social moods, sometimes, when peace is trendy, all is peace, when Human Rights are trendy, all is Human Rights. They are not so creative in looking at problems and issues sustainably and less committed to the issues. In the context of elaborative program, there is nothing. So, the most urgent issue is funds. If there is some fund, they work.[33]

In the 2006 post-conflict local election implementation, the role of CSOs was very strong. Local CSOs get big support from international agencies.[34] Post-tsunami condition and the peace agreement made Aceh receive much attention from international parties. Support from the central government was also very strong in this period. But after 2009, the support started to decrease. CSOs in Aceh started to decline in their capacity. Similarly in the 2012 governor post-conflict local election implementation, their role decreased more and more.

The cause of the decreased role does not come from the internal factor, but rather from external factor that prevent them from maximal participation. Some factors are limited funding and dependency on donor.

---

33 Interview with academicians of conflict study, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
34 Interview with Aceh Province Governor's Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.

NGO can monitor development like whether the development is beneficial, less or not. NGO is weak. Why weak? Funding problem. That's the problem. Now it is not easy to get from external. Now, if they are not close, our civil societies are weak.[35]

The next obstacle is related to threat/intimidation from some parties. Intimidation makes CSOs more careful in their action and carrying out their activities. When CSOs find any violation, they find it difficult to find the people who want to be witnesses. It is because the people are afraid of threats and intimidation if they are willing to be witnesses.

Yes, for instance if we construct it like this, there will be reports from them, 31 people reported, frauds, organizers, then intimidation, hidden campaigns, just like that. But when we want to confirm them as we want to report to *Banwaslu*. When confirmed to Banwaslu, they are afraid. They are still like that, Bro. no one wants to be witness. Legally speaking we should have evidences, there must be witnesses, where did they see it, things like that. So, eventually it is finished.[36]

Competition among the parties sometimes makes us difficult. If we say A, we are considered being part of B group. So the most probably thing we is validation to voters, monitoring and the like. The roles that we might take are not productive yet. If we do not take policies nor actions, we try to influence parties.[37]

Besides that, there is critical spotlight that questions the people's motivation and goal of involving in various CSOs. Based on the testimonies from some informants, many people get active in CSOs during the post-conflict local election implementation more because they want the engagement to be an instrument for getting access to jobs or particular positions. The condition, for instance, is proven by many CSO activists who then apply for KIP members, PA spokespersons, PA expert staff, PA legislative candidates, PA lawyers, etc.,[38] or become part of other political parties. Even there are some of them who are then elected as legislators. However, the condition is not automatically negative, both in relation to individual's right for nominating him/herself and democracy development. If CSO activists are elected as legislators, for instance, or elected to assume other strategic public positions,

35 Interview with IAINAr-Raniry Professor, Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
36 Interview with one of the former Aceh Province KIP Commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
37 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh 20 June 2014.
38 Interview with one of the former Aceh Province KIP Commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

they are expected to contribute to developing democracy with the knowledge they have gotten when they became democracy activists.[39]

Apart from various critical evaluations addressed to the engagement and participation of SO in the above *pemilukada*, another thing to be analyzed is programs and various forms of CSO activities in supporting democracy development, especially in the post-conflict local election implementation in an honest and equal manner. In the context of post-conflict local election in Aceh, CSO activities are generally related to things that are not conducted by political parties, such as political education and socialization that includes explanation of voters' rights, vision and missions of the candidates, etc., as emphasized by one of the CSO activists as follows.

> CSOs continue to conduct the strengthening to the society like to pro-vide political education. For instance, political parties do not carry out their work fully for political education to voters. CSOs take the role which is not taken by political parties. CSOs educate the people so that they know their rights, vision and missions of candidates, etc. but again, the mission is about money. So, in the final days, money is given. In hamlets, they were given money, clothes, head scarves to Koran reading women group..[40]

One of the important roles of CSOs in the post-conflict local election implementation process is political socialization and education, especially if the role of political parties in the domain is relatively weak. However, the on-going fact often shows that political education given to the society just vanished and was defeated by material incentive/financial political model. In this relation, Lipset theoretical assumption is right, that one of the important factors for a strong democracy is the strong and prosperous middle-class. (Majumdar & Singh 1999).

II.   MALUKU

### a. Readiness of Post-Conflict Local Election Institutions

Election institutions in Maluku are structurally different from election institutions in Aceh. Election institutions in Maluku refer to Law No. 15 Year 2011. The election institutions are structurally similar to election institutions in general in other provinces in Indonesia. Provincial *KPU* (General Election Commission) is established and selected by national level organizing institu-tion namely National *KPU*. Similarly, provincial *Bawaslu* (election supervisory

---

39 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh 20 June 2014.
40 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

body) is established and selected by the national *Bawaslu*. In general, this can be described in Picture 3 as follows.

Picture 3: Implementing and Supervisory Functions

Implementing Function	Supervisory Function
Provincial KPU	Provincial Bawaslu
District/City KPU	District/City Panwaslu
Subdistrict Election Committee	Subdistrict Election Supervisor
Voting Committee	Field Election Supervisor
Voting Organizing Group	

1. Local General Election Commission (*KPUD*)

The implementing function is carried out by provincial *KPU* which is formed by national KPU through special selection phases. Maluku Provincial *KPU* takes the role in developing local regulations and coordinating the collection of votes starting from distribution, voting to vote counting. Provincial *KPU* is now located in Jl. Sultan Hasanuddin, Tantui, Ambon (Photo 7).[41]

Photo 7: Maluku Provincial *KPU* building

---

41 http://kpu-malukuprov.go.id/

However, Maluku Provincial *KPU* has limitation in the aspect of field execution because field execution is under the authority of district/city *KPU*. One of the unique things in Maluku Provincial *KPU* is the balanced number of Moslem and Christian commissionaires. Besides that, Maluku Provincial *KPU* also carries out political education program. However, limited budget makes the program implementation less maximal.[42]

The problem is also located in the election institution at the district/city level downward.[43] The causal factor is limited conceptual and technical understanding on the post-conflict local election implementation based on the prevailing rules. Their understanding on the internalization of democratic values is still considered very low. These problems are getting visible in ad-hoc committee at the low level, such as *KPPS*. Maluku Provincial *KPU* as organizer also has limitation in conducting technical guidance training due to limited budget even though this training activity is important to increase the capacity of committee's knowledge at the low level.

Central Maluku *Panwaslu* saw that a problem lies in the awareness of low level committee on the values and concept of democracy even though many of them are experienced and used to be committee members in previous elections. The condition makes them really understand spaces for frauds. Central Maluku *Panwaslu* also added low educational background and main job of the committee at the low level to be tempted to conduct frauds for the sake of getting various repayments.

> People who used to experience general elections in the previous years. This has made it complicated. Since they are so experienced and get used to it, they are already expert in the post and become indication of violations….. so we want to accommodate human resources from the common people, but they have difficulty in writing and reading. The people who live in insular areas and insular sub-districts.[44]

The next problem is related to the distribution of general election logistics such as ballots, ballot boxes, etc. Limited distribution is caused by inadequate sea transportation. Sea transportation that is used is still dependent on commercial vessels whose sailing schedule is often not in accordance with KPU schedule. This often triggers delays because sea transportation is very important given the fact that Maluku mainly consists of sea and islands.

> But the problem is that Maluku has a uniqueness that is insular, so that it needs organizers, special strategy to complete the phase process so that it can run properly, according to the planned agenda, or the set phases.

---

42 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
43 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
44 Interview with Central Maluku *Panwaslu* Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.

There needs to be intensive communications as election organizers to the government. Communications is related to the challenges such as transportation. Therefore, in terms of logistics distribution, it requires vessels that can meet KPU targets to distribute logistics.[45]

Besides that, *KPU* has not so far gotten full trust from the people related to neutral organizing yet. Some cases form the perception for instance the governor post-conflict local election implementation case in Eastern Seram (SBT) in 2013. SBT district *KPU* is regarded as biased in favor of the interest of a candidate who was still the regent of the district. The partiality was observed from the omission by organizers of violations that were intended to win a candidate, for instance by falsifying votes in which the number of legitimate votes exceeded the number of voters in *DPT*. The problem was followed up and taken to legal domain and eventually SBT district KPU was declared to be guilty.

Eastern Seram district KPU at *DKPP* (Election Organizers Ethics Council) and based on the decision with the team, they were wrong, and all dismissed. Since the regent himself was the governor candidate. So, there was partiality from the district KPU colleagues there. So, actually it is not partiality, but omission. Yes it is also partiality, since they are not partial, why they did not do improvements.[46]

Bias in religious group identity still seems to adhere to organizers. Even though the existing system is designed to press sensitivity related to religious issues, there are still organizing committees that still have considerations of values based on their group identity. *Bawaslu* believes that in provincial KPU entity there is indication of strong consideration of religion-based identity group. But, based on the identified data, this is only at the level of organizers' idea; there is still no indication that the tendency is implemented in actions. This only applies issues within the society in general. In its developments, the issues may move to ethnicity domain. Primordial values of group identity based on ethnicity also starts to develop in some of the organizer body.

There is still non-neutrality within organizer's attitude because of adherent identity status. Yes, it is bad and I am very much anti the KPU chairperson because he said why Moslem cannot be a governor.[47]

O, it is not that good. The evidence is that KPU chairperson, we think, is good, but actually in the first round general election there is indication of irregularities. But, on one hand he is the son of the *negri*, the son of

---

45 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Maluku, 25 August 2014.
46 Interview with Maluku Province KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
47 Interview with one of Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

the region, the son of tradition. He is the son of tradition, so eventually he is incapable.[48]

2. Provincial Election Supervisory Body (*Bawaslu*)

The balance also exists within the Election Supervisory Body (*Bawaslu*) which is currently located in Jl. Cut Nyak Dien No. 9, Karang Panjang, Ambon (Foto 8). The balance between Moslem and Christian in the institution body is regarded as capable of representing neutrality of the organizer. As an example, some previous decades in the *Bawaslu* election process, there were three candidates and all of them were, by accident, Christians. This became a debate and eventually another Moslem candidate was looked for as representation. One of the *Bawaslu* commissionaires think that it is not professionalism that becomes the key recruitment indicator but the representation of each identity group.

> We at *Bawaslu* consist of two Christians and one Moslem. There is a case for the member of the Indonesian House of Representatives. Based on the district recapitulation count results which were manipulated, Moslem got the seat. The Christian person had a data that showed that he should be qualified. Then this person reported to Bawaslu, and Bawaslu followed up the report accordingly. Each report must be followed up. We investigate all data that we have from *TPS* (voting stations) in the city. It turned out that he won while the Moslem was wrong as the data was manipulated. We recommend Tual City for re-counting. Then occurred movements from Moslem colleagues. Two people from *Bawaslu* influenced. One Moslem could not do anything. So *Bawaslu* looked for recommendation that benefited Christian. Such thought still exists. Party elites still have such thinking pattern."[49]

In general, the role of election supervisory institution in Maluku both at the provincial and city/district levels has run well. Some cases have been dealt with well. They give transparent information on SMS reporting status. However there are still cases unsuccessfully finished. This is more caused by limited authority. Ad hoc status with the short position period causes the minimum opportunity for setting up network and developing sustainable program in conducting supervision.[50]

---

48 Interview with local people, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
49 Interview with one of the Maluku Province *Bawaslu* Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
50 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.

Photo 8: Maluku Province Bawaslu Building

Election supervising institutions only have authority to recommend to KPU or the police to investigate violations in the field. Both provincial *Bawaslu* and city/district *Panwaslu* are unable to act directly take direct actions against every violation. Limited time for handling violations even makes the follow-up of the violations less maximal. They feel that the very limited aspect of authority cannot create fair post-conflict local election. As an example in Central Maluku, the local district *Panwaslu* asked KPU to carry out re-counting of votes due to vote mark-up. However, *KPU* did not carry out the recommendation even though procedurally the case was proved and the committee at the grass root level that carried out vote mark-up was also declared guilty.

> The problem is that when we have made a report and a study, we recommend it to our KPU colleagues, but KPU does not do it. So that is the problem. For instance there was this kind of violation, related to the mark-up. We recommended re-election or re-counting. But, the KPU colleagues did not accommodate it. In Law No. 32 the time limit for dealing with this violation is only three days. Imagine, here we are in Banda island, it takes 3 nights to get to KPU. In wave season, we cannot do anything. Only 3 days and it's already expired. For instance, the mark-up there is around 10 thousand. The problem is the time limit.[51]

From the aspect of human resource capacity, the integrity of the committee also becomes a problem in the supervisory institution in Maluku. Like problems in other election institutions, conceptual and technical understanding is still less maximal yet. Low educational background, especially at the low level of committee, also gives impacts on it. Then, some frauds are also found

---

51 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu*, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

by supervisory committee. One example is the case of supervisory committee in SBT district who were caught and proved guilty of intentionally omitting frauds done by organizing committee, even though the report was already given to them.

> That problem was revealed by the Supervisory Committee (*Panwas*) itself. One of the Panwas members is now dismissed by DKPP. He did not accept the processes. Then, he revealed it to the media, then to provincial *Bawaslu* and it was processed. There are cases from within, there are reports but they are not processed and ignored just like that.[52]

> Yes, actually it is just slightly different because in many implementations, there are many reports that are not followed up. I don't know whether the *Bawaslu* chairperson is fired or not. He plays his card.[53]

3. Local Government

The local government mentioned here is a governmental institution beside election institution. In general, the role of local government in the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku is similar to the role of local government in other regions. Maluku *Bappeda* is tasked with preparing budget needed by related institutions. The system used here is a proposal from the related institution of budget to *Bappeda* that will then evaluate and approve it. This system is considered to be able to reduce corruption.

From the aspect of implementation preparation, there are some things to be conducted by the local government. For instance, through *Kesbangpol*, the government organizes dissemination on political values of democracy. Usually such programs are conducted by holding forums attended by political elites, NGOs, and community leaders. In the case of the formation of organizing committee, the local government very much considers the balance factor when selecting candidates. The intended balance is the balance between Moslem and Christian committee members. The balance is felt necessary as the symbolic representation showing that organizing committee is neutral, not in favor of either Moslem or Christian groups.

On the other hand, there are also some weaknesses from the local government related to the post-conflict local election execution. Some of them are limited budget, given the fact that Maluku is insular territory. The limitation was felt by some organizing committees especially in the distribution of logistics to areas in other islands, also by the police in mobilizing its personnel to guard the post-conflict local election implementation. Besides that, local government also faced limited infrastructures, such as less adequate sea

---

52 Interview with Central Maluku *Panwaslu* Commissionaire, Masohi,19 November 2014.
53 Interview with one of NGOs, Ambon, 17 November 2014.

transportation and inter-insular communication network. This limitation also prevents the committees from coordinating and mobilizing. Unique cases related to infrastructures occurred in the post-conflict local election implementation in Central Maluku. In the votes counting, there was electricity cut-off by PLN,[54] so that they had to count votes at night with minimum lights. Of course this has big potential for frauds.

Police is the main actor that carries out the guarding function in the post-conflict local election. In general many parties think that the police performance is excellent; they are quick and responsive in handling cases. In guarding the security, the police coordinate with some institutions and mobilize intelligence function to identify vulnerable spots that needs guarding. The main priority of the police is Moslem-Christian relation. Moslem-Christian relation is more prioritized given the fact that Maluku has a history of conflicts between both communities. Therefore, if there is a conflict between Moslems and Christians, the police is not too worried of it although they still try to settle the case. The police cooperate with the people down to the community level to get quick information when there is a clash. Another security strategy is by managing interaction between the supporting masses. For instance, by arranging campaign dates, rally routes and the like. As far as possible the police minimize interactions between the supporting masses in one event that is related to *pemilukada*.

Dissemination related to peaceful general election is also conducted with a motto "ready to be elected and not elected", which is considered to more capable of reducing competition tension rather than the motto "ready to win and lose". Then, the effort to maintain independency of personnel is carried out by doing general supervisory function and adhering supervisory function, in which superiors monitor their subordinates directly. If a subordinate carries out non-neutral practices, the superior will also get sanction. This system is considered effective because it utilizes the personnel's hierarchal structure to optimize supervision so that it strengthens social control within the security personnel.[55]

Besides that, security personnel also find some challenges especially infrastructure challenge that is considered to influence troops' mobilization. Limited sea transportation and big waves becomes the main obstacle for the police to reach some areas separated by the sea. The communication obstacle is also felt by the police even though communications is important in carrying out monitoring function. Civil infrastructures such as commercial provider signal, cannot be used due to limited number of signal towers.

---

54 Interview with Central Maluku *Panwaslu* Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
55 Interview with Maluku Province Local Police's Subdivision of Operations, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

From Bula in SBT to Werinama we have to take a boat, Boss, for 12 hours Geser, Gorom, because no other way. Here communications is a problem too. If we send our personnel to Wetar, there is no communication here, they have to go to Timor Timur for telephone to Dili and the telephone provider is only Telkomsel. It's sad, right. Who is wrong in this case? Why does the government not set up tower there? well, I talked about it yesterday that the provincial government should provide communications media for quick communications. Our region is very vast including the sea.[56]

Limitations in the security issue have implication on the post-conflict local election implementation stability. One of this is the execution of the 2013 governor post-conflict local election in SBT district. Less maximal guarding caused some ballot boxes to be opened before the election period.[57] This caused clashes between supporting masses.

In the local bureaucracy/government, issue of identity is still there. There is indication of prioritizing the interest of a particular identity. In some cases, primordial issues apply, for instance in SBT. The incumbent regent by chance registered as governor candidate in the governor election. There is indication that post-conflict local election implementation in SBT is intervened by local government for the interest of the candidate.

4. Political Parties

Political parties in Maluku in general educate their cadres based on the existing local wisdom, namely through balanced representation. The balanced representation is taken as symbolization of political party's neutrality. This applies to political parties that have secular ideologies. Political parties with religious basis continue to maintain their religious identity. According to some people, religion-based parties still get support but not much. For Maluku people, parties that bring representation ideology are considered better. This is because the people think that those parties take part in fighting for peace in Maluku. This situation can be used by political parties to collect the force of supporting masses in general election. Some parties that are identical to particular religions start to open themselves to cadre candidates of another religion. The National Awakening Party (PKB), for instance, also has Christian cadres. They claim that even though the party was established by Moslem people the ideology they bring is nationalistic.

---

56 Interview with Maluku Province Local Police's Subdivision of Operations, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
57 Interview with one of the Maluku Province *Bawaslu Commissionaires*, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

Our main [Basis] is clear, Moslems ad NU in Maluku. But we also open opportunities to our brothers and sisters from Christian community. There are around 8 Christian community fellows. It can be explained to the Christian community that the PKB committee especially in Maluku come from two existing communities.[58]

Besides that, political parties in Maluku also have some problems. One of the problems can be seen from the SNPK data in Graph 11 below.

Graph 11: Actors Found Committing Violence Related to Elections of Provincial, City and District Official Positions in Maluku Province in 2005-2014[59]

The above data shows that most of the violent conflicts related to the elections of provincial and city/district official positions in Maluku are conducted by actors that have affiliation to political parties. This indicates that political parties are less maximal in conducting their function of mediating existing conflicts. The use of violent methods is still found to deal with problems in the competition of political position elections.

The personal capacity of party's cadres also becomes a problem. Low political education to the people who want to join political sphere makes parties difficult to find quality cadres. Sometimes parties recruit outsiders to become legislator candidates when election period approaches. They do this because they haven't gotten good cadres despite training process. As a result, they are forced to recruit external people to represent them in the government.[60]

b. Political Dynamics and Friction/
   Conflict Generation

Socially the Maluku people are divided into two big groups namely Moslem and Christian groups. This religious identity indirectly sets up the

58 Interview with one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
59 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com.
60 Interview with one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.

main awareness of Maluku people on perceiving and identifying themselves. After the conflict, the religious identity boundary becomes stronger. Issue of balance growing in the community in which both groups must have equal access to everything indirectly emphasizes the boundaries between both groups. This also applies in the political domain because the balance in political domain is felt much necessary to stifle frictions between Moslem and Christian groups. For instance, if a local leader is Moslem, the deputy should be Christian, and vice versa. However, recently this issue has shifted to ethnicity.

Political constellation and map in Maluku tends to be oriented to the generation of issues in order to get massive support. Inter-elite political competitions are attached to the issue of balance between Moslems and Christians. The traumatic condition of the Maluku people about the old-time conflicts has made them prefer secular political parties to religion-based political parties. Secular parties are considered to more accommodate the interests of Moslems and Christians. However, some people perceive nationalistic parties as Christian parties, but they are not many. Sometimes, this is made a strategy by political parties to sell their images, as seen in Graphs 12 and 13 below:

Graph 12: Gained Seats in Maluku Province DPRD in 2009 Legislative General Election[61]

Graph 13: Gained Seats in Maluku Province DPRD in 2014 Legislative General Election[62]

The above data shows the number of seats in Maluku Province DPRD gained by each political party. Both in 2009 and 2014, nationalistic parties with the ideology of balanced representation have strong political influence

---

61 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com
62 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com

amidst the society. In this case, PDIP and Golkar dominated the gained seats in DPRD (Local Legislative Council) in 2009 and 2014. Some of the religion-based parties like PKS had fairly high number of seats in 2009 and 2014. However, if seen from the entire number of seats in DPRD, the majority of parties that got seats were secular parties or the ones regarded by Maluku people as nationalistic parties. Especially in 2014, PKB as a party with NU Islamic image got seats in DPRD. However, this is closely related to the party's strategy in emphasizing their ideology, that although being established by Moslem leaders, PKB is a pluralistic party, open to Christians to join and become its cadres and even to get seats in DPRD. Various things show how strongly the issue of balance plays in the political domain.

Religious issues are used by elites to gather people's support. Through this religious identity, elites set up images to draw sympathy from the public. Moslem candidates often show their Christian perspective to get sympathy from Christian communities, and vice versa. The strategy is useful to strengthen symbolization that the candidates are not the representation of one group only but representation of both religious groups.

> So, I say in Maluku it is still thick in religion. As a Moslem, if I was a governor candidate or regent candidate, I also know by heart Bible verses when I visit Christian community and talk about God's words…. They will be very happy. Also in Christian community, even though someone is Christian, but the person knows Al Fatihah, then Moslems will be happy or for instance if he visits Moslem community. That's the experience in my village, he talked and entered with Al Fatihah. People were happy and came to the voting D-Day; the person also got many votes.[63]

Sometimes, there are still elite supporters that use the space of balance to mobilize masses. For an example, issue is mobilized towards governor's identity. They state that the next governor should be from Moslem community, because so far the governor position has been assumed by Christians. Besides that, formation of negative issues related to radical group movement occurs. Sometimes, this type of issue targets the governor or vice governor candidacy personally, that he is part of the radical group movement that can break and ruin peace in Maluku. This kind of issue widely spread through SMS sent in random. For the Maluku people this issue is very dangerous because it can break post-conflict peace, which potentially generates new conflicts or frictions.[64]

---

63 Interview with one of the Maluku local journalists, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
64 Interview with one of the local Maluku people, Ambon, 23 August 2014

... It has been two periods that Christian have become governors. Now it's Moslems' time. How come Moslems cannot become the governor? There is such issue like that. And still. Primordialism is even strong now... Fairly strong, we must be honest, it's very strong. It is then made as a trendy issue. It is engineered to get masses and cut supporters.... The people will be provoked. They are still provoked by identity, religion.[65]

Based on the history, the Christian community initially was a group that had more access to the government. The impact of the Dutch colonization made Christian group have more access to quality life including education. Therefore, the competitions for governmental positions were often won by Christians. This pattern changed after the Indonesian independence. Moslem community started to develop especially in the educational quality. But, limited network in the government made Moslem group more blocked rather than Christian group.

Another issue recently used is ethnical issue which is often used by political elites to gather force at the district or city level. Ethnical issue is also sometimes used by elites in the areas with the majority of people embracing the same religion. The shift to ethnicity issue to get support is closely related to the fading issue of religion in setting up people's fanaticism. The formed issue is when the local leadership has been assumed by the people of a certain ethnicity, another ethnic should have the position in the next period. One of the implications is seen from the tendency of particular ethnical groups to forbid supporters of candidates from another ethnicity from doing campaigns in their area.

No, they only want to protect their territory. I mean, the territory of the Regent; so.... Team from other candidates are not allowed to enter the territory. It is not because of dissatisfaction to the organizers, but sentiment to the candidate that they support. The regents have been from Werinama for two periods, and now it's Bula's time. Bula is vigorously preparing it. Symbolism is now broken again. The time is over now. The time to support Werinama is over. Bula people are developing force. Werinama people cannot become regent any longer. It also applies in district.[66]

Friction generation that uses this ethnicity issue spreads with the association of some ethnicities that have kinship with other ethnicities in competition. For instance, if culturally ethnic A has kinship with ethnic B, when a local leader candidate from ethnic B mobilizes ethic A, ethnic A will also join to support ethnic B masses. The kinship relation is related to local wisdom

---

65 Interview with one of the Maluku Province *Bawaslu Commissionaires*, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
66 Interview with one of the Maluku Province *Bawaslu Commissionaires*, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

called *pela gandong*. Each *negri* has its own *pela*. If one group bound in one *pela* has problem or is in war, the *pela's* group member must help the group. The condition also applies in post-conflict local election in Maluku.

> Ethnicity is thigh here actually because there is a candidate from South-east Maluku, a Kei person, then in SBT. I remember, in SBT he has Teo sub-district, which is closer to Southeast Maluku. So, the people culturally have relation with Southeast Maluku district. One of the strong candidates forms PDIP, coming from Southeast Maluku. So in Teo sub-district, in which the people have cultural relation with Southeast Maluku people, with this candidate on stage, there occurred a tension but no physical clashes happened. But there is tension between Kei and Seram communities.[67]

c. Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Local Election

Maluku *Kesbangpol* thinks that the role of CSO participation in Maluku is very high, especially in the *pemilukada* implementation.[68] Looking at the good participation of CSOs, the local government gives priority to allocate budget to CSOs in order to conduct monitoring under coordination of *Panwaslu*. They conduct monitoring of technical implementation until the TPS (voting stations) level. The role is regarded as very much helpful to the government in maintaining post-conflict local election implementation so that it can run accordingly. Besides that, they actively give socializations and political education to the wider society, including things related to *pemilukada*.[69]

Talking about *civil society* in Maluku, religious institutions also can be categorized as CSOs. There are three major religious institutions in Maluku namely Moslem, Christian and Catholic. The three religious institutions always organize communications forums to foster good relations among them.[70] The strategy is taken to educate their followers that upholding peace is one thing to consider. In their sermons, they actively call for the followers not to get provoked and always prioritize peace. In the post-conflict local election process, religious institutions also participate in clarifying negative issues of religion spread through SMS in order to discredit a particular candidate. The clarification is usually done by organizing press conference with the hope that the people are not provoked and do not raise enmity.

---

67 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu *Commissionaires*, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
68 Interview with Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
69 Interview with one of the NGOs, Ambon, 22 August 2014; Maluku *Kesbangpol*, Ambon, 26 August 2014; one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
70 Interview with Ambonia Diocese, Ambon, 17 November 2014; Maluku Interfaith Institute (LAIM), Ambon, 22, August 2014; Maluku *MUI*, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

Formal Inter-faith forum is OK but our cooperation and sharing of information and mutual visit and meeting among religious leaders have run very well. So that, for instance if there is a case, the chief pastor will call the bishop and ask him to negotiate. Although it is GP case. The case that we are handling is from a particular territory, so the bishop will also ask the related person to talk first.[71]

Traditional institution is one of the civil society organizations that have important influence to Maluku people. Even though a structurally traditional institution is not included in post-conflict local election implementation, traditional institutions have important roles in calling for the people to maintain stability during the post-conflict local election implementation process. Traditional institutions still get legitimacy from most of the people to settle conflicts. Their *negri* identity still adheres the traditional institution is described according to *negri* led by kings. Some kings in Maluku are gathered in one vehicle called Latupati Assembly. Functionally, traditional institution is the first actor expected to be able to settle problems when there are inter-group conflicts.

I think local democracy development and the role of governmental institutions in consolidating democracy is still transitional because contributions from many parties with all the pluses and minuses make people's role strong. People's institution is good because de facto beside the government in guiding the people, religious institutions, religious leaders, traditional institutions are very strong.[72]

However, in the developments, traditional institutions become target of criticisms, especially related to post-conflict local election implementation. There are some indications showing that kings are not neutral. Sometimes some kings are constitutionally suspected of having tendency to side with candidates coming from their regions. Growing issues of inter-village conflicts also trigger criticisms against the role of traditional institutions. The condition has made some parties to question the effectiveness of traditional role in setting conflicts.

Now it has shifted to inter-*negri* (village), inter-Moslem *negri* or inter-Christian *negri* conflicts occur and are still going on and never stops; so, sometimes I question the authority of traditional institution because it involves traditional *negris*. The government cannot get involved. We

---

71 Interview with Amboina Diocese, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
72 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 20 November 2014.

don't want to see any invisible hand which tries to generate small-scale disturbances.[73]

Related to the capacity of traditional institutions, Latupati Assembly chairperson explained that they have limited financial resources. This makes traditional institution cannot carry out sustainable programs, including programs to maintain peace.[74] So far the financial resources of the traditional institutions are dependent on the people's voluntary fees. The government sometimes provides assistance, but often the activities are not sustainable. In the post-conflict local election implementation, traditional institutions are asked to attend and coordinate with the government and get financial support, but the funding value is deemed limited to maximize the program.

III. POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN ACEH AND MALUKU: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Establishment of post-conflict local election implementing institution infrastructures in Aceh and Maluku is much influenced by characteristics of conflicts in both regions. In general, the characteristics of implementation can be seen from some dimensions related to the condition, problems, and challenges faced by post-conflict local election implementing institutions. Besides that, political dynamics in the post-conflict local election implementation is also reflected in the characteristics of both regions. More detailed explanation can be seen in Table 16 below.

Aceh KIP and Maluku Province KPUD have similar problems related to the capacity and integrity of human resources at the grass-root level. Both have limited funds, most of them are allocated only for technical implementation but not enough for technical guidance to committees at the grass-root level and political education for the society. This condition causes minimum capacity and integrity of committees at the grass root level and pubic political awareness. Another problem is related to neutrality of organizers. However, Maluku is considered better in responding this problem. Balance between Moslems and Christians in the implementing committee is considered to contribute to creating conduciveness. The problem in the Aceh case is related to the KIP selection mechanism by DPRA. The absence of transparency in handling violation cases growingly strengthens public distrust.

Panwaslih and *Bawaslu* also face similar problem, namely organizers' non-neutrality. The problem is often related to the mechanism of KIP commissionaires through DPRA dominated by Aceh Party. Lack of transparency in

---

73 Interview with Pattimural University academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
74 Interview with Latupati Assembly Chairperson, Ambon, 18 November 2014.

handling violation cases strengthens the issue. Besides that, there is an issue of effectiveness of the role of supervisory institutions related to policy condition. Institutions in both regions feel that limitation of authority has implication on the less maximal performance in handling violation cases. Limited work period, namely three months, is considered to be not enough to develop sustainable programs such as technical guidance training at the grass-root level. This also has impact on the lack of human resources capacity at the grass-root level. The absence of security personnel within the supervisory body structure also becomes a problem in the effort to take action against cases quickly. So far, supervisory institution only serves as investigator. To follow up the violation, they have to coordinate with the police and attorney office.

Table 16: Condition, Problems and Challenges of Post-Conflict Local Election Implementation in Aceh dan Maluku

Province	Comparative Dimension	Condition	Problem and Challenge
Aceh	Role of election institution for Implementing Function (KIP/KPUD)	• Commissionaire members are elected through DPRA • Most of the budget is allocated to technical interest; fund for sustainable program is still lacking	• Issue of non-neutral organizers • Capacity, integrity of committee human resources at the grass root level are low • Low public political awareness
	Local government	• DPRA's seats are dominated by local parties and authority to select commissionaires in election institution • Role of security personnel is less effective	• Issue of systematic not-neutral post-conflict local election implementation • Local government tends to be dominated by local parties which establishes a system to maintain status quo
	Role of election institution for Supervisory Function (Panwaslih/Bawaslu)	• Commissionaire members are elected through DPRA • Ad hoc status for 3 months • Limited authority in taking actions against violations	• Issue of not-neutral post-conflict local election implementation • Lack of capacity among supervisory committee at the grass root level • Less capable in taking action against violation cases quickly, efficiently and effectively
	Role of political parties	• Lack of program capacity for political education program in sustainable cadre formation • Local party dominated by former GAM elite combatants who can access ex-conflict weapons • Ideology of political parties on the old-time struggle which is still implanted as a new form of struggle.	• Failure in mediating conflicts and internalizing democratic values • High primodialism values in the local parties to control governmental positions. • Use of intimidating methods

Maluku	Role of election institution for Implementing Function (KIP/KPUD)	• Awareness of religious identity of a commissionaire and is realized in the balance • Most of the budget is allocated to technical interest; fund for sustainable program is still lacking • Region's limited physical infrastructures	• Issue of non-neutral organizers • Capacity, integrity of committee human resources at the grass root level are low • Low public political awareness • Difficulty in mobilizing resources and communications
	Local Government	• Limitation in the provision of adequate infrastructures according to the regional characteristics • Role of security personnel is adequate in taking actions against violation cases	• Less able to support the performance of formal implementing institutions in order to be able to carry out effective and efficient mobilization and communications • Open spaces for frauds
	Role of election institution for Supervisory Function (Panwaslih/ Bawaslu)	• Awareness of religious identity of a commissionaire and is realized in the balance • Ad hoc status for 3 months • Limited authority in taking actions against violations • Region's limited physical infrastructures	• Issue of non-neutral organizers • Lack of capacity among supervisory committee at the grass root level • Less capable in taking action against violation cases quickly, efficiently and effectively • Difficulty in mobilizing resources and communications
	Role of political parties	• Awareness of religious identity of individuals in cadre formation • Lack of program capacity for political education program in sustainable cadre formation	• Failure in mediating conflicts and internalizing democratic values • Indirect affirmation of group boundaries

Especially for Maluku, limited physical infrastructures become significant obstacle that must be dealt with by post-conflict local election implementing institutions. The condition of Maluku region which is insular makes *KPUD* and *Bawaslu* difficult to do mobilization due to limited sea transport. The limitation becomes an obstacle in the distribution of ballot boxes. Less adequate communications infrastructures become another obstacle in doing inter-area coordination. Difficulty in the mobilization and communication is also felt by the police given their important role in the guarding.

Related to the role of political parties, Aceh and Maluku have similar problems. There are three functions of parties that must be improved, namely less sustainable cadre formation capacity, internalization of democratic values in getting power, and capacity to deal with conflicts. Most of the violent conflicts in the post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku are conducted by actors with affiliation to political parties. In the Aceh case, the problem is very apparent from the involvement of local parties dominated by former GAM combatants namely Aceh Party. Old-time GAM struggle values are

internalized into the party's ideology. Many party's cadres then feel that they are entitled to get and enjoy the power. If compared, the condition of political parties in Maluku is apparently more conducive.

In general, CSOs (*civil society organizations*) have very significant roles to protect democracy and stability in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh and Maluku. The obstacles faced by CSOs are generally related to the funding. The role of CSOs in Aceh is relatively fluctuating. The challenge is not only related to funding, but also to threats and intimidation. In Maluku, traditional institutions are considered to contribute less maximally to the post-conflict local election implementation and tend only to be "fire extinguishers" and tend to side with particular groups. The condition is more caused by limited funds. (See Table 17).

In the context of post-conflict local election's political dynamics, competition in Aceh tends to refer to two forces of the main local parties namely PA and PNA. In Maluku, political competition is more directed to the methods taken by political elites to gather votes through balanced representation between both religious groups. In term of challenges, PA domination in the government becomes the special attention in the political condition in Aceh. This condition triggers absence of significant balancing aspect which is actually needed in the development of democracy. Potential conflicts/frictions in Aceh can be seen from the disunity of former GAM combatants within PA and PNA. This less conducive situation namely tendency to be dominated by PA growingly increases tension of completion among them. In Maluku, potential conflicts are more seen from the aspect of group segregation as seen from the issue of balance. On one hand, balance can create stability. On the other hand, balance can give impact on the increasingly strict boundaries between the groups. Besides that, the emergence of provocateurs that spread negative issues related to group identity both religion, ethnicity can also trigger people's rage at the grass root level (Table 18).

Table 17: Role, Dynamics and Challenges of CSOs in Aceh and Maluku

Comparative Dimension	Aceh	Maluku
Role	• Mostly conducted by CSOs in the democracy and peace fields. • Very much contributing, but fluctuating	• Mostly done by democracy and peace CSOs and religious institutions (Moslem, Catholic, Christian) • Traditional institutions substantially are quite required, but the role is less
Dynamics and Challenges	• Dependency and limited fund • Intimidating threats from local elites	• Dependency and limited fund • Neutrality of traditional institutions

Table 18: Post-Conflict Political Constellation and Dynamics in Aceh and Maluku

Comparative Dimension	Aceh	Maluku
Political Constellation	• Competition among former GAM combatant elites in local parties to get political seats	• The use of identity symbolization in the form of religious and ethnical balance by the elites in order to gather votes for getting power
Dynamics and challenges	• Power dominated by one of the political parties (Aceh Party) in the government • Intimidating threats	• Balance that increasingly affirms group boundaries
Potensi konflik/ friksi	• Primordialism of local party (Aceh Party) that causes non democratic competition and disunity within former GAM combatant elites • Less inclusive condition	• Negative issues on group identity (religion/ethnicity) brought by elites to discredit political competitors; but the current condition tends to be ethnical • Group segregation

Conflict and Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

I. ACEH

a. Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

Long experiences on conflicts and violence (1976-2005) have made violence inseparable from the life of Acehnese people. It is of course not easy to change it. One of the academicians that focus on conflict studies in Aceh said,"violence has become part of the culture, culture of our habit, if we don't have any other ways, so be it."[1] As mentioned by an informant from security personnel, the long history of violence in Aceh has become deeply rooted and cannot immediately be removed, "because the cultural habit last for 32 years; it will not be easy just to remove it."[2]

Aceh's new era was marked by a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and Aceh Free Movement (GAM) through Helsinki Peace Agreement on August 15, 2005. Nevertheless, this does not automatically make Aceh zero-violence. After the peace agreement, new era of violence does occur in Aceh and it is still related to the old-time violence. An Aceh *Bawaslu* member stated, "even though Aceh conflicts have been said to be over, 'it is over on paper', from the MoU agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM in Helsinki, things below it is not finished yet."[3] There are still problems of socialization on peace agreement and internal consolidation at GAM level, in which sometimes different opinions between GAM elites and their members in the field occurred. One of the obvious examples is that in the meeting between GAM elites and field commanders to determine the candidates for local leaders from GAM in 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections, there were different opinions between GAM elites and field commanders. The difference in opinions eventually triggered tension and violence when former GAM competed in political domain, especially in the elections of local leaders at the provincial and city/district levels.

---

1 Interview with academician of conflict studies, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
2 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence member, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
3 Interview with one of Aceh *Bawaslu* members, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

Borrowing Jhon Galtung's terminology, post-Helsinki agreement situation shows that peace in Aceh is still at the level of *negative peace* or *weak peace*, and still far from the meaning of *positive peace*.[4] However, if the on-going process is seen from the international lens, compared to other regions or states, the post-conflict peace process in Aceh can be said to run very well, which means that for the last 10 years Aceh has not returned to the cycle of violence as taking place in Moro, the Philippines. There, after the peace between Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippines government on the autonomy devolution, situation flared up and a new violence circle was created by the emergence of fights from some parties such as Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that did not agree to the agreement. Successful Post-conflict process in Aceh is admitted by former GAM combatant.

> If we use the international lens, it is very good. In post-conflict era, it is usually full with violence, murders…. So if we look at the statistics, in Aceh there are few cases of violence from the international context after 30 year of conflict."[5]

In Aceh, violence that is still clear is the one related to post-conflict local election that ends to increase from the two election executions in 2006 and 2012. The increasing number of violence related to 2012 post-conflict local election is also admitted by one of the NGO activist in Aceh, "in 2012, the number of violence is far higher."[6] SNPK Data shows that *pemilukada* violence in Aceh in 2012 increased 13 times compared to 2006. As seen clearly in Graph 14 as follows.

Increased violence is not only seen in the aspect of quantity, but also in the aspects of forms and impacts. Aceh local police intelligence said, "… from 2012 post-conflict local election, approximately 10 people died."[7] The above graph also demonstrated that the increased impacts of violence are mostly the injuries, whose number rose 8 times. The impact of violence in the form of damaged buildings also increased in significant number between 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections, namely an increase up to 23 times. The increased violence intensity was also admitted by former Aceh Governor Irwandi Yusuf, who said, "compared with the intimidation in 2012, in 2006 it was small and petty."[8]

---

4 According to Jhon Galtung in his article (1969), *negative peace* is a condition in which there is no war in a particular region, but there are still violence, widespread injustice, inequality, and dissatisfaction. Positive peace or true peace is peaceful condition in which equity, equality and freedom grow and there is relatively violence.

5 Interview with former GAM elites, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.

6 Interview with NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

7 Interview with one of the Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

8 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

Graph 14: Violence Related to 2006 and 2012 Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election

b. Cause of Emerging Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

1. *Conflict Among Former GAM Members*

Various violent cases related to 2006 and 2012 Aceh post-conflict local election, the actors are relatively the same, dominated by former GAM members polarized into different groups. Aceh Local Police intelligence said, "Yes, most of the actors are former combatants and especially in in red areas."[9] This shows factionalism among former GAM members in post-conflict local elections, even since 2006 one.

The internal disunity within GAM is caused by different opinions between GAM elite leadership and GAM leaders in region and grass-roots. This is one of the main factors that forms the background of post-conflict local election's violence in Aceh. In 2006 post-conflict local election, GAM leadership elites supported the pair of Humam Hamid–Hasbi Abdullah (Humam–Hasbi). The decision received challenges from GAM grass-roots because Humam is not considered GAM personnel. Furthermore, Humam is one of the Aceh leaders who signed request letter to the central government in order to make Aceh the Military Operation Region (DOM) in 1990's.

GAM grassroot struggles were expressed by the support for the pair of Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar (Irwandi–Nazar) through independent path as the pair for governor and vice governor candidates. The difference in opinions was then realized in the form of competition between post-conflict local election participants. Some violent actions in 2006 post-conflict local

9 Interview with one of the Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

election were conducted by supporters of both pairs, Irwandi–Nazar and Hu-mam–Hasbi who shared the basis of former GAM members and supporters. Nevertheless, the difference in opinions within internal GAM in 2006 was not so critical yet. This was seen from the number of violence recorded in SNPK data, namely 11 incidents. The low number of incidents was influenced by the mystic atmosphere and new hope of the Acehnese people, given the fact that they just entered transitional period of peace after Helsinki agreement. Another factor that made 2006 post-conflict local election violence relatively low is absence of organization that becomes a common vehicle of former GAM members and high attention from the international community in the transitional process of peace in Aceh, in which many monitoring institutions, both local, national and international, carry out the monitoring of post-conflict local election in Aceh.

However, as time went by, it turned out that such difference in opinions does not disappear completely. In 2012 post-conflict local election, difference in opinions between GAM leadership elites and some regional and grass-root GAM leaders still occurred. This is also related to the determination of candidates of governor from GAM. In 2012 post-conflict local election, Aceh Party becomes the only vehicle of the aspirations of GAM members. In order to collect aspiration to determine candidates, on February 5-6, 2011, PA held a meeting. In the meeting PA leadership elites proposed the names of Zaini Abdullah- Muzakir Manaf as governor and vice governor candidates. It turned out that in the meeting different aspirations occurred. The meeting's participant proposed the names of Irwandi Yusuf. This is admitted by Irwandi saying that,

> The point of the story, when the second nomination occurred, democracy was severely harmed because from the meeting conducted internally (GAM), 17 commanders attended. At first only three commanders agreed with the candidates supported by leadership, just like before. Then one more person joined. So, 4 people supported the leadership and 13 supported me.[10]

Difference in opinions between GAM leadership elites and regional GAM leaders in the 2012 post-conflict local election was followed by threatened dismissal from PA or KPA membership by the leadership elites. Some violence occurred against those who were opposed with the proposal of Aceh Party. For instance, a shooting incident killed Cage Bireuen, who in the party meeting did not agree with the proposal of the PA leadership elites. This was admitted by Irwandi who said, "not long after the meeting there was a murder of Cage Bireuen." PA's firm actions can be taken because as a single vehicle for former

---

10 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

GAM members, PA is relatively more structured organisatorily. This is different from the candidacy selection process for 2006 post-conflict local election, in which there was no well-organized single vehicle yet. Therefore, difference in opinions between GAM leadership elites and regional and grass-root GAM leaders in 2006 did not allow GAM leaders to take firm actions. Some of the frictions among factions are expressed in the form of violent actions which are sometimes responded by retaliatory actions by other factions. This difference in opinions which can be see as internal conflict of former GAM forms the background of the emergence of violence in Aceh post-conflict local elections both in 2006 and 2012, in which the intensity growingly increased. This is in line with the statement of one of the former Aceh KIP members, "in 2012 the conflict became fierce because of their internal (GAM) conflicts."[11]

2. The Political Sphere and GAM's Mindset of War

The internal conflict among former GAM members in the Aceh post-conflict local elections show their unreadiness for entering competition in the political sphere. Former GAM members are used to "command" culture or militaristic culture. The GAM structure is also set up just like the military one in which there is the highest and regional commanders. In such culture, leadership authority to the lower structure is very strong. When former GAM members enter a political sphere, the condition they have to face is different because in the political sphere all individuals are in the equal position and have the rights to be elected and to elect in general elections. All people are entitled to nominate other people or nominate themselves as candidates in general elections. The unreadiness of the former GAM members was also expressed by one of the NGO leaders in Aceh, saying, "Transition from guerrillas into politicials which they are not ready for." This is also revealed by the Aceh Local Military Commander:

> So this may be the reason why they cannot apply democracy well yet. They do not have political awareness yet. This indeed needs time. It requires process. We cannot immediately expect it to happen just in one night. I predict it needs two periods of governor's changes.[12]

Polarization of factions between former GAM members in Aceh post-conflict local elections especially at the provincial level between Irwandi Yusuf and Zaini Abdullah–Muzakir Manaf groups is equally dependent on the former GAM networks. Each party has their own success teams that mostly consist of former GAM members who equally have networks at the grass-root levels down to the village level (Clark & Palmer 2008). They all try to get

---

11 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
12 Interview with Aceh Local Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

support from former members and GAM supporters. This has created frictions which sometimes triggered tension and violence. They all know their competitor's power and strategy usually applied in the old days. The use of similar network structures to get the same target of support has made the competition between candidates increasingly hard, as revealed by one of the NGO leaders in Aceh who is active in the monitoring of post-conflict local elections, "There is disunity, then competition occurs, and these competitions have impacts on the increased escalation of violence."[13]

Using former GAM network structure indirectly establishes the old culture during the rebellion era. Choice of actions to be taken become limited, and these limited choices make them resort to old patterns in handling problems, as revealed by former Aceh KIP member, "*They have no choice*; what would be their choice beside violence? That's all they have. They still practice such mindset. 'Well, this is different from mine; always disturbing, get rid of it!'"[14]

3. *Supporting Factors of Emerging Post-Conflict Violence*

Violence related to post-conflict local election occurs almost in every local election (*pemilukada)* in various regions in Indonesia, but the number and intensity of the impacts of the violence is relatively low. This is different from Aceh, in which the number of violence related to post-conflict local election is the highest in Indonesia. Potential for violence may happen in all regions, but such potential gets different in the Aceh situation. There are some contextual conditions that make post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh more intense compared to other regions in Indonesia.

4. *Uncompletely Dissappearing Former GAM Members' Experiences of Violence*

Aceh's long history of violence, especially the experiences in the GAM rebellion era has made violence as if a part inseparable from the Acehnese people, especially former GAM members. Hard life during the GAM rebellion era has made them wage wars, use arms, live in jungles to escape the security personnel, as well as always deal with security dilemma of "being attacked or attacking". When former GAM and the supporters enter the political domain, unconsciously violence still sometimes becomes the expression of actions in order to reach goals. They have been tens of years used to using violence and needs much time to transform into non-violent actions. This is admitted by one of the Aceh *Bawaslu* Commissionaires.:

> ... The people are used to violence. This habit is taken to the current democratic party... so they do one thing (violence) to show their interest.[15]

---

13 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 July 2014.
14 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
15 Interview with Aceh *Bawaslu* member, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.

5. *The Old Spirit and Moments of Retaliation*

Besides the habit of using violence that has not disappeared yet, various violent cases related to post-conflict local election in Aceh are more or less inspired by the spirit to continue the old-time struggle. Violent actions taken are not only a method to reach the goals, but also inspired by a belief that these actions are legitimate and there needs to be a form of struggle. As admitted by one of former Aceh KIP members, some of the violent actions in the post-conflict local elections are still supported by motive for struggle, "because some of them think it is still their struggle."[16] One of the PA cadres also admitted that particular violent actions done by former GAM members is supported by the struggle spirit, "the person feels that he is warrior, we struggle for Aceh." post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh also becomes a moment of retaliation. Difference in opinions, opposition, unpaid old retaliation, and grudge among former GAM members, with this post-conflict local election moment, have a space for the realization through actions; moreover, if they are in the group that supports different governor candidate. This is stated by Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel:

> But mostly retaliation factor. Because of not liking somebody or another group, the person just shoot them. That happened a lot and they use opportunities or moments like the general election. There are many kinds of patterns.[17]

6. *Remaining Arms*

The existence of illegal firearms still circulating in Aceh also stimulates post-conflict local election-related violence. Even though there was a demolition of firearms which was done as a follow-up of Helsinki Peace Agreement, it was recorded that only 830 GAM weapons were demolished. Until today there is no clear information on the number of illegal former GAM arms that still circulate in Aceh. According to a former Aceh KIP member, both Irwandi Yusuf and Zaini Abudullah groups still have arms.

The SNPK data shows that most of the violence in Aceh during post-conflict local elections was committed by arms. This is also admitted by the Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel saying, "In 2012 there were many shootings."[18] This shows that the existence of violent devices in the form of arms is still quite many. The existence of arms circulating in Aceh is also admitted by the Aceh Military Commander who continues to withdraw arms from former combatants. Circulation of long-barrel weapons, short barrel

---

16 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
17 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
18 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

arms, hand-made ones, including ammunitions, grenades and others is still quite many. Efforts to withdraw weapons circulating to Aceh have been done so far by the Indonesian Military with a silent and under expose strategy.[19] Therefore, there is no clarity on how many weapons circulate in the society.

7. *Reduced National and International Supervision*

Reduced national and international attention to the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh has also an influence to the violence of post-conflict local elections. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, one of the factors that make the level of violence not so high was world's high attention to the general election processes in Aceh with many election supervisors coming from international institutions, national and local NGOs.

In the 2012 post-conflict local election, attention from the international community relatively decreased. This can be seen by decreasing number of international election supervising institutions that conducted supervision (*ICG Report*, February 2012). This becomes the significant differentiator between the 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections. The difference also impacts the number of emerging violence, in which the number of pemilukada-related violence in Aceh in 2012 was higher than that in 2006.

c. Patterns of Emerging Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

1. *Violence against Voters*

One of the forms of actions categorized as violence of Aceh post-conflict local election is verbal intimidation of voters, as stated by an academician.

> Verbal intimidation is already sufficient (as violence). That has made them feel scared. This intimidation is sometimes conducted indirectly to voters. This example of intimidation is a question raised with less words but clear message, namely to vote for a particular pair. Fuad Bastami exemplified an indirect question: "Do you already now who you should vote?"[20]

A former Aceh KIP member stated that intimidation of voters is also found in some TPS (polling stations). Examples of the forms of intimidation by words: "If you don't vote for PA, see what will happen! If you want to go to the paddy field safely, no more fights, no more conflicts, you must vote for PA."[21] Female group is very vulnerable to intimidation. This was admitted by Women Solidarity NGO activist, who said:

---

19 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
20 Interview with Aceh academician, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
21 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

Intimidation exists and it's much. However, women tend to be reluctant to report officially…. Intimidation is widely heard in the society; if they don't vote for persons from a particular group, they will be threatened to be expelled from the communities. Despite not all, but the majority of our assisted villages, the intimidation issue like that occurs.[22]

Intimidation and threat are also directed against post-conflict local election organizers, as experienced by Ilham, a former Aceh KIP member. To carry out his tasks as KIP member, he had to be guarded by some guards with heavy arms at any time. He feels it disturbing because he loses his privacy space.

2. Violence against Supporters and Success Teams of Candidates

The intensity of the forms of violence against the supporters of post-conflict local election's opposite candidate pairs is relatively higher than the violence against voters. Even, the forms of violence are more varied than the light forms such as intimidation and destruction of goods until the deadly acts such as shooting, torture, and abduction. As mentioned earlier, intensity of violence in 2012 post-conflict local election was higher than in 2006 one, including violence against supporters of candidate pairs. Irwandi Yusuf admitted that, "Intimidation is heavier this time. Abduction of witnesses, burning of my house, flag lowering."[23] One of the examples of violence against supporters and success teams of candidate pairs is the shooting that caused the death of Cage Bireuen, a supporter of Irwandi in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Another example is the shooting of Faizal from PNA, who was the supporter of Irwandi in the 2012 post-conflict local election.

Violence against candidate pairs supporters has different characteristics from the violence against voters. One of the violence characteristics against pair supporters is "*targeted*", namely the violence is since the beginning targeted specifically to certain victims. Another characteristic is the use of violent devices in the form of firearms like the example of violence against Cage Bireuen and Faizal. The victims were the targets of violence due to their political activity and affiliation to a particular candidate pair. The targeted violence that uses violent devices like firearms requires adequate planning. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that violence against the supporters of candidate pairs is a planned violence.

---

22 Interview with women's activist, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
23 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.

3. *Hot Spots of Violence*

Post-conflict local election-related violence does not happen in all regions of Aceh. In some regions, relatively there is no violence, while in other regions, violence intensifies. The high rate of violence related to post-conflict local elections in certain regions shows the level of fierce competition among candidate pairs in the region. One of the NGO activists in Aceh gave remarks on the region where violence takes place, "... especially in the eastern coastal areas, but escalated violence occurred more in Bireuen." The police classify the regions in Aceh to determine the level of guarding. Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel stated, "Red regions, which mean vulnerable ones, are Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Piddie, Bireuen, North Aceh, East Aceh, and Central Aceh. So, the medium-level guarding is for Aceh Besar, Bener Meriah, and South Aceh." Then, the informant also stated that the determination of the vulnerability of a region in the post-conflict local election implementation is also combined with the rate of crime, "we also look at the case of violence and also the factor of the rate of crime."[24]

Graph 15: Comparison of Violent Incidents of 2006 and 2012 Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election By District and City

d. Impacts of Emerging Violence on Democracy Development and Peace-Building

Both violent actions directed against voters and supporters of candidate pairs eventually have similar goal that is to influence both directly and indirectly voters in order to support a particular candidate pair or not to choose

---

24 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

a particular candidate pair. One of the NGO activists stated "Every time violence occurs it must be connected to the political condition. And it becomes a signal which will influence voters."[25]

Violence directed directly against voters clearly tries to get voters to choose a particular candidate pairs, while violence directed against supporters of a candidate pair is a terror to supporters, sympathizers, and success team of candidate pair opponents. The violence indirectly spread fear to the people and voters, as said by one of the media's editors in Aceh, "Acehnese people even do not dare to get out at night. That's on the eve of post-conflict local election."[26] Violence against candidate pairs is then interpreted by the people who look at the victims and perpetrators of the violence. People's fear to fear eventually influences the voters' tendency to their preference.

The spread fear influences the people so that they cannot explore more programs offered by both candidate pairs. Varied violence has influenced the psychology of voters so that the people do not have a sufficient freedom space to determine their political preferences. Moreover, the occurrence of varied violence also brings concerns. Such concerns do not only deal with the safety of life but also economic disturbance and their livelihoods. One of the NGO activists in Aceh admitted that violence during the elections has mad the people prefer peace to expressing their democratic right.

> It is normal if the people are very worried about their lives. Also, the post-conflict local election process is very far from the public interest. It means, anyone who wins will never take care of the people. The important thing is a peaceful condition, comfortable condition; they can look for anything, livelihoods, than to return to the previous era.[27]

This shows that the Acehnese peole put the values of peace higher than the value of democracy in dealing with varied violence of post-conflict local election. The violence eventually brings the people to the pragmatic democracy options which do not bring huge risks to them. As mentioned by an NGO activist active in the monitoring of Aceh post-conflict local election, "Compromise from the people to choose who is stronger, is part of a true compromise. Rather than uproar, the elected may not side with the people yet."[28]

---

25 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
26 Interview with media editor in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
27 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
28. Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

e. Government and People's Efforts to Deal with Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

1. Government's efforts

The Aceh post-conflict local election agenda always becomes an important moment for the local government and central government including security personnel (policy and military), even becomes the world's attention. The emergence of violence related to post-conflict local election in Aceh makes the government willy-nilly carries out handling initiatives. The government's effort to handle violence in Aceh can be divided into two, which will be explained in this section.

2. Government's Efforts Through Law Enforcement and Security Paths

Efforts to anticipate for the emergence of violence have been conducted by security personnel before post-conflict local election process. One of the efforts from the security personnel is conducted through the role of police intelligence division. The police have mapped potentials for violence in the regions of Aceh by the vulnerability level. They call the violence-vulnerable regions as "red regions" such Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Piddie, Bireuen, North Aceh, East Aceh, and Central Aceh. These regions are the pouches of GAM supporters in the past. The regions that require medium-level supervision are Aceh Besar, Bener Meriah, and South Aceh. The determination of regions based on the level of potential violence becomes the basis for the police in carrying out the guarding.

Law enforcement efforts against violent actions are conducted by the police by various ways depending on various factors such as availability of forms of evidence and the level of case difficulties. One of the emerging difficulties is that not all violence occurring in the post-conflict local election periods can be classified as election's criminal actions, but genuine criminal actions so that the handling follows the procedure for genuine crime handling in general. This was admitted by one of the Aceh Bawaslu Commissionaires, "There are violence cases in general elections, but they do not definitely violate election's rules yet… Intimidation by shooting is not included in the rules of election's criminal actions and we cannot enter the domain. That's a genuine crime."[29]

Every violent action during the post-conflict local election implementation process is closely related to the on-going political context. Maybe the general public can see that violence is intended to influence post-conflict local election process, and regard that the violence must immediately be handled in order not to really influence the process and results of post-conflict local elections.

---

29 Interview with *Bawaslu* member, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.

But, different legal rules that handle election's criminal actions and criminal actions generate discrepancy between public expectation and post-conflict local election participants as well as the police. Therefore, develops an assumption that law enforcement process against varied violence occurring in Aceh post-conflict local election, especially in 2012, did not run well. One of the NGO activists in Aceh clearly expressed the opinion on law enforcement, "I think that law enforcement factor is a big problem. Yes, because there is no law enforcement process."[30]

The police also admitted that there were some obstacles in the handling of violence cases related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh. One of the challenges faced here is difference in opinions between police leadership and the police personnel in the field regarding violence handling management. For instance, the police in the field has identified the perpetrator of violent action and collected various information or evidences, but their leaders saw there was not enough strong evidence to file the case. A police personnel revealed,

> Regarding the case of Ayahbanta[31] we from intelligence have know it, sir, the information, but it is all back to our chief. We don't know what our chief means. But for that case, we have reported the information to the chief. And we in the field know the players there. In 2012…like I said, it depends on the leadership. In the field, we do know it. But again, the leader has other considerations for the completeness of witnesses and forms of evidence.[32]

Another challenge faced by the police in handling violence related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh is the absence of evidences and witnesses. Many people know violent actions, but very few of them are willing to become witnesses, both at the police investigation level and in the sessions at court level. This obstacle quite bothers the police in accelerating the handling of violence cases. This is clearly revealed by one of the police personnel in Aceh, "Besides that, there are still many obstacles like absence of evidences, nobody willing to be witnesses. So, that will hamper our work process, Sir."[33]

Another challenge related to the issue of coordination between the police and post-conflict local election organizers. Efforts to prevent violence cases can be done not only through law enforcement, but also intense communications between participants and organizers of post-conflict local elections and the police. For example, mediation efforts to prevent the spreading of

---

30 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
31 Ayahbanta is the actor of shooting of one of the supporters of candidate pair of *pemilukada* in Aceh. At present he has been sentenced for 18-year imprisonment based on the court verdict.
32 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
33 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.

violence can be done if there is good communications among all parties. However, the challenges of communications and coordination are still faced by the police in Aceh. The challenges of communications and coordination are getting more difficult because the role of police does not exist in *Bawaslu* any longer. According to the old legal regulations, the police was one of the elements in *Bawaslu*, but now it is not any longer. This has made communications between *Bawaslu* and the police unable to run quickly. A real example is that in the handling of election-related criminal action, the police will only take an action after receiving a report from Bawaslu. Previously, since the police became one of the *Bawaslu's* elements, the handling process of election's criminal action and genuine criminal action in the post-conflict local election period was faster.

3. *Government's Efforts Through Policy Path*

Another effort of the government to deal with post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh is carried out by using out-of-handling policy through security personnel. Competition dynamics between the incumbent governor Irwandi Yusuf, who wanted to go again for the 2012 post-conflict local election, and a candidate from Aceh Party was clear. Besides that, it is believed that the competition between them generated varied violence. PA even protested strongly and threatened to boycott the second post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh.

Responding to the situation in Aceh, the central government through the Ministry of Home Affairs eventually proposed a request to the Constitutional Court to postpone the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh. The Government through the Ministry of Home Affairs, especially the Directorate General for Regional Autonomy, carried out negotiation with PA to attempt postponement of the implementation together. The postponement became a condition for PA to revoke its boycott and joined the competition in post-conflict local election (Puteh & Fahmi, 2012). The effort of the post-conflict local election implementation postponement is believed by many parties to prevent and reduce violence in Aceh because most of the violence was carried out by the supporters and sympathizers of PA. With the implementation postponement and boycott revocation by PA, the Aceh post-conflict local election was eventually held on April 9, 2012.

4. People's Efforts to Handle Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

People's role in handling post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh is relatively not much. However, there are some actions by the people and civil societies which can be regarded as efforts to deal with the violence.

5. *Monitoring*

Even though not directly regarded as an effort to deal with post-conflict lo-cal election-related violence, monitoring done by the people, especially NGOs more or less plays a role in dealing with this problem. In 2006 post-conflict local election, the existence of quite many international election monitoring institutions such as European Union Election Observation Mission (EUE-OM), Internasional Republican Institute (IRI), Asian Networking for Free Election (ANFREL), National Democratic Intitute (NDI), U.S. Government, and Local Government Support Program (LGSP). Domestic monitoring in-stitutions also participated. They were *Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Rakyat/* People Voters Education Network (JPPR) and *Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilihan/*Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP). Local moni-toring institutions that participated were *Forum Lembaga Swadaya Masyara-kat/*Aceh NGO Forum, Aceh Internasional Recovery Program, and I-Card.[34]

In the 2012 Aceh post-conflict local election, there were some international institutions that carried out monitoring such as Asian Network for Free Elec-tion (ANFREL), European Union, and U.S. Embassy while 15 Indonesian monitoring institutions were Aceh Future, Aceh NGO Forum, Aceh Institute, and other institutions.[35]

6. *Establishment of Stakeholders' Forum and Appeal*

People and civil society's moving space for the handling of post-conflict local election related-violence in Aceh looks narrow due to security risk factor, given the fact that every action that does not side with one of the post-conflict local election participant can be interpreted differently, as stated by one of the NGO activists in Aceh, "... because parties will consider black and white; If supporting them, it means their group; if not, it means their enemy."[36] One of the breakthroughs done by civil societies in Aceh when responding to the narrow moving space is by initiating the establishment of multi-stakeholders forum in the 2006 post-conflict local election implementation. Through the forum civil societies try to communicate to parties the findings of post-conflict local election violations in the field. Also through the forum shared solutions are looked for. Many cases were eventually resolved in this forum.[37] Besides the establishment of multi-stakeholders forum, civil societies in Aceh also carry out efforts to prevent violence from occurring and promote safe post-conflict local election through statements in media, as well as appeals through banners. The appeal to prevent violence from happening is also con-

34 http://www.antaranews.com/berita/47979/sebelas-lembaga-pantau-Pemilukada-aceh
35 http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/302556-tiga-lembaga-asing-pantau-Pemilukada-aceh
36 Interview with Aceh NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
37 Interview with Aceh NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.

ducted by religious leaders by making statements that spreading violence with the goal of getting power is legally wrong (*haram*).[38]

II.   MALUKU

a. Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

Maluku in 1999-2002 was once a region of violence and conflicts with religious nuance. The conflict initially occurred on Ambon island, which can be called as the epicenter of the conflict, then spread to various areas in Maluku, like Seram Island, Laese Islands (Haruku and Saparua), and Southeast Maluku, even to Ternate and Halmahera islands which used to be part of Maluku province, before they were proliferated into a separate province (North Maluku Province) in 1999. Based on the number of deaths resulting from it, the conflict in Maluku can be said as the biggest conflict with identity nuance in Indonesia. There is no exact number of the deaths, but based on the UNDP data, in the period 1999-2002 5,000 lost their lives in the Maluku conflict (Brown et al. 2005). The field fact indicates that the number of deaths many be higher than the number stated by UNDP. Various writings on Maluku conflict record that this conflict was triggered by fights between young people of different religions (Moslems and Christians) which then spread in Ambon City, and then stretched out to other regions (van Klinken 1999; ICG 2000).

On February 12, 2002, due to facilitation effort from the central government through the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla and Coordinating Minister for Politics, Justice and Security Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, a peace negotiation between Moslem and Christian representatives was held in Poso City, South Sulawesi. From the negotiation, a peace agreement called Malino II Peace Agreement was born. Despite series of violence after the peace agreement signing, in general the conditions of Ambon and Maluku generally and gradually were getting better. With the Malino II, Maluku entered the post-conflict period. Reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts were carried out massively. The central government also issued a presidential instruction No. 6 Year 2003 on the Accelerated Building Rehabilitation in Maluku Province and North Maluku Province after the Conflict.

When the Maluku people entered the post-conflict phase, the democratic process in the form of governor's election was held through the election mechanism in Provincial Legislative Council (*DPRD*) in 2003 for the period 2003-2008. The Maluku Governor election for the next period was carried out directly. So, until 2015 Maluku has organized three post-conflict governor

---

38 Result of interview with *Serambi Indonesia* journalist, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.

elections; one election through DPRD (2003-2008) and two direct elections (2008-2013 and 2013-2017).

The NVMS data recorded that in the post-conflict local election conducted through the Maluku Province DPRD on August 16, 2003 there were no violent actions related to the election process. The election in the Provincial DPRD had two rounds. The first round was followed by four pairs of governor and vice governor candidates. The two pairs with the most votes in the first round joined the second round. The result was the pair Brig.Gen (Ret.) Karel Albert Ralahalu and Drs. Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina was elected as Governor and Vice Governor of Maluku Province for the period 2003-2008. Even though the election had two rounds, the overall process ran securely.

In the direct post-conflict local elections in 2008 and 2013, some post-conflict local election-related violence occurred, but in general the intensity was not too significant. In the 2008 post-conflict local election, the NVMS data recorded only three violent incidents that caused 6 people injured; while in the 2013 post-conflict local election there were 9 violent incidents that had three injured people and three damaged buildings (see Graph 16).

Graph 16: Violence Related to Governor's Direct Post-Conflict Local Election in Maluku (2008 and 2013)

Meanwhile, in the post-conflict period there were some *pemilukada*s at the district/city levels in some areas that used to be the centers of conflicts such as Ambon City, Central Maluku district, Western Seram (SBB), Eastern Seram (SBT) (both districts are proliferation from Central Maluku district), Southeast Maluku, and Kota Tual (proliferation from Southeast Maluku district). Related to the implementation of district/city level post-conflict local

elections, NVMS data record violence cases in the post-conflict local election of Central Maluku district, Eastern Seram, Western Seram, Southeast Maluku and Tual city with varied number and intensity. (see Graph 17).

Graph 17: Violence Related to District/City-Level Post-Conflict
Local Election in Maluku

Most of violence happened in Eastern Seram district, 12 incidents from three post-conflict local election implementations in 2005, 2009, and 2010. From the entire violent actions related to the post-conflict local elections, some were torture and destruction which injured 16 people and damaged 14 buildings. In Ambon city, which was the epicenter of Maluku conflict in 1999-2002, during the post-conflict period there were three mayor elections but there was no post-conflict local election-related violence.

b. Causes of Emerging Violence Emergence in Post-Conflict Local Election

As post-conflict region, Maluku in general has potential for violence, especially if there is competition that involves many people, including post-conflict local election. Some factors influence the potential. First, there is still a segregation of region based on religions, Islam and Christianity. This segregation is a real impact that can still be seen as the result of the 1999-2002 conflict. Actually the segregation in Maluku, especially on Ambon Island is not a new thing but has a long history (Ansori et al. 2014). *Negri* or village in Maluku is formed based on religious similarity of the people, in which a *negri* is often called "Moslem *negri*" or "Christian *negri*" according to the religions the people embrace.

In some areas especially in Ambon city, before the conflict, it was inhabited by mixed populations, Moslems and Christians. The conflict with religious issue has made segregation in Maluku become clearer. There are regions where after the conflict the populations are still mixed, between Moslems and Christians such as Wayame and Waringin. But in general, most of the

post-conflict areas in Maluku are currently segregated based on religion. The segregation strengthens group fanaticism so that it hampers inter-community interaction processes and becomes the potential for the emergence of violence. This is admitted by one of the Maluku *Bawaslu* members.

> Never let someone misuse it, for instance, by provocation. That will be fatal. Why? Because we are still segregated. And the segregation becomes a land for fanaticism and primordialism. The Moslems get stronger with their Islam, the other stronger with Christianity. So, with a little touch, it will be broken.[39]

Besides different religions, Maluku people also consist of various tribes and ethnicities. In some particular areas such as Eastern Seram district, the majority of the people are Moslems, but the people's sentiment established there is based on ethnicity. On the eve of post-conflict local elections, the ongoing issue is about ethnicity. This is related to the competition of the candidates who are Moslems, but come from different tribes. At last, the ethnic sentiment gets stronger. And inter-ethnicity frictions potentially occur if there is strong exploitation to the ethnic sentiment for the sake of winning votes in post-conflict local elections, as stated by an informant.

> In SBT district there will be a regent election. There are candidates from Werinama tribe and candidate from Bula. This may trigger inter-ethnicity clashes. There Moslmes are dominant. There, ethnical sentiments are built. Now it has started, Bula has developed its force; Werinama has too and Geser has already started. And the post-conflict local election will be certainly hot because their candidates are equally strong.[40]

Secondly, threats that potentially generate violence related to post-conflict local elections include many inter-village conflicts in Maluku that are still unfinished until now. These inter-village conflicts always rise and sink. It means, the conflicts can occur everytime there is a trigger even though it is a small trigger. It can be said that inter-village conflicts has been handed down and inherited from one generation to the next generations. The operational chief of the Maluku Local Police stated some inter-village conflicts kept going on: conflict between Porto village and Haria over spring issue, inter-village conflict between Seith village and Lima Negri, conflict between Mamala and Morela and conflict between Larika and Wakasiu villages.

One of the reasons that cause inter-village conflicts inherited through generations is high sentiment from the village people to defend their villages. As stated by the Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, there is a saying

---

39 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
40 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon 23 August 2014.

"I am the son of *negri*, *I* remember my mom's advice, protect the *negri* until the last drop of your blood." This saying has made the inter-village conflicts difficult to settle. Besides that, inter-*negri* alliance relation can also make inter-village conflicts get bigger. In Maluku there is a *pela* culture between two or more villages.[41] The inter-*negri pela* relation is established for a noble goal, namely mutual help. But the relation also has a potential for creating problems, as stated by Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, "So, *pela gandong* that is adored as the local wisdom, can also potentially create problems. 'It is obligatory for you to help me.'"[42]

Thirdly, another potential that can push the emergence of post-conflict local election related-violence is the experience of Maluku people on the past conflicts. The 1999 conflict is over indeed and the promotion of sustainale peace is continuously carried out by various components of the people and the government, but the experience on the bitterness of the conflict still remains and does not fully disappear. One of the informants that is active in the peace-building in Maluku gives a remark on "... *child soldier* who said that they are always ready whenever there is conflict." What is referred to as child soldiers here are those in the 1999-2002 conflicts were still in child-age and involved in the conflicts. Now they are teenagers but their memory on the conflicts is still strong. According to the informant, former child soldier is very brave and does not have any fear due to past conflict experience. They also have high conflict capacity because they can use any weapons; even they have the capacity to make bombs by themselves. Then, the informant revealed its research result on child soldiers that "85%, 90% from 35 child soldiers admitted to be ready at any time. It means they still keep their rage."[43]

In addition to various factors that potentially stimulate post-conflict local election-related violence above, based on the data and evaluation by Maluku Local Police, in the Maluku province overall there are 129 conflict-prone spots.[44] Many conflict-prone spots show that Maluku still has fairly big conflict potential. However, some implementations of post-conflict local elections both at the provincial and district/city levels show that potentials for violence do not realized into massive violence that involve many people. In other words, there are factors that can stifle the occurence of violence in post-conflict local election.

One of the factors is the level of public awareness on conflict prevention and creation of peaceful atmosphere in Maluku. With the high awareness,

---

41 *Pela* is alliance relation between Moslem and Christian *negri*/villages that consist of two or more *negris*. The alliance relation can be caused due to family relation or from one father or often called *pela gandong*, and relation due to past history, like two *negris* that used to be involved in a war but then were reconciled by making *pela*.

42 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

43 Interview with inter-faith dialog activist, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

44 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

the people are not easy to be provoked. This is admitted by the Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police:

> Threats based on the prediction of our intelligence, existed, but they did not happen. This did not just come but it is cooperation. So not only the police and soldiers, the people are already aware, and this is the most important thing. With public awareness, this has a high value. "Well, I don't wanna conflicts anymore. Even though I am provoked, I don't want to be provoked." That is quite high. If we see in other areas, there are burnings, KPU was burned, and all was burned. There are no such things in here.[45]

Maluku people's awareness is also supported by the strong belief that the 1999 conflict is not caused by the Maluku people, but because of the elites who were provoked from outside Maluku. Therefore, Maluku people have awareness on not wanting to be divided. As stated by an informant who was former kind "Many Maluku people say that don't disturb us. We are already safe and secure." One of the former refugees in Christian community said,

> The riot has made use stronger. Last time riot was caused by the interest of powerful men that used religious issue for reciprocal destruction. It was felt by us as Maluku people. Now, if something happens, we do not bother it, both Moslems and Christians.[46]

People's awareness to move forward and forget the past conflict is described in the statement from an informant who is a private TV reporter in Ambon:

> We here may have blessings. We used to analyze that conflicts in Maluku claimed people's lives. In my mind and all of my friends' minds that in Ambon, in Maluku, it is not safe any more for the next seventh generation. We thought about that. Some people lost their fathers or mothers or brothers. There were many. So in our mind, Maluku is not safe anymore until the next seventh generation, but what we assumed turned out different. Now we have forgotten what happened. We think all of them are normal. It is the Will of God.[47]

The fairly high level of public awareness makes provocation to the people for potential conflicts and violence become hard. An academician of Pattimura University said, "… because here the general public are not provoked; then the security personnel is one the alert 1 level."[48]

---

45 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
46 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014.
47 Interview with reporter, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
48 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014.

Implementation of post-conflict local elections was initially feared by the Maluku people to generate conflicts or violence. But it turned out after the implementation of several times of post-conflict local election at the provincial and district/city levels, such fear was not proved. The post-conflict Maluku people are more careful, as stated by an informant.

Post-conflict local election in Maluku in the post-conflict era, we felt scared but it was only an issue. In fact when we had two pemilukadas, nothing happened. Why? When we had the post-conflict local elections, two groups mingled in one interest. So, in the post-conflict local election, for me the Maluku people turned to be very careful. For instance, in Eastern Seram, even though there was one group, there were still small ripples but there was significant difference before the conflicts. In Ambon, for instance, once there was a little friction, they got angry. But now, small friction will not make them angry. It is normal. We don't know about it after conflict, because all people are mutually careful and we respect each other. So, but if it is not designed well by the government, conflict may explode again. But in the context of previous post-conflict local elections we think it normal, but people thing that it would be dangerous, but it was not.[49]

Another factor, related to the people composition based on religion, both Moslem and Christian communities, is there is no domination between the two in terms of quantity. Moreover various post-conflict local elections implementation both at the provincial and district/city levels, more than two candidate pairs joined. If one candidate pair only uses particular religious issue, either Moslem or Christian, it will be hard to get the majority of votes. Therefore, in order to win post-conflict local elections, many candidate pairs consist of combination of two religious groups. If the candidate for the local leader is Moslem, the deputy is Christian; on the contrary, if the candidate for the local leader is Christian, the deputy is Moslem. Such combination seems to be a necessity, as stated by the Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, "Yes always like that. It is a must here. It is obligatory in order to maintain the balance."[50]

The combination of candidate pair can have two meanings. First, the combination is intended to accommodate the values of balance between Moslems and Christians. Issue of balance increases more. Even though not admitted in a firm fashion, the fact of that thing is like a law. Secondly, the combination is a political language to get vote supports from both groups. The use of the pair's combination ris related to the high primordialism and patron-clien

---

49 Interview with private TV reporter, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
50 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

in the politics in Maluku, as stated by an informant, "Primordialism is still strong now. Quite strong, we must be honest. That's very strong. That is then used as an issue because it is engineered. It is made an issue of cutting and taking masses, cutting supporters." [51]

Combination of candidate pair is also intended to facilitate communications wth Moslem and Christian voter candidates. Segregation based on religious line in Maluku, for candidate pairs, can hamper communications with voters if the pairs only consist of one religious group. Combination of candidate pairs enables communications with each community groups to run well. They can share roles, in which Christian candidates will be easier to communicate with Christian society, while Moslem candidates will be easier to communicate with Moslem society.

Potential for the emergence of violence and presence of factors that can stifle potential violence in Maluku has made the intensity of violence related to post-conflict local elections at the provincial and district/city levels not high, as stated by an informant from Maluku *Bawaslu*, "According to me (violence) is small; small because violence occurs in the villages, or in sub-district which does not involve masses of people."[52] Another informant from NGO also shared the opinion, saying: "No, nothing was striking. If there is violence, it is only in that location. For instance, in this complex violence happens here only, then is finished and other places are not disturbed. It is different from the past violence in the conflict era from 1999 to 2004, it was pretty difficult. If there is a conflict in one place, it can trigger conflicts in other areas."[53]

c. Patterns of Emerging Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

Despite the factor of Maluku people's high awareness on not repeating violence or conflicts in Maluku, some violence related to post-conflict local election still continue to occur. From the data recorded in SNPK, during the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Maluku, both at the provincial and district/city levels, the most dominant forms of violence related to post-conflict local elections are torture (14) and destruction (12), then demonstration (7). Torture is usually conducted by the supporting team or sympathizers of candidate pairs to supporters or sympathizers of opposing candidates. For instance, on May 1, 2013 in Sehati village, Amahai sub-district, Central Maluku district, YN, a functionary of Democratic Party's Branch Leadership Body was strangled and his face was spat by MW, a local

---

51 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
52 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon 23 August 2014.
53 Interview with NGO activist, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

village authority. WM came to YN's house and forbade him to put Democratic Party's attributes or campaign instruments of the pair "Bob–Arif" (Jacobis Puttileihalat–Arifin Tapi Oyihoe) in every corner of Sehati village because the village is the area of the pair "Beta Tulus" (Abdullah Tuasikal–Hendrik Lewerissa). After threatening YN, WM came to the command post of the pair Bob–Arif and took out the flag of Democratic Party there. The incident is related to the competition in the 2013 election of Maluku governor and vice-governor.[54]

One of the interesting findings on the violence related to post-conflict local elections in Maluku is that the violence is localized in particular areas. The violence does not trigger violence or spread to other areas. More violence occurs in post-conflict local elections at the district/city levels compared to post-conflict local elections at the provincial level. Also violence only occurs in particular regions such as Eastern Seram (SBT) and Central Maluku districts.

Even though, in general, violence of post-conflict local elections in Maluku is relatively low, various tensions occur. These tensions are more caused by competition between supporters and sympathizer of candidate pair that tend more to use ethnic issues than religious one. In a particular region, such as SBT district whose majority of the people are Moslem; the growing issue is more on ethnical issue. One of the Maluku Bawaslu stated,

> ... Ethnicity is quite strong here, actually because there is candidate from Southeast Maluku's Kei person, and then in SBT there is Teo subdstrict which closer to Southeast Maluku. So people with cultural relations with Southeast Maluku district. There was once a tension, but no physical clashes occurred. But there was tension between Kei people and Seram.[55]

Ethnic and religious issues continue to be played by the success team of candidate pairs to get support and votes. Religious issues are played especially through private spaces (dialog between two or three people), not through open forums that involve many people. The use of religious issues is not accompanied by mobilization of the masses. Therefore, there is no violence that has background on religious issues in the *pemilukadas* in Maluku. One of the informants admitted,

> No, there isn't anything like that. This method is the way in which the success team uses to influence a mass of supporters at the grass root. So, there is no massive physical mobilization. It is the issue and it is played beautifully by the success teams.[56]

---

54 Case example is taken from SNPK data.
55 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon 23 August 2014.
56 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon 23 August 2014.

One of the issues that grows and spreads in the 2013 Maluku Province post-conflict local election is the turn of a local leader from a particular religion because people from the other religion has assumed the position twice, as stated by one of the Maluku *Bawaslu* members, "... that Christians has been governor for two periods, now it's time for Moslems. How come Moslems cannot be the governor?"[57] The use of ethnic and religious issues actually has the potential for provoking the people who have experiences of the conflict in the past. However, the provocation does not push and generate violence. Provocation is used by the success team of candidate pairs as a strategy to beat opponent's votes. The Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police said,

> There are provoking ways. That's general election. Even in the presidential election, some people said, for instance, Jokowi was like this. This also happened in the current governor election. When he is still a candidate, people say he is Moslem fanatic. There were leaflets from the supporters as a reaction. This did not create conflict directly. This effort only tried to spread issues and to reduce opponent's votes.[58]

Even though Maluku people with high awareness cannot be provoked any longer by religious issues, but the use of the issue is still regarded as potentially negative. So it needs to be kept on guard, as stated by an informant:

> Maluku, yes. Violence does not exist in the group and religious group. But it still exists especially in the areas that have potential for conflicts, even though it is not massive and does not influence Maluku security significantly, but it is still potential conflict.[59]

Eventually the people's awareness becomes important to prevent violence from happening in *pemilukada* in Maluku. The religious issues will eventually be left behind and shifts to a system that sides more with social and economic programs. One of the informants firmly said,

> So whether he is Moslem or Christian, when he assumes the position and is wrong, the Christian will go amok, and Moslems go amok. Sometimes they use various ways to confirm that, but I am convinced in the future. I told to my colleagues in politics "You cannot fight the trend era. This issue will be greatly sold well. We will enter a glocal space in which it will really be determined by merit system"[60]

---

57 Interview with *Bawaslu* member, Ambon 23 August 2014.
58 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
59 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
60 Interview with inter-faith dialog activities, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

d. More Prioritizing Peace-Building than Democracy Development

Major conflicts in Maluku have more than one decade ended. In the post-conflict period, some post-conflict local elections were organized both at the provincial and district/city levels. However, past time conflict experiences and public awareness on not repeating conflict have become a spirit in dealing with post-conflict local election. This makes Maluku people more prioritize the aspect of peace in handling various post-conflict local elections in Maluku.

Option for prioritizing peace is also based on the real need for peaceful situation. Since there is such need, Malino II Peace Agreement has run naturally. This was stated by a *Bawaslu* member:

> Well, our peace is built by itself naturally. The people feel the need for peaceful atmosphere; can find food, to market, can access this or that, this will be built by itself. Malino is the formality, in my opinion. So, let's see how people can provoke the society currently? I am optimistic, nothing will happen here. Peace is a need. Peace is a need, so the peace must be continuously implemented, against provocation, or many other things."[61]

e. Government and People's Efforts to Deal With Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election

1. Government's Effort

The Maluku people's awareness on not getting involved in conflict must be recognized as a spirit that has influence in the low number of violence related to post-conflict local election in Maluku. On the other hand, such awareness must be supported and balanced by the government's role in defending the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku so that it can run smoothly and securely. The government takes the role in dealing with violence related to post-conflict local election in Maluku, one of which through security personnel/police. The position of police is very important. The people are fairly dependent on the police to guard peaceful situation and secure post-conflict local election. Since the huge expectation to the police to maintain peaceful atmosphere, professionalism and neutrality of the police become the important prerequisite, as stated by one of the former refugee informants:

> The personnel must really not side with anyone, but side with the truth, in order not to trigger it. That's what happened. So last time the security

---

61 Interview with Maluku *Bawaslu* member, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

personnel had a strict attitude so that it helped to support post-conflict local election condition so that post-conflict local election can run.[62]

The importance of the police's neutrality is also realized by Maluku Local Police. Every police action in the effort of prevention and handling of violence related to general election can have negative impacts if in the duty the police are regarded non-neutral by the people. This can trigger the problem and other violence. The Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police said, "It was emphasized by the Local Police Chief that no police officer siding with candidate, and if this happen, it will create chaos/trouble."[63]

The condition of Maluku region is unique. The region's width is 720,000 km^2, but 93.6% of the width is sea. It means the Maluku inland region is only 6.4% from the total width and spread in hundreds of islands. The natural condition becomes a particular challenge for police personnel in handling violence related post-conflict local elections in Maluku. The solution taken by the police in order to handle violence related to post-conflict local elections in Maluku. The solution taken by the police in dealing the challenge is by conducting coordination with various parties including the government, TNI and post-conflict local election organizers. In the coordination meeting, phases of post-conflict local elections and potential for influence were discussed. Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police revealed:

> We conduct a coordination meeting with three institutions, namely KPU, local government and the police. TNI backs up from behind. Then, KPU explains the phases (of *pemilukada*). The police also make presentation of the security levels along with budget requirements, so that KPU and the police become inseparable partners.[64]

In the coordination phase, the police and KPU anticipate for the potential problems or violence, even the smallest potential. The police guard all the phases of post-conflict local elections from the shipment of ballot boxes through the installation of the elected local leaders. The Operational Chief of the Maluku Local Police gave an example of the guarding process by the police in the governor's post-conflict local election.

> On the eve of post-conflict local election, we have agreed the phases with KPU/organizers and identified which crucial phases we need to (conduct the guarding) for instance, the shipment of ballot boxes and voting. So there is even no smallest space for not conducting the guarding. So, we must secure every of the smallest things of each phase by taking techni-

---

62 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014.
63 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
64 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

cal and tactical actions because the potential still exists. Therefore, by looking at the potential, based on the intelligence prediction, we need to prepare the guarding plan for every phase, starting from the start like shipment of ballot boxes, then to the next phase to the recent installation.[65]

Another effort done by the police in order to prevent violence is the security engineering. The plice tries to minimize gatherings of sympathizers or supporters of different candidate pairs in particular spots. Technical efforts that are conducted include coordination with KPU to arrange campaign schedules. The police also design campaign paths or routes which will not collide or be conducted at the same time. With such field arrangements, the meeting of the different supporters which potentially creates violence does not develop into a real security disturbance.[66] Besides that, to support the police's quick movements in handling potential violence, the police also accumulate the number of personnel in strategic spots. The strategic spots are those closest to the areas which have potential for post-conflict local election-related violence. Therefore, if there is violence, the plice will immediately go to the places and do guarding efforts.

Efforts to prevent violence from occurring are also taken by the police, KPU and various parties through "peaceful election" agreement among candidate pairs and success teams. The joint declaration of "peaceful election" is also conducted to convey a message and example to the sympathizers that candidate pairs prioritize peaceful post-conflict local election processes. Therefore, sympathizers are expected to follow their leaders. Of course all of the efforts done by the police cannot run well without the support from the local government. One of the supports given is the budget support. The TNI (Indonesian Military) provides support by backing up police's efforts in the guarding process. Besides that, the support and cooperation in carrying out guarding are also given by the post-conflict local election organizers (*KPU* and *Panwaslu*) both at the provincial and district/city levels. The Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police described the importance of the support and cooperation of all parties as the key of post-conflict local election guarding in Maluku.

"In Ambon, it can run peacefully and smoothly thanks to all of us. The local government gives support, TNI/the police give support, the people give support to create security."[67]

---

65 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
66 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
67 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.

2. People's Efforts

Low number and intensity of violence related to post-conflict local elections in Maluku, not only due to the role of the government, but also due to people's participation. As discussed earlier, the real role of the Maluku people includes the building of high awareness that they do not want to be provoked any longer. The awareness has even placed the peaceful atmosphere as the need of the Maluku people.

The role in handling potential violence is also conducted by some NGOs in Ambon, especially NGOs that carry out post-conflict local election supervision. Support from donor agencies for NGOs in Maluku in conducting supervision of post-conflict local election is said to be very small, if we don't want to regard it as none. With minimal support, NGOs still play their role in guarding the smooth implementation of post-conflict local election through supervision. The supervision conducted by NGOs has more or less stifle potential for violence since their presence makes the campaign teams and sympathizers feel being watched over and eventually they try to perform according to the rules.

At the community level, efforts to prevent violence from occurring are conducted through various methods. One of them is through pulpits bot in churches and mosques. Religious leaders in each region give enlightenment and advice on how to choose good leaders, namely those who fear God. Eventually either the elected leaders are from Moslems or Christians, this will not be a problem because the people believe that the elected leaders fear God.[68]

The roles of traditional leaders, in this case the kings, are also very influential in dealing with the potential for post-conflict local election-related violence. Traditionally, in Maluku there are 351 kings from various traditional villages and 582 village heads (of non-traditional villages). They are the ones who directly lead the people at the grass-root level. Therefore, they can understand in details the potential for any violence in their areas so that preventive efforts can be done earlier. Kings and village heads coordinated under Latupati Assembly if potential violence occurs. Then they gather and invite journalists from printed and electronic media to immediately hold press conference. In the press conference, they will explain the ongoing condition to all parties, especially the society to guard the secure situation. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the kings do not end up merely in press releases; they will also immediately go to the incidents' places to calm down the people.[69]

---

68 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014.
69 Interview with former Maluku Latupati Assembly chairperson, Ambon, 23 August 2014.

III. POST-CONFLICT LOCAL ELECTION AND VIOLENCE IN ACEH AND MALUKU: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Aceh has its particular uniqueness as a post-conflict region. 30-year long armed conflicts in the region has the nuance of vertical conflicts in which GAM wanting to release itself from Indonesia must face the Government of Indonesia, even though in the developments, in some areas in Aceh occurred the nuance of horizontal conflicts between the Acehnese people and Javanese migrants. This is different from the Maluku conflicts which have more nuance of horizontal conflicts between religious groups, even though we cannot deny the fact that initially in the conflict, ethnic issues once rose such as eviction of Bugis, Butonese and Makasarese migrants.

However, both conflicts in the region can be settled through the same path, namely peace negotiation between the conflict parties. In the Aceh conflicts, agreement between GAM representatives and the Government of Indonesia was facilitated by Martti Ahtisaari from Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in Helsinki on August 15, 2005. In the Maluku conflict, peace agreement was held in Malino, on February 12, 2002 between the Moslem and Christian people representatives while the Government of Indonesia played a facilitator role.

The different conflict backgrounds in both regions make the post-conflict situation occur differently. Since the Maluku conflict has more horizontal nuance, after the peace agreement of the conflicts that used to get involved in conflicts remain to be in Maluku; none of the groups leaves the region. This causes areas in post-conflict Maluku to be segregated based on religion. The condition does not exist in Aceh due to vertical conflict nuance. Post-conflict Aceh does not experience segregation among the people who used to get involved in the conflict.

In post-conflict local election, the goals of each competing candidate pairs are to win post-conflict local election by getting the most votes. In this case, the competitions occurring in Maluku and Aceh post-conflict local elections are different one another. In the Maluku post-conflict local elections, even though the population is segregated based on religion, one group cannot ignore the other group if they want to win post-conflict local elections. Therefore, candidate pairs try to get support from both previously-conflicting groups. In terms of implication, the frequently taken strategy is to combine Moslem and Christian figures as one candidate pair of local leader. The use of religious issues in the campaign to withdraw public support is not conducted in an open fashion because it can have contra-productive impact, namely to close opportunity for getting support from another religious group. The use of religious issue is used by the success teams of candidate pairs as a campaign strategy to attack another candidate pair. Therefore, the violence related to

post-conflict local elections in Maluku does not have nuance of or background of religious issues.

In Aceh, it can be said that post-conflict local elections generate internal competitions among the playing actors. Candidate pairs who are former GAM members compete for getting support of votes from former members and supporters of GAM. The network that they have built is equally based on the GAM network. The target of supports they compete for is the same, namely GAM supporters and sympathizers. This situation makes frictions even harder given that they are altogether knowledgeable of their respective network and strengths. Competition among former GAM people makes the violence related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh has higher intensity, in terms of quantity and impacts.

The supporting factor for the emergence of violence makes the character of violence related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku different, even though both regions are post-conflict ones. In Aceh, widespread circulation of firearms in the society makes some violence that occur look harder and it can be said as "*bloody violence*". Shooting, abduction, torture and ambush with firearms between success teams and sympathizers of different candidate pairs. This is not found in the violence related to post-conflict local elections in Maluku. Even though there is no information on the firearms circulation in Maluku, violence that uses firearms in post-conflict local election does not occur at all. The most incidents are torture and fights between success teams and sympathizers of different candidate pairs.

At the grass-root level, there are similarities in the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Maluku and Aceh. The Maluku and Aceh people both have experiences on conflict situations. This experience has encouraged them more to prioritize peaceful condition than conflicts. Similarly, in the post-conflict local election implementation, the Aceh and Maluku people prefer choosing peaceful implementation of post-conflict local election, even though the post-conflict local election processes can be said to be still far from the consolidation of democratic values.

Efforts to handle violence related to post-conflict local elections both in Aceh and Maluku is closely related to the role of the government. It can be denied that the uproars occurred in the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Aceh. That has made the role of the government significant, not only the provincial but also the central government. In the Aceh post-conflict local elections, the role of the central government looks significant as the balancer of internal competition between candidate pairs from GAM. Even to pacify the tension and uproars the central government actively carries out various efforts such as proposing request of postponement of post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh to the Constitutional Court, and do-

ing negotiation between the central government, in this case the Ministry of Home Affairs, with PA. Even though the postponement of the post-conflict local elections on one hand is regarded as detrimental for another candidate pair, but in reality it can stifle sustained violence.

In the relatively safe Maluku post-conflict local elections, the role of the government is mainly realized at the local government level. The role is much more manifested in the form of funding support to the police for guarding and to post-conflict local election organizers. The local government also actively coordinates with the security personnel and *pemilukada* organizers in order to anticipate for various problems in the post-conflict local election implementation.

The role of government is closely related to the people's support and contribution, both CSOs and the general public. In the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku, the roles of CSOs are manifested in the form of supervision. There are situational similarities related to post-conflict local election supervision by CSOs in Aceh and Maluku. In both regions, the post-conflict local election supervision tends to reduce due to decreased public attention, both national and international to the implementation of post-conflict local election. Practically, funding support from donors for CSOs in Maluku is not available, although this situation does not paralyze the role of CSOs in the post-conflict local election process monitoring. Decreased monitoring and public attention have indirect impacts on the emergence of some post-conflict local election violence, especially in Aceh. People's support at the grass-root level is directed in a real fashion through the drive for peaceful post-conflict local election implementation. People's awareness in Maluku has become basic capital in dealing with various provocations. The awareness is also supported by the role of religious figures through their sermons in Church or Mosque's pulpits. In the post-conflict local elections in Maluku, the role of traditional figures such as kings as well as governments and security personnel is able to stifle the emergence of sustained violence related to post-conflict local election implementation.

Conclusion and Recommendation

I. CONCLUSION

Post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku are intended as a form of validation for peace-settlement as well as foundation for the democratization process in both regions. In general, implementation of two post-conflict local elections in Aceh (2006 and 2012) and three in Maluku (2003, 2008, and 2013) are regarded as non-fully successful despite various unique challenges and problems in each of the regions. In this case, being non-fully successful means that the implementation of post-conflict local elections in both regions has reached proportions of promotion of sustainable peace and democracy development. The findings in the research have clearly confirmed various propositions of this study, assuming that the post-conflict local elections have helped to develop local democracy and promotion of sustainable peace in Aceh and Maluku.

The implementation of post-conflict local elections in both post-conflict regions can be believed to have relatively helped to consolidate and build peace in both regions. This condition is confirmed by the increasingly solid economic and political stability in Aceh and Maluku. However, criticisms are also directed to the level of peace in Aceh which is believed to have not much touched substantive issues of peace yet such as socio-economic equity and equality, especially among different areas and tribes in Aceh. The important factors considered to help build peace and maintain stability in Aceh are inter-play political and economic opportunity and access factors. The victory of former GAM group through Aceh Party (PA) has placed many PA cadres in various centers of powers in Aceh, both legislative and executive ones, especially the position of governor. The condition has provided wider economic access and opportunities for former GAM combatants. Jarstad (1998) even emphasized that former rebels or particular groups would feel that peace was to expensive if they were eliminated in the future government. On the other words, it will be one of the serious dilemmas for the post-conflict local election implementation if the former combatant group is eliminated (see also Brancati & Snyder 2011).

On the other hand, peace and stability building in Maluku is related to power sharing which becomes the local creative initiative. Of course, the power sharing does not automatically help to build peace in Maluku. Therefore, the

determiner is that to what extent the combination is not simply a symbol of representation, but is also implemented in various programs of equal development programs and inter-community dialogs. Nevertheless, at least the power-sharing initiative becomes a symbol of togetherness that unites Maluku people's common sense. Besides that, other factors are a cultural entity called "*pela gandong*" and Maluku people's post-conflict increasingly-stronger awareness.

In general, post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku is regarded as relatively better compared to in Aceh. The condition may become a reflection from different conflict characters between the two, namely horizontal conflicts in Maluku and vertical conflicts in Aceh. However, at macro/international levels, post-conflict local elections in Aceh are still viewed as a particular success. Observed from the security and stability dimensions, for instance, the post-conflict local elections in Maluku tend to be safer and stable compared to those in Aceh which were accompanied by lots of violence and intimidations, as well as horizontal conflicts after 2005 Peace Agreement. The finding is definitely in line with NVMS data concerning violent incidents in post-conflict local elections (2005-2013), in which post-conflict local election-related violent incidents in the period in Aceh reached the number of some 300 cases and in Maluku less than 100 cases.[1] Even, violence and intimidations in Aceh tended to increase and spread evenly, instead of decreasing, in the 2012 post-conflict local election. In Maluku, sporadic violence was only located in particular areas such as South-east Maluku, Tual City, and SBT (Eastern Seram). Lots of dissatisfaction with post-conflict local election results in Maluku that ended in the Constitutional Court is regarded as good progress since they were not manifested in violent ways.

From the technical-procedural dimension the implementation in both regions runs smoothly according to the general standard of post-conflict local election organizing. However, many criticisms are also directed to the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh which is much believed to be not neutral. The condition is believed to be more caused by the selection of Aceh KIP members by DPRA. However, it must be admitted that there are still technical-procedural problems in the post-conflict local election implementation in both regions, especially related to vote-counting fraud. Besides that, the development of the substance of democracy in Aceh is considered not to be fully achieved such as freedom of expressions, protection of minority, equity of social and economic development, respect to different values, views and opinions, etc. The Aceh people are considered to still easily use short cuts of violence, intimidation and terrors to deal with differences in opinions and views. On the other hand, the development of the substance of democracy in

---

1 See the SNPK data table in the preface chapter.

Maluku is still considered to be better in which the people are free to express aspirations, opinions and voices without any pressure, intimidation or terrors.

Various studies on democracy and democratization show that the path to democracy is often steep and full of conflicts, even violence. The post-conflict local election process can help build peace, but also can become an entry point to violence because the competitive character of the elections is dichotomy: win-lose.[2] In this context, threats to instability and violence in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh tend to take the form of inter-civilians conflicts and violence, both PA supporters and non-PA supporters and between supporters or PA elites. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, violence and intimidations were not so filled as in 2012 and political frictions still occurred between PA supporters and non-PA supporters. However, entering the 2012 post-conflict local election, the levels of violence, terror and intimidations tended to increase and new political friction occurred, between PA and PNA. From the aspect of actors, former combatant elites are often regarded as the cause of the emerging conflicts and threats to instability in post-conflict local elections and in general in the peace-building process. However, the threats to instability and violence are considered not to eventually cancel post-conflict local election implementation nor even threaten peace-building prospects in Aceh. On the other hand, threats to instability and violence in the post-conflict local election implementation and peace-building in Maluku is generally considered to come from various types of actors, both individuals and particular groups/community organizations, and generally takes the form of political provocations by using religious variable both through SMS or leaflets.

Competition among former GAM has made post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh relatively high in the intensity both in the aspects of quantity and impacts, compared to in Maluku. The key supporting factor for the emergence of violence in Aceh is the widespread circulation of firearms within the society. This is not found in the post-conflict local election related-violence in Maluku. Even though there is no information on the circulation of firearms in Maluku, violence that uses firearms in the post-conflict local elections did not occur at all. The most incidents included torture and fights between different success teams and candidate pair sympathizers.

At the grass-root level, bitter experiences of conflicts that the Aceh and Maluku peoples had before have encouraged them to prioritize peaceful situation and stability rather than conflicts and violence. Besides that, in the Aceh post-conflict local elections, the role of the central government looks significant as the balancer of internal competition and tension among candidate pairs, especially candidates from GAM, for instance by proposing postponement of 2012 post-conflict local election. Even though the post-

---

2 See Jerstad 1998, p. 29; Hoglund 1998; Kuhne 2010; and Korth 2011.

conflict local election postponement is considered to be detrimental to other candidate pairs, but in reality it can stifle sustained violence. Meanwhile in Maluku post-conflict local elections that are relatively secure, the role of the government is relatively not so significant. The role is more manifested in the form of fund support for the police and post-conflict local election organizers to guard post-conflict local elections.

Lastly, sustainable peace requires good governance.[3] Good governance, thus, becomes important indicators of success or failure of democracy development and peace-building in post-conflict regions.[4] Beside people's participation, various dimensions of governance such as accountability, transparency, public service and law enforcement are not full yet in both post-conflict regions. People's participation in post-conflict local elections in both regions is relatively good, around 70 percent. Unfortunately, the participation tended to decline in the last post-conflict local election. Accountability in Maluku is considered to be relatively better than in Aceh. Even the public in Aceh tends to consider that there is no difference between the leaders coming from former GAM or not. Transparency in both post-conflict regions tends to be still poor and often becomes the object of public criticisms. Besides that, law enforcement against violence occurring in post-conflict local elections in Maluku is still regarded as better than in Aceh. The massive and repeated violence in Aceh post-conflict local elections is often related to the weak law enforcement. The law enforcement in the criminal domain tends to get better in both regions. However, law enforcement against corruption in both regions tends to remain unmoved.

II.   RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings in this study, some recommendations can be formulated as follows:

a. *Pemilukada*, Peace-Building and Democracy Development In Post-Conflict Regions

1. Aceh

- Level of peace in Aceh is considered by many parties not to have touched substantial problems of democracy yet such as socio-economic equality and equity, especially inter-region and tribe in Aceh. In this case, the local government or authorities of Aceh Province elected through post-conflict local elections must consider more and prioritize particular

---

3 See Jarstad 2008, pages 18-19; Lyons 2002 page 5; Reilly 2008.
4 See Korth 2011

regions or tribes that are socio-economically regarded as far underdeveloped compared to other regions or tribes.

- Substantively, democracy development in Aceh is considered not to fully touch the democratic values in Aceh such as freedom of expression, minority protection, respect to differences in values, values and opinions, etc. It must be admitted that the development of democratic values requires particular time and process. Therefore, various related stakeholders including Aceh local government, politicians, political parties, NGOs, universities, media, etc., must cooperate and start to pay more attention to the condition by providing political education, training, and socialization intensively, both in the form of informal activities/programs, such as political training and socialization in various public and formal spaces such as particular curriculum or subjects.

- Threats to instability in the peace-building and democracy development, taking the form of violent actions, intimidations, and terrors tend to refer to the conflicts among former GAM members namely PA and PNA elites. For better peace-building and democracy development, the parties' elites are advised to restrain themselves and not to use violent ways and intimidation. Such ways are believed only to victimize the people. The use of violent ways is no more than a forceful form and far from democratic attitude and system, in which various differences in interests should be managed in a peaceful and equal manner.

b. Maluku

- The power sharing initiatives are considered to become one of the important factors that help build and consolidate peace in Maluku. However, various stakeholders of peace-building and democracy development are recommended to prioritize competency and professionalism as well as real peace programs more, apart from power sharing consideration.

- Another factor that is believed to play an important role in maintaining peace and democracy stability so far is the people's strengthened awareness. In this case the Maluku local government and civil society elements are recommended to keep on protecting and strengthening the awareness by various creative programs and activities.

- Potential for instability in peace-building and democracy development in Maluku tends to take the form of political provocations in the post-conflict local election (*pemilukadas pasca-konflik*) by using religious variable, both via SMS or leaflets. To anticipate for it, the Maluku local government and various related stakeholders especially the security elements, are expected to work together to strengthen people's awareness

and give diverse understanding and knowledge on various forms of provocation consistently. The mechanism can be used in various ways such as SMS, counter-leaflets, sermons in mosques or Churches, public hearing or particular socialization and training.

c. Governance in Post-Conflict Regions

1. Aceh

- The Aceh Local Government's accountability is considered to tend to be poor. Even the general public emphasizes there is no difference between the leaders from former GAM and not GAM. To improve the accountability, the Aceh local government, bureaucracy or leaders must be honest and keep their promises, prioritize people's prosperity more than enrich themselves, and willing to and capable of listening to and absorb people's aspirations, not use violent ways, as well as leave behind and put an end to various types of KKN.

- Transparency related to the recruitment of public officials and project tenders and financial affairs of the Aceh local government becomes a particular problem, which makes transparency in Aceh tend to be poor. To improve the transparency the Aceh local government must make the mechanisms for development project tenders and recruitment of public officials more transparent. In the Irwandi Yusuf's leadership (2006-2011), the fit and proper test mechanism was once applied despite various defects. Unfortunately such mechanism was then deleted in the current Aceh government.

- The people consider that public service in Aceh does not still meet their expectations. In order to improve public service, the Aceh local government must strengthen the capacity and knowledge of public officials, strengthen the political will of the public officials to deliver public services, to improve public service facilities especially outside Banda Aceh, and in general reduce public service gaps between Banda Aceh city and outside Banda Aceh.

- There is a decline in post-conflict local election participation rate. To increase the participation again, the Aceh local government and other Aceh leaders/bureaucrats must enhance the level of public trust to them along with better performance and behaviors that are far from corruption.

- Law enforcement in Aceh is considered not to have satisfied much yet; the role of law enforcers is regarded as still weak. The Aceh government and law enforcers must prioritize the law enforcement by fixing the performance and improve capability as well as eliminate various forms of discrimination in law enforcement.

2. Maluku

- The Maluku local government's accountability is relatively better. However, the main issued that is faced is the increased corruption which is more massive than before the conflicts. Therefore, the Maluku local government and some relevant stakeholders must work together to leave behind and put an end to various forms of KKN. Beside that based on the inputs from the public, authorities or local authorities or leaders elected after the conflict should prioritize the interest of the society rather than that of groups, parties or families.

- Transparency in Maluku also becomes a problem and public criticisms widely. Even though the Maluku local government claimed to have conducted improvements related to transparency, they must improve and fix the mechanism for public officials and project in order that they are far more transparent.

- Even though public service in Maluku has experienced many improvements, there are some things to be considered by the Maluku local government to increase the public services, namely competency and professionalism of public service provider, discrimination in providing public service and public services' gap between Ambon city and outside Ambon.

- People's participation in post-conflict local elections also experiences a decrease in Maluku. To boost again the participation, the local government and leaders/bureaucrat must also reduce public pessimism to them by improving performance and make lots of change for the goodness and welfare of the people, as well as carry out political socialization and education more intensively.

- Law enforcement problems in Maluku are more related to corruption issues and major riot that involve religious variable. In this relation, the Maluku local government and law enforcers must give more attention to corruption handling and solutions to SARA (race, religion, race) –related riot cases more equally and transparently.

d. Institutional Infrastructures of Post-Conflict Local Election

1. Aceh

- Dissatisfaction with post-conflict local election results often occur. For better democracy development in the future, political parties and the supporters are recommended to bring the dispute of post-conflict local election results to the Constitutional Court and various dissatisfactions to available legitimate paths, instead of settling the problems using violent ways.

- Many criticisms are directed to post-conflict local election organizers in Aceh who are regarded often as non-neutral and dishonest. Firm law enforcement against the behaviors of the organizers is required; if necessary, dismissal must be done against the non-neutral and dishonest organizers. Besides that, punishment must also be imposed equally on post-conflict local election participants who are believed to make interventions or pressure on the organizers.

- Related to the above problems, Aceh KIP commissionaires are recommended to be elected by independent team consisting various Aceh community components, if not by the central KPU and instead of by DPRA. The action is important to maintain neutrality and integrity of KIP commissionaires as well as avoid them from various forms of political parties' intervention, especially the parties with dominant gained seats in DPRA.

- Another problem related to competency and experiences of post-conflict local election organizers especially at the grass-root level, such as KPPS, PPS, and PPK. In general, the issue tends to be related to the reluctance of the people who are considered to have capacity and knowledge to be part of the post-conflict local election organizers. Aceh government, Aceh KIP, and various CSO that are concerned with democratic developments must be more proactive and go down to the field to encourage the them to take part in the post-conflict local election implementation, besides the strengthening of political socialization and education.

- Many criticisms are especially given to the weak law enforcement against various post-conflict local election violations in Aceh, especially various forms of violence, intimidations and terrors. Future improvements in post-conflict local elections and democracy development in Aceh oblige the law enforcers/security personnel to take firm, fair and thorough actions against various forms of violations without differentiating parties or groups. Law enforcement is believed to be the strategic instrument for improving the quantity and stability of post-conflict local elections, as well as strengthening public trust in post-conflict local election implementation.

- Political parties are considered to have strategic position in maintaining stability and democracy development and peace-building. In this relation, political parties should play more intensive roles in providing political education and strengthening other democratic values to their respective constituents and encouraging their supporters to avoid violent ways.

2. Maluku

- Limited number of supporting infrastructures for post-conflict local election implementation is a particular issue in Maluku whose areas are insular. In this relation, Maluku local government, post-conflict local election organizers and other related stakeholders should think about and prioritize the development of infrastructures in the areas, especially the problems of transportation and communications on the eve of and after post-conflict local election implementation. Due to the limitation, post-conflict local election organizers cannot carry out maximal mobilization and coordination. This condition has generated various spaces which potentially trigger violations in post-conflict local election implementation.

- The problem in Maluku is also related to the limited number of competent and capable post-conflict local election organizers at the grass-root levels. Similarly in Aceh this problem also tends to be related to the reluctance of the people who are considered to have capacity and knowledge to become part of post-conflict local election organizers. Besides that, related to financial and human resource limitations in the provision of effective technical training to grass-root organizers. In this relation, the Maluku local government, Maluku local KPUD and various CSOs that are concerned about democracy development must be more proactive and visit the grass-root people to encourage them to be willing to participate in the post-conflict local election organizing, as well as strengthen socialization and political education.

- Political parties have strategic positions in maintaining stability and democracy development and peace-building. In this connection, political parties should play more intensive role in providing political education and strengthening democratic values to their respective constituents.

- Power sharing which is much carried by various candidates must not only end up as group representation symbol and vote getter, but also has to become the vision and real programs of sustainable democracy development and peace-building.

e. Post-Conflict Local Election, Violence and Peace-Building and Democracy Development

1. Aceh

- Violence and intimidation tend to intensify in the post-conflict local election implementation. Security personnel, especially Aceh local police, must take firm, responsive and quick actions in dealing with every form of violence and intimidation without considering affiliation of particular groups, tribes, or parties. If not, the violence and intimidation will

continue to repeat and are feared to disturb the ongoing processes of peace-building and democracy development.

- Civilians tend to be reluctant to and afraid of reporting or becoming witnesses of intimidation/violence cases. This condition becomes a stumbling stone for the violence/intimidation handling. The civilians should be proactive and willing to report and become witnesses of each violence case. However, the role of the security personnel in being always ready to provide security guarantee to the reporters or witnesses must also be improved.

- Given the fact that one of the violence sources often refers to fully-unrealized mental transformation and violent culture of former GAM combatants, the local government and various related stakeholders should provide various education, training and other capacity building activities to the former combatants (reintegration of former combatants) more seriously and intensively.

2. Maluku

- Violence tends to be centered in particular regions such as South-east Maluku, Tual City, and SBT. In each post-conflict local election implementation, both the provincial and district/city level, security personnel and various related stakeholders should more prioritize supervision in the regions, and of course other regions that are believed to have similar potential.

References

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Aisyah, Ti et al. (2008). *Darul Islam di Aceh: Analisis sosial-politik pemberontakan regional di Indonesia, 1953-1964*. Lhoksumawe: Unimal Press.

Alfian, T. I. (2006). Aceh and the holy war (Perang Sabil). In *Verandah of violence: The background to the Aceh problem*, p. 109-120.

Ansori, M. H. (2012). From insurgency to bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Party and the new face of conflict. In *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 31-44.

-------. (2012). Linking identity to collective action: Islam, history, and ethnicity in the Aceh conflict. In *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1. H. 1-46.

Aspinall, E. (2009). *Islam and nation: Separatist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-------. (2009). Combatants to contractors: The political economy of peace in Aceh. In *Journal of Indonesia*, vol. 87, April 2009, p. 1.-34. Cornell Southeast Asia Program.

-------. (2004). The historical and political background to the Aceh conflict. In K. Askandar & A. M. Chee (ed.). *Building peace in Aceh: Problems, strategies, and lessons from Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland*, p. 31-42. Proceedings of the International Symposium. Bangkok: Mahidol University, Chulalangkorn University, Tammasat University, dll.

Awaluddin, H. (2009). *Peace in Aceh: Notes on the peace process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Helsinki*. Jakarta: CSIS.

Bakwesegha, C. J. (2004). Ethnic conflict and the colonial legacy. In A. Wimmer et al. (ed.). *Facing ethnic conflicts: Towards a new realism*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 53-60.

Barnes, S. (2001). The contribution of democracy to rebuilding post-conflict societies. In *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 95, no. 1, h. 86-101.

Bernard, J. (1950). Where is the modern sociology of conflict? In *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 56, no. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Belloni, R. (2008). Civil society in war to democracy transition. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (eds). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building.* New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 182-210.

Bertrand, J. (2004). *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-------. (2008). Ethnic conflicts in Indonesia: National models, critical junctures, and the timing of violence. In *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 8, p. 425-449.

Birgit, B. (2008). *Cultural solutions to religious conflicts? The revival of tradition in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia.* In *Asian Journal of Social Science*, vol. 37 (2009), p. 872–891.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste.* London: Routledge.

Brancati, D. & J. R. Snyder. (2011). Rushing to the polls: The causes of premature post-conflict elections. In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 55, no. 3, p. 469-492.

Brown, G., Christopher Wilson, & Hadi Suprayoga. (2005). *Overcoming violent conflict: Peace and development analysis in Maluku and North Maluku, vol. 3.* Jakarta: United Nations Development Programme dan Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia.

Call, C.T. & S. E. Cook. (2003). On democratization and peace-building. In *Global Governance*, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 233-246.

Camara, D. H. (1971). *Spiral of violence.* London: Sheed and Ward, Ltd.

Cederman, L. E. et al. (2009). Elections and ethnic civil wars. Article was presented in dipresentasikan dalam *Democratization and Conflict* workshop in Zurich, 2 October 2009.

Clark, S. & B. Palmer. (2008). Pemilukada pasca-konflik di Aceh dan implikasinya. in *Indonesian Social Development*, paper no. 11. Jakarta: World Bank.

Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative research.* Los Angeles: SAGE.

Chotim, E. E. & S. Aminah. (2009). *Shaping the future of Aceh.* Jakarta: LabSosio FISIP-UI.

Collins, R. (2008). *Violence: A micro-sociological theory.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Coser, L. A. (1967). *Continuities in the study of social conflict.* New York: The Free Press.

Connor, W. (2004). A few cautionary notes on the history and future of ethnonational conflicts. In A. Wimmer et al. (ed.). *Facing ethnic conflicts: Towards a new realism.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 23-33.

Cramer, C. (2007). *Violence in developing countries: War, memory, progress.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Creswell, J. W. (1994). *Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.* London: SAGE Publications.

Cyllah, A. (2011). Continous's winners: Warlodas and illegal armed groups as legitimate actors in Liberia. In *The role of elections in peace processes: When and how the advance stability or exacerbate conflicts.* Report is published by United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), Turin, Italy, p. 51-54.

Dahrendorf, R. (1967). *Conflict after class: New perspectives on the theory of social and political conflict.* London: Longmans.

Denzin, N. K. & Y. S. Lincoln (ed.). (2005). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Faulks, K. (1999). *Political sociology: A critical introduction.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Fearon, D. J. & D. D. Laitin. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. In *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, no. 4, p. 715-735.

Fisher, R. et al. (1991). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in.* New York: Penguin Books.

-------. (1994). *Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for coping with conflict.* Boston: Harvard College.

Flores, T. E. & I. Nooruddin. (2011). The effect of elections on post-conflict peace and reconstruction. In *Journal of Politics*, 23 November.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstanding about case study research. In *Qualitative Inquiry*, vol. 12, no. 2.

Frere, M. S. (2011). *Elections and the media in post-conflict Africa: Votes and voices for peace*? New York: Zed Books London.

Fukuyama, F. (2005). *Guncangan besar, kodrat manusia dan tata sosial baru.* Jakarta: Gramedia.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. In *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 167-191.

Garber, L (1998). Introduction. In K. Kumar (ed.). *Post-conflict elections, democratization, & international assistance.* London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, p. 1-4.

Giddens, A. (1976). *New rules of sociological method: A positive critique of interpretative sociologies.* London: Hutchinson.

Guelke, A. (2004). Democracy and ethnic conflict. In A. Guelke (ed.). *Democracy and ethnic conflict: Advancing peace in deeply divided societies.* New York: Palgrave Micmillan, h. 239-251.

Hale, H. E. (2008). *The foundations of ethnic politics: Separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the world.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Harris, D. (2002). *Post-conflict elections or post-elections conflict: Sierra Lione 2002 and pattern of voting in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Heaton, J. (2004). *Reworking qualitative data*. London: SAGE Publications.

Hechter, M. (2004). Containing ethnonationalist violence. In A. Wimmer et al. (ed.). *Facing ethnic conflicts: Towards a new realism*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 283-298.

Heidenheimer, A. J. *et.al*. (1983). *Comparative public policy*. St. Martin's Press.

Henslin, J. M. (2006). *Sosiologi dengan pendekatan membumi (jilid 2)*. Jakarta: Erlangga.

Hoglund, K. (2008). Violence in war to democracy transition. Dalam A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (ed.). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 80-102.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horton, P. B. & C. L. Hunt. (1999). *Sosiologi (jilid 2)*. Jakarta: Erlangga.

Isenhart, M. W. & M. Spangle. (2000). *Collaborative approaches to conflict resolution*. London: SAGE Publications.

Jarstad, A. K. (2008). Dilemma of war to democracy transitions: Theories and concepts. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (ed.). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 15-36.

Jarstad, A.K. & T. D. Sisk. (2008). Introduction. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (ed.). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-15.

Jeong, H. W. (ed.). (1999). *Conflict resolution: Dynamic, process and structure*. New York: Ashgate.

Kingsbury, D. (2006). *Peace in Aceh: A personal account of the Helsinki peace process*. Singapore: Equinox Publishing.

Korth, S. (2011). Highlights of the 2010 dialogue series. In *The role of elections in peace processes: when and how the advance stability or exacerbate conflicts*. Report is published by United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), Turin, Italy, p. 9-18.

Kuhne, W. (2010). The role of elections in emerging democracies and post-conflict countries: Key issues, lessons learnt and dilemmas. In *International Policy Analysis*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Kumar, K. (1998). Post-conflict elections and international assistance. In K. Kumar (ed.). *Post-conflict elections, democratization & international assistance*. London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, p. 5-14.

Kvale, S. & Brinkmann, S. (2009). *Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Kvale, S. (1996). *Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Larsen, H. F. & D. Selim. (2009). Local democracy and peace-building in Asia: Devolution arrangement and power-sharing in local government councils. Paper was presented in *Regional Technical Seminar on Local Governance and Basic Service Delivery in Conflict Affected Areas*, Bangkok, 2-3 June, 2009.

Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI). (2011). Current Asia dam the centre for humanitarian dialogue. *Pengelolaan konflik di Indonesia: Sebuah analisis konflik di Maluku, Papua, dan Poso.* Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Lindlof, T. R. & B. C. Taylor. (2002). *Qualitative communication research methods* (second edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Lyons, T. (2002). Post-conflict elections: War termination, democratization and demilitarizing politics. *Working paper*, no. 20, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.

Majumdar, A. K. & B. Singh. (1999). *Political sociology.* Jaipur: RBSA Publishers.

Malley, M. (2002). Political centralization and social conflict in Indonesia. In S. A. Giannakos (ed.). *Ethnic conflict: Religion, identity and politics.* Ohio: Ohio University Press, p. 170-187.

Mancini, L. (2008). Horizontal inequality and communal violence: Evidence from Indonesian districts. In F. Stewart (ed.). *Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 106-135.

Marshal, C. & G. B. Rossman (1989). *Designing qualitative research.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Mayer, B. S. (2000). *The dynamics of conflict resolution: A practitioner's guide.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Minichiello, V. et al. (1995). *In-depth interviewing: Principles, techniques, analysis.* Melbourne: Longman.

Miller, M. A. (2009). *Rebellion and reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's security and autonomy policies in Aceh.* New York: Routledge.

-------. (2004). The Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Law: A serious response to Acehnese separatism? Dalam *Asian Ethnicity*, vol. 5, no. 3, October. Carfax Publishing.

Miriam, B. (2008). *Dasar-dasar ilmu politik (Edisi revisi).* Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Moore, C. W. (2003). *The mediation process: Practical strategies for resolving conflict.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Moreno, L. (2004). Divided societies: Electoral polarization and the Basque country. In A. Guelke (ed.). *Democracy and ethnic conflict: Advancing peace in deeply divided societies.* New York: Palgrave Micmillan, p. 29-51.

Oberschall, A. (1978). Theories of social conflict. Dalam *Annual Review of sociology*, vol. 4, p. 291-315.

Oliva, F. (2011). Learning to lose: accepting electoral outcomes. In *The role of elections in peace processes: When and how the advance stability or exacerbate conflicts*. Report was published by United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), Turin, Italy, p. 19-34

-------. (2011). Final observatiosn and reas for future works. In *The role of elections in peace processes: when and how the advance stability or exacerbate conflicts*. Report was published by United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), Turin, Italia, p. 63-65.

Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Przeworski, H. & H. Teune. (1970). *The logic of comparative social inquiry.* New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Reilly, B. (2008). Post-war election: Uncertain turning points of transition. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (ed.). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building.* New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 157-181.

Rex, J. (1981). *Social conflict: A conceptual and theoretical analysis.* London: Longman.

Scott, W. R. (2012). *Institutions and organizations: Idea, interests, and identities (Fourth edition).* Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: SAGE.

Shapiro, S. (2009). Classical Logic. In *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.* Stanford University, The Metaphysics Research Lab. Downloaded from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-classical/#1, On 3 June 2010.

Sherman, A. K. & A. Kolker. (2000). *The social bases of politics*. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Sudarman, A. P. & C. Fahmi (ed.). (2012). *Kekerasan dalam bingkai demokrasi: Laporan hasil pemantauan peristiwa kekerasan selama pemilukada Aceh 2012.* Banda Aceh: The Aceh Institute and Forum LSM Aceh.

Sujatmiko, I. G. (2012). Conflict transformation and social reconciliation: The case of Aceh, Indonesia. Dalam *Asian Social Science*, vol. 8, no. 2, February 2012.

Susan, N. (2009). *Sosiologi konflik dan isu-isu kontemporer*. Jakarta: Kencana.

Ritchie, J. & J. Lewis (ed.). (2003). *Qualitative research method: A guide for social science students and researchers.* London: SAGE Publications.

Ritzer, G. & D. J. Goodman. (2008). *Teori Sosiologi Modern*. Jakarta: Kencana.

Robinson, G. (2001). Rawan is as rawan does: The origins of disorder in New Order Aceh. Dalam B. R. Anderson (ed.). *Violence and state in Suharto's Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press, p. 213-241.

Ross, M. L. (2005). Resources and rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. In P. Collier & N. Sambanis (ed.). *Understanding civil war: Evidence and analysis*. Washington: The World Bank, p. 35-58.

Rush, M. & P. Althoff. (2003). *Pengantar Sosiologi Politik*. Jakarta: Rajawali.

Schulze, K. E. (2007). The conflict in Aceh: Struggle over oil? Dalam W. Kaldor et al. (ed.). *Oil wars*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, p. 183-224.

-------. (2004). The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a separatist organization. In *Policy Studies*, vol. 2. Washington: East West Center. Downloaded from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs//PS002.pdf, on 6 July 2010.

Schwartz, P. (1991). The art of the long view. Dalam *Global Business Network*. Downloaded from file:///C:/Users/NMVS-THC/Downloads/Art%20of%20the%20Long%20View%20Excerpt.pdf, on 14 January 2015.

Sisk, T. & P. Risley. (2005). Democracy and peace-building at the local level: Lessons learned. Program report in *Conflict and Conflict Management*, International IDEA, *working draft*.

Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan (SNPK)-The Habibie Center. (2014). *Segregasi, kekerasan dan kebijakan rekonstruksi pasca konflik di Ambon.*

Sivapathasundaram, D. (2004). *Elections in post-conflict environments: The role of international organization.* IFES Report, Washington DC.

Thorne, S. E. (1994). Secondary analysis in qualitative research: Issues and implications. In J. M. Morse (ed.). *Critical issues in qualitative research methods*. London: SAGE Publications.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (2003). *Democracy in America*. Translated by Gerald Bevan. London: Penguin Classic.

Tomsa, D. (2009). Local elections and party politics in a post-conflict area: The *pemilukada* in Maluku. *Working papers of Indonesian Studies*, School of Asian Languages and Studies, University of Tasmania.

Ury, W. (2000). *The third side: Why we fight and how we can stop*. New York: Penguin Book (Non-Classics).

van Klinken, Gerry. (1999) What caused the Ambon violence? *Inside Indonesia*, no. 60.

Waleensteen, P. (2008). International responses to crisis of democratization in war-torn societies. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (ed.). *From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peace-building*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 211-238.

Wirsing, R. G. (2004). The autonomy puzzle: Territorial solutions to the Kashmir conflict. In A. Guelke (ed.). *Democracy and ethnic conflict: Advancing peace in deeply divided societies*. New York: Palgrave Micmillan, p. 80-102.

Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

REPORTS, DOCUMENTS, NEWSPAPERS, AND MAGAZINES

Aceh dalam angka. (2014). Banda Aceh: Aceh Province Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

Analisis kesenjangan antarwilayah 2013. Jakarta: Bappenas.

Atjehpost.co. "13 alasan mengapa memilih Partai Aceh." Accessed from http://atjehpost.co/articles/read/2392/13-Alasan-Mengapa-Memilih-Partai-Aceh, pada 29 Desember 2014.

Maluku dalam angka 2014. Ambon: Maluku Province Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

Profil kehutanan Provinsi Maluku. Jakarta: Ministry of Forestry.

Statistik modal sosial. (2012). Jakarta: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

Data pemilukada 2012. KIP Aceh.

Data pemilukada. KPUD Maluku.

Detik.com. "*Rapat paripurna penetapan pimpinan DPR Aceh ricuh.*" Accessed from detik.com/news/read/2014/12/09/012421/2771443/rapat-paripurna-penetapan-pimpinan-dpr-aceh-ricuh, on 25 December 2014.

International Crisis Group. (2000). *Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku.* Asia Report, no. 10. Jakarta and Brussels: ICG.

Indonesia governance index. (2012). Jakarta: Partnership.

Manifesto nilai-nilai perjuangan Partai Nasional Aceh. Downloaded from www.pna.or.id, on 2 January 2015.

Merdeka.com. "*Eks sekretaris negara GAM terima NKRI, tapi kecewa pemimpin Aceh.*" Downloaded from id.berita.yahoo.com/eks-sekretrais-negera-gam-terima-nkri-tapi-kecewa-105440264.html, on 25 December 2014.

MoU Helsinki 2005. Downloaded from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_08_05_aceh.pdf, on 28 December 2015.

Perhitungan dan analisis kemiskinan makro Indonesia tahun 2013. Jakarta: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

Perjanjian Malino 2. Downloaded from *Pengelolahan konflik di Indonesia: Sebuah analisis konflik di Maluku, Papua, dan Poso.* Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Rumahpemilu.org. *Gakkumdu pemilu.* Accessed from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/17/Gakkumdu-Pemilu, on 29 December 2014.

National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK)-The Habibie Center. *Peta kekerasan di Indonesia (Mei-Agustus 2014) dan kekerasan terkait tata kelola pemerintahan.* Edisi 08, November 2014.

Statistik politik. (2012). Jakarta: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

Index

Annexes

RESEARCH QUESTION 1:

To what extent does post-conflict local election in Aceh dan Maluku help develop democracy and strengthen peace settlement, or vice versa?

Related Informants:

Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local election and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); politicians, local journalists, bureaucrats (including governor/regent), former combatants, security elements (TNI/Police) and general public.

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution?
2. How do you see the implementation of post-conflict local election and democracy development here?
3. How do you see peace-building here so far?
4. In your opinion, to what extent has the current peace-building fulfilled the people's expectations here?
5. How is the implementation of Helsinki MoU or the Malino 2 Agreement in relation to the peace strengthening here?
6. In your opinion, to what extent has the implementation of post-conflict local elections and democracy development so far helped to build peace here?
7. In your opinion, in which aspect or dimension (factors) did the post-conflict local elections help build peace here?
8. On the contrary, in your opinion, what aspect or dimensions from the peace-building here disturb democracy development?
9. In your opinion, how have post-conflict local election so far generated accountable and legitimate leaders?
10. In your opinion, how have post-conflict local elections generated local government and accountable and good governance?
11. In your opinion, how have the people seen and responded to the leadership and rules resulting from post-conflict local elections?

12. How do you see public participation in all political processes in post-conflict local elections?
13. In your opinion, how freely and comfortably did the people participate in or engage in the political processes of post-conflict local elections?
14. In your opinion, how is the post-conflict development or growth of the civil societies here?
15. In your opinion, how do the people currently have initiatives and independence in settling conflicts occurring among them?
16. How do you see rule post-conflict law enforcement (rule of law) here?
17. What is the local government's attitude and action in handling and treating the difference in groups here?
18. How do you see the participation and role of the women in the political processes of post-conflict local elections?
19. How have the participation and role of the women been in building peace here?
20. What are your advice and expectation for local peace strengthening and democracy development here in the future?

RESEARCH QUESTION 2:

How has post-conflict governance helped to build democracy and peace in Aceh and Maluku?

Related Informants:

Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local election and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); politicians, bureaucrats (including governor/regent), former combatants, local journalists, security elements (TNI/Police) and general public.

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution?
2. What factors (dimension and aspect) of the implementation of post-conflict local elections here are considered to make or create instability in the society?
3. What factors (dimension and aspect) of the implementation of post-conflict local elections here are considered to disturb or even aggravate peace building process here?
4. How do the factors occur/happen (process)?
5. In your opinion, what factors disturb democratization development here?

6. In your opinion, what aspects of the post-conflict democracy development process disturb or even aggravate peace-building/strengthening here?
7. On the contrary, what aspects of the post-conflict peace-building/strengthening that prevent development/consolidation of democracy here?
8. In your opinion, what aspect of the peace agreement here has not been fully met? Why?
9. In what levels can some of the unrealized aspects of the peace agreement disturb peace prospect?
10. In your opinion, how is the attitude and response of the public to the authorities (regent, governor, DPRD, and other bureaucrats) elected through post-conflict local elections here?
11. How do you see the people here still think of and dream the return of the condition and situation of the old history here (especially Aceh)?
12. Are there any particular groups that are treated more specially than the others in the peace building process here?
13. How do you see some post-conflict law violation cases that are not settled completely and properly based on the existing constitution/laws?
14. How do you see the people who are reluctant to participate or be involved in the post-conflict political processes?

RESEARCH QUESTION 3:

How did conflicts and violence emerge in the post-conflict local election processes in Aceh and Ambon?

Related Informants:

Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local election and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); politicians, local journalists, bureaucrats, KIP/KPU, former combatants, security elements (TNI/Police) and general public.

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution?
2. How do you see varied violence that emerged in the post-conflict local election processes here?
3. In your opinion, what factors caused the conflicts and violence to emerge in the post-conflict local election?
4. How is the pattern of conflict and violence in the post-conflict local election here?

5. In your opinion, what are the impacts of conflicts and violence in the post-conflict local election implementation on the democracy development and peace building here?
6. In your opinion, how is the prospect of democracy and peace building here with the emergence of various conflicts and violence?
7. How do you see post-conflict local elections or democracy development that are accompanied by various conflicts and violence will disturb stability and generally peace prospect here?
8. How are the initiatives and efforts of the local government or other government institutions and security elements in handling and settle conflicts and violence emerging in the post-conflict local election implementation processes here?
9. How are the initiatives of the people and various civil societies in addressing and settling conflicts and violence emerging in the post-conflict local election implementation processes here?
10. How do you prioritize peace stability and absence of democracy or democracy and the absence of peace stability?
11. What are your expectations of handling of conflicts and violence in the post-conflict local election implementation processes here?

RESEARCH QUESTION 4:

To what extent is the institutional and social readiness in the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh and Maluku?

Related Informants:

Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local election and peace-building; local journalists, community figures (traditional or religious); politicians, bureaucrats, KIP/KPU, and general public

Interview Questions:

1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution?
2. In general, how do you see the local government's readiness in post-conflict local election implementation here?
3. In general, how do you see the readiness of election institutions such as KPU/KIP, *Panwaslu*, etc.) in the post-conflict local election implementation here?
4. In general, how do you see the readiness and participation/engagement of NGOs in the post-conflict local election implementation?
5. How do you see political party readiness (human resource, management, organization, etc) in the post-conflict local elections here?

6. In your opinion, how are the participation and engagement of the general public in the implementation of the post-conflict local elections here?
7. In your opinion, what are the impacts of the readiness of all elements above (local government, post-conflict local election organizing institutions, political parties, NGOs, and general public) on the peace development and peace building here?
8. How do you see the level of acceptance (willingness to accept defeat) of the wider society on the post-conflict local election results here?
9. How do you see competitions inherent in the post-conflict local elections have created frictions and disunity among the society (religion, group, tribe, etc)?
10. How do you see frictions that occur in the constellation of post-conflict local elections often serve as the extension of the previous conflicts?
11. In your opinion, what are the impacts of the extension of the previous conflicts in the post-conflict local elections on the democracy development and peace building here?
12. How do you describe the post-conflict political constellation and map here by comparing the similar thing before the post-conflict era?
13. In your opinion, what is the level of transparency and freedom in the post-conflict local elections here?
14. In your opinion, what about the timing between the peace agreement and post-conflict local election implementation here? Is it ideal or when is the ideal timing?
15. What is your general expectation of the post-conflict local election implementation here?

ANNEX 2: *INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT FORM*

Interview #   :
Interviewee(s)   :
Age   :
Gender   :
Occupation   :
Affiliation   :

Date and time   :
Location of interview :
Researchers   :

Q: ………………………..
A: ………………………..

ANNEX 3: EXAMPLE OF DATA *CODING GRID* FOR ANALYSIS

RESEARCH QUESTION 1:

In what level have post-conflict local election helped to develop democracy and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) in Aceh and Maluku?

Name of Informant	Sub-Theme	Sub-Theme	Sub-Theme	Sub-Theme

Profiles of NVMS Research Team

Mohammad Hasan Ansori is a researcher at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of the sociology department, Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta. He obtained his Ph.D. in sociology from University of Hawaii, Manoa, USA in 2011, with a dissertation entitled *Between self-interested and socio-psychological motivations: the complexity and dynamic of ethnic conflict decision in Indonesia.* His research focus includes conflict and peace studies, social movements, consumerism and culture of classes, as well as ethnic relationship. He has also published some articles in national and international journals such as *Asian Journal of Social Sciences; Stability: an International Journal of Security and Development; Exploration: a Journal of Southeast Asian Studies; Studia Islamika; Heritage of Nusantara: an International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage; Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM; The Habibie Center Review,* and some book-chapter as well as book publication in progress by Routledge Press. He can be contacted via email: mansori_uhm@yahoo.com or ansori@hawaii.edu

R. Praditya Andika Putra is a researcher at SNPK-THC program. He completed his bachelor degree in the department of Sociology at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia. His study's interest focuses on the issues related to economics instability and conflict, relations of corporation-local community, community development as model of gang's violence and conflict resolution in urban areas.

Johari Efendi is a researcher at SNPK-THC program and one of the lawyers at the Jakarta's Legal Aid Institute (LBH). He obtained his bachelor degree in Law from the Faculty of Law, University of General Soedirman (UNSOED), Purwokerto. He completed his Master degree on Conflict and Dispute Resolution in Law School, University of Oregon, USA in 2013. His interest and concern over issues of peace-building, post-conflict, mediation, negotiation, facilitation, collaborative governance and urban conflict. He has written working paper at Center for Humanitarian Dialogue;

Sopar Peranto is a research at SNPK-THC program. He completed his bachelor degree in Sociology Department of Faculty of Social and Political Science (FISIP), University of Indonesia. His researches mainly focus on conflict and violence issues in Indonesia.

Rudi Sukandar is advisor to SNPK team and lectures at STIKOM London School of Public Relations-Jakarta (LSPR). He obtained his Ph.D. from School of Communication Studies, Ohio University, Athens OH. The research topic includes inter-personal, organizational and communal communications and conflicts.

Imron Rasyid is the project manager of SNPK-THC program. He completed his bachelor degree in Anthropology at the Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He has interests and is active in various studies on conflicts and violence. He engages in various program evaluations in various organizations.

Sofyan Cholid is a researcher at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of Social Welfare Science Departement at University of Indonesia. He got his master degree in Geography from the University of Indonesia. His research interest includes social planning sector and has more focus on quantitative approach.

Fathun Karib is a research at SNPK-THC program and a lecturer of Sociology Department at Jakarta Islamic State University, and of International Relations Department at Paramadina University. He completed his master degree in South-East Asian Studies in University of Passau, Germany in 2013. His study interests include development, natural resource conflicts, disasters as socio-political phenomenon. He has also published articles on conflicts and violence in The Habibie Center Review and JakartaBeat.net

Nurina Vidya Hutagalung is a researcher at SNPK-THC program. She completed her Master degree in Peace and Conflict Resolution studies at University of Indonesian Defense (UNHAN). Her interest in researches includes issues on international and Indonesian conflicts, defense and peacebuilding. Her published research is "Local Wisdom for Harmonization of People's Life in the State-Defending Perspective: Case Study of Mataram City".

Profiles of THC and NVMS/SNPK

The Habibie Center was established by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and the family in 1999 as an independent, non-government and non-profit organization. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society based on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values. The missions of The Habibie Center are, firstly, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects and promotes human rights, to carry out studies and advocacy to issues on progress of democracy and human rights, and secondly, to improve effective human resource management and dissemination of technologies.

Address: Jl. Kemang Selatan No. 98, Jakarta Selatan 12560, Indonesia
Ph. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7211 | Fax. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7212
E-mail: nvms@habibiecenter.or.id | www.habibiecenter.or.id
facebook.com/habibiecenter@habibiecenter

National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK) is a breakthrough in the information system which provides data and analysis on conflicts and violence occurring in various regions across Indonesia. The NVMS projects are led by The Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, with support from World Bank and The Habibie Center. The main activities of NVMS are *firstly*, detailed and regular collection of data on when, where, how and why violence occurs and what the impacts are. The NVMS's data have been collected since 1998 and updated on monthly basis and presented through NVMS portal (www.snpk-indonesia.com); *secondly*, analysis on the data collected and researches on conflicts and violence. NVMS is earmarked as a reference to the development of policies and programs of violence handling and prevention. Since December 2, 2014 NVMS has monitored all provinces in Indonesia.