Conflict Studies in Indonesia:
A Preliminary Survey of Indonesian Publications

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Introduction

Studies on conflict in Indonesia have reached an unprecedented stage in terms of the proliferation of publications, both in print and online. There are two interrelated reasons for this new and significant development.

First, the increased number of incidents of violent conflict that took place especially from 1996 to 2003 (Varshney et al. 2004), together with a marked increase in inter- and intra-religious conflict over the last few years (Ali-Fauzi, Alam, and Panggabean 2009). The upsurge in violent communal clashes has in turn led to an increasing number of studies of these conflicts.

Second, democratisation in Indonesia has heralded a new era of publishing on previously restricted or forbidden topics. The New Order did not allow the publication and public discussion on ethnic (Suku), religious (Agama), racial (Ras), and inter-group (Antargolongan) conflict. This was known as the SARA policy. Reformasi and the demise of the New Order ushered in new freedom that has enabled the publication of books and articles on social conflict.

Together with an increased number of conflict incidents in

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Indonesia, this accounts for the ongoing proliferation of publications in political, social, and economic conflict both by Indonesian and international authors and researchers (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005; Thung 2006).

Surprisingly, little effort has been made to map the range, quality, and type of these new and growing publications. The main purpose of this article is to begin the process of filling in this gap in the literature by asking a number of interrelated questions: What methods are used to study conflict in Indonesia? What are some of the most important findings of these studies and how are they represented in publications? And how are the findings feeding into the issues of democratisation, power, and conflict resolution in Indonesia – if at all?

To answer these questions, this article will review a sample of published material on conflict and violence in Indonesia, written or co-authored by Indonesian authors. This selective approach will limit the literature reviewed whilst highlighting the significant contribution made to the literature by Indonesian scholars, researchers and journalists. Much of the literature on conflict and violence in Indonesia that has been published during the last decade was written by non-Indonesian scholars and researchers (for reference see, for example, van Klinken 2007; Varshney 2010). Many of these publications has been reviewed elsewhere (see Davidson 2009) but much less has been done regarding less well-known Indonesian authors. The particularistic approach adopted in this article will provide an opportunity for reviewing the state of conflict studies by Indonesian writers and scholars.

In addition, the article does not pretend to be exhaustive. The literature referred to in this article includes publications dealing with religious, ethnic, and anti-Chinese conflict. These constitute the most violent types of conflict in Indonesia, reflecting the most important cleavages in Indonesian society (Varshney et al. 2004). Other publications dealt with in this article refer to separatist conflict in Aceh and Papua, as well as conflict over natural resources and the environment. Although this article makes no claim to covering all of
the literature dealing with these types of conflict, it tries to provide a substantial overview of the issues, parties and dynamics involved in the conflicts. It should be noted however, that specific types of conflict such as inter-village brawls and industrial disputes are not covered.

With the above caveat in mind, this article will begin with a section on religious conflict – both inter-religious and sectarian or intra-religious. The following sections will then deal with ethnic conflict, separatist conflict, and environmental and natural resources conflict respectively. At the end of the article some conclusions will be presented.

**Religious Conflict**

*Dataset on religious conflict*

Based on a database created by using local newspaper reports on collective violence in Indonesia from 1999 to 2003, Varshney et al. (2004) report trends and patterns of collective violence in Indonesia. The findings indicate that inter-religious violence—mainly between Christians and Muslims—had caused the largest destruction of lives in Indonesia since 1998. This was followed by inter-ethnic violence. Christian-Muslim violence is not a post-1998 phenomenon since conflict between these communities, and other types of conflict, occurred in parts of Indonesia prior to 1998 (Mas’oed et al. 2000). However, since 1998, Muslim-Christian strife became more frequent and more deadly.

Among the publications that discuss aggregate data on religious conflict in Indonesia are Alam (2009) and Ali-Fauzi et al. (2009). Unlike Varshney et al. (2004), these studies focus on religious conflict. Like Varshney et al. these studies use local newspaper reports as sources. Alam presents the patterns of religious conflict from 2004-2007 in ten provinces of western Indonesia (eight provinces in Sumatra, along with West Java and Banten provinces in Java). Alam finds that violent religious conflict tends to concentrate geographically both at the provincial and district or municipal levels. Ali-Fauzi et al. (2009) analyze dataset on religious conflict in Indonesia based on reports from *Kompas* newspaper and the government news agency,
Antara. Their analysis show that most incidents of religious conflict in Indonesia took the form of peaceful protest (sixty-six percent of incidents). These mostly occurred during the transition period from the New Order to reformasi, and were mostly related to communal as compared to sectarian or moral issues. Communal groups—and not religious groups—dominated the acts of violence perpetrated during religious conflict. This study also show that information on the role of the police and security forces during religious conflicts was inadequate. Both Kompas and Antara only reported one-quarter of the total 718 conflict incidents in which the presence of security forces was assumed.

Maluku and North Maluku

The violence involving Christians and Muslims in Maluku and North Maluku which took place from 1999-2002 generated a wave of publications. These publications labelled the conflict as religious, although religion was ascribed varying different roles in the conflict, including as a justification for violence, an instrument of mobilisation or a factor among other structural factors that lead to the conflict (Komnas HAM 2005; Rahman 2005; Sudjangi 2005; Tomagola 2001; Triono 2001). Some of these publications deal with the conflict in Maluku and North Maluku in general. They cover the causes, dynamics, impact and the casualties of the conflict. Hasan (2002) discusses the involvement of jihadi forces in Ambon, and other publications discuss efforts at reconciliation and conflict management both by the conflicting parties and outside actors including the central government (Andrianto, 2000; Salampessy and Husain 2001; Leatemia 2003; Pieris, 2004; Komnas HAM, 2005; Sudjangi et al. 2005; Awaludin 2009).

Other publications emphasize a specific aspect or dimension of the conflict in Maluku and North Maluku. Suaedy (2000) and Azca (2006) discuss the role of the military and police in mitigating and, especially, in exacerbating the conflict. Eriyanto (2003) examines the role of the media and how violent conflict polarised journalists in Maluku. The role of traditional norms and institutions in the conflict and in conflict management is the focus of several publications
(Leatemia, 2003; Laksono and Topatimasang, 2004; Husain, 2005). Kastor (2000) and Waileruny (2010) exemplify the role of different conspiracies (among Muslims and Christians) behind the conflict. Pariela (2008) provides an interesting study on how and why a village in Ambon escaped from the violence during the conflict. Although this list only scratches the surface of an enormous body of literature, it does suggest the prominent place given to research utilising case study.

Poso

Violence involving Christians and Muslims in Poso, Central Sulawesi, has been the topic of several publications. Some publications elaborate on the phases of the conflict from the end of 1998 to 2001, narrating the conflict dynamics, damage and casualties caused by the conflict, as well as the Malino agreement in 2001 that formally ended the communal violence (Ecip et al., 2002; Damanik, 2003; Komnas HAM, 2005; Purwanto, 2007; Awaludin 2009). Other publications have focused on specific aspects of the conflict, such as the negative role of the security forces (Aditjondro, 2004; Sangaji, 2007), the impact of the conflict, particularly on women and children (Gogali, 2009), and the political and economic interests of the elite during and after the conflict in Poso (Prasetyo and Aditjondro, 2010).

The role of religion and traditional norms and institutions is the subject of several publications. For some publications (Ali, 2005; Padmiaty, 2005; Hasrullah, 2009), religion did not cause the conflict in Poso; the struggle for power in the local politics did. Karim et al. (2005), however, see the conflict in Poso as related to religion, both during and after the conflict. The role of traditional norms and institutions in Poso is the subject for Ruagadi et al. (2007) and Aditjondro (2007). Culturally and traditionally, Poso enshrines the value of harmony among people of different backgrounds, such as through pekasiwia (equalising the status) rituals and dero dance (group dance with players from different gender and other backgrounds). However, local institutions such as these are not sufficiently institutionalised to support a plural society in Poso. But, for Aditjondro, institutionalisation or lack of it is not the
crucial problem with regard to traditional institutions in Poso. For him, a combination of old and new institutions and mechanisms, accepted by all the parties and which were able to address the issues at hand, are the real need in Poso.

**Place of worship**

An increasingly important type of religious conflict is disputes over places of worship, especially churches, mostly in West Java. Reports on this type of conflict, mainly produced by institutions working within the human rights field in Indonesia, include the protection of religious freedom as an important theme (Wahid Institute 2009; Cholil 2009; Ali-Fauzi and Panggabean 2009; Setara Institute 2011). Asfinawati et al. (2008) have investigated some incidents of conflict over the place of worship, including at Jemaat Gereja in Bandung district (West Java). Ali-Fauzi et al. (2011) also discuss cases of conflict over the location of churches in the Jakarta area, some of which have been resolved and some of which are still ongoing (at the time of publication of this article). To indicate further variance in the conflict over the building of churches, Ali-Fauzi et al. include case studies where several churches in Jakarta have been built without precipitating conflict.

Conflict over places of worship is arguably one of the most important problems of inter-religious conflict in contemporary Indonesia since the violent forms of inter-religious collective violence receded. Publications on the conflict over places of worship have approached the conflict from several perspectives, including human rights, state regulation, social regulation, majority and minority relations, and the role of the police. Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi (2011) Ali-Fauzi et al. (2012) and Kontras (2012) locate disputes over places of worship in the context of religious freedom and the role of the state in protecting religious freedom. Their study offers recommendations on protecting religious freedom, emphasising the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the police, the role of religious leaders and civil society organisations in supporting the police in maintaining peace and freedom of religions.
Sectarian conflict

Sectarian conflict, or conflict between different strands within one religion, has received new attention as incidents of attacks against Ahmadiyah increased since reformasi. Hakim (2005) documents a riot in September 2002 in East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province, against the Ahmadi community. According to Hakim, the previously latent conflict became manifest in the reformasi era. Asfinawati et al. (2008) investigate attacks against Ahmadiyah on the island of Lombok, in Manislor, Kuningan (West Java), and attacks against a small group called al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah Siroj Jaziroh in Padang (West Sumatra). These attacks have illustrated some patterns, including the issuance of fatwa (religious decree) by ulama (religious scholars) against the minority group, the presence of thugs to press the government to disband the minority sects, and the failure of the police to protect religious minorities. Kontras (2012) investigates the role of the police in dealing with anti-Ahmadi violence in Cikeusik, West Java, that led to the killing of three Ahmadis, as well as other anti-Ahmadi incidents in Manislor and Ciputat.

The relationship between fatwa and sectarian violence is discussed by Assyaukanie (2009). Assyaukanie argues that some fatwa by the ulama in Indonesia tend to strengthen intolerance which is vulnerable to triggering violence against minority sects. A fatwa by the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI - Majelis Ulama Indonesia) declaring Ahmadiyah as a heretical group reinforced hate, animosity, and violence against this group. Since members of MUI come from different Sunni organisations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, and other influential Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the fatwa reflected a wider network of intolerance against the Ahmadiyah group, as well as the propensity for the perpetration of violence against this religious minority.

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict in West and Central Kalimantan

Communal violence in West and Central Kalimantan has been the focus of several publications. There is a large body of literature on the
conflict involving Malays and Dayaks against the Madurese in West Kalimantan (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000; Purwana 2003; Giring 2004; Alqadrie 2004; Tasanaldy 2007), more so in fact than the literature on conflict between the Dayaks and the Madurese in Central Kalimantan (Cahyono 2004; Sukandar 2007). Varshney et al. (2004) found that, for the period between 1990 and 2003, the conflict between Madurese and Dayaks/Malays in the two provinces were among the most violent conflicts in Indonesia, second only to Muslim-Christian violence in terms of the number of incidents and victims. The violence in West Kalimantan started in 1996, with peaks of violence in 1997 and 1999, while the violence in Central Kalimantan occurred in 2001.

On the causes of conflict between Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan, Giring (2004) argues that cultural differences caused the violence. Alqadrie (2004), however, maintains that socio-cultural, economic, and political factors were the cause. In this case, socio-cultural factors include ethnic identification, norms of dispute settlement, religious understanding, and patron-client relations. Economic factors include competition and the attempted dominance by the Madurese. Lastly, political factors include competition between the local elite and the use of ethnicity to mobilise people to dominate local politics. On the causes of the conflict between the Malays and Madurese in Sambas, West Kalimantan, Purwana (2003) classify these into two types, namely structural and cultural causes. Petebang and Sutrisno (2000) emphasize the role of history and negative stereotyping as causes of the conflict.

While *adat* (customs and tradition) may promote incompatibilities and violence, it may also mitigate ethnic conflict and foster inter-ethnic relations in the aftermath of violent conflicts. Rosdiawan et al. (2007) underline the role of local wisdom in creating peace in the plural community in West Kalimantan. For example, a Dayak family organised a wedding ceremony (*jonggan*) in which everybody, including the Madurese, was welcome to congratulate the groom and the bride and to celebrate the ceremony together. These inter-ethnic contacts took place in villages studied by the author in West Kalimantan, including Retok and Korek. These villages
remained safe and peaceful even when violence struck nearby villages. Local community leaders in three communities (Madurese, Dayak, and Malay) actively restrained their communities from violence and met regularly to talk over issues and settle disputes. Such *adat* mechanisms saved the two villages from the conflict.

**Violence against the Chinese**

A number of publications have discussed the anti-Chinese riots that occurred in the late-Suharto period, particularly in 1998. Some of these publications have focused on the cities where the riots occurred. Latif and Lebang (1998) studied the riots against the Chinese in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in mid-September 1997. The killing of a ‘*pribumi*’ girl by an ethnic Chinese youth triggered the riots, but the cause of the riot was the perceived economic inequality between ethnic Chinese and the non-Chinese population in Makassar. Nurhadiantomo (2004) has studied the anti-Chinese violence in Solo, Central Java, that took place between 13-15 May 1998. He argues that social cleavages were characterised by social and economic inequality, racial and ethnic differences, perceived relations between the Chinese and the New Order, and cultural, religious and educational backgrounds. Pattiradjawane (2000) describes how the riots in Jakarta of 1998 unfurled, the damage incurred to people and property, the rape of Chinese women and the role of provocateurs in the riots. The author also discusses two possible causes of the riots: (a) they were racially motivated; (b) they were a strategy of the elite to divert the attention of the public from the struggle for power.

Heryanto (1999), Pattiradjawane (2000), and Sidharta (2000) discuss the rape of Chinese women during the riots of 1998 in Jakarta. Heryanto calls the rape political rape and locates it in a broader context, including structural violence of the New Order, the oppression of women, discrimination against the ethnic Chinese minority, and the impunity of the security forces. Pattiradjawane, based on the report of the May 1998 Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) and other sources, discusses the controversy surrounding the mass rape, the types of rape and harassment that took place, and the number of victims. Sidharta argues that the mass rape during the riots of 1998 struck a
double blow to the identity of the victims as women and as Chinese. The author argues that this violence reflected a long history of violence against women.

Interesting studies on Chinese-‘pribumi’ conflict include Susanto (2000), who asks why anti-Chinese riots did not occur in Yogyakarta, and Panggabean and Smith (2011), who ask why they occurred in certain cities but not in others. Susanto (2000) contends that the Chinese community in Yogyakarta adapted to local, Javanese, communities and maintained a modest life style, far from the images of abundance and exclusivity. In addition, the Sultan of Yogyakarta played a key role in preventing anti-Chinese riots in the city in 1998. Panggabean and Smith (2011) ask why anti-Chinese riots took place in some Indonesian cities (Medan and Solo) but not in others (Surabaya and Yogyakarta). Employing process tracing within a sub-national comparison of the four cities, the authors argue that the anti-Chinese riots of May 1998 were a frame-shifting strategy employed by security forces to distract public attention from their failure to control anti-government student demonstrations. Anti-Chinese rioting took place only where the local government and the security forces failed to limit the repertoire and spatial reach of protests used by student demonstrators.

Other studies have focused on long-term problems such as Chinese identities and discrimination against the Indonesian Chinese (Wibowo 2000; Bachrun and Hartanto 2000; Thung 2000; Pattiradjawane 2000; Suparlan 2003; Suryadinata 2003; Efendi and Prasetyadji 2008). Wibowo (2000) collected articles which discuss the problems, discrimination, and violence faced by the Chinese of Indonesia before and during the fall of the New Order. Suryadinata’s book (2008) portrays a different picture of the situation of the Chinese community. Published ten years after the anti-Chinese violence of 1998, the authors in this collection of articles show how democratisation in Indonesia has resulted in insignificant progress in the legal, cultural, and political status of the Indonesian Chinese (Lembong 2008; Winarta 2008).
Separatist Conflict

Papua

Conflict in Papua increasingly attracts the attention of researchers and commentators who discuss different strands of the conflict and its causes, whilst offering various suggestions on how address the issues concerned. Papuan nationalism (Pigay 2000), aspirations towards independence (Bhakti, 2005) and the different functions these serve (Widjojo 2006) indicate one aspect of the conflict in Papua which re-emerged since the fall of the New Order. Some books focus on the assassination of independence leader Dortheys Hiyo Eluay (Theys) in 2001 (e.g. Karoba and Gebze 2002; Ramandey 2004). Other topics discussed include disappointment with central government (Kholifan 1999; Raweyai 2002), human rights violations (van den Broek 2001; Al Araf & Mabruri 2012), sources of the conflict (Siregar 2004), and how mining industries interlock with conflict and human rights violations (Erari 1999; Ngadisah 2003). Finally, some publications address the role of dialogue (Widjojo et al. 2009; Tebay 2009; Situmorang 2012; Gunawan 2012) civil society (Sujito et al. 2009), and women (Prabawaningtyas 2012) in peacebuilding.

Bhakti (2005) focuses on the aspiration of Papuan independence, both among the Free Papua Movement or OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), and among the activists and intellectuals in Papua. This aspiration for independence indicates the persistence of the Papua problem. Widjojo (2006) argues that in Papua, both the Indonesian military and the pro-independence movement use the separatist discourse for their own interests. For the military, the existence of a separatist group threatening the integration of Indonesia justifies the violence they perpetrate in Papua. For pro-independence groups, separatist aspiration and violent response by the Indonesian military strengthens their desire to secede from Indonesia.

Kholifan (1999) discusses local disappointment with the policies of central government, such as the lack of attention to the history of Papua in the curriculum, unfair economic redistribution, lack of participation in social and economic development, the under-representation of Papuans in governmental positions, human
rights violations and marginalisation. According to Kholifan, these policies and approaches have led to the demand for independence by the OPM. Other sources of conflict cited include separatism, exploitation and the decline of local norms and institutions blamed on capitalism (Siregar 2004). The Bishop’s office in Jayapura has published literature on human rights in Papua, utilising reports from civil society organisations, the churches, news reports and interviews to produce a chronological list of incidents in Papua, including human rights violations (Van den Broek 2001).

In another book, Widjojo and his co-authors (2009) consider four causes of conflict in Papua: marginalisation of the Papuans; failure of development; violation of human rights; and absence of dialogue. Accordingly, this study proposes four key areas for dealing these problems. These are: recognition of a new paradigm of development, dialogue, reconciliation, and the establishment of a human rights court. These, the authors argue, will provide the road map toward a new Papua.

Tebay (2009) spearheads a new call for dialogue to end the conflict in Papua. According to Tebay, dialogue should involve the participation of Papuans (both indigenous population and migrants), with the agenda accepted and agreed by all participants. Assisted by facilitators, the dialogue should take place in several phases. The first phase would take the form of dialogue among the indigenous peoples of Papua. The second phase would be a dialogue among non-indigenous Papuans. The third would be a dialogue between representatives of the Papuans in Indonesia and Papuans abroad; and the fourth would be a dialogue between the representatives of the Indonesian Government and the Papuan people. In the final phase, a trusted and impartial facilitator would lead the dialogue sessions to reach agreements accepted by all. Then the result of the dialogue would be implemented, with a third party monitoring the implementation.

**Aceh**

An unprecedented wave of publications on conflict and its impact in Aceh has emerged since the fall of the New Order. Prasetyo
and Birks (2010) provide a background to the conflict. Many of these publications concern human rights violations perpetrated during the military operation of the 1990s (Eda and Dharma 1999; Rahmany P. 2001; Ishak 2000; Rachman and Ronnie 2000). Other studies have dealt with specific topics such as the role of the media in reporting the conflict (Anto 2002; Pardede 2002), the failure of counter-insurgency operations to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese (Sukma 2004), and the role of the Free Aceh Movement, known as GAM (Sulaiman 2000; Pane 2001; ). The most important turning point in the history of the conflict, the peace deal of 2005, has been discussed in several publications dealing with the peace process (e.g. Nurhasim 2005) and the role of Jusuf Kalla, the then Vice-President of Indonesia, in the process (Husain 2008; Aly et al. 2008; Awaludin 2008).

Eda and Dharma (1999) document human right violations from 1989-1998, when Aceh was designated a military operation area (DOM). These violations include torture, rape, summary execution, and disappearances mostly carried out by the security forces. Rahmany P. (2001) reported the story of Rumah Geudong, a military post that was also used for the detention, interrogation, and torture of suspected GAM members and their families, including women. Ishak (2000) provides a collection of short essays that refer to, but do not detail, human rights violations during the DOM era. Rachman and Ronnie (2000) document human rights violations perpetrated in 2000. Conditions of the internally displaced peoples (IDPs) are discussed in Gayatri and Purnawati (2005), while the deteriorating situation in the rural areas is the theme of inquiry in Cahyono (2008).

Anto (2002) looks into how local newspapers in Aceh and North Sumatra reported the conflict. This book combines a research report, essays on the conflict in Aceh by journalists, and a seminar report. It concludes that the reports were unbalanced, reflecting “New Order journalism” that affirmed the information from the government and security forces and ignored other sources. In addition, the book suggests that the press focused more on the conflicting parties and neglected the perspectives of the victims. They reported casualties and damage but not the longer-term impact of the war on the
community. They published statements and opinions of the security forces but less of the rebels and mostly ignored the victims in their coverage. The book stresses the need for balanced reporting, giving a voice to the victims, and peace journalism.

The agreement reached by the Government of Indonesia and the GAM inspired several publications. Husain (2008) chronicles his role as an aide to the then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla in the process which led to the agreement. This book, together with Aly et al. (2008) and Awaludin (2008), provides a behind-the-scenes insight into the processes that produced the historic deal. The book describes the role of key players, such as Kalla, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Martti Ahtisaari (mediator and former President of Finland), and members of the negotiating teams from both sides. Nurhasim (2008) argues that the leverage of the mediator, the trust of the negotiating parties to the mediator, and a comprehensive peace agenda explain the success of the Helsinki negotiations. Also important were support from external parties, limited access for the media during the negotiation, and pre-negotiation preparation.

Several publications have discussed the challenges of the post-conflict situation in Aceh, including development and reconstruction issues (Gayatri 2008), the transformation of rebel groups into political parties (Aliabbas 2008), the implementation of local elections (Hasan 2008; ISAI 2010), and the role of the military (Yanuarti 2008) and the police (Siregar 2008). Nurhasim and Bhakti (2008) refer to a host of other post-agreement problems in Aceh, notably crime, safety, poverty and the failure to establish the truth and reconciliation commission as mandated by the Helsinki agreement, while Prasetyo and Aditjondro (2010) describe the role of business and material interests accompanying the peace process in Aceh.

**Environmental and Natural Resources Conflict**

Scholars and activists have explored many substantive topics related to environmental and natural resources conflict. This section will point to some works across key areas in these conflicts: mining corporations and violent conflict (Bachriadi 1998; Zulkarnain et
al. 2003; Zulkarnain et al. 2005; Prasetiawan 2005; Siregar 2006; Putroand Tolomundu 2006; the impact of mining on women (Erman 2010; Umar 2010); oil and gas (De Rosari 2007); geothermal energy (Prayogo 2006); forest-related conflict (Wulan et al. 2004); palm oil (Sirait 2009); natural resources and boundary disputes (Tim Mediasi Resolusi Konflik 2010); and decentralisation and natural resource conflict (Baiquni and Rijanta 2007).

How mining corporations became entangled in violent conflict and how they trigger disputes and violence in the community is the theme which Bachriadi (1998) focusses on. Using the experience of Freeport Indonesia in Papua and Kelian Equatorial Mining in East Kalimantan, the book outlines cases of human rights violations such as the right to self-determination, the right to life, and freedom of fear from arbitrary arrest, disappearance, torture, and so on. Cases of conflict and violations arising from gold mining in Pongkor and Cikotok, West Java, is the subject which Zulkarnain et al. (2003) explore. Parties entangled in the conflict include the state-owned company Aneka Tambang, local communities, migrants, security forces, local governments, civil society organizations, and members of PETI – unregistered small-scale gold miners. Different forms of conflict such as riots, attacks, arson, and demonstrations have occurred between the communities and PETI, between PETI and Aneka Tambang, and between Aneka Tambang and local communities.

Other contentious issues relating to the mining industry include divestment (Prasetiawan 2005) in the context of decentralisation, and hazards to the environment (Siregar 2006; Putroand Tolomnundu 2006). Umar (2010) and Erman (2010) discuss the impact of mining on women. Erman argues that women are marginalised in the mining sector, and the impact of mining industries on women range from prostitution, restricted access to the non-mining economy and forest products, to the scarcity of clean water for their families. Zulkarnain et al. (2005) have studied tin mining in Bangka and Belitung islands, where the deregulation of tin mining caused rapid social change and conflict between the governments (central, district, provincial, and village governments), companies (private and local government-
owned) and the artisanal mining groups. The main issues behind the conflict there include the plurality of regulations, jurisdictional disputes, social conflict, and environmental problems.

Wulan et al. (2004) surveyed national and provincial newspapers in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java to study forest-related conflict in Indonesia from 1997-2003. The data show that incidents of conflict increased in 2000 during the transition to decentralisation. More incidents took place in East Kalimantan, followed by Sumatra and Central Java. The actors in these conflicts included local communities, concession owners (HPH), industrial plantations (HTI), palm oil plantations, and national parks. The most common causes of conflict were unclear administrative and territorial boundaries together with perceived injustice by the communities whose access to forest resources and benefits are restricted by the companies. This research proposes that the companies and government should fulfil the basic livelihood needs of the community and the employment of third-party mediation and long-term programmes to deal with the conflict.

De Rosari (2007) has collected articles, reports, photographs, and graphics from the daily Kompas newspaper on the case of Lapindo Brantas, Sidoarjo, East Java. The data show how an extractive industry—the oil and gas industry in this case—caused conflict after hot mud in large volumes poured out from an operation site. The mud buried villages, rice fields, roads, and factories in an area of approximately six thousand hectares. Protests and demonstrations against the company took place in East Java and Jakarta, involving different parties such as the company, communities in the surrounding areas, civil society organizations, and the Government of Indonesia. The impact of the spill includes displacement of thousands of people, sudden unemployment, and the closing of dozens of factories. Other issues include water pollution, inadequate and late compensation, and a legal battle involving the company and the victims of the spills. There is also a legal controversy about whether the Lapindo Brantas case should be regarded as a natural disaster or as an outcome of mismanagement on the company’s side.

Conflict involving a geothermal electricity plant in Pangalengan,
West Java, is described by Prayogo (2006). The parties to this low-level conflict were the industry, the communities of the surrounding villages and sub-districts, and the government. The forms of conflict included demonstrations or rallies, threats, damages to property, and theft. The main issues include the employment of local people in the industry, assistance to and cooperation with local business and livelihoods, environmental and social impact. Although the company accommodated most of these issues and demands, the writer argues that the state should play a bigger role in resolving the issues and problems related to the geothermal industry.

Sirait (2009) focuses on the role of palm oil plantations in West Kalimantan in creating conflict. The government plans to expand the palm oil plantation in the province to five million hectares and make the province the home to the largest palm oil plantation in Indonesia (followed by Riau and Papua, which have plantations of about three million hectares each). Forests and agricultural land cultivated by small farmers with no ownership certificates would be converted into palm oil plantation. The government considers this land empty and unproductive. West Kalimantan is already a locus for conflict relating to palm oil production, and more incidents are expected as displacement, and the lack of access to land for indigenous populace and migrants—such as the Madurese and the Buginese—take place on a fairly regular basis. Forms of conflict include blockades, rallies, occupations, attacks, communal conflict (anti-Chinese, anti-Javanese, and anti-Madurese), violation of the rights the indigenous people, and class-based conflict.

**Trends in the Studies of Conflict in Indonesia**

Many publications in conflict studies in Indonesia have emerged during the last decade, written by academics, commentators, and workers of NGOs. These publications have reflected the increasing number of incidents within a range of different types of conflicts, including violent ones, which have taken place across the country. In addition, the emergence of this body of literature has also pointed to new opportunities for publishing on topics that were outlawed or restricted under the New Order, namely SARA or Suku, Agama, Ras,
and Antar-golongan. During the New Order, it was possible to find out how many banana trees or condom users there were in a village in Java. But information on conflict and incompatibilities in society remained sketchy or absent. The end of the New Order, therefore, saw the beginning of free discussion, participated by a wider array of individuals and institutions on different types of conflicts in the public realm and publications. Nevertheless, this situation also reflected some limitations.

Most of the literature reviewed in this article takes the form of single case studies presented in books, book chapters or articles. Many of these case studies, however, do not include any theoretical development and do not therefore constitute case studies in the social scientific sense. Many authors do not provide a conceptual or theoretical context for the cases studied. Some do not propose specific questions to be answered by the study. Many publications contain data and information on the conflict discussed, and they are certainly useful as a source of data and information. Nevertheless, theoretically informed research design is an important requirement to increasing knowledge on conflict—from inter-religious to natural resource conflict—in Indonesia. Additionally, ethnographic approaches, an important tool for generating qualitative data and information on conflict dynamics, were seldom used in the cases under review.

Some publications reviewed in this article initiated a new approach to researching conflict in Indonesia by creating a dataset on incidents. The first attempt was done by Tadjoeddin (2002) and followed by Varshney et al. (2004), covering more than three thousand six hundred incidents of collective violence. Of these, more than one thousand resulted in deaths. Varshney et al. adopt the following conflict types: ethno-communal (inter-ethnic, inter-religious, and intra-religious or sectarian violence), state-versus-community violence (such as attacks by security forces on civilians and vice versa), economic (conflict over land, natural resources, and industrial conflicts), and others (such as vigilante killings and inter-village brawls). It did not cover separatist conflict. Alam (2009) and Ali-Fauzi et al. (2009) based their study on a dataset of religious

Some case studies identify a number of causes that explain why certain violent conflict occurred. However, the lack of good discussion on the theoretical context results in unsatisfactory conclusions. For example, several publications on environmental and natural resources conflict enumerate a variety of causes to the conflicts — such as plurality of state regulations, jurisdictional disputes involving different levels of government, societal conflicts, environmental problems, human rights violations, and other causes. While causes that lead to a conflict might generally be many, it was peculiar to many of these studies that they did not discuss the relationship between these individual causes and how they relate to one another in producing the violence studied. Similarly, publications on the conflict in Aceh and Papua mention human right violations as causes of the conflict despite the face that many of these causes are in fact grievances that emerged during the conflict and which were not present at the onset of the conflict. An attempt to classify these causes, for example to differentiate between the root causes, triggering causes, and sustaining causes, would make a good start. However, these are nevertheless absent in most of the publications.

This survey has included several publications — that make reference to conspiracy theories. However, there are not many of them and there are none in the literature on environment and natural resources conflict. This is despite the popularity of conspiracy theories in explaining violence in Indonesia, according to some. Also, this survey found a number of examples of cultural explanations for violence, such as the Dayak-versus-Madurese conflict or Malays-versus-Madurese conflict in Kalimantan. The bulk of the literature, however, emphasises different historical and structural explanations of the conflicts. An agency-oriented approach to communal violence, which focuses on reasons, justification, and participants’ account, is seldom used.

In addition to analytical or theoretical significance, a question should be asked with regard to the subsequent use of the literature on
conflict and violence in Indonesia. For instance, has the evidence and the conclusions generated by this literature fed into better public policy responses – for instance in the areas of policing, development, and governance? Many of the publications reviewed in this paper make policy recommendations, assuming a relation between research and policy or theory and practice. However, research on conflict in Indonesia is still in its infancy and its connection to policy responses dealing with conflict is still very weak. Thung (2006) identifies a number of challenges, such as the need for better use of analytical concepts, more research on conflict cases, and knowledge accumulation related to conflict in Indonesia such as studies on ethnicities, religions, and economic relations to increase the relevance of research on conflicts in Indonesia.

**Power, Democratization and Conflict Resolution**

An important implication of this survey of literature relates to the issues of power, democratization and conflict resolution in Indonesia. Democratization can be seen as “movement towards a broader and more balanced array of norms for managing conflicts, such that violence and injustices can be progressively minimized, human and social capital enhanced, confidence in the future and opportunities for effective participation broadened, and quality of life improved” (Davies 2004, 145). Many of the conflicts studied in the literature took place when Indonesia was in the transition phase between the New Order and reformasi. It was a time of interregnum, when the old was dying and the new was yet to be born. In fact, as shown by Varshney et al. (2004), there is an inverted U-shaped of incidents and deaths related to violence during the transition from the New Order to reformasi, signaling a trend similar to those countries experiencing transition from authoritarian rule to democracy elsewhere (Klopp & Zuern 2007).

Based on the literature review, there are several challenges for Indonesian democratization. Firstly, how to deal with religious and ethnic diversity. Indonesia prides itself on being a diverse country where communities from different religious and ethnic backgrounds live and cooperate peacefully. There is strong evidence for this since,
even in the peak of collective violence during transition, most cities in Indonesia remained peaceful. Only fifteen districts and cities, totaling 6.5 percent of the population in 2000, accounted for 85.5 percent of all deaths caused by collective violence (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004). However, ethno-religious violence, when it takes place, claims many more lives than other forms of group violence. The literature on interreligious violence in Maluku, North Maluku, and Poso identifies weaknesses in the conflict-mitigating mechanisms across communities with different religious backgrounds. The literature also cites the inability of the state to deal with communal violence.

The literature on other types of religious conflicts, albeit at lower level of violence though not in the number of incidents, provides another dimension of this challenge. Conflict over places of worship demonstrates how intolerance damages the pluralism of Indonesia and the image of moderation so often referred to in regard to relations between communities of different religious backgrounds. On this issue, the challenge for Indonesian democracy is how to better protect minorities whilst providing mechanisms with which to counter majority oppression. The role of the police in enforcing the law and maintaining security is often minimal, indicating the need for further reform in the security sector.

The same challenge applies to the relations between sects of one religion. As indicated by the studies on vigilante attacks against the Ahmadi, the Muslim majority in Indonesia needs to develop mechanisms for respecting internal diversity, and not to dominate or subordinate minorities through vigilantism. At the same time, studies on fatwa or religious opinion by the Indonesian Ulama Council provide telling examples of how the religious leadership cares more about protecting the religious interests of the Muslim majority, and not about restraining the masses from taking the law into their own hands through vigilantism, nor about developing intra-Muslim dialogue and tolerance. A classic challenge of democracy everywhere, the problem of majority rights and minority protection is an ensuing challenge for Indonesian democratization understood as conflict resolution.
Studies on ethnic violence in West and Central Kalimantan point to similar problems but add another dimension. When tension erupted between two ethnic groups, what mechanisms did they have for avoiding violence that would lead to the collapse of order and further instability? Violence between Dayaks and Madurese and between Madurese and Malays indicate a power based approach to incompatibilities among ethnic groups, where force and other leverage is used to try to dominate another ethnic group. The incidents of violent conflict in West and Central Kalimantan clearly reveal the absence of superordinate norms and mechanisms that work across ethnic lines. Democracy, therefore, needs to develop ways to fulfill the interests of different ethnic groups, thus preventing ethnic mobilization in responding to intergroup conflicts.

The case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, however, is different. As Indonesia democratizes, it becomes more tolerant and discriminates less against the ethnic Chinese. Ten years into reformasi, much of the legal, cultural, and political discrimination against the ethnic Chinese has disappeared. Still, Indonesian democracy needs to tolerate other minorities, including religious and sectarian minorities, and their rights to inclusive participation.

Literature on conflict in Papua and Aceh suggest there are many similarities in the conflict but highlight differences in their resolution. Issues of the historical background to the conflicts, separatism, armed resistance, and human rights violations are present in both cases. In Aceh, a totally different approach to dealing with the conflict in the previously restive province resulted in a peace agreement that has been in place since 2005. A peace process that addresses the interests and rights involved in the conflict will lead to a better peace. A similar approach should and could be used in dealing with the conflict in Papua. So far, a democratic Indonesia that is able to strike a deal in Aceh has failed to do so in Papua, despite calls for dialogue and nonviolent ways of addressing conflict in Papua.

Finally, the literature on environmental and natural resources conflict indicates a long term challenge to governance, in comparison to the more episodic nature of interreligious and interethnic conflicts.
These studies identify several problems in this area of conflict: a zero-sum perception of conflict among the conflicting parties, a dominant role played by a power-based approach among the conflicting parties and by the government, and injustice done to local communities including women. Business and investment that does not benefit the local communities (yet which benefits the often corrupt government officials) contributes to the formation of violence. The studies also suggest that the government and industries urgently need integrative, interest-based approaches to dealing with conflict in the environmental and natural resources sectors.


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