

DEMOCRACY AND MANAGING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: INDONESIA EXPERIENCE

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Abstract

The idea of democratic rule requires that democratically elected civilian government should have effective authority over the army. The role of national army is purely for defence. Army's direct involvement in politics will undermine its capability to cope with external threats. Indonesia is an example where the army was deeply involved in the country's political affairs. This article shows that Indonesian national army has already possessed political orientation since the beginning of Indonesia's independence. Military and political functions performed by the Indonesian army during revolutionary war has been influential factor in shaping army's doctrine and self-perception of his role as not only the guardian of the state but also political force of the country. The weakness of civilian institutions, elite conflicts and national culture especially Javanese tradition has contributed as well to this situation. The role of Indonesian army in politics has gradually decreased since the reform of Indonesia's political system initiated in 1998.

Keywords: *army, civil-military relations, Indonesia, politics*

Introduction

The issue of civil-military relations has been extensively discussed by scholars focusing on their academic research to find an ideal model in managing the two entities – the military and elected civilian government. Generally, an attempt to create military professionalism is by putting it under the control of civilian government. In democratic political climate, the main task of military is defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity from external threats, while government has responsibilities to formulate and decide the whole policies including national defence. On the other words, the government deals with strategy, and the military engages in tactics. Civilian government is a client of the military, and the military is a subordinate of the government. It will create ineffective government if the military intrudes on the political realm and takes over the government from civilian control. But sometimes the military also intervenes in civilian led government in the name political stability.

The problem of military involvement in politics generally happens to developing countries. The military intrudes on political affairs usually due to the fact that the weakness of civilian government. It is common issue for developing

countries when they come to existence without strong political institutions and, to some extent, social bases at grassroots level. The absence of political institutions and social bases is able to effect the running of government whereas civilian elites lack capability to mobilize their supporters in balancing military power. As consequence, the military is able to easily intervene and take over civilian led government.

Indonesia is one of countries whereas the military has had a great amount of influence in political life. The military has crucial roles in the war for independence. Even in the following years after independence, it has become one of important actors in determining country's political trajectories. And it got momentum to involve in politics after failed bloodshed rebellion of PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) or Communist Party of Indonesia in 1965. Afterward, the military along with *Golkar* as government party became the main supporters of Suharto's New Order for more than three decades. Even in its development, Indonesian army has introduced the concept of *dwifungsi*. It simply means that Indonesian army has functioned as not only main defender of the nation but social and political roles in creating and maintaining national stability.

The fall of Suharto's New Order in 1998 has triggered reformation of Indonesian political system. The role of civilian government has been strengthened. Political parties are of crucial roles in influencing and determining the outcomes of political processes or events. Civil society is more enthusiastic to pay attentions in social and political matters. Attempts to create military professionalism is increased. And military dualism manifested in the concept of *dwifungsi* has been diminished. It does not have its representatives anymore in the Indonesian Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR*). Military officials who are interested in competing political positions are required to retire from their military careers. In short, Indonesia's politics has become more democratic now. And here placing the military under civilian control is an important requirement, as many observers believe, to achieve democratic consolidation.

This article attempts to explore several important factors effecting civil-military relations in Indonesia. It also explains reforms of Indonesian army after the fall of Suharto's New Order, and describes new pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia after democratic transition. This article is divided into four main parts. First, it deals with literature discussing an ideal pattern of civil-military relations and the reasons why the army intervenes in political life of the country. Second, it examines

factors causing Indonesian army involvement in politics by tracing the roles it has played during revolutionary war. Third, it describes reforms of the army as a consequence of the changing of Indonesian political system. The last is concluding remarks from previous discussion.

Literature Review

There are many existing theories which explain patterns of civil-military relations. Political scientists stress on different factors to analyze why the military seizes power from civilian government and the latter, to some extents, seems so weak *vis-a-vis* the former. For example, Michael C. Desch (1999) emphasizes on strategic environments of a country – internal and external threats – as the main cause influencing civil dominance over the army and vice versa. When domestic threats are high, the control of civilian government is weak. But when external threats are high, the potentiality for army involvement in politics is weak. Here, the second conditions show an ideal model of civil-military relations. Civilian elites has bigger control over the army. They are aware of national security. There will be a cohesiveness in the army as an institution because its orientation is outward looking to face external threats. And army adventurism into politics can be diminished.

David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz (2011) argue that “explanation of civil-military relations has to cover three crucial issues including agential entities, environmental variables and the relationship between agent and environment”. Furthermore, they elaborate relevant actors along with their interests, environmental factors influencing power relations between civilian leaders and the army, and possible actions as the result of the relationship between environment and agency. Both authors not only define and specify these three issues but try to systematically analyze agency and structure in explaining patterns of civil-military relations called as ‘integrative’ approaches by examining theories developed by some prominent scholars like Muhtiah Alagappa, Aguero, Trinkunas, and Croissant *et al* as well. Even though these four experts have different analytical focus, they agree “that civil-military relations are determined by the interplay of civilians and military actors”.

Political institutionalization places an important position in new democratic countries where it functions as balancing power of the army. ‘The configuration of

threats perceived by the army interacts with a society's political institutionalization and the popular legitimacy of the civilian government to determine a military obedience to civilian control' (Staniland, 2008, 332). By combining environmental threats, he also pays attention to civilian legitimacy because 'different threat levels demand different levels of political legitimacy and institutionalization' to marginalize the military from political matters.

Civilian control of the army is a primary condition for democratic consolidation. The basic idea of democracy suggests that the government has the authority to take policies without intervention from non-democratic institution like the army. The government holds legitimate power to decide national policies because it is democratically elected by the people while the army is not. In order to be able to differentiate degree of civilian control, Croissant and Kuehn (2009) identifies three decision-making areas including "elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defence and internal security" (page. 190). The first area is an absolute requirement to democratic consolidation. The existence of free and fair general elections is able to give political elites an effective power to make and implement political decisions in all political affairs. Even though the army is involved in policy formulation on national defence and dealing with internal security in the matters of insurgencies and terrorism, civilian government is the supreme actor who legally holds final decisions.

The conception of civil-military relations simply puts 'civil' and 'military' into two different spheres. Professionalism of the army officers will be achieved if military is strictly separated from civilian institutions. Huntington (1957), a proponent of military professionalism, points out that "politics is beyond the scope of military competence and participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism". The degree of civilian control over the army can be assessed by using two indicators namely subjective and objective. Under subjective control, civilian administration tries to completely control the army and makes it as an integral part of the government. On the contrary, objective control endeavors to enhance military professionalism whereas this condition will marginalize the military from politics and provide its neutrality. But the pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia is totally differed from the Western countries. The strict separation of civil and military spheres was hardly known in Indonesia and other Southeast Asia countries such as Thailand and Philippines. In this sense, Heiduk (2011) suggests that "it is necessary to dissolve the dichotomy of 'military' vs. 'civilian' institutions and take a deeper look at

the underlying power structures of the transition processes” (page. 255-256). This is because struggle between contesting social force will determine trajectory, scope and sustainability of a country’s democratization (Bellin, 2000; Heiduk, 2011). This means that we have to observe “socio-economic configuration of society vis-a-vis political institutions” in order to get the whole view on army involvement in political affairs.

Rebecca L. Schiff (1997) proposes “concordance theory” as an alternative in understanding civil-military relations by viewing “the military, political elites, and citizenry as three partners that should aim for cooperative relationship. Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining military’s role in the domestic sphere including the government and society”. There are four indicators to be examined – “social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. Concordance theory considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-military relations”. Furthermore, “it accomplishes two goals. First, it explains the institutional and cultural conditions affecting relations among the three partners. Second, it predicts that if three partners agree on four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur” (page. 8-12).

The Nature of Indonesian Army

Indonesia’s army is one of important actors during the war for independence. The establishment of Indonesia’s armed forces is unique. It was not founded by the government. It was Indonesia’s people especially the youth who had important roles in establishing the army. And it can be traced back to Japanese policy during occupational periods in Indonesia. Japan mobilized Indonesian youth (*pemuda*) in military training known as *Pembela Tanah Air/PETA* (Defender of the Motherland) and other armed organizations where as they could be used as volunteers or troop substitutions for supporting Japanese wars. This policy of mobilization gave the youth martial skills, and it also triggered “an awareness among the youth on the need to fight colonial powers for country independence” (Said, 1992, 5).

Initially there was reluctance from the new government to establish an army. This was because civilian elites worried the possibility of invasion from the Allies

after Japanese surrender. The first agency for Indonesia's military was BKR (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat/People's Security Organization*). But it was not an army because "it was not centrally organized, had no headquarters, and its formation was dependent on the initiative of National Committee or *Komite Nasional Indonesia/KNI*" (Said, 1992, 22). Then it was renamed as TKR¹ (*Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat/the Army of People's Security*) on 5 November 1945. The components of Indonesia's armed forces were made of KNIL (*Koninklijke Nederrlands-Indische Leger/the Royal Netherland East Indies Army*), PETA, and *laskar* or partisans (Sundhaussen, 1986, 21-22).

Actually the government appointed a former KNIL officer, Urip Sumoharjo, as the chief-of-staff of the army assisted by Didi Kartasasmita, Nasution, Simatupang, Alex Kawilarang for the task of organizing the army. But, in every attempt of organizing the army, they faced realities that, whenever they tried to select commanders at local units, the commanders had been elected by troops. PETA's suspicion to KNIL officers made it more difficult to organize the army. PETA officers getting Japanese indoctrination to believe in spirit (*semangat*) and hate the white man. As consequences, they saw the former KNIL officers as Dutch's collaborators. And the problems became more serious on account the fact that the central government did not give clear directions. "There were no policy guidelines and no attempt was made to control the recruitment and promotion of officers or to bring the military structure under government control" (Jenkins, 1983, 16). And it had its own policy in dealing with the enemy – the Allies and Dutch. Finally, Urip held a military conference for discussing common solutions and finding proper way to face the enemy in Yogyakarta on 11 November 1945. But participants of the conference pointed out that what the military need in the beginning was a commander-in-chief or *panglima besar*. The conference that was dominated by PETA officers, of course, did not favour Urip for the supreme position of the military. So most of participants selected Sudirman having background from PETA to be the first of commander-in-chief of Indonesia's armed forces. Moreover, they also elected Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX as the minister of defence (see Said, 1992; Sundhaussen,

¹ On 23 February 1946, it was renamed as TRI (*Tentara Reublik Indonesia*) or Army of the Republic of Indonesia. TRI was changed to TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) or Indonesian National Army on 3 June 1946. Under the New Order, it was replaced with ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. Finally, TNI is formally used once again as the name of Indonesian Military since political reform in 1999.

1986). What we can be inferred here is that it was the army itself creating its own organization as a tool of defense for the new state.

Indonesian army has already possessed political orientation since beginning of its existence. During revolutionary period from 1945 to 1949, it played roles in the matters of not only defense but also political realm. Army involvement in Indonesia's politics for the next decades is due to "this blurred distinction between its military and political functions during revolutionary war against the Dutch" (Crouch, 1978, 25) where the army see themselves as one of political forces in the country. As its consequence, the army had different views with government policies. For example, during the war for independence, the government favoured diplomacy as a way of facing enemy while the military preferred armed struggle. Ambiguous attitudes of the central government in establishing an army was another cause. In this case, 'the reluctance of the government to deal with the military in the early days of independence had already created a particular pattern of civil-military relations, and all subsequent efforts to bring the army under civilian control failed' (Said, 1992, 33).

There was an attempt to put Indonesian army under civilian control. For instance, under the Constitution of 1950, the army accepted the supremacy of civilian government. But this condition just was temporary. Gradually, the army expanded its political role. This was because 'the weakness of successive political system provided opportunities that military leaders exploited' (Crouch, 1978, 27). The government was only able to last for a short period of time. There was polarization among civilian politicians where they were splitted into ideological preference of their political parties. The army itself actually was not a cohesive institution. It was divided into several factions of army elites. There were conflicting views and interests between them. On the one hand, the army distrusted politicians. But elites of the army sometimes were fell into struggle between the government and opposition parties in order to achieve their short-sighted objectives.

Implementation of martial law in 1957 was an entry point for the army to return to political realm. Martial law proved the failure of civilian politician to run government effectively and gave the army legitimacy to involve in political life of the country. The army enhanced its power and authority in response to domestic disorders caused by regional rebellions. The success of the army in dealing with rebellions absolutely emphasized its role as the protector of the nation (Jenkins, 1983, 19). Furthermore, The army played roles in not only military and political functions but also economy. In

the name of martial law, the army had also controlled Dutch's companies that were nationalized by Indonesian government.

Army's direct involvement in national politics would come to an end when the martial law dismissed. It could not last forever. It was just temporary situation as a response to the outbreak of regional rebellions. The emergence of Guided Democracy by restoring 1945 Constitution gave the army opportunity to deeply involve in national politics. The concession of functional group to the army "has given it rudimentary form as political organization guaranteeing it a basis for political participation". Accordingly, "the army's elite was integrated into the political structure of the nation and was satisfied" (Lev, 1963, 360). Officers of the army have taken their places in most of public institutions such as parliament, advisory council, and even chiefs of local government.

Under Guided Democracy, the army was one of pillars of the system along with President Sukarno and Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The rivalry between the army and PKI coloured Indonesia's political configuration since 1959. Sukarno played balancing role in the middle of two conflicting institutions – the army and PKI. Compared to other national parties, PKI was more disciplined organization and had strong bases in the grassroot of Indonesian society. PKI was the main political rival of the army at that time. The army viewed PKI as "one remaining powerful political party whose threat to Indonesia's future was made serious by its foreign ties; and as a threat to the army position" (Lev, 1963, 357) especially its social, economic and political interests. But the army got much bigger roles after it successfully eliminated Communist Party and marginalized Sukarno from political stage because of failed rebellion by PKI on 30 September 1965. In this case, Indonesian army's involvement in politics differs from countries where army officers has seized power from civilian administration by coup d'etat. It is important to take into serious consideration Harold Crouch's argument that Indonesian army came to power by undergoing 'a lengthy period of preparation, during which they learned skills of negotiating, bargaining and compromising' (Crouch, 1978, 35).

Army intervention in Indonesian politics was then legitimized by the concept of dual function (*dwifungsi*). It is "an assertion that it is legitimate and necessary for Indonesian army to take on both military and non-military roles" (Lee, 2000, 693). In short, it justified that the army not only served as the guardian of the state but was social and political force of the country as well. By referring to *dwifungsi*, "the

Indonesian army believed that it was rightfully first a political and only second a military institution. This led to the development of an interventionist political culture in which the army saw itself as having right to involve in politics. This was also particularly true with regard to the safeguarding of Pancasila as national ideology, the 1945 Constitution and the unity and unitary nature of the state” (Singh, 2000, 616).

Even though this concept was formally introduced in the New Order, conceptual development of *dwifungsi* can be traced back to the previous government. Explanation of historical narrative of the army above has clearly described dual function of the army. It is Nasution who first proposed publicly the concept of *dwifungsi* known as *Jalan Tengah* (Middle Way) at that time. He stated that “the position of the army was not solely an instrument of the government. Rather, it was one of the forces of the people’s struggle together with other forces such as parties” (Jenkins, 1983, 20). Luckily, this idea came into existence at favorable time when “Soekarno needed an ally to oppose the various parties that under Parliamentary democracy failed to create stable governments” (Said, 2006, 121).

The experience during revolutionary war against the Dutch have gradually developed “a participatory political culture that included army’s involvement in politics which was later codified in the concept of *dwifungsi*” (Singh, 2000, 616). The root of *dwifungsi* actually has its origin in Javanese tradition as well whereas soldiers are considered as *kesatria* or knight (Britton, 1996). A king according to Javanese tradition acts as not only the leader of government but also the commander of the army. Here, there is no clear distinction between civilian and military life. This Javanese value was actualized by army officers during revolutionary war whereas military leaders performed political function as well. Javanese officers who dominated membership of the Indonesian army since independence have espoused this proposition. This also explains why there was no military coup during Sukarno’s administration although the army emerged as the only cohesive political force of the country at that time. “The officer corps was divided in its attitude towards Sukarno whereas many Javanese officers were personally quite loyal to him” (Lev, 1963, 359). In the end, *dwifungsi* have played critical role in shaping a pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia since the country came into existence. Consequently, most of army officers has dedicated to not only service the country but also control

power in politics and economy. So it is not surprisingly to say that the army and politics in Indonesian context has been inseparable.

The Reforms of Indonesian Army

Civil-military relations in Indonesia have showed that civilian elites seemed weak vis-a-vis the army. The central government indecisiveness in the early days of independence to create an army and roles played by the army in both politics and defence during revolutionary war has contributed to the rise of the army as one of political forces in the country. As a result, the government faced difficulties to put the army under its control. The failure of civilian politicians to create stable governments has also given the army opportunities to exploit the situation for its corporate interests. As Sundhaussen points out, the Indonesian army's active and direct involvement in politics since independence is due to the military defending its corporate interests against civilian infringement and the failure of civilian government to run the country (Sundhaussen, 1983). And for more than four decades, the army has taken roles in not merely military functions but also almost every aspect of public life in the country.

It was true that Indonesia adopted constitutional democracy in the beginning of independence. But it must be also acknowledged that the foundation of democracy was weak. Political parties were important forces to support continuity of democratic system at that time. But they also undermined it because of polarization among political elites causing the rise and fall of central government in short period of time. Consequently, civilian administration failed to run government effectively. Finally, "the failure of constitutional democracy and threats of national disintegration had provided the army to present itself as a defense force and social-political force whose direct involvement in politics was politically acceptable and constitutionally legitimate" (Anwar, 2001, 11).

The situation above had proved that the army was the only institution possessing capabilities to overcome the problem of national disorders. There was popular opinion in Indonesian society viewing the army as an alternative to create national stability. National culture in this sense has critical role in forming "familial system" considering the army as "an integral member of country's political family,

and any attempt to exclude the army from national politics would be able to undermine the political system that was conceived in the struggle for independence” (Singh, 2000, 629).

Under Suharto’s New Order, the army then appeared as the main supporter of authoritarian rule. Developmentalist ideology that believed that authoritarian regime was necessary to ensure political stability and finally support economic development of the country made condition easier for the army to consolidate its power and penetrate all aspect of public institution and social organization. It was a fact that the New Order still maintained democratic institutions such as political parties, general elections, and legislative councils. But the substance of democracy was cheated by the ruling elites dominated by Suharto and the army. People were not really free to elect their leaders and express their aspirations. In this case, democracy was just symbolic. Another example was the existence of *Golkar* or functional group as political machine of the government. Its members were mainly made of government employees and state-related organizations. It was also a participant in general election. The ability of *Golkar* to win every general election from 1971 to 1997 had provided the government political and constitutional legitimacy to rule the country. By combining “political penetration, manipulation and co-optation with exclusion and repression” the ruling elites were able to prolong their domination in political stage (Anwar, 2001, 13-15).

The context of Indonesia’s social structure also presented a favorable condition for the army to ensure its dominance in country’s politics. “The Indonesian class structure lacked two important classes namely strong indigenous bourgeoisie and big-landlord class which in other countries have provided social bases for political movements which have to some extent been able to balance and limit the power of central bureaucracy” (Crouch, 1988, 355). As a developing country like Indonesia, India is a good example for this case. One of important factors of Indian civilian politicians succesfully controlling its army and marginalizing it from politics is due to “a substantial mass presence of Indian National Congress (INC) supported by broad social coalition that included members of all India’s main religious groups” (Wilkinson, 2015, 13) finally creating party institutionalization and the ability of INC to form an Indian-wide network of alliance with India’s capitalists and landed peasantry or local elites in the country (Pardesi & Ganguly, 2010, 58).

The Fall of Suharto's New Order on May 1998 has paved the way for reforms of Indonesian armed forces. Army's direct involvement in politics and its track records in human right abuses in the past has been widely criticized. Therefore, it is not surprise if "the central demand of democratic reform movement in Indonesia includes the supremacy of democratically elected civilian authority vis-a-vis the security forces, and the prevention of the military involvement in domestic political and business affairs" (Heiduk, 2011, 256).. Placing the army under civilian control is absolutely necessary in order to create professional soldiers. The extraction of Indonesian army from politics can be seen as a major step to support the implementation of good governance, law enforcement and government accountability. Here, two preconditions consisted of "the existence of strong political institutions and the achievement of legitimacy" (Lee, 2000, 703) are necessary provisions for enhancing civilian supremacy. Accordingly, the army has to solely focus on its function in the matters of defense as the idea of democratic rule requires. It means that the army should submit its loyalty to civilian supremacy. And it should not topple authority of civilian administration. But it is important to note that the army is a tool of the state for defending the country from external threats, not a tool of power used as a regime to maintain its own interest.

The army was in weak position after the fall of the New Order. Even the army could not avoid public enthusiasm for democratic reform, and prevent Suharto's resignation from presidential office. To certain extent, claims that the roles of the army in politics were in decline were reasonable because the army was under domestic and international pressure to reform its organization as professional institution in the matters of defence. The army did not have another option except accepting reform agendas. But it remained relatively strong as a political actor. This could be seen in the case of human right violation after a ballot on self-determination of East Timor from Indonesia's territory. Here, "the army was against explicit wishes of President Habibie whereas it orchestrated the campaign of violence and intimidation of the East Timorese people" (Kingsbury, 2000, 304). Besides, it played important roles in negotiating regime change and influencing political development of the country. Although it rhetorically had commitment to leave political matters to civilian politicians, army adventurism into politics seemed difficult to be extracted. Without retiring from military, some army officers also occupied crucial positions in the cabinets. This simply indicated that political structure of the New Order was not

really collapse. Therefore, the army still enjoyed its privileges in the new political system.

Army's political engagement in the early phase of democratic transition was mainly because "intrasystemic transfer of power from Suharto to his deputy avoided the complete destruction of the regime and allowed many its components including the armed forces to make a relatively smooth transfer into new polity. The disunity among civilian politicians also contributed to this matter. The fragmentation of Indonesia's civilian politicians caused the failure of societal and political organizations to form a united opposition front against the government. No credible figures and teams outside the government were able to replace the ruling elites. Accordingly, it was bureaucrats and politicians associated with the regime who took the main beneficiaries of the transfer of power facilitated by senior military officers" (Mietzner, 2006, 5-8).

The attempt to put the army completely under civilian control is long process. It should be done gradually to prevent military backlash to civilian administration. In the early phase of post-authoritarian regime, President B. J. Habibie leading the new government successfully took important decisions to reform Indonesia's political system such as introducing fresh general election inviting participation from various political parties, press freedom, and also expanding civil liberties. A new pattern of civil-military relations under democratic climate was also redefined. Main agendas of military reform that could be identified in the early years of Indonesia's democratic transition included breaking off military roles in politics, changing organizational structure of Indonesian army, investigating human right abuses done by the army, and removing army involvement in economic and business activities to cut off its ability in self funding (Wulan, 2008, 9).

The exclusion of active military personnel from government and public institutions became first priority of democratic regime as a way of depoliticization of the armed forces. Social and political role of the army was gradually decreased. But "this progress did not lead to a comprehensive and lasting strengthening of civilian control over the core political decisionmaking areas" (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009, 194). This was because policy of compromises between Habibie and the military leadership. The new government gave the army autonomy to define and implement their own internal reform. There was mutual dependence between the new president and the armed forces at that time. The former relied on support from the

armed forces to stabilize his rule, fend off societal challenges to his legitimacy, and prevent individual officers from undermining the reformist policies of his administration. On the other hand, the policies taken by the president in appointing senior military leaders, distributing resources and setting the political agenda would give advantages to the armed forces (Mietzner, 2006, 10).

Therefore, it was not surprising if initial military reform worked in favour of the armed forces. The scope and the contents of depoliticization and redefinition of its political role was decided by the army (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009, 194). The army introduced a new paradigm consisted of four points underlining its roles under democratic regime: (1) the military does not have to take the lead of national affairs; (2) the military will no longer occupy political institutions; instead it will influence political decisions; (3) this influence will be exerted indirectly; (4) the military will work with other national entities in making important national decisions (Anwar, 2001, 24).

Other significant steps to reduce army's political adventurism has been made by the military. The concept of *dwifungsi* that gave the army legitimacy to actively involve in was finally abolished. The army accepted a decision reducing its political representatives from 75 to 38 seats in legislative councils. Representatives of the army in legislative was not elected in a ballot. Rather, they were appointed. Another initiative was the separation between the police and military. The police will be dealt with internal disorders while the army focuses on the issues of defence. Finally, the name of the military was changed from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI/*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) to Indonesia National Army (TNI/*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) in April 1999 (Marijan, 2011, 252-253). And as manifestation of its neutrality in the next general election, the formal relations between the army and Golkar was also cut off. Social and political office in the army was also dissolved in order to marginalize the roles of the army in political affairs.

The progress in civil-military reform faced a setback during President Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati. In the years of his presidency, Wahid made radical changes in order to progressively achieve military reforms. He appointed reformist officers in the military to occupy important posts in Indonesian army and the cabinet as well. Ministry of defence was also led by a civilian. He even ousted Wiranto, a Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Affairs and former commander of Indonesian army, who was responsible for human right abuses in East Timor in 1999 from his cabinet. Initially, Wahid leadership was strong enough

to push military reform. His policies “created disunity in the ranks and weakened the armed forces as a single political actor” (Mietzner, 2006, 26). But it did not last for long period. His political behaviour in misusing power caused serious problem for his political standing. He lost political supports from civilian politicians who were previously his allies. His attempt to issue emergency rule for restoring political chaos was refused by the army. At the same time, the army was even collaborated with opposition to oust Wahid from presidential office. Finally, Wahid was impeached by *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) or People’s Consultative Assembly in 2001.

The army was able to consolidate its power under Megawati administration. This situation came into existence due to domestic and international considerations. The outbreak of communal conflicts in several province in Indonesia proved that the army has been the only capable actor in dealing with internal disorders. Threats to territorial integrity posed by separatist movement in Aceh and Papua supported the army to regain its political weight in influencing government policies to cope the issues. The fear of national disintegrity gave chances for army adventurism in national politics and decision-making processes. Government efforts to negotiate with GAM (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*) or Aceh’s Free Movement was failed because it was sabotaged by the army. The army preferred military operation to solve the crisis.

The campaign of war on terror sponsored by the United States since 2001 also made external pressure on the Indonesian armed forces and its human right violation was decreased. Even the US government re-open cooperation with Indonesian army for the purpose of coping with terrorism threats. This was based on an assumption that “the provision of additional equipment, professional training and increased defence cooperation facilitated by the US government would translate into an intensified campaign by Indonesia’s security forces against radical groups in the country”. This point of view actually did not correlate with the reality. “The domestic power of Indonesian army has never rested on the number of its personnel, the quality of its equipment, or the education of its officers. It is based on politically negotiated and supported network of territorial units securing the financial independence of the army from civilian control mechanism” (Mietzner, 2002, 71-72). President Wahid actually tried to address the issue of territorial command structure by appointing reformist general such as Agus Wirahadikusumah as Army Strategic Reserve Command, but he failed and even lost his presidential position.

Megawati's decision to give concession the army on military management was another cause for power consolidation of the army. Of course, this was done in order to get support from the army to her rule. The experience as vice president in the Wahid's cabinet made her aware on rules of the game among civilian politicians who also took their own parts in facilitating the fall of Wahid's presidency. It would be risky for her rule if she put totally her trust to politicians. "The distrust between key civilian leaders convinced politicians to maintain good relations with the military particularly after assuming executive office". So "concessions to the military became an integral part of post-Suharto civilian politics" (Mietzner, 2006, 35).

Authority of central government seemed effective under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The ability of Yudhoyono's government to solve a crisis in Aceh peacefully was an example on exercising solid civilian control over the army. As a former senior officer in the army, he "knew the inner working of the army with an intimacy that no other post-Suharto president before him had possessed". He also learned a lot from the failure of Megawati's government in achieving peaceful resolution in Aceh due to disruption from top officers in the army. By eliminating senior general like Ryamizard Ryacudu favouring military resolution, peace agreement between the central government and GAM's leaders was successfully secured. But "Yudhoyono has also been responsible for some of deficiencies of the post-1998 civil-military relations particularly his hesitancy to push for structural reform that has undermined the institutionalization of civilian control mechanisms". The most crucial issue that is not addressed is "Yudhoyono's personal control has not been accompanied by sufficiently extensive institutional reform to make civilian control over the army independent from the character and the ability of the incumbent president" (Mietzner, 2011, 271-284). For instance, the problem of territorial command structure has remained untouched. The existence of army territorial structure has been viewed by observers as a loophole of democratic civilian control because it has provided opportunity for army adventurism in politics from village till provincial level.

It must be acknowledged as mentioned above that the reform of Indonesian army is long process. It cannot be done in a short period of time. Even the army to certain degree has involved in politics. Overall, the attempt to redefine civil-military affairs by underlining civilian supremacy over the military had made significant progress. Indonesia has been in middle ranking in terms of military reform compared

to other countries initiating reform in its military affairs as well. Official documents on management of military organization and military position under democratic regime have been published by army headquarters namely military doctrine of *Tri Eka Darma*, general policy on national defence, presidential decree on military business, book on military neutrality in general election, and four strategic documents from ministry of defence including defence white paper, defence doctrine, defence strategy and posture (Wulan, 2008, 78-79). The government also has formally passed regulations in order to strengthen institutionalization of civilian control and military professionalism – Law No. 2/2002 on State Defence and Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian National Army. Essentially, these laws ban the army involvement in political and economic activities (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013, 296).

Conclsion

Concordance theory proposed by Rebecca L. Schiff seems fit to explain a pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia since its independence in 1945. By considering unique historical and cultural experiences of the nations, concordance theory is able to precisely analyze critical factors influencing army involvement in Indonesian politics. It will be misleading if we keep it in mind that army involvement in Indonesian politics was begun since the establishment of the New Order. It is true that the army enjoyed political privileges in this era, but the culture of political interventionist of the Indonesian army has already existed since the birth of Indonesia as a new nation. The reform of Indonesian army particularly in attempts of redefining civil-military relations since 1998 has made significant progress. Army's direct involvement in politics was already dissolved. The concept of *dwifungsi* justifying army intervention in socio-political affairs was also abolished. Gradually, civilian government democratically elected by the people has performed solid control over the army.

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