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# The role of pragmatics in cross-cultural

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**Abstract**--We here try to find out the role of pragmatics in the cross-cultural contexts. Pragmatics is the way we convey meaning through communication (Deda, 2013). Other factors beyond competence are the adjustments between contexts and situations that can change the ordinary meaning of elements/sentences according to the language situation. The culture of an organization decides the way employees behave amongst themselves as well as the people outside the organization. Pragmatic culture more emphasis is placed on the clients and the external parties. Customer satisfaction is the main motive of the employees in a pragmatic culture. In linguistics, pragmatic competence is the ability to use language effectively in a contextually appropriate fashion. Pragmatic competence is a fundamental aspect of a more general communicative competence.

**Keywords**--communication, context, cross-culture, pragmatics, situation.

**Introduction**

According to Robert E. Quinn & Kim S. (2001), Cameron at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, there are four types of organizational culture: Clan, Adhocracy, Market, and Hierarchy. Clan oriented cultures are family-like, with a focus on mentoring, nurturing, and "doing things together." The normative model of culture assumes that culture consists of a set of norms. These norms are ideas in all aspects of society. As a consequence of the assumption that cultural norms were expressed in material remains, the normative model equates an archaeological culture with human culture. The main difference between semantics and pragmatics is that the semantics studies the meaning of words and their meaning within sentences whereas the pragmatics studies the same words and meanings but with emphasis on their context as well. Both semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of study in linguistics.

Gunraj, Drumm-Hewitt, Dashow, Upadhyay & Klin (2016), cultural models are defined as molar organizations of knowledge. Their internal structure consists of a core component and peripheral nodes that are filled by default values. The genesis of the concept of the cultural model is traced from Kant to contemporary scholars. Semantics is the study of meaning. More precisely it is the study of the relation between linguistic expressions and their meanings. Keenan, MacWhinney & Mayhew (1977), pragmatics is the study of context. More precisely it is the study of the way context can influence our understanding of linguistic utterances. Semantics is the study of meaning in language. It can be applied to entire texts or to single words. For example, "destination" and "last stop" technically mean the same thing, but students of semantics analyze their subtle shades of meaning. In

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an organization with a power culture, power is held by just a few individuals whose influence spreads throughout the organization. There are few rules and regulations in a power culture. Engel, Maye, Kurthen & König (2013), a power culture is usually a strong culture, though it can swiftly turn toxic.

The initial emergence of postverbal reinforcement, before the conjoined use with the preverbal negative becomes the unmarked option, has been interpreted as promoted by presuppositional contexts. Such contexts are defined by Schwenter (2006) and Mosegaard Hansen & Visconti (2007) as activated, where the underlying proposition is accessible to the hearer because it has been mentioned before or can be inferred through accommodation or contextual relations. The activated status of Old French post-verbal reinforcements find contrasted empirical support. Categorical evidence that activation characterizes a marked negative is provided by the preverbal negative. This use of the marker is interesting in itself, given that its disappearance is a specificity of French among Romance languages (van Hoেকে 2006); this disappearance may be seen as a step in the weakening of the preverbal marker that is conceived as an impetus of the negative cycle that again seems more advanced in French than in its Romance counterparts. More generally, the decline of preverbal now provides critical data for the comprehension of the role of pragmatics for grammatical change.

Several scholars even asserted that impaired proverb understanding was almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia (Gorham, 1956), but the use of proverbs as a diagnostic tool was criticized due to its poor reliability and the concept was subsequently widely abandoned (Andreasen, 1977). However, the cognitive deficit underlying schizophrenic patients' impaired ability to accurately interpret proverbs is still inadequately understood (Gibbs & Beitel, 1995). For example, it is unclear whether poor proverb comprehension in schizophrenia is linked to a more general cognitive impairment such as intelligence, poor executive functioning or to a more specific problem in information processing, or whether the ability to think abstractly is indispensable for proverb comprehension at all (Gibbs & Beitel, 1995).

Research into communication disturbances has revealed syntactical and semantic speech abnormalities in schizophrenia (Thomas *et al.*, 1996; Docherty *et al.*, 1996), as well as deficits in patients' pragmatic use of language (Frith & Allen, 1988; Langdon *et al.*, 2002a,b). The rules of pragmatics involve the capacity to extract the figurative meaning of an utterance (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Therefore, a speaker and his interlocutor must be able to go beyond the literal meaning of a phrase—precisely what many schizophrenic patients' so-called concretistic way of thinking is lacking (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941).

In recent decades the cognitive aspects underlying pragmatic impairment have also been the subject of growing interest (*e.g.*, Bambini *et al.*, 2016; Cummings, 2009, 2014; Perkins, 2000; Stemmer, 1999). Even if the specific pattern of deficits resulting from traumatic brain injuries may differ widely depending on the lesion site, the type of damage, and the time after injury, individuals with TBI usually suffer from damage to the frontal lobes, resulting in deficits in executive functions, the construct used to describe the ability to manage goal-directed behavior (*e.g.*, Miyake *et al.*, 2000).

Executive functions include abilities crucial to the efficient use of communication, such as self-regulation, organization, and planning; some authors have proposed that executive dysfunction is the main cause of pragmatic impairment in TBI (Channon & Watts, 2003; Douglas, 2010; McDonald & Pearce, 1998). Channon & Watts (2003), found TBI individuals to be impaired in the comprehension of indirect speech acts, as well as in executive tasks indexing working memory, inhibition, and multitasking.

That only inhibitory processes provided a significant contribution for explaining pragmatic performance in patients with TBI, while no association was found between working memory, multitasking, and pragmatic tasks. Douglas (2010) evaluated pragmatic-communication difficulties in TBI individuals using the La Trobe Communication Questionnaire (LCQ; Douglas, O'Flaherty, & Snow, 2000), and she also provided different measures of executive skills, i.e. verbal fluency, the ability to maintain and manipulate information, and the speed of verbal processing. The author found that executive skills, in particular, verbal fluency, were able to explain approximately a third of the variance in the pragmatic performance of TBI individuals (Preissler & Carey, 2005).

Communicative-pragmatic impairment in individuals with TBI has also been linked to a deficit in ToM, i.e. the ability to infer others' mental states, such as beliefs and intentions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Some authors have argued that ToM plays a critical role in human communication: understanding another person's mental state is essential in order to modify it and to achieve a specific communicative effect, i.e. to induce the partner to believe or to do something (Bosco, Bono, & Bara, 2012; Cummings, 2015; Happé & Loth, 2002; Tirassa, Bosco, & Colle, 2006a, 2006b). Several studies have reported poor comprehension of ToM tasks in individuals with TBI (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Geraci, Surian, Ferraro, & Cantagallo, 2010; Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010; Milders, Ietswaart, Crawford, & Currie, 2006; Muller *et al.*, 2010; Spikman, Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra, & van der Naalt, 2012), and some authors have suggested that this difficulty may be crucial to understanding their pragmatic impairment (Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999; Havet-Thomassin, Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx, & Le Gall, 2006; Martin & McDonald, 2003).

In a recent study, McDonald *et al.* (2014) investigated the contribution of executive functions (cognitive flexibility and inhibition) and ToM in TBI individuals, by administering a speech production task in which the patients were presented with different sets of photographs that they had to describe to a partner. The authors found that both executive functions and ToM had a unique effect on the speech production task, but also that cognitive flexibility was the best predictor of pragmatic performance. Moreover, ToM difficulties were able to predict poor performance by patients in language production tasks but only when the tasks implied strong inhibition, such as when participants were asked to think about a specific event from their own perspective, and then inhibit that perspective and switch to someone else's perspective.

Sperber & Wilson (1986), Wilson & Sperber (1993) and Carston (1988, 1993), regard these expansions as part of the explicit contents of utterances, which they call explicates, as they are not implicatures in the traditional Gricean sense. To give another example, consider the park is some distance from home (Carston, 1988). Listeners could infer a complete, truth-evaluable proposition for this utterance solely on the basis of its semantic content and reference assignment (*e.g.*, the park and the home are not contiguous). Yet listeners are quite likely to recover an expanded proposition, perhaps based on the assumption that the speaker has something relevant to say and is not simply saying something trivially true (*i.e.*, "The park is farther from my home than you might think"). Examples like this do not fit Grice's conception of what is said, inasmuch as they are not "closely related to the conventional meaning of the ... sentence ... uttered" (Grice, 1975). The gap between linguistic meaning and the proposition expressed by utterances such as The park is some distance from home cannot be closed just by reference assignment and disambiguation as Grice and others have argued.

Gernsbacher & Robertson (1999), clearly believed that there is a difference between the conventional meanings of words and what is said by uttering the words. Yet the contextual information needed to assign referents and disambiguate words in utterances severely underdetermines what is said. It appears that enriched pragmatic information similar to

that used in inferring conversational implicatures may very well come into play as part of how people determine what speakers say, or what is said.

To what extent do people recognize that pragmatics influences their understanding of what is said? There has been significant debate among some linguists and philosophers over whether people can actually distinguish between what speakers say and what they implicate (cf. Bach, 1994a,b; Carston, 1988; Recanati, 1989, 1993). Some hypotheses assume that people should not find it easy to distinguish between what a speaker says and what he or she implicates. Grice's implicature hypothesis, for example, suggests that only some aspects of our understanding of what a speaker says are influenced by pragmatics (*i.e.*, those necessary for evaluating a proposition's truth value). Munang, Thiaw, Alverson, Mumba, Liu & Rivington (2013), under this view, the proposition expressed by what is said by we have had breakfast need not be consciously accessible. What is consciously accessible, according to this hypothesis, is only "what is communicated" (*i.e.*, the result of combining the proposition literally expressed with the various extra elements such as the conversational implicatures).

Another view, the standardized nonliteral hypothesis (Bach, 1987, 1994a,b), suggests that non-literal uses of sentences like I have had breakfast are the standard ones that make most pragmatic interpretations of such sentence examples of standardized nonliteral. When a speaker says I have had breakfast, he or she is not consciously aware of having stated anything like "I have had breakfast at least once before in my lifetime" because this utterance is standardly used to convey the idea that they have eaten breakfast on the day of the utterance. Our understanding of what is implicated by I have had breakfast parallels what occurs in cases of standardized indirection when an indirect speech act is standardly performed by means of a certain type of sentence (Bach & Harnish, 1979). For example, when a speaker utters Can you pass the salt? in some discourse situation, he or she is often not aware of the direct, literal speech act performed (e.g., Is it possible for you to pass the salt?). Most generally, the standard nonliteral view suggests that ordinary speakers would not find it easy to distinguish between what a person says and what he or she implicates.

Chomsky's (1980, 1995) claim that young children are confronted with insufficient evidence in their input, *i.e.* hear many erroneous sentences, receive incomplete and poor positive evidence and very little negative evidence (cf. Bertolo, 2001; Roberts, 2006) has been widely challenged. The last decades of empirical acquisition studies (Gallaway & Richards, 1994; MacWhinney, 2004) have provided abundant evidence of a very close input dependency of children's outputs on inputs. Exceptions in morphology acquisition can often be well motivated. For example, in languages that have a distinct second singular present indicative form, such forms are very frequent in children's input but often emerge relatively late in children's outputs. The main reason for this contrast is pragmatic: mothers interacting with their infants focus on their interlocutors (thus high frequency of the second person), whereas small children rather refer to themselves (thus high frequency of the first person or the third person agreeing with their own name or baby, *etc.*).

Moreover, it has been shown that parental input also offers non-negligible direct and indirect positive and negative evidence in terms of adult reactions to children's non-adult-like productions (cf. Demetras *et al.*, 1986; Clark and Chouinard, 2000; Chouinard & Clark, 2003; MacWhinney, 2004; Goldberg, 2006). Saxton (2000) and Saxton *et al.*, (2005) have demonstrated that such reactions have an effect on children's grammatical development.

Shortcomings in Chomsky's view on the problem of inconclusive negative evidence lie also in his insufficient interest in pragmatics. Given the reference model of an explicit coding of language, such a view ignores the importance of pragmatic inferences (cf. Grice, 1975;

Sperber & Wilson, 1986) which play a crucial role in affording indirect evidence, as we will insist below.

### Pragmatic classification of reactions

Saxton (2000), distinguished negative evidence, consisting in an “immediate contrast between the child error and the correct alternative to the error as supplied by the child’s interlocutor” (Saxton *et al.*, 2005) from negative feedback typically occurring “in the form of an error contingent clarification request” by the child’s interlocutor. These two categories, however, do not seem to have a different corrective effect on the child (Saxton, 2000). They cover only part of the adults’ relevant reactions. For example, positive feedback byways of adult repetitions are expected by children as a form of ratification (Krause, 1999).

Thus, following Demetras *et al.* (1986), Veneziano (1999), Clark & Chouinard (2000), Salazar Orvig (2000), de Weck (2000), Chouinard & Clark (2003) and Bernicot *et al.* (2006b), we differentiate repetitions, expansions, reformulations, questions, continuations and back-channels, whereby corrections may appear in repetitions, expansions, reformulations and questions. Further subgrouping distinguishes repetitions, expansions and reformulations, which usually have the child’s words as their own constituents, from continuations and back-channels which usually do not include the child’s words.

These types of reactions are cross-classified by our basic pragmatic division between conversational and metadiscursive reactions, which goes back to the medieval distinction between speech acts *de re* ‘on content’ and *de dicto* ‘on linguistic form’ (cf. also Perrin *et al.*, 2003).

Our first general hypothesis is that children’s morphological errors trigger metalinguistic adult reactions to a higher degree than children’s morphologically correct, *i.e.* adult-like utterances. Morphology, such as syntax and phonology, is part of the speech act and of the felicity conditions of interactions. Therefore one may expect that in case these felicity conditions are not satisfied, move-on, be they topic developments or introductions of new topics, may be delayed or even impeded and hence the flow of interaction can be broken (cf. Demetras *et al.*, 1986). Mainly metadiscursive reactions represent such interruptions in the interactional flow of conversation, in contrast to mainly conversational reactions. They signal to the child that there exists a problem in communication and thus constitute indirect negative evidence.

Kilani-Schoch, Balčiunienė, Korecky-Kröll, Laaha & Dressler (2009), basically, a language researcher can examine language in terms of its form. For example, it examines a language in terms of its phonology alone, or in terms of its morphology, syntax, and semantics only, or all four aspects are examined. After that, he will formulate the language system he studies. Typically, the results of the study are in the form of a grammatical language system (set of rules).

If the research is applied in everyday language usage, the explanation or description that will be produced will be inadequate. For example like the example. (1) Mother: Is the water cooked? Child: Coffee or tea ma'am? (2) Ali played the ball.

Example (1) one above, if it is only examined in terms of its shape, the results become *taxa*. This inaction is caused by the child’s speech which is supposed to be an answer but what arises is a question again. The child’s answer should have been “yes ma'am, I turned off the stove”. Likewise, for example (2), Ali as the subject of the sentence should not be played by the ball. The truth is the ball is played by Ali. These phenomena often arise in the use of everyday language.

For a formal linguistic researcher, he will only examine a language unit without being associated with the use of everyday language. He will not question why and how a sentence or utterance appears. [Champagne-Lavau & Stip \(2010\)](#), in fact, in everyday language usage, there are important elements that influence the use of language. That element is context. Context greatly influences the form of language that will be used by a speaker. Because of the indifference of the linguistic researcher to this element of context, the results of the analysis are inadequate.

The context began to be considered important for linguists since the beginning of the 1970s. They realize the importance of context in interpreting sentences. The implications in calculating and paying attention to the context stated by Sadock ([Brown & Yule, 1996](#)).

There is, then, a serious methodological problem that confronts the advocate of linguistic pragmatics by [Larrivée \(2011\)](#). Given some aspects of what a sentence conveys in a particular context, is that aspect of what the sentence conveys in virtue of its meaning ... or should it be 'worked out' on the basis of the Gricean principles from the rest of the meaning of the sentence and relevant facts of the context of utterance?

One branch of linguistics that emphasizes context in its analysis is pragmatics. This is confirmed by [Levinson \(1997\)](#) in his book *Pragmatics*. In his book, Levinson made several pragmatic definitions related to the context. The following is Levinson's pragmatic definition related to the context.

- Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of language. 'Pragmatics is a study of the relationship between language and context which is programaticized or coded in the structure of language'
- Pragmatics is the study of relations between language and context that is the basis for an account of language understanding. 'Pragmatics is a study of the relationship between language and context which is the basis of an explanation of language understanding'
- Pragmatics is the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with the context in which they would be appropriate. 'Pragmatics is a study of the ability of language users to adapt sentences to the context so that the sentence is appropriate or appropriate to say'.

Based on the pragmatic definition above, it can be concluded that the context is very much needed by pragmatics. [Gibbs Jr & Moise \(1997\)](#), without context, the pragmatic analysis will not work. The purpose of the two utterances can be explained because they involve context. In other words, the pragmatic power or pragmatics force is very dependent on the context that takes place at the time the speech is uttered in a speech event.

### **Context and pragmatics**

The term context was first introduced by [Malinowski \(1923\)](#) as the context of the situation. He formulated the context of the situation. Exactly as in the reality of spoken or written languages, a word without a linguistic context is a reference and stands for nothing by itself, so in reality of spoken living tongue, the utterance has no meaning except in the context situation.

In line with Malinowski's opinion, Firth ([Brown & Yule, 1996](#)) also alludes to the context of the situation for understanding speech. According to Firth, the context of the situation for linguistic work links three categories. (a) Relevant characteristics of the participants: people, personalities. (i) Verbal acts of the participants. (ii) Nonverbal deeds of the participants. (b) Relevant objectives. (c) As a result of verbal actions.

The context of the situation introduced by Malinowski and Firth was further developed by Hymes (1974) which links with the speech situation. In this speech situation, there are eight speech components that are abbreviated to SPEAKING. The eight components of speech can affect someone's speech. Strobbe & Jacobs (2005), the eight speech components include the physical setting and psychological setting (setting and scene), the participant of the participant, the purpose of the ends, the acts, keys, the instruments, the speech norms), and the type of speech (genres).

Leech (1983), describes the context as one component in the speech situation. According to Leech, context is defined as aspects related to the physical and social environment of a speech. Leech added in his definition of context is as a background knowledge that is shared by the speaker and the speaker and this context helps the speaker interpret or interpret the purpose of the speaker's speech.

A rather long explanation related to the context put forward by Levinson. Levinson (1983) suggests the context of the Carnap definition, an understood term that includes the participant's identity, space and time parameters in the speech situation, and the participants' beliefs, knowledge and intentions in the speech situation. Furthermore, Levinson (1983) explains that in order to know a context, one must distinguish between the actual situation of a speech in all the diversity of their speech characteristics and the selection of the speech characteristics culturally and linguistically related to speech production and interpretation.

To find out the characteristics of the context, Levinson took Lyon's opinion which listed the universal principles of logic and language use (MacPherson, 2004). (i) Knowledge of rules and status (rules include rules in speech situations such as speakers or speakers, and social rules, while status includes social relative position). (ii) Knowledge of spatial and temporal locations (iii) Knowledge of the level of formality (iv) Knowledge of mediums (roughly the code or style of a channel, such as the difference between written and spoken language variations) (v) Knowledge of the accuracy of something being discussed. (vi) Knowledge of the accuracy of the field of authority (or the determination of the domain registers of a language).

Then, Ochs (Levinson, 1983) states that it is not easy to define the range of context. According to him, one considers the social and psychological aspects of language users who run it all the time. Such a thing is minimal reach. In addition, the range of context also includes beliefs and assumptions about social, temporal and spatial settings; the first act or deed, the perpetual deed, and the act that will come (both verbal and nonverbal), and the statement of the matter of knowledge and attention to participation in social interaction. Breheny, Katsos & Williams (2006), thus, Lyon and Ochs emphasize that context does not have to be understood by removing linguistic characteristics. Levinson added that context also includes participants, speech venues with a series of speeches that build a discourse.

Another opinion expressed by Hamblin who interpreted the context as the uniqueness of the speaker in the sense of the promise that was recorded (Gazdar: 1976). Van Dijk (Levinson, 1983) adds that context is interpreted as a complex situation, as is the situation in the case of consecutive couples where the initial situation causes a second situation. The first situation is the speech production spoken by the speaker, while the second situation is the interpretation of the speech by the speaker. In line with Dijk's opinion, Verschueren (1999) explains that in the use of language there are elements of speakers and speakers. Speakers are tasked with making a speech, while speakers interpret the speech of speakers. About the context, Verschueren deals with the psychological, social and physical world, linguistic channels, and linguistic contexts. About the definition,

context is the result of a generation process that includes what is out there and mobilization or mobilization (and sometimes manipulation) by language users.

[Schiffirin \(1994\)](#), describes the context in his book *Approach to Discourse* in a separate chapter. Describing the context he relates to text notation. In his book, Schiffirin discusses the context in relation to various theories, namely the theory of speech acts, pragmatics, interactional sociolinguistics, and communication ethnography. [Matsumoto \(1990\)](#), speech act theory and pragmatics view context as knowledge (related in linguistics and in communication competence), while interactional sociolinguistics and ethnography of communication view context as a situation (including knowledge "here and now") and knowledge about general forms of the situation.

[Yule \(1996\)](#), discusses the context in relation to one's ability to identify referrals that depend on one or more of the person's understanding of the expression being referred to. In connection with this explanation, Yule distinguishes context and context. The context is defined as the physical environment in which a word is used. Yule's cotexts are linguistic materials that help understand an expression or expression. Context is the linguistic part of the environment in which an expression is used.

[Mey \(2001\)](#), argues that context is important in the discussion of the imposition of spoken or written language. Mey defines context as a dynamic concept and not a static concept, which must be understood as an ever-changing environment, in the broadest sense that allows participants to interact in the communication process and the linguistic expression of their interactions that can be understood. [Brüne & Bodenstein \(2005\)](#), context is user-oriented so context can be assumed to differ from one user to another, from one user group to another user group, and from one language to another. Mey added that the context is more than just a referent but an act/action. Context is about understanding what something is. [Trillo \(2002\)](#), context also gives the actual pragmatic meaning and allows the actual pragmatic meaning to be the actual pragmatic act. The context becomes more important not only in assessing appropriate referents and implicatures but also in relation to other pragmatic issues such as pragmatics and presuppositions. Another context characteristic is the register phenomenon. With registers, speakers understand the linguistic forms that speakers use to mark their attitudes toward their speech partners.

[Yan Huang \(2007\)](#), discusses the context in relation to semantic and pragmatic basic notions. According to Huang, the context is widely used in linguistic literature, but it is difficult to give an exact definition. The context in the broadest sense may be interpreted as referring to the relevant features of a dynamic setting or in an environment where linguistic units are used systematically. [Bardovi-Harlig & Griffin \(2005\)](#); [Barner, Brooks & Bale \(2011\)](#), the context is composed of three types, namely physical context, linguistic context, and general knowledge context. Physical context refers to the physical setting of a speech. For example speech (3), the interpretation depends on measured knowledge from the physical context, namely the space-time location of the speech. (3) He's not the chief executive; he is. He's the managing director. The linguistic context refers to the utterances around them in the same discourse. For example, the following (4) contains elliptical construction. (4) John: Who gave the waiter a large tip?

[Bosco, Parola, Sacco, Zettin & Angeleri \(2017\)](#), the context of general knowledge includes a number of background assumptions that are shared between speakers and speakers. For example, the speech (5) and (6) below which are pragmatically assessed are good and anomalous. (5) I went to Beijing last month. Forbidden City was magnificent. (6) I went to Paris last month. Forbidden City was magnificent. Speech (5) is considered pragmatically good, while (6) is considered anomalous. Based on one's world knowledge it is known that the forbidden city is in Beijing, but there are no tourism shows in Paris.

The context of this general knowledge by Stanlaker (Yuang, 2007) is called the common ground. The context of general knowledge is also known as background, general meaning, encyclopedias of knowledge, the context of real-world knowledge.

Joan Cutting (2008), explains the context along with text and function. These three aspects are examined by pragmatics and discourse analysis. The context according to Cutting is knowledge of the physical and social world and socio-psychological factors that influence communication as knowledge of time and place in the words spoken or written. Ohta (2005); Pan & Lee (2004), context is knowledge shared by the speaker and the speaker. Cutting divides the context into three types, namely situational context, the context of background knowledge, and context. Brem (2003); Chan & Mak (2012), the situational context is related to the situation in which the speech interaction occurs, whether the speakers know about what they can see around them. The context of background knowledge is related to whether speakers and speakers know each other about cultural and interpersonal matters. Culture is general knowledge that most people carry in their minds, like a place to live. Interpersonal relates to the special knowledge and personal possibilities of the history of the speaker himself. Koteks refers to the context of a text itself.

From the various opinions above, it appears that the role of context in pragmatic studies. The pragmatic analysis is very context-dependent. In context, the speaker can interpret the speech of the speaker in a speech situation. Important ideas about context are as follows. (1) Context is a dynamic concept. The dynamic intention here is that the reality of the world is always changing, in a broad sense that allows participants to interact in the process of communication and linguistic expressions of their interactions that can be understood. This is different from sociolinguistics which is static. Myers-Scotton (2000); O'Driscoll (2013), for example, sociolinguistics explains the selection of language forms based on the speech component of Hymes (SPEAKING), while pragmatics explains the selection of language forms based on the objectives of the speech participants. (2) The second important notion is that the context based on current literature consists of three elements, namely the context of the situation, the context of knowledge, and context. Normally the context of the situation and knowledge take place before the context. (3) The third point, the context is user-oriented. Piazza (2002); Rose (2005), the use of context can be different, both among users, between user groups, and between user languages. (4) The fourth point, context is used to understand all the factors that play a role in the production and comprehension of speech.

## **Conclusion**

Pragmatic language refers to the social language skills that we use in our daily interactions with others. This includes what we say, how we say it, our non-verbal communication (eye contact, facial expressions, body language *etc.*) and how appropriate our interactions are in a given situation. There are 3 pending changes awaiting review. Pragmatics is the study of how context affects meaning. There are two types of context: physical context (such as where a sign is located) and linguistic context (such as preceding sentences in a passage). The main difference between semantics and pragmatics is that the semantics studies the meaning of words and their meaning within sentences whereas the pragmatics studies the same words and meanings but with emphasis on their context as well. Both semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of study in linguistics. Pragmatic language impairment may comprise difficulties in pragmatic language skills that are important for successful social development and building confidence in talking. Pragmatic language skills include. The use and understanding of body language, e.g. gestures, facial expressions, eye contact.

Semantics refers to the specific meaning of language; pragmatics involves all the social cues that accompany language. Pragmatics focuses not on what people say but how they

say it and how others interpret their utterances in social contexts, says Geoffrey Finch in "Linguistic Terms and Concepts." Social communication or pragmatics refers to the way in which children use language within social situations. It has three components including The ability to use language for different purposes (e.g. to greet, inform people about things, demand, command, request).

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