

A Social Sketch of Radical Islamism in Solo

Abstrak/Abstract

This article examines phenomena of Islamic radicalism in Solo based on the social facts in the city. The assessment is important in tracing the origins of Islamic radicalism in Solo recently. By bibliographical study of Islamic movement and field study in the region, this study describes and analyzes the formats of Islamic radicalism in Solo and its impacts in political situation in Indonesia. This comprehension on the emergence of this radicalism, according to the writer, could bring to the solving of the problems and the prevention of surfacing Islamic radicalism in the future.

Artikel ini mengkaji gejala radikalisme Islam di Solo berdasarkan pada fakta-fakta sosial di kota tersebut. Pembahasan ini penting bagi melihat asal-usul radikalisme Islam di Solo pada gejala akhir-akhir ini. Dengan studi literatur dan lapangan, kajian ini mendeskripsikan dan menganalisis apa yang menjadi formasi radikalisme Islam di Solo dan dampaknya pada situasi politik di Indonesia. Pemahaman tentang kemunculan radikalisme ini, menurut penulis, dapat mengantarkan pada pemecahan masalah dan pencegahan timbulnya radikalisme Islam di kemudian hari.

Key words

Solo, Islamic radicalism, sociology of religion, religious movement

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A. Introduction

Radical Islamism in Solo is part of social radicalism of the Solonese in general. Therefore, the problem of radical Islamism in the region as the focus of my study here is not merely problem of Muslims nor Islam as a religion as such. Rather, it is the problem of the Solonese in general. The real problem is lying beneath the social structure of the Solonese since it has to do more with their social history, culture, and politics. As Olivier Roy has noted that despite the trans-national factors, some national peculiarities also play a significant role in shaping the resurgence of Islamism.¹ In other words, cultural,

¹ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: the search for a new ummah*, Hurst & Company, London, 2004, p. 62.

Social Justice

social, and political deprivation on the local and national levels have been supported by the mainstreaming process of modernization and globalization in the global context.

Indeed, all radical Islamism in Solo do not have to do with Islam as a corpus of religion. Likewise, radical Islamism has nothing to do with the doctrines or dogmas of Islam. Rather, it has to do more with how Muslims interpret doctrines within Islam on this current situation. There were cultural, social, and political problems which have shaped their attitude and behaviour. On the national level, all Indonesians have undergone almost the same treatment of the state. The hegemony of the state, the issue of corruption, and the authoritarian government are commonly felt by any Muslims even Indonesians in general. In other words, political grievances are not enough tension to produce such radicalism. In the same way, other similar characteristics may also be found at other cities, but they do not breed radical Islamism. But, why such radical Islamism is not becoming a phenomenon in other cities as it is in Solo. It should be noted here, therefore, that there are some peculiarities of Solo or the Solonese which gave the rise to this radical Islamism. Therefore, beside political factors, I tend also to focus on other characteristics such as social culture of the society. On this phase, culture and politics must be examined to more fully understand how radical Islamism is prolific in the region.

To comprehend this cultural phenomenon, Bourdieu's perspective of *habitus* may assist me in viewing the practice of radicalism among the Solonese. For him, the attitude and behaviour of people could not be detached from social structure in which they live. The approach which could also be called as *genetic structuralism* views that mental structure of a person in a community is a result of social structure

of the community. By employing this approach, theories of social production and the logic attitude of person in a community could be established. The theory of *habitus* argues that an attitude and behaviour of a person in society is shaped unconsciously by common behaviour of people in the community. People within the community just take these attitude and behaviour for granted (Haryatmoko, 2003: 8). In the context of Solo, social and political deprivation is a *habitus*, while historically the Solonese are *abangan* is the capital, and finally politics which sometime triggers the emergence of 'practice' (radicalism) is the field in this approach.

Along with the rise of radical Islamism in Indonesia, Islamism is also the phenomenon of the current world even at most developed countries. As many scholars argue, radical Islamism is one of the products of the globalizing mainstream of modernization. Modern technology has shrunk the world into a global village. The rapid growth of information and technology have marginalized the role of religion in society. For fundamentalists or Islamists, modernization is an immense threat to Muslims since it is not only a concept but it is a social process which produces social products. Traditional Islamic values are marginalized, swept away, and even replaced by Western values. Conventional Islamic preaching no longer could restrain the influence of modernization from the West. Among the influence of modernization and globalization is the spread of secularism as a part of *gazwul fikri* (the war of ideology). The inability of some Muslims' groups to follow the beat of modernity has given rise to such Islamic revivalist groups as a way to counter to modernization. The demand of *shari'ah* in many Muslim countries is one of the ways Muslims counter Western's modernization. However, the encounter with modernization and globalization is

also accompanied by the sentiment of anti-Westernism. The hegemonic power of some Western countries toward Muslim countries to some extent have also heightened the situation. The emergence of *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI) may be one of the examples of such resistance movement.

B. Social Facts Regarding Islam in Solo

1. Diverse ethnics: the failed indigenization

Solo is characterized by its plural society since the beginning of its existence in the 18th century. There are many ethnics living in Solo such as Javanese, Arabs, and Chinese.² Similar to some other plural cities in Indonesia, ethnicity has become a sensitive issue. However, since different ethnicity is also followed by different religions, cultures, and identities, the plurality Solonese has been heightened by those diverse identities. In fact, the Javanese are the majority of all ethnics living in the region. The insignificant numbers of other ethnics should not bring about social problems for the Solonese. However, due to the economic successful of several ethnics over the majority, it led to such kind of social tension. With the exception of the Chinese,³ almost all ethnics share many things in common especially in terms of their religion, which is mostly Islam. The different religion and other cultural identities which finally make difficult for

² In fact, there are many other ethnics in the city, i.e. Sundanese, Banjarese, Maduranese, Minang and Batak. However, since their number is not quite significant, their existence is not quite significant in Solo in many senses.

³ Although the name of Chinese is the most common term used to identify the Chinese descendants in Southeast Asian countries, its translation in Indonesia (*Cina*) and Javanese *Cino* is not common in Indonesia. Since both terms have some negative connotations, Indonesian Chinese prefer to be called as *Tionghoa* (Zhonghua). In this thesis, however, I will use the term Chinese with its neutral connotations.

the Chinese to integrate into the majority community. Religion and economic differences between the Chinese and the Javanese as majority led to such kind of social disparities among them. For this reasons, I will explore the ethnics of Arabs and Chinese in terms of their striving to survive and to submerge within the majority of the Javanese.

Although Arabs do not comprise 1% of the population, the existence of this ethnic is quite significant in Solo in many senses. Since its presence in the region, they have been residing in the Pasar Kliwon sub-district, at the Eastern side of the Kasunanan kingdom. It was part of the politics of Dutch government to locate this ethnic and separated it with indigenous Muslims.⁴ Although there were many Arabs living in other sub-districts of Solo, Pasar Kliwon has been the major Arab community in the region. Business has become the skill of Arabs since their coming to the archipelago. In the Solo context, the privilege of Arabs from the royal kingdom gave them many chances in businesses especially middleman trade, money lending, and landownership (Mandal, 1994: 42).⁵ The success of Arabs in business is supported

⁴ Dutch government wanted to reduce the influence of pure Islam and the idea of Pan-Islamism of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghani from the Middle East in Indonesia by limiting the immigration of Arabs to Indonesia, banning the assimilation of Arabs in Indonesia, and discriminating Arabs in Indonesia. In Dutch's view, Islam is identical with Arabs. Therefore, based on Snouck Hurgronje's advises, Dutch government launched some regulations on Arabs in the country. Further see Hamid Al-Gadri, *Politik Belanda terhadap Islam dan keturunan Arab di Indonesia*, CV Masagung, Jakarta, 1988, pp. 58, 85, 146.

⁵ Since the early of 1900s, most Arabs in the archipelago were engaged in the intermediary trade while others profited from the cultivation of crops, the construction and rental properties, and batik industry. Further, see Sumit Mandal, *Finding their place: a history of Arabs in Java under Dutch rule, 1800-1924*. PhD thesis at Columbia University, 1994, p. 52.

Social Justice

by the facts that this community has good networks across the country. Although initially the Arabs had problem in term of their assimilation with the indigenous people, since the early of the 20th century and the involvement of some Arabs in the struggle for Indonesia independence, the problems has been settled (*Ibid*: vii). Along with any other Arabs all over Indonesia, Arabs in Solo are Yemeni-descendant firstly coming to Indonesia in the 13th century. Similar to any other Arab communities, however, Arab community in Solo is characterised sharply by the *Sayyid* and *non-Sayyid* or '*Alawy* and *Irshady*.⁶ In the context of Solo, however, both groups seems developed each own activities within the region.

Owing to their religious similarity, the relationship between Arabs and the Javanese goes well. Although they have different culture, the Arabs could easily submerge into the Javan Solonese. Van den Berg underlined that the Arabs' acculturation was also supported by the fact that most Arabs men at first married with Javanese women.⁷ Nowadays, however, most

⁶ *Sayyid* or well known as '*alawy* or '*alawiyyin* or *Habāib* is those having direct link to the prophet Muhammad through his grand-son Hussein. The word '*alawy* is taken from Hussein's descendant Habib 'Alwi bin Ubaidillah bin Ahmad Al-Muhajir who lived in Hadramawt, the south of Yemeni. While *non-Sayyid* are just common Arabs who do not have any link to the prophet. Prior to the independence of Indonesia, the first group are those united in *Jami'at al-Khair* (charitable association). It was the Sudanese Achmad Soorkati (1872-1943) who was disagree with this distinction and finally established *Jam'iyyah al-Islāh wa al-Irshad al-Islamiyah* or well know as *Al-Irshād* in 1913.

⁷ According to van den Berg, only few Arab-born women stayed for long period in Indonesia. That is among the reason why most Arabs married with Indonesian women. Most Arabs in Indonesia the 20th century were born in Indonesia. The existence of *sayyid* as the descendants of Prophet Muhammad is among the exception. See L.W.C. van den Berg, *Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di*

Arabs descendants do not marry with other ethnics especially Arab women. Interestingly enough, although not all Arabs know a lot about Islam, most Javanese consider them as having higher degree in terms of their religiosity.⁸ Undeniably, therefore, that some Arabs become religious scholar. I want to underline here that being Arab is blessing among the Javanese although only a few of them could speak Arabic. Nevertheless, I would assert that only a few Arabs in the region involved much in proselytizing of Islam. One significant phenomenon to support my argument is that the most Javanese living in the neighbourhood of Arabs are still *abangan*. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the villages in the sub-district of Pasar Kliwon has been among heavily *abangan* communities in Solo.

On the religious role of Arabs among the Javanese, it is necessary to assert here the existence of Habib 'Ali bin Muhammad bin Hussein Al-Habsy in Solo. Although he died about 95 years ago, thousands Arabs and Javanese coming from many different regions across the country appear at the mosque of Riyadh at Pasar Kliwon annually on 20th *Rabi' al-Awwal* to commemorate his death (*haul*). Habib 'Ali is well known for his efforts to do dakwah during his life, especially to the poor. The figure also well known of its poetic prose of the prophet's history namely, *Simtu al-Durār* (necklace of pearls). The attendants which could reach as many as 50,000 recite the prose, sway to and fro as if in

Nusantara, INIS, Jakarta, 1989 (the original book was in Dutch and published in 1887).

⁸ Van den Berg also argued that it was mistaken to believe that most Arabs master in Islamic theology. Rather, he stated that only a few Arabs are good in Arabics as well as in Islam, even more to be a teacher on Islam. In fact, some Javanese '*ulama* also dislike Arabs since there were such belief among Javanese that indigenous '*ulama* could be consider as 'a half Arab'. Further see, L.W.C. van den Berg, *Hadramaut dan Koloni*, p. 103-104.

the spiritual ecstasy. The spiritual gatherings of Habib 'Ali are well known to be so spiritually surcharged that they draw many non-Muslims to Islam. Most Javanese Muslims come to the gathering are poor people coming from many suburb areas across the Central Java and hoping that they would get *barakah* (blessing) from Habib 'Ali.

The talent of Arabs to run a business also support their acculturation with the indigenous Javanese. Initially, the Pasar Kliwon village was such kind of an enclave of Arabs. However, their expertise in business have attracted more people to cooperate with or work for them which finally led the village became such kind of plural community. *Batik* and clothes trading which was initially run by Javanese has been surpassed by the Arabs. The necessity of Arabs to expand their network of business has given rise to the necessity of more workers which mostly done by the Javanese. Such patron-client relationship made more possibilities for Arabs to be accepted well among the Javanese.

Figure 1: Ethnic Population in Solo

No.	Ethnics	Num- bers	Percent- age (%)
1.	Javanese	460,080	94,01
2.	Chinese	17,594	3,59
3.	Arabs	3,874	0,79
4.	Sundanese	1,940	0,40
5.	Banjarese	1,017	0,21
6.	Maduranese	968	0,20
7.	Batak	708	0,14
8.	Minang	290	0,06
9.	Others	2,949	0,60
	TOTAL	489,420	100

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) branch of Surakarta 2000.

Although it is not quite clear when the Chinese came to the archipelago for the first time, it is obvious that its existence in Java is much

earlier than the Dutch or even the Arabs. When the Dutch arrived at Batavia in the end of 16th century, traders from southern China were already well established in some port cities of Java (Purdey, 2006: 5). Similar to the presence of Arabs, the Chinese came to the archipelago for living due to the economic and political difficulties of their countries. Lombard (1996) asserts that in 18th century, Chinese assimilated broadly in Java. Further Carey (1984) notes that in 1704, the region of Pekalongan was granted to a big family of Chinese with the name of Jayaningrat. The growth population and the triumph of Chinese in business which endangered the existence of the Dutch's business company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, VOC) especially in Batavia led the massacre of about 10,000 Chinese in 1740-1742. Some of the survived Chinese fled to Central Java (Lombard, 1996: 358).

It was not until the Dutch occupation that this ethnic has problems with some indigenous people especially in Java. Prior to the coming of Dutch, the Chinese could immerse easily into any ethnics and communities In Indonesia, even to adopt some local cultures. Some scholars argue that among prominent *wali* (Islamic preachers in Java) are Chinese descendant such as Sunan Ampel, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Kalijaga and Sunan Gunung Jati (Muljana 2005). The Dutch's policy gave the Chinese higher social status than the Javanese especially during the *Cultuur Stelsel* (work force) in 1830-1870. The closeness of the Chinese to the Dutch government and royal families established an uneasy relationship with the Javanese. According to Cribb, it was not until 19th century that the Chinese have been becoming 'problem' for Indonesians when the Dutch government introduced and maintained a system of racial classification. It was in

Social Justice

1825, that the troops of Pangeran Diponegoro led by Ayu Yudakusumo killed a Chinese community in Ngawi which could be regarded as the first Javanese war toward Chinese in Java.⁹ The prohibition of Pangeran Diponegoro for his followers to have (sex) interaction with Chinese women afterwards had seeded the hatred of Javanese toward Chinese. Unlike the Arabs, Carey even notes that the Chinese has no significant role in the struggle to achieve Indonesian independence (Carey 1986: 10).¹⁰

Although after the Indonesian independence almost all Chinese were born in the country (*peranakan*), they still have problems to assimilate with the indigenous people. This uneasy relationship was supported by the fact that the New Order also neglected the existence of this ethnic within the diversity of the nation-state of Indonesia, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). In the mid of 60s, the New Order regime introduced a series of laws and policies to repress expressions of Chinese identity and culture. The laws and policies forbade Chinese language and characters, and cultural festivals, while at the same time encouraged ethnic Chinese to adopt Indonesian-sounding names (Purdey, 2006: 21). Hence, the

⁹ Further on this issue, see Peter Carey, *Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825*, in *Indonesia*, Vol. 37, 1984.

¹⁰ Since the birth of the proto-nationalism of Indonesia which was marked by the emergence of both national and Islamic organizations, the Chinese was never involved. Even more, the Chinese domination in *batik* business in Surakarta at that time invoked the rise of the *Sarekat Islam* (SI). While the Arabs were involved much in this "age of motion" in the forms of the *Jami'at al-Khair* and also *Al-Irshād* for instance, no single Chinese organization arising in this category. Undeniably, therefore, that in 1928, the Chinese was excluded in the *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Oath) for the hallmark of the Indonesian nationhood. Cf. Leo Suryadinata, *Pribumi, Indonesians, the Chinese minority and China: A study of perceptions and policies*, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore, 2005, pp. 9-11.

central point of the Chinese problem in Indonesia is the social identity of the Chinese which never been regarded by other ethnics as part of Indonesian.¹¹ Currently, although Indonesian government has continuously revised the regulations on the *peranakan*, ethnic Chinese which make up 1.5 per cent of the Indonesian population still lack the same legitimacy as *pribumi* Indonesians. Regardless of the unfair treatment of the government toward ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, this ethnic has a strong nationalism on Indonesia. The willingness of this ethnic to learn local and national languages for instance is among their efforts to adopt their new identity. In many cases, Chinese living in Central Java for example speak Javanese more 'totok' than Javanese people, and so Chinese living in other regions.

It is not quite clear either when the Chinese firstly came to Solo. However, it was quite obvious that this ethnic was already around when the Mataram kingdom moved from Kartasura to Sala in 1743 during the reign of Pakubuwono II (1745-174). The business interest of the Chinese always brought them to the centre of political institution. The ability of Chinese to adapt to new social changes and play in it made them could survive in any situation.¹² Their successful in economics brought them to be closed to the elite politics of the Dutch government and Surakarta kingdom at that time. Due to the Dutch government's policy, the population of the colony was divided into three categories: European, foreign Orientals, and native/*inlander* (Mandal,

¹¹ Since the early of 19th century, the Chinese even proposed to Dutch government to have the same rights as European. The government refused it and finally issued the regulation which categorized Chinese as part of Foreign Orientals.

¹² Further see Ricklefs, M.C., *Yogyakarta di Bawah Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah Pembagian Jawa*, Matabangsa, Yogyakarta, 2002

1994: 55). The Chinese descendant which was initially part of *inlanders* was separated from them and thus later was separated from the category of "Indonesians".¹³ Arabs and Chinese are in the second category which has also some privileges rather than the third category. Therefore, the most populous region of Chinese in Solo was at Balong and Warung Pelem which located at the northern side of the European vicinity. Therefore, Chinese which now are widely spread across Surakarta are coming from these two villages. Similar to any other regions in Indonesia, the Chinese in Solo has also been the pioneer in business. Since the Dutch era, the existence of the Chinese was significant for the kingdoms especially as the lender of money and advisor of the kingdoms' trade (Carey, 1986: 11).¹⁴ In late of the 19th century, Solo had become the centre of *batik* which had its market almost major cities in the archipelago at the time. On this business, the raw materials of *batik* were mostly under the control of the Chinese (Sariyatun & Hermanu: 40).

Obviously, the relationship between the Chinese and the Javanese in Solo was not quite good. Although the Chinese had a good relationship with the aristocrats, it is not with the common people of Javanese. Reportedly, there were also some Chinese converted to Islam in the early of the 20th century and even established *Persatuan Islam Tionghoa* (Chinese Muslims Union, PIT) in 1936. Rather than Arabs who tend to cooperate with the Javanese in business, the Chinese could be seen more as a rival of

business for Javanese. The emergence of the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) in 1912 in Laweyan was precisely as a reaction to the domination of the Chinese and also the VOC (Larson, 1979: 62). Indisputably, therefore, that the acculturation of the Chinese to the Javanese as the indigenous went so slowly. The 'hatred' of Javanese toward its business rival had given rise to the belief that the Chinese has older "*awu*" (spirit of descendant) rather than that of the Javanese.

Therefore, although along with the reluctant of the Chinese to assimilate with the indigenous people, the Javanese reject this assimilation with the Chinese in term of marriage. Some Javanese believe that due to the 'spirit', the later descendents would have stronger Chinese characters rather than that of the Javanese. Although some Javanese may take the benefit from business relationship with the Chinese, the rivalry between these two ethnics remains at the bottom of social structure of the Solonese. In addition, the triumph of the Chinese in business in general to some extent has positioned it as different social class. All above privileges, social status, residential situation and opportunities or political access have led to such kind of social gap between Chinese in the one hand and Javanese on the other. The nowadays success of Chinese in business is another social jealousy which add another social gap with the lower level Javanese.

Along with the half-hearted process of indigenization, religion has become major difference between the Chinese and the Javanese. Culturally the Chinese's culture has been curb by the New Order regime¹⁵ and, hence, it has

¹³ Robert Cribb, "Criminality, Violence and Chinese in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930-1960." Paper presented for International Conference 'Decolonisasi and Posisi Etnis Tionghoa Indonesia 1930-1960. Padang, 18-21 2006, p. 2.

¹⁴ Carey even asserts that the Chinese was involved much in the kingdom's matter especially during the reign of Pakubuwono IV (1788-1820) since he was so wastrel. See Carey, p. 18.

¹⁵ Lombard asserts that Chinese in Java had adopted much of Javanese traditions since prior the occupation of the Dutch in Indonesian archipelago. The Chinese ethnic leading in business brought it to such of special status among the Javanese. This phenomenon was

Social Justice

adopted much of the Javanese's such the language of Javanese. Besides, the Chinese has also been forced not to show up its cultural traditions such as the Chinese New Year and other celebration days. However, since religion has been playing significant role in Javanese society, this distinction has given rise to such kind of tension between them. Most of ethnic Chinese's religions are Confucianism and Christianity, while the Javanese's are Islam and Javanese syncretism. The religious differences between the Chinese and Javanese was the major obstacle of the first parts' indigenization. In many cases in Indonesia, furthermore, religious difference has been considered to see other adherent of religion as 'otherness'. Although many Chinese have adopted some Javanese culture such as in naming of their offspring, religion is still the main hindrance of inter-marriage between the Chinese and indigenous people.

It should be noted here, however, that many Javanese especially residing at Balong and Warung Pelem could take the advantages of the Chinese triumph in business. Therefore, since the relationship between these two ethnics in the villages in quite good, the Chinese in these villages is never became the victims of riots in Solo. In fact, the above case could be a good sample for other residents in Solo in term of their relationship. Indeed, it seems on the surface that the relationship between Chinese and the indigenous people in general in Solo is good. I believe, however, that cultural and religious

marked by the belief among the Javanese that the blood of a murdered-Chinese is doubled compared to that of a Javanese. The presence of Dutch in Batavia in 1619 twisted the assimilation process of the Chinese ethnic in Java particularly and in the archipelago in general. On this issue see, Dennys Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Kajian Sejarah Terpadu Bagian II: Jaringan Asian*. Jakarta:Gramedia, 1996, p. 357.

differences among them have given rise to different cultural identity. In fact, historically there were many Chinese in Solo who adopted Javanese culture as part of their traditions.¹⁶ The insignificant number of the Chinese who did so which could not unite their identity. The absence of common identity among them is a hindrance to the unity among them. Therefore, as long as this main problem is not resolved, indigenization and identity would always be problems lying beneath the communities in Solo.

2. Social and economic deprivation: the seeds of fragmentation

Social fragmentation is among the factors behind the rise of radical Islamism in Solo. Since the beginning of the Solonese history, the lower level *abangan* Javanese majority of the Solonese have been deprived socially and in economics. The social stratification during the Dutch occupation had put the *abangan* Javanese into the lowest level after the Dutch and Javanese *priyayi* (high level class) at the top level, while Arabs and Chinese on the second level.¹⁷ This privilege of the Dutch gave also possibilities not only for Chinese to live at urban areas, but also other business conveniences. Eventually, the lower level *abangan* Javanese were marginalized not only socially, but also in economics. Such social and economic situation did not change significantly until recently. Although many of the lower level Javanese today are living at

¹⁶ Rustopo notes that there were several cultural institutions founded and run by Chinese in Solo especially during the Old Order period such as *Wayang Orang Panggung* (Human Puppet on the Stage, WOP). There were also some Chinese involved in the *Perkumpulan Masyarakat Surakarta* (The Association of Surakarta Society, PMS) especially on the department of art. Further on this issue, see Rustopo, *Menjadi Jawa: Orang-orang Tionghoa dan kebudayaan Jawa di Surakarta, 1895-1998*, Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2007.

¹⁷ On the account of Arabs in Java see Mandal, *Finding Their Place*.

the periphery of urban areas, they are constantly marginalized economically. Current success of Chinese in business is another social jealousy which add another social gap with the lower level Javanese. In turn, recurring anti-Chinese riot has become long-lasting crucial issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots caused by any social problems would finally lead to the destruction of Chinese properties.¹⁸

The legacy of Dutch's law to regulate society according to their social status sustains social deprivation. Furthermore, the regulation of Kasunanan kingdom during the Dutch occupation to arrange society according to their social status also positioned the lower level Javanese into the periphery of the city. This situation was not only deprived the lower level Javanese socially, but it also led them to have limited access to economic resources. Along with the modernization process of Indonesia, Solo is also developing well in many aspects economically. Similar to other big cities in Indonesia in general, the economic development in Solo is also followed by demographic changes especially the movement of suburb people to urban areas. Job opportunities, however, do not provide enough space for the new dwellers coming for their living. As a result, the more people live in the slum areas of Solo, the more unemployed youth living in the areas. This social situation is worsened by the economic crisis hit Southeast Asian countries, and even monetary crisis of Indonesia. This socio-economic situation has given rise to the emergence unstable society.

In addition to the social deprivation, the surpassing of Chinese in

business also has deprived the lower level Javanese economically. Along the history of Solo, ethnic Chinese plays a significant role in major business in the region. In the early 1990s, although Chinese population was only about 4.4 per cent (24,000) of the total population of the city, about 80 per cent of shop owner in Solo were Chinese (Purdey, 2006: 126). The domination of Chinese in business is considered by Javanese as their main rival. Undeniably, therefore, many people believe that Chinese behind the sudden disappearance of certain products from the market. On the other hand, the failure of the government to overcome Indonesian's economic crisis and to distribute welfare to society has worsened socio-economic condition. Therefore, it is obvious that social gap between the poor and the wealthy is represented by the Javanese and the Chinese respectively. In many cases, the Javanese actions could be seen as class actions, i.e., proletariat against the bourgeois. Since the bourgeois is represented by Chinese, this ethnic become the 'victims' of many proletariat Javanese actions.

Social gap based on ethnicity is a big challenge of the Javanese in Solo. The social disparities has become vulnerable factors behind the phenomenon of social radicalism in the city. Therefore, anti-Chinese riots is the long-lasting crucial issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots triggered by any trivial social problems would finally lead to the destruction of Chinese properties. Hence, along the history of Solo, the issue of religion has become the most critical issue which could lead to social violence. In other words, religious sentiment has strengthened the break down of the Solonese social structure. The recurring social riots in Solo is due partly to the failure of the government as well as social thinkers to create such a melting pot for the diverse ethnics. The

¹⁸ On this issue, see Jemma Purdey "The 'other' May riots: anti-Chinese violence in Solo, May 1998" in Charles A. Coppel, *Violent conflicts in Indonesia: analysis, representation, resolution*, Routledge, New York, 2006.

Social Justice

difficulties and inability of ethnics especially Chinese to immerse to the Javanese society is one of the reason of the disparity between Chinese and Javanese. However, different religion and culture prohibit them to interact each other more than just in business matters.

3. Political deprivation: the fragmentation of political authorities

Along with the above characteristic of the Solonese, political deprivation also played a significant role in the fragmentation of the society. Since the early history of Solo under the rule of Kasunanan kingdom, the rulers had neglected the grassroots due to political matters. History records that the patron-client system was not maintained well especially during the Dutch occupation. The fact that religious leaders do not play a significant role in Solo is also supported by the reality that neither traditional nor modern Solo leaders do pay enough attentions to the society. Finally, the political deprivation has given to the destruction of social system. The emergence of such radical Islamic groups as *Sarekat Islam* or current vigilante forces is only a symptom of this fragmentation.

The absence of such social cohesion among the Solonese is also another major factor to the social fragmentation. The hegemonic power of the Solo kingdoms during the Dutch occupation is another deprivation of the lower level Javanese *abangan*. The aristocrats of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran kingdoms did not play a significant role in the society. Since the very beginning of the history of Solo (Surakarta) in the 18th century, politics was becoming a dominant issues among the aristocrats which finally split the Mataram kingdom into several kingdoms. The inability of the aristocrats to handle social problems properly had drawn the involvement of Dutch

business company (VOC) in both internally or externally social problems. The rise of the *Sarekat Islam* in the early 20th century as the peak of social protest to the hegemony of the authoritarian Dutch government was not responded positively by the aristocrats. This ignorance was also supported by the disharmonic relationship between the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran kingdoms which is lasting until recently. The Kasunanan kingdom which was relatively closer to society finally did not care much to what really happened in the society. On the other hand, the social gap or distance between the aristocrats and *kawula*¹⁹ (lower class people) was not well mediated by the *priyayi* (upper class people). On the emergence of the *Sarekat Islam*, Kuntowijoyo asserts that it was as a result of collectively sub-conscious culture due to the failure of the *priyayis* mediate between *raja* and *kawula*.

Until the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the kingdoms let alone Kasunanan reluctantly acknowledged the new state and still accepted the return of Dutch government in 1948. The detachment of the Kasunanan to the lower class people was responded by the reluctant of the people to the planning of Indonesian government to give the Kasunanan a special autonomous region in 1946.²⁰ The social actions in the name

¹⁹ For the case of social class during that time, I tend to employ Kuntowijoyo's category: *raja-priyayi-kawulo* (king-upper class-lower class). Further on this account, see on his work *Raja, Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915*, Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 9.

²⁰ On August 1945, the Pakubuwono XII who just inaugurated as the king of the Kasunanan kingdom was selected as the leader of the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah* (Regional Indonesian National Committee, KNID) as part of the effort of the Republic of Indonesia to compose government of the regional level (*swa-praja*). Some people considered this appointment as an effort of the Indonesian government to re-empower the kingdom. They kidnapped some prominent figures of the kingdom and demanded (1) the omission of the *swa-praja* region of Surakarta, (2)

of anti-*Swapraja* (anti-autonomous government) were supported by majority of the Solonese.²¹ Obviously, the failure of the kingdoms to be such kind of social cohesion for the society, to some extent, have split the unity of the society. Nowadays, the traditional leaders or kings of Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran kingdom do not have any significant power in society. Politics and power within the Kasunanan kingdom is much more interesting for the rulers rather than caring society. Due to disharmonic relationship among the princess of the Kasunanan (the children of Pakubuwono XII), currently there are two kings, Hangabehi and Tedjowulan, who declare that each of them is the most authoritative as the king of Kasunanan entitled as Pakubuwono XIII. In addition, both kings are trying to regain the king's recognition from society by exhibiting some kingdom's cultural heritage to public and giving certain people kingdoms' titles.²² Regardless of the enthusiastic of some people about these events, many consider all these activities as cultural and historical events rather than to acknowledge the authority of kingdom. Unlike the power of

the resignation of Pakubuwono XII, and (3) changing of some rules of *swa-praja* which is not suitable with modern era. Further on this issue, see Bram Setiaji (et al), *Raja di Alam Republik: keraton Kasunanan Surakarta dan Pakubuwono XII*, PT Bina Rena Pariwara, Jakarta, 2000, pp. 88-90. Apart of the refusal of the autonomous region, some unrecognized people kidnapped the prime minister Syahrir when he visited Solo on June 1946. On this issue see, Soejatno, Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta 195-1950 in *Indonesia*, No. 17 (April), Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1974, pp. 104-105.

²¹ Further on this account, see Noto Soeroto, *Pro Swapraja*, Mataram, Solo, 1950, pp. 24-25. Soedarmono and Muh. Amin, *Solusi Konflik Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di Kota Solo*. Laporan Penelitian Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002, p. 1.

²² *Tempo*, 06 September 2004 on www.tempointeraktif.com (Accessed 20 September 2007); *Seputar Indonesia*, 03 September 2007.

traditional leaders in Solo, the king of Kasultanan Yogyakarta has more authoritative and much more powerful among the people of Yogyakarta. Historically, since the beginning of the history of Kasultanan Yogyakarta, the elites of the kingdom are closed to the grassroots.

The authoritarian government of the New Order worsened the political deprivation of the society. The political attitude of Suharto regime was felt by almost all communities in Indonesia at the time, yet it was much worse in the context of Solo since the Solonese have long history being deprived politically. The single majority of *Golongan Karya* (Functional Group, *Golkar*) had deprived any political aspirations of society especially that against the government. The phenomenon of the *Mega Bintang* of Mudrick M. Sangidoe in 1997 clearly signed the enormous opposition of the society against the hegemonic power of the New Order. In fact, the phenomenon of *Sarekat Islam* in 1912 is similar to the phenomenon of *Mega-Bintang*. The longing of the Solonese to the government caring much of its society resulted the emergence of such social radicalism. Undeniably, therefore, that on the reformation era, the PDI-P which rooted at the grassroots gains its enormous voters in Solo. Current political elites which satisfied the necessity of lower level *abangan* Javanese which hopefully could reduce radicalism in the region.

C. Political Impacts of the Social Facts for Radical Islam in Solo

Political and social climate of the post-New Order era have given rise of some Islamic activisms. Many groups of Muslims responded differently to the opportunity. In general, however, in more open political atmosphere the demand of more formalistic Islam would surface since conservative Muslim

Social Justice

groups would have more mass supports and political resources. In the national context, there are at least three features appeared in such scene, (1) the establishment of a number of Islamic political parties that mostly adopted Islam as their basis instead of the *Pancasila*, (2) the increasing demand of implementation of *shari'ah* in some parts of Indonesia, and (3) the emergence of some Islamic vigilante forces such as *Lasykar Jihad* (Jihadi Troops), *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front). Along with the emergence of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, the city of Solo also witness the distinctiveness of radical Islamists in the region.

The dramatic changes from the New Order to the Reformation Era have changed political system of the state. Although there is no exactly similar practice of democracy in the world, the democracy of *Pancasila* adopted by the New Order regime was flawed and ill-described. In the name of 'democracy', the state did not give much opportunity for society to actively participate in governing the state. In fact, the democracy during the Suharto regime was much alike with that of during the Sukarno era, the guided democracy (*demokrasi terpimpin*), which is pseudo-democracy. Obviously, the democratization process of Indonesia is meant to compose an imagined nation or nation-of-intent. Since the practice of democracy during both the Old and New Order could not accommodate all stake holders of the nations, many people felt that their existence was not really recognize by the state. Therefore, the nationhood of Indonesia is not a finished process yet.

Many groups of people disappointed with the nation-state of Indonesia protested in many various ways. The government, however, limited only for certain groups of people to have access to politics. Muslims who had been

curbed during the Sukarno regime were also suppressed during the first 25 years of the Suharto regime. Undeniably, there were many conflicts between Islam and the state during this period which brought about the marginalization of Islam.²³ To support the authoritarian state, Suharto gave certain limited people access to the natural resources of the state. The current complicated and vast corruptions among the elite politicians are among the way how Suharto establishes his 'kingdom'. It was such behaviour which gave rise to the emergence of resistance movements among the society. Horizontal conflicts in the form of ethnic or religious conflicts were happened as part of the process of democratization of Indonesia. Several structural conflicts were also occurred as part of their disappointment with the government which could not share some natural resources equally with local governments or traditional leaders. Apparently, it takes long time and painful prior to the birth of a new democracy a la Indonesia.

The current democratization process of Indonesia has opened many possibilities. Undeniably, the decline of Suharto was worsened by the monetary crisis of Southeast Asia. The inability of the government to overcome the crisis which hit almost the entire society of Indonesia has also worsened the legitimacy of the state among its citizens. Along with social and religious conflicts, there are also some groups of people demanding the inclusion of Islam on the governmental level such as the *shari'ah* 'fever' in various parts of Indonesia. On the parliament, there was vicious debate about the necessity of applying the *Pancasila* as stated in the Jakarta Charter. The long debate finally did not resolve the problem. The economic problems and longing of society to such a good

²³ Further on this issue, see Bachtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003.

governance attracted more groups of people to participate in forming better governmental system. Not only are many uneducated people involved in politics, there are also many religious leaders on the elite politics. Social and political problems finally led to the polarization of the society. The inexistence of such a melting pot among the society has worsened the situation, beside also the absence of social and religious leaders as an adhesive for the unity of the society. The emergence of *Laskar Jihād* and *Front Pembela Islam* in the beginning of the Reformation Era signed the inability of the government to overcome the socio-political problems of the country.

In the context of Solo, the disappointment of the society toward the state has been reflected by many various forms. In general, however, such complicated socio-political situation has given rise to the emergence of social radicalism. Among the social radicalism in the region is the emergence of many various forms of radical Islamism. In fact, some Islamists have already around since the early of the New Order regime and to some extent had shown their radical activities. During the conduciveness of political system of the Reformation Era, some Islamists emerge as a protest toward the state and also to participate in the reconstruction of the nationhood of Indonesia. Some people view that Islam is not merely as religion but is also as a way of life including politics. Along with the socio-economic problems faced by lower level people, Islam is giving many promises which would lead them to a better life.

Different from other regions which currently already adopted *shari'ah* as regional regulation (*perda shari'ah*), the Solonese Muslims articulate their views on Islam distinctively. At least there are two features of the distinctiveness of the Solonese Muslims

which obviously could be categorized as radical Islamism, i.e., (1) the emergence of many various Islamic vigilante forces, and (2) the emergence of new publishers on Islamic activism. Unlike the emergence of vigilante forces in other regions across Indonesia, there are at least 10 Islamic vigilante forces have emerged in the region. There are (1) *Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta* (the Surakarta Youth Muslim FRONT, FPIS), (2) *Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang* (the party of Allah soldier of Sunan Bonang), (3) *Laskar Jundullah* (the soldier of Allah), (4) *Hawariyyun* (the disciples), (5) *Brigade Hizbullah* (the party of Allah Brigade), (6) *Barisan Bismillah* (the Path of Bismillah), (7) *Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta* (the soldier of Surakarta Muslim, LUIS), (8) *Al-Ishlah* (the reform), (9) *Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah* (the Ka'bah Youth Movement, GPK), and (10) *Front Pembela Islam* (the front of Islamic defender, FPI). Although the last two vigilante forces are only the branches of those in Jakarta, the existence of eight other vigilante forces in Solo is a significant phenomenon of radical Islamism in the region. Obviously, the above list does not include the *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI) since it is a national phenomenon although Solo is central for the clandestine organization.

Another feature of the rise of radical Islamism in the region is also characterised by the emergence of some publishers on Islamic activism. In many respects, Solo is just after Jakarta in term of its publishers on Islamism; various current publications on Islamic activism are mostly published either in Jakarta or Solo. Out of other publishers on common teachings of Islam, there are at least nine publishers on conservative Islamism including Islamic activism. There are (1) *Pustaka Al-'Alaq*, (2) *Jazeera*, (3) *Era Intermedia*, (4) *Media Insani Press*, (5) *Pustaka Mantiq*, (6) *Arofah*, (7) *Aulia Press*, (8) *At-Tibyan* and (9) *An-Nadwah*.

Social Justice

While the Pustaka Al-'Alaq publishes a series book on *jihād* of Abdullah Azzam, the second publisher Jazeera is famous because it publishes the book of Imam Samudera, *Aku Melawan Teroris*. In addition, it is also significant to add in this category that there are also several small companies producing cassettes and compact disk (CDs) on radical Islamism such as cassettes on the preaching of Abdullah Sungkars and CDs on Afghanistan and Maluku/Ambon battles.

In addition, it is also worthwhile to note that while *Ikhwani* activism is flourishing among highly educated people in Solo such as university students, *salafy* pietism is also flourishing among less educated people. In the one hand, the first characteristic is common phenomenon in many cities in Indonesia such as the abundant followers *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (United Action of Indonesian Muslim Students, KAMMI) as the *underbow* of *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperity and Justice Party) and also well accepted of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation, HTI) in many various universities in Indonesia. On the other hand, *salafy* pietism is broadly accepted among less educated and lower class people such as those of the Pondok Ngruki and *jama'ah* Gumuk. However, the *salafism* of both institutions is different from other *salafy* school in the region. While some others tend to be purist *salafy*, the Pondok Ngruki and *jama'ah* Gumuk is *salafy* in term of its ideology.

Finally, it is difficult to conclude that either of Islamic activisms, the Pondok Ngruki and *jama'ah* Gumuk, is better than another. In fact, they are different in many respects since they are different type of Islamic activism. Although they could be categorized as *salafy*, their *salafism* is different each other which also different from the mainstreaming *salafy* in Indonesia in

general. As radical Islamism, however, both could be said as successful radical Islamism. While the Pondok Ngruki could influence and attract *abangans* at its surrounding until it formed such an 'enclave', the *jama'ah* Gumuk is successful in term of attracting *abangan* people to join to the exclusive Islamic teachings and also the FPIS as well as the *Hawariyyūn*. Conclusively, although they have some differences, they have many things in common as radical Islamism.

D. Concluding Remark

Obviously, the nation-state of Indonesia is on trial. Although Indonesia has achieved its independence since about 60 years ago, the notion of nationhood of Indonesia is not finished yet. Rebellious conflicts in several parts of Indonesia apparently do not only split the unity of Indonesia, but also left the question on the nationhood of Indonesia. In fact, there are some groups of people dissatisfied with the nation-state of Indonesia especially due to economic matters. Compared to some of its counterparts in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is left in many aspects in economics. Such this disappointment, finally, led to the eagerness of some groups of people to change the national identity. The classical problem such as the Jakarta Charter and the *Pancasila* as the state's ideological foundation resurfaced. Along with the split of East Timor from Indonesian and also some other potential conflicts' regions such as Aceh and Papua, some Islamists demand *shari'ah* as the positive law. Some Islamists view that *shari'ah* is the ultimate solution for current endless social and political problems of Indonesia.

The inability of the government to deal with current socio-political problems is due to the complexity of the problems. The problems do not only lie on the political level but also within the society. It is the problems on the political level which finally led to the difficulties

of the government to deal with *korupsi*, *kolusi* and *nepotisme* (corruption, collusion and nepotism, KKN). It was the tough pressure of the New Order government toward Muslims which have given rise to the breakdown of social structure of the society. For such patriarchal society as Indonesian especially Javanese, the legacy of traditional social status or social hierarchy is necessary to maintain the social system within the society. Therefore, the existence of religious and traditional leaders is absolutely needed for Indonesian society especially to interpret new and modern values into the society. In the context of Reformation Era, such cultural brokers as traditional leaders and *ulamas* are needed to sustain social exchange within the society. Otherwise, in the era which permit any possibilities, people would lose their control and do whatever they want as a political euphoria.

Obviously, the government is powerless to handle the complex problems faced by Indonesia. The disappointment of society toward the government has brought about their distrust toward the government. The disappointment finally led to questioning on the nationhood of Indonesia and the possibility of another identity to overcome the problems. In addition, the weak of the government is deteriorated by its powerless to impose some positive laws into the society. Endless monetary crisis hit Southeast Asia and Indonesian in particular deteriorate the legitimacy of the government among society. All the above have given rise to the breakdown of some laws among the society. In the context of Solo and also some other cities generally, the most obvious breaking of law is the disobedience of some cafés and restaurants to be closed down during the fasting month (*ramadhan*). This situation was worsened by the

disability of the government to deal with religious conflicts such as in Ambon and Maluku.

All the above forced some groups of people to be involve in dealing with the problems by conducting street politics as an alternative. The establishment of many vigilante forces is chosen by some groups of people as the most suitable solution to address the problems. With this power, these groups of people conducting demonstrations in the street protesting government's policies and raiding cafés, hotels and other entertainment places as done by the FPI in Jakarta and the FPIS in Solo. Even more, several vigilante forces in Solo conducted 'sweeping' of Westerners in the city. The 'sweeping' was conducted as their attempt to protest the interference of US to Indonesia's politics and also the invasion of US to Iraq in 2002. In many cases, some vigilante forces even cooperated with the authorities to conduct raids etc. Some leaders of the vigilante forces argue that their attitude is to impose the realization of some regional regulation (*peraturan daerah*, *perda*) such as on drunken beverages (*minuman keras*). In general, they see that their attitude is still on the ordinary manner since they do not use violence as their attitude.

Besides, these groups see the necessity of another social system which could be an ultimate solution for their problems. They see Islam as a comprehensive religion which does not only regulate worship to Allah but also as a social system. Along with the *Majelis Islam Indonesia* (MMI), some of the vigilante forces also utterly summon the necessity of *shari'ah* and *jihad* in order to compose *ummah* (Muslim society). Currently, the notion of *shari'ah* is accepted well among the society rather than the concept of *negara Islam* (Islamic State) which were did not responded positively among the society. Although

Social Justice

at its minimum fashion, each of these groups are trying to impose *shari'ah* among their own limited group or enclave. By reinforcing *shari'ah*, they are trying to alter national identity to be more religious. Each of these radical Islamic organization, however, has its own way to implement *shari'ah*. In the context of Solo, however, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's demand on the regional regulation (*perda*) based on *shari'ah*, for example, was not responded positively by many other Islamic organizations in Solo. The *jama'ah* Gumuk see that it is not the precise time to impose *shari'ah* since the society is not ready yet. It fears that the notion of *shari'ah* would even rejected by Muslim communities, even more the *Khilafah Islamiyah* which still burred among radical Islamists.

The emergence of some radical Islamic organizations, however, is not inline with the acceptance of the Solonese of the notion of *shari'ah*. In fact, the phenomenon of abundant vigilante forces and the acceptance of Pondok Ngruki among *abangan* is only trivial phenomenon and not mainstreaming yet among *abangan* Solonese. In other words, the limited acceptance of the notion of Islamism among the Solonese is due mostly to the inability of some leaders of Islamism to frame the current social problems. Unlike the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) in the early 20th century which was mainstreaming in the society, the notion of *shari'ah* is only accepted among certain levels of *abangan* communities. In this regard, I tend to say that the propaganda of Islamists does not touch the heart problems of the society yet. Undeniably, therefore that although there are many radical Islamic organizations in Solo, the demand on the *perda shari'ah* is not responded positively by the Solonese Muslims. In addition, this occurrence is also due partly to the various colour of Islam in the region. Although such radical Islamic vigilante forces are abundant in Solo, there are several other

powerful Islamic organizations such as the MTA which has enormous members in Solo in particular and the ex-residency of Surakarta in general.

On the emergence of many Islamic vigilante forces in Solo, I tend to say that it has to do with the *habitus* of the Solonese. While the socio-political deprivation on the Solonese is the *habitus* and historical precedence is the *capital*, the political conduciveness in the *field* on Bourdieu's theory of *habitus*. Since the early history of Solo, such radical response of Muslims toward socio-political problem is becoming part of the Solonese culture. The emergence of the vigilante forces of the *Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad* (Army of the Lord Prophet Muhammad, TKNM) and *Sidiq Tabligh Amanah and Vatonah* (to confirm, convey, and propagate goodness, SATV) during the early of the 20th century was such a precedence for the Solonese Muslims to response any violating issues on Islam. Radical responses of the Solonese to the autonomous government during the early of the Old Order period was also part of the *habitus* of the Solonese. In general, I would argue that radical activism either violence or not has become part of the *habitus* of the Solonese. The radical responses of the Solonese toward the dramatic changes of the political system in 1998 were among the phenomenon of this *habitus*.

Finally, I would argue that the emergence of such radical Islamism in Solo is due mostly to the failure relationship between *santri* and *abangan*. It is obvious that most radical Islamic activisms are well-accepted among lower level *abangan*, although this trend is not mainstreaming. The indifference of the Solonese Muslims to the regional regulation (*perda*) of *shari'ah* and Islamism in general sign that there are various levels of *abangan* in the region. At least there are two kinds of *abangan* in the region, i.e., those attached to Javanese syncretism and those attached

to communism. For those attached to Javanese syncretism, it is easier for them to convert to be Islamists, while those previously communists tend to convert to Christianity as their religion for their own safety. Meanwhile, the Solonese Muslims who were previously on the category of *santri* nowadays could accept modernity easily. The widely spread of radical Islamism in the region is due mostly to the failure of *santri* to involve *abangan* in their mainstream. Finally, it is difficult to say which school of Islam is mainstreaming in the region since all schools of Islam, traditional, moderate and conservative has its own vast communities in the region.

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