

# IN SEARCH OF LEADERS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: A REFLECTION OF INDONESIA'S 2014 GENERAL ELECTION

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## ABSTRACT

*Article deals with the questions of leadership transition in post-Mao Zedong/Deng Xiaoping era. During the time of Mao and Deng, factionalism played important roles in all segments of Chinese politics, including the election of a leader. After Mao and Deng, although factionalism persisted, it did not become contradiction, but rather it created a situation in which factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperated in all aspects of Chinese politics. The main objective of this research is the perpetuation of the party's grip on political power. The paper also deals with the questions of recruiting and educating party cadres. Career paths of three post-Deng Chinese leaders, i.e., Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were also explored to explain the period they reached their peak of their careers by blood and sweat.*

**Keywords:** Chinese leaders, general election, factionalism, cadre recruiting and education.

## INTRODUCTION

Electing, promoting or appointing a leader is a regular event undertaken by all countries regardless of any political system they embrace. In the past two years, it was fortunate for people to have the opportunity to witness the change of leadership in two largest countries in Asia, specifically China, towards the end of 2012 and early 2013, and Indonesia in March and July 2014. As it can be seen, about two or three years ago, there has been a process of leadership change in China from the fourth generation led by Hu Jintao to the fifth generation under the command of Xi Jinping. The selection of Xi as the Secretary-General of the CCP was carried out by the Party Congress, while his appointment as the Presidential was conducted by the National People's Congress (NPC). Xi, therefore, was holding two highest positions in China and naturally he was the most powerful leader in the country.

Meanwhile, in 2014, Indonesia held "a democracy festivity" to elect the president and vice president, and before that people chose legislators who would sit at different levels in the house of representatives. Although Indonesia implements a democratic system, it does not mean that we do not need to learn a practice run in China for comparison. What aspects can we learn? This paper discusses some interesting aspects of the system in cultivating new leaders in China, since the post-Deng Xiaoping, especially with the appearances of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. The rise of three different generations of leaders is different from the period of Mao and Deng.

China is practicing a system of one-party rule—westerners call it dictatorship or totalitarian. In such system, the process of electing a leader in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is conducted in a closed door system or often called "internal party democracy." Moreover, at the time when Mao

Zedong was still alive and controlled power, he determined who would sit in the leader position. Not too long before his death in September 1976, Mao suddenly appointed Hua Guofeng, an unknown political figure, to take his position with his very famous statement *ni banshi wo fangxin* (With you in charge, I am at ease).

Deng Xiaoping did the same policy when the CCP leadership was faltering as a result of the internal dissension caused by Tian'anmen events in 1989, and after firing Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, he appointed Jiang Zemin to serve as a President and CCP General Secretary. Jiang's meritorious service, who at that time served as the mayor of Shanghai, freed the city from riots sparked by demonstrations in Tian'anmen Square, Beijing.

## METHODS

This paper is written based on a qualitative method, supported by data from library and online research in both English and Mandarin. By using this method, the data are broken down into three parts of discussions. The first part is about the factionalism which emphasized in post-Deng Xiaoping. The second part is the discussion of cadre education and the last part discusses the career path of tree Chinese leaders.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Factionalism is fragmentation occurs commonly in almost all political parties, especially the dominant ones. In fact, there is a tendency that the factional competition is not different from fight and competition in multi-party political system in which the parties have different ideology, vision, and mission. Longman (2006) defines the term as the existence of "a group of people in a larger group who brings different thoughts from what generally is accepted". Thus, it can be said that factionalism is the seeds for conflicts.

Since its establishment in 1921, factionalism can be categorized as "chronic disease" within the CCP. At first, different understanding was started from ideology and strategy to win the struggle for the establishment of a socialist state. After the PRC was established, disagreement arose between the two factions: the moderates versus the radicals. Ideology differences which then evolved into an open conflict had brought the PRC into the turbulent political situation since 1957 until Mao's death in September 1976. The competition between the two main wings of the CCP was also reflected in electing a leader. The competition was frequently developed into violence. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the Tian'anmen Incident (1989) are the examples of how factionalism was unbridled and developed into almost a civil war. During the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997), at the time when China was undergoing a period of transition, the political frenzy still existed although it was not as noisy as during Mao period.

Deng Xiaoping, who shifted management of state from "politics in command" into "economy in command," had changed the political situation in the country. At present, politics is no longer an affair for ordinary people but had become an elite game. However, it did not mean that factionalism disappeared. Factional rivalry, which during Mao era was shown by the rise in mass campaigns, now has turned into a competition which is not widely known by the masses. This phenomenon also occurred in electing a leader.

In line with the fundamental change result from Deng's reforms, the map of factionalism inside the CCP has also changed significantly. Following the rise of the PRC status from a Third World nation into a world power in the economic, political, and military fields, the main issue debated among factions in the leadership is about how the country played role in the global arena. Therefore, it is necessary to find what kind of policy should be taken in order to preserve the position of the CCP as the sole holder of political power at a time when globalization has changed world political division.

Following the new trend, the map of factionalism inside the CCP has become more complex. During Mao's period, factionalism was mainly political or about how to translate Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought into action or in other words, the operationalization of ideology. Therefore, during Mao's time, the main competition was dominated by the rivalry between radical versus moderate camps, whereas during Deng's period it was between the radical reformists versus those who were called "careful reformists." The difference in ideology since Deng's time until today is basically motivated by the same reason: how and where the role of ideology at a time when economic factors increasingly occupied a dominant position.

In line with the changes in post-Deng era and the leadership of Jiang Zemin, there were at least three main factions competing within the CCP. The first was Maoist faction. Supporters of this group generally consisted of senior figures from the same generation as the late Deng, like former Prime Minister Li Peng. They were well aware that Deng reforms had led to the decreasing role of ideology. Therefore, they aspired to retain still the principles embodied in the teachings of Mao.

However, due to age, the role of Mao's teachings successors were increasingly receded. There was a relatively young figure, Bo Xilai, Mao's torch bearer. With his position as a mayor and the party chief of Chongqing Branch, he made the city a symbol of Maoist doctrine. During his tenure of Chongqing mayor, he did various manipulations. Bo Xilai was later arrested, tried and sentenced to lifetime in jail. According to some Western observers, Bo's fall was not merely his actions, but rather due to other factors. He was considered a serious rival of Xi Jinping to occupy the highest position in the country (Wong, 2013). With the fall of Bo, the role of Mao's successor increasingly dimmed.

The second faction is the one Western observers called with a nickname "Shanghai Clique" while in China, they were called *haipai*. The members of this group consisted of people who gathered around Jiang Zemin, the mayor of Shanghai, whose position catapulted to become the president of the PRC and the General Secretary of the Party. It can be said that the influence of this faction was getting bigger because of Jiang Zemin. At first, their mindset focused on how to improve the economic development of the southern coastal areas and the development of policies to those areas to keep developing. However, their ideas were growing into a national idea after Jiang Zemin served as a president and General Secretary of the CCP.

At the national level, *haipai* was known as the group that introduced the idea of economic development and how to enhance the role of China in the global economy. For that reason, they ruled out "for a while" various negative factors as the result of economic development, such as the gap between those who got benefits from the reform and those who did not, or simply the difference between the rich and the poor as well as the prosperity gap between rural and coastal areas. To push the economic development, they did not hesitate to cooperate with agencies representing the world capitalist organizations like IMF, the World Bank, and others. The concept adopted by *haipai* was more or less about "growth is the main objective, while distribution of wealth can follow later at least for the time being". Since Jiang Zemin left a "legacy" in the form of his thesis on "Three Representatives" (*San ge daibiao*), the following leaders always left a trail of teachings which became the main direction of his programs.

The role of *haipai* increasingly imprinted the publication of Jiang Zemin's thesis known as the Three Representatives. Basically, according to Jiang, the transformation of the country into economic

development as its main focus, the CCP had also been transformed to become a more "democratic" organization. Consequently, the new situation had made the party open to all groups, including businesses and other wider communities. In other words, Jiang's idea was to include elements of society which during Mao's time referred to as the "enemy of the working class" to join the CCP (Wolf, 2001).

The third group consisted of the graduates of the Young Communist League which were often called in China by a nickname *tuanpai*. According to Western observers of China, they were considered as having deeper roots in Chinese society than the Shanghai Clique. They were united by the experience of getting education and training in the Communist League and having worked to help people in undeveloped regions. Therefore, their views were considered to be more populist, and their ideas focused on how to create principles of justice in China when reform created inequality in various fields (CCTV, 2003).

*Tuanpai* climbed to leadership position when Hu Jintao was elected as the President of China/Secretary General of the CCP replacing Jiang Zemin. In line with their vision, Hu submitted his thesis on "Harmonious Socialist Society." The goal was to loosen social tensions, particularly the imbalances as a result of successful economic development. Based on this thesis, Hu assisted by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who is also a *tuanpai*, focused on government programs such as on poverty alleviation and addressing the environmental damage as a result of unbridled industrialization. However, due to the key positions in the government and the party, especially in the rural areas, which were still held by the loyalists of Jiang, Hu and Wen the programs were less successful. In brief, rivalry between the "parties" of *haipai* and *tuanpai* could be compared to the debate between two opposing opinions—particularly in the "Third World countries". On the one side, there are those who are mostly concerns with focusing on how to enlarge the "cake" of development against those who on the other side want the equal distribution of development gains more equally (Bergsten, 2009).

The fourth "party", or a "party" that was often considered to be allied with *haipai* was the aristocracy or *taizidang* as the nickname. Western writers usually called them "princelings." They were composed of the sons and daughters of people from Mao and Deng generation who participated in the struggle to make the CCP winner in the political and military struggle to control China. According to Chinese sources, their number now consisted of about 300 men and women, aged about 60 years and like their parents; they suffered during the Cultural Revolution since they were accused by Mao as "capitalist roaders". They pursued careers in various fields and activities such as business, trade, bureaucracy, and politics (Li, 2001).

Because of their special position, they were the ones who got benefits from the economic reforms. They received the best education by studying at schools dedicated specifically for children of the elite. They also had the opportunity to receive education in the best universities in China such as Qinghua University, Peking University, Nanjing University, Jiaotong University and other elite universities. Many of them later went to study at various universities abroad—especially in the US and Europe—received the highest scientific degrees in many fields. Xi was a graduate from Qinghua University'.

Not to be outdone by his two predecessors, Xi introduced the "China dream" (*Zhongguo meng*) (Kuhn, 2013). There have been various interpretations of the dream. A retired Colonel, Liu Mingfu, for example, said that the dreams were the ideals of China to be a strong country both economically and militarily so that this country was highly regarded by other countries (BBC News-China, 2013). However, according to Xi, dream was an advancement of progress. It was Xi's call to the youth to "dare to realize the dream and contribute to the revitalization of the nation and for the sake of the country". Some people interpreted his as a call to the nation to revive since China was in the middle of a situation when the spirit of reform has begun to fade (Renmin Ribao, 2013).

Ideologically the *taizi* was not tied to any other political wings of the CCP. That was the reason they spread in various streams. Xi, for example, tends to be associated with *haipai*, while Bo Xilai, also a *taizi*, drifted into the Maoist stream. The election of Xi Jinping as Chinese new leader symbolized the rise of *taizi* party.

Disagreement as a result of factionalism has caused competition, and the opposition did not just evolve around differences in policy-making but also in appointing official to certain positions, particularly the strategic ones. If an important position was occupied by members of a particular wing, the factions would be able to influence the policies adopted. Scrambles to occupy strategic positions were more intense closer to the end of the tenure of a president and a Secretary General of the CCP. At the turn of the leadership in November 2012, they fought over 25 top positions in the leadership of the CCP.

The concept of how the policy was carried out might be different, but there were some basic concepts that factions agreed with, and it made them able to coexist peacefully. All factions always had a commitment to preserve the position of the CCP as the sole authority. They also committed to maintain the principle of "socialist market economy," while they were faithful to the principles inherited by Deng Xiaoping that maintaining stability was an unnegotiable thing.

All factions learned from the 1989 Tiananmen incident when the leadership of the CCP torn between the pros and the cons to demonstrations calling for democracy, openness, and the eradication of corruption and abuse of power. Therefore, they came to a consensus that dissent and debate could happen, but it must be done behind the closed doors. The positive aspect of the CCP's internal factionalism after Deng Xiaoping was the fact that they could complement each other. *Tuanpai*, for example, could provide information about negative aspects of the economic capitalization process although they did not master the concepts of economic development. The information was taken into consideration by the *haipai* and the *taizi* in running the policy.

In China post-Mao and Deng period, there was no dominant leader anymore, and as a result, the concept of collective leadership in all areas had been created. The formulation and operationalization of all policies and the appointment of officials were conducted by factional bargaining with an additional factor referred to as the "Gorbachev's Syndrome" who inspired the thinking of China's leaders. That was a reality experienced by the Soviet Union when a leader ran a policy, which according to one of the Chinese leaders was wrong. As its consequence, the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union disappeared from history. The task of all members of the CCP was to avoid the catastrophe to happen in China (Taubman, 1997).

This political consensus was reflected in the composition of the highest level of government officials. As an example, during the leadership of President Hu Jintao, a *tuanpai*-accompanied Hu, Xi Jinping affiliated with *daizi* and *haipai* to occupy the vice presidency. Now, Xi is occupying the presidential chair, accompanied by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, a *tuanpai*.

Finding a leader could not be separated from education. A communist party that monopolized power especially as the CCP inevitably focused on the recruitment and education of the cadres who would be in charge of leading the country in the future. This was the only way that the preservation of the CCP as the holder of the monopoly of political power could be guaranteed. In accordance with the demand, schools for educating cadres had been formed since the CCP established in the 1920s. At that time, the challenges to the education system for cadres was getting more complex, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Research conducted by Guo *et al.*, (2009) revealed the fact that essentially all candidates, no matter how high the level of their education was, had to attend basic level school. Then, once in active duty, once every five years, they had to attend refresher training. School cadres were available in

almost all locations around the country, either in the village, town, district, provincial, or capital. The place for the highest cadre training was in Beijing, under the management of the Central Committee of the CCP. This Cadre School's name was Central Cadres School of the Central Committee. This training center had branches under the name of the Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong, Jinggangshan, and Yan'an. There was also another brand provided special training for business people. The cadre school operates under the name Academy of Business Executives, located in Dalian.

Political indoctrination and ideology were the core courses offered to the cadres, both beginners and advanced. However, because of various challenges both from within and from without the country, the courses provided also diversified ranging from international relations issues, socialism with Chinese characteristics, the difference between contemporary and orthodox Marxism, administration techniques, and how to manage day-to-day business and overcome problems. Many of the elite cadres were sent to leading universities in the USA and Europe to obtain higher degrees.

To see how a leader rises to the top of his career, it is worth looking more closely to China on how the process is going as a comparison. For the purpose, let us discuss the career paths of the three post-Deng top leaders, namely Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

Jiang Zemin was the first successor to Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Because he was personally appointed by Deng, Jiang was often regarded as an intermediate or substitute figure of Zhao Ziyang, the CCP General Secretary, who was accused of being sympathetic to the student demonstrators at Tian'anmen in 1989, and was later fired. However, his career was not as bad as it was considered by critics.

He was born in 1926, in Yangzhou as an orphan, after his father, a member of the CCP, was killed in an armed conflict. Jiang joined the CCP in 1926 and graduated from Jiaotong University the following year. After the victory of the communists and the establishment of the PRC, he worked on a variety of duties related to the organization of the party and held a regular job in Shanghai. He served as a party secretary and a deputy director of a food factory in Shanghai and also worked as a deputy director of a soap factory. He later got a higher position as the head of the engine division in a government car factory.

In 1955, he was sent to Moscow for training at the Stalin Automobile Factory. Upon returning to China the following year, his position rose, and in a few years, he received a promotion to become the head of the import-export Directorate at the Ministry of Car Industry. Then he was appointed as a Director of International Relations of the Ministry. His career continued to rise when in 1982; he was appointed as a member of the CCP Central Committee and a year later was promoted to Minister Electronics Industry.

In 1985, he returned to Shanghai with the position of a Deputy Secretary of Party in the metropolis branch and soon became a secretary as well as the mayor of Shanghai. He followed Deng's path as an economic reformer but conservative in politics. One of his major breakthroughs as mayor of Shanghai was the auction of the land use rights. The action was actually not in accordance with the Constitution of PRC, but he argued that the action was legal in order to attract foreign investors to Shanghai.

In 1987, he became a member of the Politburo, one of the nine most powerful men in the PRC. However, one great advantage to make Deng put him in the top power position was that he made Shanghai relatively free from the debris of the 1989 Tian'anmen protests. So, when Deng fired Zhao Ziyang from the post of the Secretary General of the CCP, he appointed Jiang to replace Zhao. The position, furthermore facilitated his rise to become the President of the PRC (Gilley, 1998).

Hu was born in 1942 in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province, in a simple family. His mother was a school teacher who died when he was seven years old. Known as a talented young man, he completed his early education in his hometown and successfully graduated as a water engineer from Qinghua University. As a student at the University, he joined the CCP and became an activist. He worked as a volunteer in Gansu Province in the power station construction project while managing the affairs of the party in the province. He started his political career in Gansu.

In 1980 Deng Xiangping—in order to attract youth for revitalizing the party—started a program called "Four Transformations." The goal was to find potential talents for future leaders who were young, more revolutionary, more knowledgeable and had more special expertise. Hu was elected to participate in the program. The political figure who acted as sponsor to Hu to participate in the program was Song Ping, who at that time served as secretary of the Gansu Branch of the CCP.

In 1982, Hu was appointed Secretary of the Communist Youth League Gansu Branch, while also served as the Director of All China Youth Federation. At the same time, Song Ping was assigned to Beijing, occupying the position of Minister of Organization of the CCP. One of his tasks was to provide recommendations for the nomination and promotion of senior cadres. Recommended by Song Ping, Hu was assigned to get training at the Central Party School, a party organization in educating talented cadres for filling strategic positions within the party and bureaucracy.

After finishing his education, Hu was appointed as a Secretary of the Young Communist League. In this position, he met Hu Yaobang (no family relation to Hu Jintao), the General Secretary of the CCP, who was a graduate of the League. Hu Jintao accompanied Hu, the General Secretary, on visits around the country. Later, Hu Yaobang recommended Hu Jintao to work in Guizhou Province as a Party Secretary. There, he left an imprint by his efforts to improve the economy of the backward region. The period of 1985-1989 was a time of political turbulence in China. At that time, in Beijing, the youth and students launched street actions under the banner of Democracy Wall Movement. Hu Yaobang was later ousted from his position as secretary general because he was considered too weak and was even accused of being sympathetic to the movement. However, Hu Jintao succeeded in avoiding the emergence of similar action in Guizhou.

Perhaps, as a result of the fall of Hu Yaobang and the closeness to him, Hu Jintao received a "punishment" to be appointed as a government commissioner as well as Political Party Secretary of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet, the territory which has always been in turbulence since early 1950s. Taking an advantage of the hot situation in Beijing, the Tibetan political activists also launched a movement demanding independence. The movement was suppressed, and Hu was accused of being behind the use of the police and army in the annihilation of the movement.

In line with what had happened in Tibet, Western observers assumed that Hu's hands were behind the suppression of the Tian'anmen demonstrations in June 1989. Those analysts said, the hands of Hu were the idea behind the bloody repression. Therefore, they concluded, the method used by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the police in Tian'anmen Square was similar to what being used in the suppression of the mass movement in Lhasa, Tibet. However, the allegations could not be proved, and Hu's career rise. In 2002, he was elected to replace Jiang Zemin as the CCP Secretary-General and the President of the PRC. As the most powerful man in China, he, along with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, launched the idea of Harmonious Society (Heisey, 2004).

Similar to information regarding Chinese leaders in general, Xi's life history was exposed to the public incompletely. What is known clearly is that his father was the late Xi Zhongxun, who joined the CCP in 1928 and heralded as a hero of the revolution who helped Mao to establish revolutionary based in North China. However, during the Cultural Revolution, he was denounced as one of the "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders". Mao made him victim by sending him to jail for a more than five years. Only after Mao died and Deng Xiaoping took control of the country, he rehabilitated Xi

and assigned him as party boss in Guangdong province. Under the leadership of senior Xi, Guangdong province launched economic reforms that focused on the development of Shenzhen, which subsequently became a model to start the opening of China's economy to the outside world in the 1980s. Shenzhen located adjacent to the New Territory, Hong Kong, which previously was just a fishing village. The location had been transformed by Xi Zhongxun into a modern economic territory which became a model for other areas to follow.

Xi Jinping was born in Beijing in 1953 when his father served as head of the CCP's Central Propaganda Department and on currently the Deputy Minister of Education and Culture. Therefore, Xi junior grew up in the middle of elite environment. He was a member of the group that people cynically call "red aristocracy." Westerners called them *princelings*. The estimated number of this group today has been about 300 people, and they used their position using *guanxi* (connections) and networking to get good quality of education which then pushed their careers forward in various fields. There was one feature attached to Xi Jinping's personality. If other members of the aristocracy mostly plunged into business to reap the abundant of wealth, he used the connection to reach the position in politics. At the time of the Cultural Revolution Xi was just 15 years old. As a child with "counter-revolutionary element", he was put in rural Shaanxi province to perform forced labor or in Mao's political term "learn from peasants" (Xinhuanet, 2012).

A colleague of his youth, as quoted by the Western press, described Xi as a very sincere person and ambitious in pursuing a career. It is proved by the fact that despite his father's public humiliation, imprisonment, and torture during the mass campaign, the younger Xi insisted on joining the CCP (Callahan, 2012). When the Cultural Revolution came to an ending, he evaded the boisterous atmosphere of the capital in which everyone scrambled for good positions in the party and the government by showing off themselves as revolutionaries to get the attention of Mao. His career continuously accelerated, and in 1983 he chose a career to be assigned in the district.

In Shanxi village, because of his organizing ability, he had made the farmers amazed that made him appointed party secretary of the village. His ability also made him get a recommendation for studying in college—a rare chance for a descendant of a "counter-revolutionary". After graduating with an engineering degree from Qinghua University, a leading university in Beijing, he was appointed as a Deputy Secretary of the CCP in Zhengding District, Hebei province, a backward area.

To develop the area, Xi smartly took advantage of Zhengding, which was used as a set of popular television series adapted from the classical Chinese novel *Hong Lou Meng* (known in the West as *Dream of the Red Chamber*). These series with a little touch of sex became very popular. Xi made the set for making the TV series tourist object. His effort was very successful, and Zhengding soon became a tourist destination. At that time, all development programs were still under the central planning, and tourist destinations were limited to the area of the Forbidden City, the Summer Palace, the Great Wall or Badaling (burial place for Ming emperors) around Beijing. Because of his skills, the Chinese media praised Xi as a person who had soul and spirit of reformers and pioneers.

Western and Chinese press and media praised Xi as a great diplomat who was skillful in influencing and convincing all people. Since Xi was a descendant of a "prince" in the leadership of the Chinese dynasty, the Chinese press praised him as a "populist crown prince". Even Kristoff (2013), an American senior analyst who was usually critical to the politics in China, had a positive impression on Xi and called him as a genuine reformer. Kristoff's opinion was based on several factors. First, Kristoff said, X was having the soul of a reformer. This attitude descended from his father, the late Xi Zhongxun, a pioneer in the economic development and publicly condemned the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. His mother chose to stay in Shenzhen, the most capitalistic region in the country. Xi also sent his daughter to Harvard University. It mirrored, according to Kristoff, that Xi highly regarded the importance of English and American education system. Kristoff also speculated about the possibility of Xi to release Liu Xiaobo, the writer and the critical current Nobel Prize winner from

prison. He was also quite concerned and would listen to public demands for the need of government to be more transparent. Kristoff speculated further by saying that one of Xi's main programs was to move the body of Mao Zedong who was preserved and on display in a mausoleum at Tian'anmen Square complex. It was intended to eliminate the tradition of personality cult in Chinese political system.

With the election of Xi as the Chairman of the CCP and President, the leadership of the party and the country has shifted from the 4<sup>th</sup> generation to the 5<sup>th</sup> generation. One of the characteristics of the 5<sup>th</sup> generation is the fact that they grew up, experienced and suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Xi was not the exception to this phenomenon because those who were influenced by the massive campaign and the longest one in Mao's period of history were not only ordinary people but also the elite groups and their families. Even, Deng Xiaoping, the architect of reform suffered. In fact, Mao fired Deng for three times because he was accused of disobeying the Party's programs and was branded "capitalist roader"—the label branded to anyone who was considered Mao's political enemy.

For 25 years, his career continued to rise by getting some various leadership positions within the party. At first, he was assigned to a position as a party secretary in Hebei province (1983-85), an undeveloped and poor province. Then, he was assigned to two prosperous provinces of Fujian (1985-2002) and Zhejiang (2002-07). In both provinces, he managed to make an anti-corruption campaign and earned the nickname of "Mr. Clean." In 2007, he was stationed in Shanghai and considered successful in eliminating corruption in the southern metropolitan city. Due to series of his success, he was pulled into Beijing to sit in the center of the party leadership and its position continued to deteriorate when he was appointed as a vice president under Hu Jintao in March 2008.

Chinese media also praised Xi as a leader who embraced the philosophy of reform. He continued what his father had done by forming several cities in the south to be the "special economic zone." As the Mayor of Xiamen, in 1985 he encouraged the development of trade relations with Taiwan which was located across the city and was ideologically different. Xi stayed in this position for 17 years, and the economic relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits was growing rapidly. This pioneering and reformer spirits were brought in 2002 to Zhejiang province where the economy was growing rapidly.

Xi's leadership optimism was more open and reformist as it was reflected in his speech after he was elected, "People love their life and hope for better education, steady job, better income, and reliable social security, high standards of healthcare, as well as pleasant living conditions and surroundings. They expect their children can grow, work, and live better. People long for good and beautiful life; those are what we strive for (Renmin Ribao, 2012)."

However, if we look from the constellation of the various forces in the CCP, the praise is somewhat exaggerated and needs to be proved. There was still much work need to be done for the realization a productive leadership, and it obviously took time. One main reason is factionalism within the CCP. The current developments in mainland China shows that Xi is still following the path inherited by Deng. CCP should maintain its position as the holder of the monopoly of power in the country. Closing to the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1986 Tian'anmen incident, he ordered security forces to arrest government critics, apply censorship in cyberspace and alert security personnel to keep things that bother public security.

## CONCLUSIONS

After closely following the process of searching leaders in China, there are many things to learn as lessons. First, the fact on the importance of finding talents for leaders the creation or cadres especially for a large party such as the CCP which has a monopoly of political power has been carried out since 1949. Availability of future leaders will ensure the survival of the party.

Second, it should be noted that education is very important. As it has been described in this article, there are various institutions in the management of fostering and maintaining CCP leadership candidates. In this case, the Chinese nation was lucky because people highly value education and education has become one of the important factors in a nation's civilization.

Third is the importance of ideology for a political party. Although there are doubts whether people in China still believe in socialism/communism, the CCP based his monopoly of power on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thoughts. Any Political party without ideology as its foundation, and based only on ambition for power, or furthermore use money politics, will not gain root in society.

Fourth, it is very interesting and deserves attention to the fact that the 5<sup>th</sup> generation of leaders who are now controlling power in China under Xi Jinping are descendants of the CCP elite, or popularly known in China as the *taizi*. These are people who have enjoyed special privileges in education, connections, money, and other best facilities. On one hand, it is undeniable, that they could occupy these strategic positions because they were the descendants of the party elite, and thus had enjoyed special privileges. On the other hand, however, by tracing career paths of three post-Deng leaders, we can draw a conclusion that good facilities are not enough. Jiang, Hu, and Xi started their political career at low level and rose gradually until achieving top positions.

As the last conclusion, it cannot be denied that what is happening in China now in the area of leadership is a system of a political dynasty. However, the fact must be accepted that in modern times a person will not become a leader without a good education, good social environment, and good training. They have to start their careers from the bottom, and therefore they are not the so-called "instant leader" or *pemimpin karbitan* in Indonesian.

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