

## **Informal Security Groups as Social Non-Movement in Indonesia: Case of *Buru Jejak* in Central Lombok**

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### **Abstract**

This essay discusses vigilante groups in relation to access for rights to security, particularly in Central Lombok District, West Nusa Tenggara Province. Vigilante groups are defined as 'informal security groups' to distinguish them from formal security entities owned by the state such as the police and military. I propose an alternative interpretation toward the existence of informal security groups that is different from mainstream explanation. Most of the literatures have a strong tendency to categorize informal security groups merely as antagonist actors and a predatory element in the process of democratization in Indonesia. By referencing Asef Bayat's notion of social non-movement, I argue that informal security group, in Lombok particularly, is one way ordinary people seek to improve their quality of life when security and access to justice are not available, resulting in a blurred line between legal and illegal activity. However, these groups are susceptible to be used by the local elites to achieve particular political interests. This research used qualitative methods, including interviews and archival research.

### **Kelompok Keamanan Informal Sebagai Bentuk *Social Non-Movement* di Indonesia: Kasus *Buru Jejak* di Lombok Tengah**

#### **Abstrak**

Artikel berikut ini membahas tentang kelompok kekerasan dalam kaitannya dengan akses terhadap hak atas keamanan di Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat. Kelompok kekerasan dalam artikel ini didefinisikan sebagai 'kelompok keamanan informal' untuk membedakannya dengan entitas keamanan formal yang dimiliki oleh negara seperti polisi dan tentara. Saya menawarkan alternatif interpretasi yang berbeda dengan penjelasan yang sudah umum terhadap keberadaan kelompok kekerasan informal. Sebagian besar penelitian terdahulu cenderung menempatkan kelompok kekerasan informal hanya sebagai aktor antagonis atau elemen predatoris dalam proses demokratisasi. Dengan mengacu kepada konsep yang digagas oleh Asef Bayat tentang *social non-movement*, saya berargumen bahwa kelompok keamanan informal di Lombok merupakan cara orang-orang biasa untuk meningkatkan kualitas hidupnya ketika akses terhadap hak atas keamanan dan keadilan tidak tersedia, meskipun berada di antara batas aktivitas legal dan ilegal. Akan tetapi, kelompok-kelompok seperti itu rentan digunakan oleh elit lokal untuk memperoleh kepentingan politik tertentu. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan wawancara dan penelusuran arsip/dokumen.

*Keyword: Central Lombok, buru jejak, crime, local politics, thieves*

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### **1. Introduction**

*"In the beginning we lost our sheep, but if we report to the police for our case, we will lose our motorcycle",  
local humor in Central Lombok*

Article 3 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone is entitled to security. The right to

security is mentioned along with the right to live and to freedom. Therefore, it is clear that security is an absolute principle in human existence that must be upheld. Related to the right to security, Indonesia's transition from the authoritarian New Order regime to democratization and decentralization is characterized by instability and insecurity. The state no longer holds the sole monopoly over security: it appears that entities

outside the state use violence in the pursuit of security as a central characteristic of their existence.

A topic that often arises in discussions about post-New Order security is the presence of groups and organizations that use violence to achieve their goals. These groups can be shaped by identity, such as ethnic-based and faith-based or political orientation, such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) task force (Masaki & Hamid, 2008). The most prominent examples for the ethnic-based and faith-based groups are *Pecalang* in Bali and Islamic Defender Front (FPI). Compared to the New Order period, the existence of these violent groups is increasingly significant in the contemporary public sphere.

The Universal Periodic Review in 2008 and 2012 noted that violence against minorities that are often carried out by violence groups should be a major concern (Universal Periodic Review, 2008; 2012). Vigilante groups, especially faith-based ones such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), play prominent roles in the violence against and persecution of minorities. They are actively involved in acts of intolerance and violations of religious freedom. Minority groups such as the Ahmadiyah, Shia, and Christians have become targets of violence.

Mainstream explanations for the emergence of these so-called vigilante groups suggest that they are the consequence of political transition after the end of the New Order and democratization policies such as decentralization and implementation of local direct elections (Wilson, 2015; Hadiz, 2010). The leading explanations present them as predatory vigilante groups who seek economic resources and defense for their notions of morality. However, vigilante groups are a complex phenomenon throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and at this point, there is still no comprehensive explanation for them. Therefore, I would like to propose a different perspective to interpret the emergence and role of vigilante groups. This perspective is connected with access to security rights as one of the elements of human rights principles.

In this essay, I will discuss the vigilante groups in relation to the access to rights to security, particularly in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province. Vigilante groups are defined as 'informal security groups' to distinguish them from formal security entities owned by the state such as the police and military. By referencing Asef Bayat's notion of social non-movement, I would like to emphasize the way ordinary people seek to improve their lives through these informal security groups who offer a more accessible type of security than does the state. This essay intends to address a question: how should we interpret the presence of informal security groups, such as *Buru Jejak*, in relation to the security needs of the Central Lombok society?

In order to elaborate this position, this essay examines cases that occurred in Central Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province, using data from previous visit to this site. Lombok Island is widely known as an area that has large numbers of informal security groups compared to other regions in Indonesia (McDougall, 2007). These groups have a significant role in the local community. This is because they are not only involved in the security issues but are also influential in the area's political and economic spheres.

## 2. Methods

This article is a part of an ongoing study on politics and crime in West Nusa Tenggara Province with several visits since 2012 until recently (2015). Multiple visits were done to assess the process of social change related to decentralization in the Indonesian outer island region that has a low human development index. One obstacle that appeared was access to key informants. It was because the topic is quite sensitive, thus requiring multiple visits during fieldwork to be able to build a strong network and a good relationship with the targeted informants.

The methodological approach is qualitative. The primary resources were obtained from interviews with 26 participants and a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) that involve five participants. The secondary resources include official documents and archives from agencies of the Central Lombok District Government, especially the statistical agency, regional election commission, and local police office. I also referred to local newspaper accounts. I conducted in-depth interviews with members of the public and key participants such as local government officials and religious leaders. Participation was purely voluntary. The interviews were semi-structured and conversational, focusing on the community's knowledge toward crime, security, and the existence of informal security groups in Central Lombok. I used a local assistant to develop familiarity with the community.

I have conducted the interviews in several stages. First, I conducted several semi-structured and informal interviews with six targeted participants, and a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with five participants, which consisted of experts on social and political issue, which included a lecturer in the University of Mataram, a civil society organization activist, and a journalist. These interviews could be characterized as academic discussions, rather than standard participant interviews, and I have already had connections with these people previously. They mostly live at Mataram, the capital of West Nusa Tenggara Province, which is located in Western Lombok. These discussions helped me to obtain scholarly opinion and background information for the case study. In these interviews, I obtained advice on cultural sensitivities in terms of contacting and meeting potential participants, as well as the names of potential participants. The second

stage involved semi-structured and informal interviews with 16 participants who live at Central Lombok. These participants included government officials, police officers, religious leaders, aristocrats, local politicians, and ordinary residents. The third stage will comprise in-depth interviews with four targeted figures who affiliate with informal security group such as its leaders and members.

In general, I used snowball technique for participant recruitment through intermediaries from the network that I have already established. These intermediaries helped me obtain information on accommodation and transportation during the fieldwork period. I have made contact with participants from various backgrounds during my previous research visits. I started with approaching the most trustworthy and credible contacts in order to investigate potential participants and key participants. Through these individuals, I narrowed down and was introduced to targeted participants and key participants for the interviews.

Participants in Stage 1 were chosen on the basis of their expertise on social and political issues in Central Lombok and/or their connection to the communities. Another consideration in selecting participants at his stage was their access to the data that I sought such as local newspaper archives and previous research files from the University of Mataram concerning Central Lombok. Participants in stage 2 were selected based on their knowledge of the issues related to the role of informal security groups. The participants came from various backgrounds. They were also individuals who had the authority to provide the data that I needed such as statistical data on the specific issue that released by the local government. This category of participant includes informal leaders and respected figures in the communities who helped me gain access to valuable information related to the political situation. Finally, there were also people who used the security service from informal security group. Moreover, they opened the gate in order to give me greater familiarity with the communities. Stage 3 participants were chosen because of their involvement in the informal security groups.

Data from primary and secondary resources is analyzed with triangulation technique. This technique is used to ensure the reliability of the data from multiple resources such as interviews, observations, and documents. Triangulation helped to identify the most convincing data because it would be re-examined and compared with other multiple sources. Therefore, the data is relatively valid and trustworthy.

### 3. Results and Discussion

**Theoretical Overview and Key Concepts.** Mainstream explanations always categorize vigilante groups or organized violence, which have been mushrooming

since the collapse of the New Order, as an antagonist and predatory actor in the democratization of Indonesia (Bakker, 2016; Wilson, 2015). The groups can adapt to the new political scheme to maximize the benefit of local resources as much as possible. I argue that most of the literatures categorize vigilante groups as part of the consequences of the political transition in 1998 and democratization practices such as decentralization. They adapt to the new political system to maximize the profits from predatory economic goals and defend political ideology expression such as *syariah* regulation (Kloos, 2014). They often legitimize themselves as a defender of local or regional interests (Bakker, 2015).

For this paper, there are several types of vigilante groups and organized violence prominent in Post-New Order Indonesia public sphere either at the local level or national level. Those groups can be categorized into identity-based vigilante groups and community-based vigilante groups. The identity-based vigilante groups can be distinguished into two types: ethnic-based and faith-based. Groups that are classified into ethnic-based vigilante groups include the Betawi Brotherhood Forum or Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) and Jawara (traditional thugs) in Banten Province; faith-based groups include the Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defender Front). They use identity as a source of legitimacy for their existence.

As an ethnic identity-based group, the Betawi people, members of FBR, are reclaiming political-economy resources from which they were previously marginalized. Members of the FBR use coercion, intimidation, and violence to obtain political rights and economic advantages. They try to control the informal financial sector by such tactics as securing a parking lot; collecting debt; security businesses, and protection for marketplaces (Brown & Wilson, 2007; Wilson, 2010). However, the case of jawara (thugs) in Banten Province is different. It is because they can also control formal politics. Chasan Sochib is the godfather of jawara in Banten Province. His family controls various important political positions in both the legislative and the executive branches of local government. His daughter, Ratu Atut, was Banten Governor before the Corruption Eradication Commission or *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* arrested her in 2013. Well-funded government projects often fall into hands of the family of Chasan Sochib (Masaki & Hamid, 2008).

Meanwhile, faith-based violent groups, such as the Islamic Defender Front or *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) have a more prominent role in channeling the expression of ideology based on Qur'an Edict for 'leading people toward good and away from evil' (Wilson, 2006; Wilson, 2014). A radical interpretation of the Qur'an leads them to violent acts such as targeting nightclubs and religious minorities (Wilson,

2008). The FPI members attack religious minorities and groups they consider deviant under the pretext of the fatwa (legal opinion) issued by Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI) (Woodward et al., 2014). They use the fatwa of the MUI as a way to legitimize the persecution act to the minority groups. Therefore, FPI can gain support mainly from conservative people in Indonesia. Also, it helps them avoid the label as terrorists (Woodward et al., 2014).

The prominence of the faith-based violent groups such as FPI in the public sphere is in line with the analysis of scholars that capture the phenomenon of conservative turn in Indonesia. van Bruinessen (2013) interprets conservatism as an aspiration that reject modernist, liberal, or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings with a strong commitment to establish orthodox doctrines in the society. The conservative interpretation of Islamic doctrine is well articulated in the public sphere through symbolic violence, such as hate speech, and also violent attack (Woodward et al., 2014). Thus, violation of religious freedom and tolerance easily occur, such as persecution of Ahmadiyya and Shia groups through controversial fatwa of MUI, sharia regulations that contain discrimination, and the emergence of radical Islamist groups in various regions in Indonesia (van Bruinessen, 2013; Burhani, 2014).

Furthermore, Menchik (2014) indicated that the continued violence toward religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya was caused not only by conservative turn but also related to the design of Indonesian nationalism which he called with 'Godly Nationalism'. It means that an imagined community based on common or mainstream theism mobilized by the state in cooperation with religious organizations in the society (Menchik, 2014). Thus, with the conservative turn and Godly Nationalism context, it is not surprising if FPI becomes very prominent, even though the number of its members is quite small when compared with the two major Islamic organization in Indonesia, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. In the end, Indonesian social atmosphere is conducive for violent acts carried out by the FPI.

Another type of vigilante groups is a community-based vigilante group. Lombok Island is famous as a region with the biggest number of community-based vigilante groups in Indonesia (McDougall, 2007). Therefore, we can find sufficient literatures that discuss the emergence and existence of these groups. In the beginning, the formation of community-based vigilante groups is an initiative that emerged from particular villages. Then, the groups can attract more members from other villages, so they can form a solid organization. Kristiansen (2003) was the first scholar who wrote about the emergence of community-based vigilante groups in Lombok Post-Suharto. He investigated the emergence of AMPHIBI which is the first and also the largest community based-

vigilante group in Lombok Island. AMPHIBI emerged as a response to economic recession, unemployment, and weakened state institution that hit Indonesia after the political transition in 1998 (Kristiansen, 2003). The existence of AMPHIBI is increasingly influential in the society because of the strengthening of local identity sentiment, elite political interest, and lack of law enforcement (Kristiansen, 2003).

McDougall (2007) conducted a further investigation of the community-based vigilante groups. Based on empirical research, McDougall (2007) concluded that the existence of community-based vigilante groups such as AMPHIBI is related to competition between Islamic Leaders such as Tuan Guru with the ambitious noble and political design created by the ruling regime. Furthermore, McDougall (2007) also explained the economic networks, historical and cultural insights into crime, particularly about theft in Lombok. He was able to describe clearly the criminal operation in Lombok famous thief with a system of 'ransom'.

Tyson (2013) analyzed deeper about AMPHIBI in relation to the effects of decentralization. The role of AMPHIBI becomes very significant in political competition at the local level where the organizational network can be effectively used as an instrument for mobilizing political support. Telle (2015) conducted further research with a focus on political patronage to two community-based vigilante groups namely AMPHIBI and *Tiga Bersatu*. Telle (2015) provided a conclusion that affirms the findings of Tyson (2013). The leaders of AMPHIBI and *Tiga Bersatu* cooperated with politicians to secure their position in the district or regional government. The group leaders had a back channel to gain access to government projects. Previously, Telle's research (2013) on AMPHIBI was quite different, because she was more focused on the theoretical debate conceptualizing the notion of 'vigilante citizenship'. It means that AMPHIBI leaders can make their predatory actions such as the persecution of Hindus in Lombok, as a legitimacy action. They can manipulate the state to get respect and recognition so that access to funds and economic 'security-related projects' becomes available (Telle, 2013).

However, most of the literature put the groups in antagonistic manner and as a predatory element in the local politics. I will therefore propose a different theoretical position in this essay. The group to be discussed here is *Buru Jejak* (which literally means: 'Tracker') in Central Lombok. They cannot just simply be categorized as a predatory group because they are also a channel for ordinary people to fulfill their need for security when the state is incapable of doing so. *Buru Jejak* is used as an instrument of social change without relying on the state. The vigilante group studied in this essay is a form of social non-movement, which refers Asef Bayat's literature. Asef Bayat defines social

non-movement as "the collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody the shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but-similar activities trigger much social change. These practices are guided by an ideology or a recognizable leadership and organizations" (2010: 14).

Asef Bayat formulated his theory based on cases that occurred in Cairo, Egypt. Vulnerable groups such as the urban poor and illegal immigrant attempt to reclaim rights that are not fulfilled by the state, such as access to clean water and electricity. This reclamation is conducted through illegal practices. As a 'weak' people, they are not just passive but also attempting to improve their quality of life through accessible and pragmatic action. However, this theory has limitations with regard to the cases being discussed here because of the differences in context between Cairo and Central Lombok. Asef Bayat's studies were conducted in urban areas that tend to see the absence of influential or charismatic leaders. This is different from Central Lombok, which is a rural area, where a charismatic leader plays an important role in inspiring action. Furthermore, there is a cultural value that strengthens the leadership of certain figures. Lastly, Asef Bayat's theory does not consider the presence of vigilante groups. It needs adjustment to be applicable to social non-movement theory in the case of *Buru Jejak* in Central Lombok.

Therefore, to distinguish them from other vigilante groups, I define *Buru Jejak* as an informal security groups. This refers to the definition of informal security groups (ISGs) formulated by Robison, Wilson, and Meliala as "Organizations [that] provide (or impose) various forms of security and protection across a range of levels, largely outside the scope of the rule of law and the reach of formal regulation" (2008: 1). Furthermore, they identify several characteristics of informal security groups that are appropriate in examining *Buru Jejak* in Central Lombok. These characteristics include the fact that ISGs provide services when formal policing by the state is inadequate. They, however, are often not immune from political interest, and can offer welfare functions by providing jobs for the unemployed. They also offer particular value as a source for legitimacy (Robison, Wilson, & Meliala, 2008).

**Central Lombok: The Landscape of Crime.** The political transition in 1998 was marked by the emergence of insecurity in almost all parts of Indonesia, including Lombok. The population of Lombok Island reaches 3.2 million with the majority being ethnic Sasak representing 92 percent of the total population (Telle, 2013). The number of criminal cases registered in the court of Lombok doubled from 1997 to 1998 (Kristiansen, 2003). The state is assumed to no longer be able to satisfy the security needs of the community. Thus, a

number of informal security groups began to appear, establishing themselves in various places in Lombok. The groups absorb approximately 25% of adult men as an active member (McDougall, 2007). The presence of informal security groups is attractive for the ordinary people because it coincides with the economic crisis and an increase in the number of criminal cases. Local governments and community leaders enthusiastically welcomed the presence of these groups as a new form of 'people power' in its efforts to maintain the security of their respective regions (McDougall, 2007).

The problem of insecurity and crime in Central Lombok is closely connected with the high rate of poverty. As a rural area, most of the inhabitants of Central Lombok are farmers. They are dependent on commodities such as livestock, maize, rice production, and tobacco (Tyson, 2013). From 2006 to 2010, literacy rate in central Lombok is lowest in the region (BPS Lombok Tengah, 2012). High levels of poverty are reflected as well in the human development index figures. West Nusa Tenggara Province is a province with the lowest human development index score. Central Lombok itself is a district with the lowest human development index in the West Nusa Tenggara Province administrative area. The human development index numbers of Central Lombok district only ranged from 59.7 to 62.57 from 2008–2012 (BPS Lombok Tengah, 2013).

Data on poverty is consistent with the high levels of crime and insecurity in Central Lombok. Based on data released by the Central Lombok Police about the criminality cases from 2006-2010, the three types of crime with the highest frequency are theft with qualification, theft with violence, and theft of a motorcycle. Theft with qualification means that the targets are animals - farm animals such as cattle, goats, and buffalo. This property is an important asset for the local people because most of them are farmers. As can be seen in the Table 1 below, theft with qualification has the highest rate of frequency amongst all crimes in 2006 with 85 cases and in 2007 with 118 cases. Based on this, it shows the reason why the presence of informal security groups such as *Buru Jejak* in Central Lombok became very popular. With this high criminal case, Lombok people try to seek their own way to resolve the problem. Informal Security groups become the accessible option rather than relying on the police officers, who are well known for their corrupt behavior.

Moreover, the members of *Buru Jejak* are famous as well-trained people who master how to track farm animals.

However, poverty is not the only factor that makes crime, especially theft, in Lombok especially very high. There are cultural values that influence the conception of thieves in the Lombok people. The Balinese kingdom

Table 1. Criminality Rate in Lombok Tengah District 2006-2010

Types of Criminality	Year				
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Theft with qualification	85	118	38	52	151
Motorcycle theft	26	103	22	35	252
Violent theft	18	26	16	12	77

Source: Central Lombok Police

occupied Lombok in 1891. In the stories passed down from generation to generation, the occupation was always described as very cruel (interview with Academician, Lalu Subkhi, June 8, 2013). The people of Lombok were considered as the lowest group in the caste system. The Balinese Kingdom was very strong so it had the capability to engage in pitched battles and conventional warfare. Stealing the property of Balinese family in Lombok became popular as the thief became a popular folk hero for the Lombok people. They are known to have supernatural powers such as being able to disappear and impervious to stabbing by machete.

Counter discourse toward the culture of 'noble thief' is emerging along with the presence of informal security groups. They offer a different concept of masculinity and other symbolic capitals that were previously attached to the 'noble thief'. Informal Security Groups like *Buru Jejak* are not only village thugs but are often seen to be equipped with a mystical invulnerability and supernatural powers. Adult men who become leaders are individuals who have advanced skills in martial arts, supernatural powers, and magic, often earning a high degree of respect.

**Buru Jejak: Brief Overview.** *Buru Jejak* is an informal security group that was first established in Lombok Island. The group is named *Buru Jejak* because of their expertise in tracking stolen livestock. Actually, the existence of *Buru Jejak* dates back to 1994, but at the time they were an unofficial group of bounty hunters. *Buru Jejak* started to get public attention as an informal security group in 1998 when the local people were afraid of the increase crime and theft. The founder and leader is Hasan Basri (a fake name), who is more widely known as Amaq Hasan. *Buru Jejak* was established in Amaq Hasan's house in the Bilelendo village, Central Lombok (interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). Currently, the house of Amaq Hasan has also become the headquarters of the *Buru Jejak*. Based on *Buru Jejak* records in 2007, there were 9,400 people spread across Central Lombok who have a membership card (interview with the secretary of *Buru Jejak*, June 2, 2013).

The reason for the formation of *Buru Jejak* as an informal security group is quite personal for Amaq Hasan. A family member of Amaq Hasan had lost his

livestock due to theft in 1998. Equipped with excellent tracking skills, Amaq Hasan and his friends was able to capture the thief. The thief was handed over to the police. However, a few days later Amaq Hasan saw the thief run free, apparently the thief had bribed his way to freedom. Disappointed with such corrupt police behavior, Amaq Hasan with relatives and friends sought to resolve criminal cases such as this in their own way (interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). In addition to these personal reasons, the formation of *Buru Jejak* was also influenced by local cultural values. Amaq Hasan, as a member of the noble house of Praya, wanted to restore the dignity of the Sasak aristocracy. In the hunt operation, teams of *Buru Jejak* members would bring traditional weapons that are believed to have magical and supernatural powers. They use local tradition and culture as a basis for their moral supremacy.

The primary members of *Buru Jejak* handling the investigation of theft consist of ex-criminals and thugs. Amaq Hasan claims that he was able to persuade many ex-thieves to switch jobs into 'legal' work by joining as a member of *Buru Jejak* (interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). That is why they understand underground criminal operations and networks. After getting reports of cases of theft, the hunter team of *Buru Jejak* would spend a few days to investigate and pursue the perpetrators. If the thief is caught, they will be imprisoned and at times even killed immediately.

The operational cost of *Buru Jejak* activities is taken from the treasury of the organization. This treasury is sourced from annual fees, registration fees, and insurance money from people who register to become a client of the organization. Each client will have to pay Rp 100,000, or approximately USD 9, every year and Rp 52,000, or approximately USD 4, as registration fee. In addition, there are insurance costs. Clients will ensure the most valuable properties such as cattle. Each cow is valued at Rp 250,000 or USD 24 per year. Thus, *Buru Jejak* will be responsible for the cow if the insured cattle are stolen (interview with hunter team of *Buru Jejak*, May 28, 2013). After registered as a client, each will get a sticker of *Buru Jejak* to put into home. These stickers serve as a marker that the person concerned is under the full protection of The *Buru Jejak*.

The symbol of *Buru Jejak* is similar to the Indonesian National Police symbol. This is because from the beginning of its formation, *Buru Jejak* was meant to help the police with their tasks. The performance of the police in maintaining security was disappointing (interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). What is controversial about *Buru Jejak* is how they punish thieves, which include tactics such as arrest, torture, and even murder. Under the rules of community policing in Article 3 of Law No. 2/2002 and the Chief of the National Police Decree No. 737/X/2005, informal security groups only assist to provide security in their respective areas. Moreover, the rule does not provide the authority to sanction such institutions like the police. However, the police uses community policing as a reason to allow their practice, although they give sanctions towards the thieves (interview with the Chief of security intelligence Central Lombok Police, June 5, 2013). Local police admitted that they had limited funds and personnel to conduct investigations into all cases of theft. Therefore, the presence of *Buru Jejak* actually assists police in their work (interview with the Chief of Security Police Intelligence Central Lombok, June 5, 2013). It is apparent that the way *Buru Jejak* operates provides an example in how the lines between 'legal and illegal' have become blurred in regions such as Lombok.

Informal security groups such as *Buru Jejak* 'Kumpul' slowly but surely obtain popularity and trust of the population. It is because the provision of security services that they offer is affordable for the ordinary people who are mostly rural residents. The ordinary people acquire the services of security with only paying hundreds of thousands rupiah. It is still cheaper rather than they go to the police. Corruption and unofficial payment make the cost of security service from the police highly expensive. Therefore, it is not surprising if there is a popular local joke on how the people who lost their goats and report it to the police and then they lose a motorcycle. Many residents who use the informal security group services, such as *Buru Jejak*, show the distrust of residents toward the police. The police is a state institution that should fulfill public needs of security relatively not reliable. The police's argument of their lack of funds and personnel cannot be the reason for the poor performance of the police in providing security. Combating corruption or unofficial payment inside the office is the real action that should be undertaken by the police to improve the institution integrity in the local society.

Accessibility of security service from informal security group can be interpreted not only financially but also culturally. Most of the ordinary people in Central Lombok are farmers who do not have higher educational background. Therefore, they feel uncomfortable if they should come to the police and face the complicated

bureaucratic procedures. They find it more convenient and familiar to take care of its security needs to *Buru Jejak*. They recognize some of *Buru Jejak* members personally because they also came from the same village. Moreover, the procedure does not require a complicated process such as in the police. Furthermore, *Buru Jejak* often uses traditional symbols that are close to the everyday life of ordinary people. Traditional symbols, such as sacred weapons or magical ability, are not only to familiarize the local populations but also to convince people about the capacity of the *Buru Jejak* members in securing property and resolve crime cases. *Buru Jejak* members are already known to have high supernatural powers or martial arts skills.

Both economic and cultural accessibility makes informal security groups like *Buru Jejak* achieve trust and legitimacy from the local people. Crime is increasingly worrying, providing the ordinary people in Central Lombok with limited options. A form of legitimacy that given by the people to *Buru Jejak* can be seen from how the people are silently permissive toward the act of violence carried out by the group as long as their security needs are fulfilled. Concern over crime makes people see violent act of the group as 'reasonable' even 'necessary' to eradicate crime.

#### ***Buru Jejak* and the Local Elites: Unholy Alliance.**

The presence of *Buru Jejak* as a provider of security services in Central Lombok is increasingly popular. The services of *Buru Jejak* have attracted ordinary people who are not able to access the security they need that should normally be provided by the state. They do not have the economic capital (money) and other symbolic capital to be served by the police maximally. However, the informal security groups are prone to abuse of power. For example, they can be used by local elites for their muscle power in order to mobilize voters in the local election and securing the head of the district's policies.

The emergence of *Buru Jejak* as an informal security group cannot be separated from the figure of Lalu Wiraatmaja. He had served as the Central Lombok head of district from 2005 to 2010. When Amaq Hasan established *Buru Jejak* at in 1994, Lalu Wiraatmaja was the person whom Amaq first asked suggestions from. Lalu Wiraatmaja was a Parliament member of Central Lombok at that time. He was designated as a protector and advisor for the organization. He helped lobbying local elites, such as the head of district and local military commanders, in order to avoid barriers in the establishment and operation of *Buru Jejak*.

Amaq Hasan and Lalu Wiraatmaja, became close as well because the two men are bound by similar notions of tradition. Lalu Wiraatmaja is a Sasak aristocrat successor of Praya house of nobles. Meanwhile, Amaq

Hasan is a descendant of the Praya house of noble palace guards. They both grew up together. In addition, as a noble successor of the Praya House of Nobles, Lalu Wiraatmaja is entitled to inheriting the land that became the territory of the House of Nobles. Amaq Hasan and their families were given the right to manage some of the land belonging to the house of Praya. Therefore, Amaq Hasan is known to have a strong sense of loyalty toward Lalu Wiraatmaja (interview with the secretary of *Buru Jejak*, June 2, 2013).

Paired with Lalu Suprayitno, Lalu Wiraatmaja won direct election as district head in 2005 with 128,685 votes (Table 2). Lalu Wiraatmaja utilized its influence on *Buru Jejak* through Amaq Hasan in order to win the elections. This was evident from the day of candidates' registration for the elections. When signing up to the Regional Election Commission (KPUD) Central Lombok on April 15, 2005, Lalu Wiraatmaja was escorted by thousands of members of *Buru Jejak* (Lombok Post, April 16, 2005). Based on the records of both the Regional Election Commission and the Election Monitoring Agency (Bawaslu), it is apparent that Lalu Wiraatmaja used *Buru Jejak* as one of his instruments to mobilize voters (interview with chief of Central Lombok Regional Election Commission, June 4, 2013).

The community network of the *Buru Jejak* organization that includes even remote villages is an effective way to increase the number of supportive voters. They persuaded and even intimidated the public to vote for Lalu Wiraatmaja (interview with chief of Central Lombok Election Monitoring Agency, June 6, 2013). Members of *Buru Jejak* also organized events such as mass rallies in public spaces to invite the community to openly give declarations of support. Actions like this made the other candidates hesitate to compete with Lalu Wiraatmaja. In the end, Lalu Wiraatmaja won primarily

**Table 2. Central Lombok District Local Direct Election in 2005**

No.	Name of The Candidates	Vote
1	Drs. H. Bushairi Najmuddin Drs. Ahmad Zihni Rifai	92,731
2	Drs. HL. Suhaimi Jazuli Azhar, SH. Msi	92,656
3	HL. Wiraatmaja HL. Suprayatno, SH, MBA, MM	128,685
4	Drs. HL. Puri, SS HL. Gede Wirasakti Amir Murni Lc	62,282
5	HL. Moch. Syamsir, SH Drs. Marinah	23,485

Source: Central Lombok Regional Election Commission

in sub-districts known as a base of *Buru Jejak* members such as Pujud and Praya.

In addition to the local elections, *Buru Jejak* was also used to secure the policies of district head, such as the case of the Lombok International Airport construction in Tanah Awu. People who lived in the airport area were against the airport construction because it was to be built in the location of their settlements. The airport construction area needed the clearing of 538 hectares and had to move the local inhabitants. The local inhabitants were evicted from their land, and they felt that the compensation provided by the government and Angkasa Pura Company, the contractor, was unjust and unsatisfactory.

Together with SUAKA, a local NGO, and the Indonesian Farmer Union (SPI) Branch of Central Lombok, the locals clashed with police as part of a resistance action on September 18, 2005 (Tyson, 2013). As a response, Lalu Wiraatmaja deployed members of *Buru Jejak* together with the local police to dismiss the protesters. Amaq Hasan was caught carrying weapons while leading the *Buru Jejak* to disperse public rallies of Tanah Awu people in district head's office on January 26, 2006 (interview with an activist from Indonesian Farmer Union Central Lombok Branch, June 2, 2013). Members of *Buru Jejak* conducted intimidation and violence to suppress the people. The members of *Buru Jejak* attacked Amaq Hanan, one of the protesters leaders, at his home (interview with Amaq Hanan, June 5, 2013).

However, Lalu Wiraatmaja failed to be the head of the district in the 2010 and 2015 direct local election. Twice Suhaili, who come from Tuan Guru family background, defeated him. Traditionally, Tuan Guru is the leader of a madrasa (Islamic boarding school). He is recognized by the people because of his high religious knowledge. Lalu Wiraatmaja can be defeated because he was unsuccessful to unite informal security groups in Central Lombok that previously supported him as in the 2005 election. Lalu Wiraatmaja's favoritism to Amaq Hasan creates jealousy among the leaders of informal security groups (Permana, 2015). Therefore, they moved the support to others candidates who most likely to bring more profits (Permana, 2015).

Although Lalu Wiraatmaja failed to become the head of the district in 2010 and 2015, the existence of *Buru Jejak* remains influential in the community of Central Lombok. The rise of new informal security groups in Central Lombok did not reduce the prominence of *Buru Jejak*. The total amount of *Buru Jejak* membership is relatively still the biggest in Central Lombok. Leaders at the unit level continue to play a significant role in the village respectively. As the earliest informal security group in Central Lombok, there are still many residents who entrust the assets and property for security service. The candidates who run for legislative election or



village election still ask for support from leaders of *Buru Jejak* (Permana, 2015). It shows that the loss of Lalu Wiratmaja in the 2010 election did not over the prestige of *Buru Jejak* in society. Furthermore, elites who run in particular political events need members of informal security groups, such as *Buru Jejak* and others, to mobilize votes. The group serves as a vote broker for candidates who can provide benefits.

Originally, informal security group was an initiative of the residents to make improvements in their life quality, especially for security needs. However, it turns out that their existence is susceptible to be used by the elites for the political machine. Their involvement as muscle power in electoral politics could give negative impacts. Ways of intimidation that they use to win a certain candidate should also be eradicated.

***Buru Jejak* as Social Non-Movement.** This essay opens with a local humorous quote that illustrates the limitations of the ordinary people of Central Lombok in accessing their rights to security. The rampant corruption of the police made the majority of the population, who are poor, unable to afford security services that should be provided free of charge by the state. Therefore, it becomes an anecdote: if someone's valuable property is stolen, such as a goat, reporting the case to the police will require greater costs in the process. Thus, the option to use the services from informal security groups such as *Buru Jejak* is a rational and pragmatic choice for the local people. The fee to be paid to the *Buru Jejak* is cheaper and their work is more effective than the local police.

The emergence of *Buru Jejak* and other informal security groups in Central Lombok was an initiative for social change movement in terms of the fulfillment of the right to security. When the ordinary people of Central Lombok could not rely on the state to provide security, they chose their own way to improve their life quality. However, the actions that they chose were without mass protests and rally on the streets or revolution. They chose to conduct actual action to fulfill the security needs with do-it-yourself mechanism, although the mechanism tends to be illegal. A part of the everyday lives of Central Lombok ordinary people is establishing community-based security groups.

The action of ordinary people for social change and improving the quality of life can be understood further using the concept social non-movement. Social non-movement, conceptualized by Asef Bayat, is different from the mainstream definition of social movements. Mainstream definition of social movement, as Charles Tilly (2004) explain, consists of several elements such as 'a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities and employment of combinations from among the following forms of

political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering'. In contrast, social non-movement is action-oriented, through quiet movement rather than audible, and it is also part of ordinary practices of everyday life.

Asef Bayat, more or less, developed the concept of social non-movement from everyday forms of resistance that was formulated by James C. Scott (1985). The everyday form of resistance is popular in the agrarian and peasant studies. The concept became an influential discourse in the wider political studies. Everyday forms of resistance can be understood as a resistance movement of ordinary people or powerless group which have informal and passive nuance such as subtle sabotage, deception, false compliance, ignorance, slander, and dissimulation that involves little or no organization (Scott, 1986; Kerkvliet, 2009). The resistance refers to those of a more powerful class and social status or institutions, which are regard as unjust and unfair and even illegal (Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday resistance is non-confrontational behavior, which becomes a part of people's daily activities. Therefore, everyday form resistances are considered as part of the normality of ordinary people's everyday life. However, social non-movement is different from the everyday forms of resistance. The struggle of ordinary people is not merely passive and defensive (Bayat, 1997). Social non-movement captures initiatives of ordinary people who struggle for social change on their own actively or even offensively while remaining quiet. They do not act like they can change the political system or topple the local regime, but creatively reproductive power structure in order to obtain benefit as much as possible to improve the quality of life.

In the context of Central Lombok case, ordinary people prefer to not always be in a powerless or marginal position in the security fulfillment. They creatively produce a system that utilizes the weakness of the state in providing the service. In fact, through informal security groups, ordinary people obtain the opportunity to take advantages of a local patronage network with the local elites, such as access to state resources. However, these groups are susceptible to be used by the local elite in the local power contestation. Furthermore, their activities are located within the blurred line, between legal and illegal.

Social non-movement has two principles: (i) more action-oriented rather than ideologically driven, and quiet rather than audible; (ii) the movement is part of the everyday life practice (Bayat, 2010). The first principle can be seen in the case of Central Lombok; the inability of the state to meet the needs of security through police was responded not by protesting in a

massive scale or mass action. The Central Lombok people made an effort at social change to meet their own security needs through a silent act by establishing informal security groups. None of the demonstrations appeared to protest the police or local government in terms of their weakness to secure people's properties. There are many residents registered either as an active member as well as a client.

The second principle can be seen from the daily activities of *Buru Jejak* members. When there is no case of theft, *Buru Jejak* members in each village conduct neighborhood watch or patrol with other local residents. Every night they come together in a place built like guard post that is made from bamboo (*berugak*). Then, they would take turns for patrolling to houses of villagers to ensure the security. This kind of activity is part of the involvement of all members of the community in order to maintain security in their daily life.

However, the people of Central Lombok use local cultural values as a source of legitimacy for their involvement in *Buru Jejak*. Thus, this is different with the conception of Asef Bayat, which presupposes that the social non-movement emerged with no ideological background. *Buru Jejak* is a way of Sasak ethnic populations that are affiliated with the Praya House of Nobles to increase their pride and dignity. By becoming a member of *Buru Jejak*, Sasak adult men gained symbolic capital, such as increased masculinity and supernatural power. They will often use sacred traditional weapons. Thus, the presence of *Buru Jejak* is also as part of an effort to maintain local traditions and culture. This local culture is what can be accessed and understood by the ordinary people of Central Lombok in their fight for security rights. This situation is in contrast to when they report to the police or to the courts. Besides not having enough money, they do not have the symbolic capital, such as the level of education, to understand the languages that are used in the legal institutions of the modern state.

#### 4. Conclusion

To sum up, the presence of informal security groups such as *Buru Jejak* is helpful in addressing the issue of security needs for people in Central Lombok. The presence of *Buru Jejak* as an informal security groups cannot simply be considered as predatory. They also act as an instrument of security that provides an accessible service for the population when the formal security apparatus of the state cannot provide optimal service. *Buru Jejak* is a way ordinary people improve their quality of life with regard to rights of security, resulting in a blurred line between legal and illegal activity. With that said, however, this group can be used by the local elites to achieve particular political interests. This group can also have a potentially destructive impact. Moreover,

their use of violence puts them in the grey area between illegal and legal practices. Therefore, the state should be able to provide sufficient security service to citizens, so that the presence of such informal security group is no longer needed. The police must reform its institution completely by eliminating the practice of corruption and unofficial payment. In the end, it can restore the police integrity in the local society.

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