LOVE ME, LOVE ME NOT: THE FLORENESE STRUGGLE IN THE INDONESIAN NATION STATE PROJECT OF NATION UNITY

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ABSTRACT

Indonesian nation state develops project of nation unity to share imagined past and to offer a future dream. In this process, the nation with its power and authority invents, re-invents and creates collective memory by attaching meaning to cultural heritage, both tangible —sacred artifacts, monuments, sites and landscapes— and intangible —national history, religious celebration, nation day commemoration and collective memory—. However, when this collective memory is associated with the cultural heritage of major ethnic group, it marginalizes, subordinates and denies the heritage of ethnic groups outside the core. In response to the state ignorance, the minor ethnic groups develop various ways to attach and include on the nation state project of nation unity. In this article I discuss the Florenese marginalize ethnic in Indonesian nation state struggle to be granting the status of homogeneity and belonging to the Indonesian nation state citizen.

Keywords: Indonesian nation project, collective memory, cultural heritage, inclusion-exclusion, the Florenese struggle.

ABSTRAK

Pemerintah Indonesia mengembangkan proyek kesatuan bangsa untuk menyatukan kesamaan sejarah di masa lampau dan impian bersama di masa depan. Dalam proses semacam ini, negara Indonesia melalui kekuatan dan kekuasaannya menemukan, memperbarui, dan menciptakan kolektif memori dengan memberikan makna terhadap warisan budaya, baik yang berupa budaya materi—artefak keramat, monumen-monumen, situs dan bentang lahan— maupun budaya non materi—sejarah nasional, perayaan keagamaan, peringatan hari nasional, dan kenangan terhadap peristiwa nasional. Meskipun demikian, pengkaitan kolektif memori nasional Indonesia dengan warisan budaya dari kelompok etnik dominan atau utama akan memarginalisasikan, menjadikan subordinat, dan mengesampingkan warisan budaya dari kelompok etnik minor. Dalam upaya menanggapi pengabaian dari negara Indonesia, kelompok etnik minor juga akan mengembangkan berbagai macam cara agar dapat dimasukkan ke dalam proyek pemerintah tentang kesatuan bangsa Indonesia. Artikel ini mendiskusikan perjuangan kelompok etnik minor Flores dalam upaya memperoleh pengakuan status sebagai komunitas bangsa Indonesia, khususnya melalui pemaknaan warisan budayanya.

Kata Kunci: proyek bangsa Indonesia, identitas kolektif, warisan budaya, inklusi-ekslusi, perjuangan Flores etnik.

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INTRODUCTION

The awakening of the Indonesian collective identities in the middle of the twentieth century was the idea of nationalism, an expanding consciousness of a shared experience of Dutch colonialism and the heavy struggle for freedom. This notion was obviously a political concept to overcome and at the same time to resist humiliation of the Dutch colonial oppressor. In Indonesia the nationalism movement was started around 1908 by a small number of Indonesian students who were searching for higher education in the Netherlands. Mostly, they were the sons of the middle and high classes of Javanese noblemen (priyayi), sons of entrepreneurial rich merchants of West Sumatera, Indonesian pilgrims to Mekka, some young elite Indonesian people who were the product of limited Dutch colonial education and a few people of pure Dutch descent who thought Indonesian as their real home. Inevitably, they shaped an Indonesian nationalism that was manifested in a self-defined collectivity and the cohesive power derived from specific solidarity; a sense of unity of all Indonesian people beyond religious affiliation, ethnic, race and fixed island boundaries (Elson, 2008:6-21).

In 1942 the Indonesian nationalist movement experienced a big impact of World War II. The Dutch colonial administration surrendered to the Japanese military victory on the 8th of March 1942. The Japanese freed Sukarno and Hatta—two prominent Indonesian nationalists—from the Dutch exile punishment. Furthermore, the Japanese military promoted a huge number of Indonesian nationalists and political leaders to Japanese administration work, particularly to develop propaganda activities supervised by Japan, such as radio broadcasts, editing newspapers, mass instruction and films. This work gave a chance to Indonesian nationalists in practicing the networking and communication equipment, which were later very useful to manage connection with the international world (Elson, 2008:98-101).

On the 15th of August 1945, by the time Indonesian nationalists knew from radio, that the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces, the Indonesian nationalist movement accelerated to its peak. In the morning of August 17th 1945, Sukarno and Hatta—supported by many prominent Indonesian nationalists—declared the establishment of ‘Negara Republik Indonesia’ a free state of Indonesian Republic (Elson, 2008:111-113; Ricklefs, 2008:247; Vickers, 2005:95).

Today, Indonesian nation-state in a geographical sense is an archipelago which is deployed between continental Asia and Australia, stretches from Sumatera Island to Papua Island. In addition, this nation state consists of more than 17,000 islands, 931 distinct ethnic groups, different religion, language and culture (Sammeng, 1997:76; Koentjaraningrat, 1997:104).

THE INDONESIAN NATION STATE PROJECT OF ‘IMAGINED COMMUNITY’

In order to strengthen national unity and to construct a national ideology, the Indonesian nation-states provided their people with an ‘organizational culture’ or ‘political institution’—the meaningful ways of life in all aspects of human activities, i.e education, politics, economics, ideology, social, religion, entertainment-. Being able to maintain its political institutions is important for the nation, since it can be used to signify that this nation is capable to develop institutionally integrated societies (Herb, 1999:10-11; Kymlicka, 2001:250).

Furthermore, in building a compelling vision of national identity, Indonesian state emphasizes a glorious past with territory imagination, specific triumph and sacred heroes. As Ross (2007) and other scholars (Byrne, 2008:154-157, Harrison and colleagues, 2008:4-5) argue, in this process, the government with its power and authority invents, reinvents and creates history by attaching meaning to tangible—sacred artifacts, monuments, sites and landscapes—intangible—national history, language, religious celebration, nation day commemoration and collective memory-cultural heritage (Herb, 1999:17-24).
This Indonesian nation-state project were designed by Indonesian nation founding father and elite Indonesian state officers, particularly in a sense to construct an ‘Imagined Community’ a society where people may never know and meet each other or even have not a shared similar past history, but where in their cognition exists a recent political desire of the image of their community (Anderson, 1991:5-7; Wood, 2005:2-3).

Such a single unity nation imagination was clearly seen in the Indonesian state effort to reinvent Sriwijaya and Majapahit kingdom. The ancient kingdom of Sriwijaya located in Palembang, Sumatera was founded 700 AD. This kingdom was an exemplar of the first Indonesian nation embryo, since its territory was stretched from Sumatera to Malay Peninsula, ruled by a Malay race—a majority of Indonesian race today and became the transshipment centre in Southeast Asia. However, the most prominent model of Indonesian ancestor grandeur was Majapahit kingdom. This kingdom emerged around 12 AD, in Trowulan, East Java and was founded by Raden Wijaya a Javanese ethnic. From East Java region, Majapahit expanded its boundaries by regularly conducting expedition to conquer other region. As a result, this kingdom controlled territory as wide as Indonesian region today (Sumadio, 1992). Moreover, Indonesian state took Pancasila—the state ideology—and constructed its nation jargon ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’—unity in diversity—for fostering unitary Indonesian nation state.

In short, Indonesian nation shared vision to legitimize a specific territory and state existence via the golden age history of one particular ethnic group. Since Indonesia is consisted of many ethnic groups and each ethnic group eagerly adds their role in the formation history of the Indonesian nation state glorious past, thus the construction of Indonesian collective memories on nation building is highly contested and involving struggles over whose collective memories will be recounted, remembered and preserved and whose collective memories will be erased and forgotten.

Being interested in the way in which Indonesian nation-state maintaining project of coercive nation homogeneity and conformity, and giving immediate interest to acknowledge its wide diversity of languages, cultures and religious practices. I intend to focus on the Flores region—a small island in east Indonesia—which makes claims to rights and resources on the basis of belonging to the Indonesian nation-state. Two related problems are under deeply consideration. First of all, the way in which Flores people manage their multiples citizenship both as indigenous Florense, Indonesian nation-state citizens, and as international community. Further, I will questions to what extend does Indonesian nation state boundaries marginalize the Florense, how does Flores society perceive the Indonesian nation-state and are they willing to participate in Indonesian nation building? Secondly, I will examine the Florense struggles over who has the right to represent the Indonesian nation past and whose ethnic group glorious past will become institutionalized.

**FLORENESE FEATURE**

For more than a half century, Flores Island is part of the Indonesian nation state. According to historical evidence, this island got its name from Portuguese sailors, ‘Cabo de Flores’, which indicated the cape of the most eastern peninsula of the island (Abdurachman, 2008:59-60). However, according to oral tradition of indigenous Florense—who live in Sika, Nita and surrounding regions—this island was called ‘Nusa Nipa’, an island of dragon, following the shape of Flores island (Orinbao, 1969:114-167).

From a geographical perspective, Flores Island is part of the Lesser Sunda Island archipelago and lies between 8° S and 11° S latitude, 116.5° E and 125.5° E longitudes (Nurini, 1985:1-8). Rugged mountains, inaccessible buttes, deep canyons and gravel plains represent a very substantial part of the island. About half of the island is composed of volcanic mountains with many active craters. Among them are Ebu Lobo (2149 m), Ine Rie (2200 m) and Ine Lika (1159
The main range runs the length of the island somewhat south of the center. As a result, the southern part is steeper and more mountainous than the northern. The highest point is the Poco Renakah (2408 m), southeast of Ruteng in the western part of Flores. Eastwards altitudes decrease gradually (Anon, 1945:47).

The rugged and mountainous topography of Flores and the effects of different historical influence have helped create and perpetuate great cultural diversity. Generally speaking, in Flores Island at least four or five different population groups can be distinguished in mountain and coastal regions (Lewis, 1988:7; Anon, 1945:86). In the large western part of the island live the Manggarai, who have long been subject to Maccasan influences. Thus, many Manggaraians show Macassan and Buginese 'Proto-Malay' physical characteristics (Kunst, 1942:1; Bellwood, 1978: 30; Erb, 1999:65-69). The Ngadha live immediately east of the Manggarai and they settled around the Ine Rie volcano. As mountain people, the Ngadha and the culturally related Nage of the Mbai and Keo district appear to have been rather isolated. Both groups tend to be more 'Melanesian' in appearance. The Ende and Lio people occupy central Flores. The 'purest' Lio group is found east of Ende, whereas around Ende itself the Lio have inter-married with Maccasan and Buginese. The Sikka group and Larantuka live in the eastern part of Flores, especially in the region of Nita, Sikka and Kangae (Kunst, 1942:1-2).

**FLORENESE IDENTITY**

Different with the Javanese or the Acehnese, for whom ethnicity and place are consider the same, the Florenese incorporate the ethnicity of significant number of indigenous Flores inhabitants, such as the Manggarai, the Ngadha, the Nage, the Keo, the Lio and the Sikka. Thus, among themselves, the Florenese differentiate their ethnic identity according to the region or village in which they were born. It is also worth noting, that they usually identify themselves by name, but when identifying themselves concerning claims to the rights and status of them in relation to their ethnic identity, their name alone is inadequate. Hence, they add to it the myth of their ancestor origin—the long recitations of the names of places and the name ancestor associated with those places-. In other words, the extent to which the members of the ethnic groups in Flores Island have the right to claim their ethnic identity and territory will depend upon their genealogical authenticity, which can be traced from their founding ancestor whom they can recall through recitation (Sudarmadi, 1999:178-183). Since, each ethnic group has their own myth, thousands of such myths are preserved among the ethnic groups affiliation. It is no wonder, that the right to claim ethnic identity and ancestral land in Flores Island is highly contested. However, in Flores Island being Florenese is unattractive choice for the Flores indigenous people, since they fear that within such a more broad ethnic identity, they will exclude and marginalize from their more restricted origin ethnic identity.

While land continued to be a primary economic resource for the ethnic groups in Flores, access and control to the land reside in the elder and the highest rank of the ethnic group. With time, an increasing number of new members and lacking land for farming resulted in the welfare decline of Flores people. The collapse of their traditional livelihood and a firm commitment from the Indonesian nation-state to guarantee economic and social well-being of the Florenese had challenged young Florenese and the lowest strata of the Flores ethnic groups to migrate.

As Indonesian government launched transmigration programs around 1970s, many Florenese were resettled -state-sponsored and self-motivated- to the less densely Indonesian-state Islands, such as Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. At the same time, industrialization in Java attracted Florenese to seek wage labor in big Javanese cities, i.e., Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. Being uneducated—approximately 35% of total Flores population graduate from elementary school-, unskilled farmer of
modern wet rice cultivation technology—the Florenese are dry land farmer with traditional main farming techniques—, physically different appearance—black skin, curling hair, flat nose, and Christian on the basic ground of religion (Graham, 2008:124-127; Tirtosudarmo, 2006:139-141; Sudarmadi, 1999:54-55), the Florenese became a migrant of an Indonesian ethnic minority group, second class citizenship with low rank of socio-economic level. Irrespective of their different ethnic groups, spoken language and cultural custom, they were not considered as Orang Ngadha', Orang Manggarai, or Orang Lio', but 'they were called Orang Flores'. When asked about this improper ethnic name and inequality on social-economic realms, the Floreneses believed that—as a migrant, they had no choice but to accept subordinate positions outside their Flores territory. However, as time passed by, many Florenese migrant become more educated, richer and able to negotiate their multiple identities—indigenous Flores ethnic group, the Florenese and Indonesian—.

In the early 1980s, the world demand of palm (Elaeis) oil increased rapidly. Malaysia as the biggest oil palm producer opened new palm plantations to fulfill the world palm oil market needs. As demand for plantation workers began to exceed the Malaysian's labor supply, the Malaysian government recruited contract laborers from neighboring country. Being attracted to their migrant family success stories in Sabah, the Florenese migrated to Sabah, Malaysia, and took plantation jobs, which were offered by the Malaysian government (Graham, 2008:115-118; Tirtosudamo, 2006:144-148).

Away from home, migrant Florenese struggle in a world of marginalization. Basically, Sabah authority classifies the Florenese as 'Orang Timor' (Timor ethnic groups) or 'Budak Indon' (blue-collar workers from Indonesian nation-state), since majority of them work as unskilled labor plantation—coolies in colonial era term—. Their Catholic religion also places them in a minority religion, since Moslem is the dominant religion in Sabah. Fortunately, the Florenese migration to Sabah is organized via familial and kinship networks—The Florenese community has already been established since 1950 in Sabah, as these links and networks are internally strengthened and externally broadened, they retain and sustain social, political and economic relationship with other Flores migrants outside Sabah and their 'Flores' ancestral land. Such processes allow Flores migrants to weld and maintain cultural boundaries of their origin and settlement, while at the same time build collective identities that cross geographic, cultural and political borders. According to Basch and colleagues this symptom shows an embryo of transnational community (Basch, Schiller and Blanc, 1994:6; Tirtosudarmo, 2006:146, 148).

THE FLORENESE IN THE INDONESIAN NATION STATE BOUNDARIES

After Indonesian Independence was proclaimed, Flores Island was joined together in Nusa Tenggara Timur province. Under the Indonesian nation-state, the Florenese began to broaden their boundaries in a new modern institutional setting. In addition, they had rights and obligation in obtaining better education, political participation, religion affiliation and social-economic development as equal members alongside other Indonesian ethnic groups.

In the same way, by bringing the Florenese into Indonesian nation state boundary, the Indonesian government incorporates Flores people boundary into a unified boundary vision of the Indonesian nation, 'Imaginary Community'. As many scholars argue, such nation state boundary functions as instruments for control over its people, its collective identity's territories, especially by referring to codes of collective identity—ideas, events and places—. Since codes of collective identity are constructed and contested, thus boundary construction is a process of classification and identification of gender, religion, ethnicity, modernism and education into two categories—similar or different—in which, mechanism of inclusion and exclusion are created, used and reinvented (Herb, 1999:17-24; Kaplan, 1999:31-32, 37-38; Eder, et. al., 2002:19-20; Cooper, 2005:72; Jesse and William,

It is no wonder, that to be granting the status of homogeneity and belonging to the national community, the Florenese must fulfill Indonesian nation state criteria - "included" or 'excluded' - on religion, ethnicity, gender, language, social, economic and political view. By using such classification, the Indonesian government formulates an inclusion and exclusion mechanism of citizenship and territory. However, this Indonesia's project of nation boundary not only creates unity, but also constructs hierarchy, particularly on formulating first class and second class Indonesian citizenship, which is clearly seen in its legislation and practices.

Take the example of Indonesian government criteria of traditional ethnic groups: living in hinterland region or at the heart of the jungle, far away from metropolis and out of reach of state authority. They are considered as 'primitive' or marginal ethnic groups, who are different from majority of modern Indonesia ethnic groups. As a result, these minority ethnic groups are treated as second-class citizen of Indonesian nation and are excluded from modern members of Indonesian. Such practices can be traced back to the Dutch colonial classification on Southeast Asian ethnicity, especially of small group people, lacking of economic resources and remote places, a kind of hill tribes, slash and burn prehistoric agriculturalists and stone-age community (Anderson, 1998:321; Rosaldo, 2003:1-2).

Being a hinterland community, Flores ethnic groups have a mark of second class Indonesian citizenship and face problems of exclusion, marginalization, and subordination from the Indonesian state oppression. When the Indonesian nation-state was proclaimed in 1945, Flores Island was immediately occupied by the Australian allied troops. Shortly after, the Australian allied handed on Flores to the Dutch armies and its civil administration (NICA). In 1946, the Dutch promoted the State of East Indonesia and Flores Island was part of this state. Indeed the majority of the Florenese supported the Republic in the blood revolution against Dutch colonialism, but their Christian religion and their local leaders support to NICA government posed ambiguity in the Indonesian nation movement. Inevitably, the Florenese got the least political representation in the Indonesian nation-state. During the Old Order government to present day Indonesian institution, two Florenese - Frans Seda and Jacob Nuwawe got ministry position. Under the New Order regime - almost 32 years, none of the Nusa Tenggara Timur Province governors were Florenese. At the national level, no Florenese obtained general positions in the Indonesian armies. They were absolutely excluded, denied and subordinated from Indonesian nation-state political discourse.

The Indonesian nation-state idea of modernism also marginalized Florenese people, since they were categorized as isolated traditional and living 'prehistory' ethnic groups. From the early of 1930s to 1980s, both Dutch Colonial institutions and the Indonesian government forced the Florenese to abandon their megalith villages in the up hills and to build modern settlements in the low land, which are close to the asphalt road. In addition, the Florenese primitive methods of hunter-gatherer for living and slash-burn cultivation are supposed unproductive and deteriorating the environment. Thus, the Javanese wet rice agriculture method and modern plantation are considered the best (Sudarmadi, 1999; Molnar, 1998).

From 1980 to 1988, when the New Order rocketed to its peak, 'Pembangunan' (development) was the ultimate ideology to transform Indonesian traditional agriculture society to industrial modern society. As Indonesian state established infrastructure throughout most of its archipelago - school, public health hospital, electricity, public transportation and asphalt road-, such development brought transformation to the Florenese modernity. However, the Indonesian government rhetorically stated that the Florenese, in fact were left behind by other Indonesian Provinces. Thus, their predicate of being 'backward' of other Indonesian ethnic groups was always reiterated.

As the Indonesian state development programs to a great length reach the Florenes,
such state efforts to bring modernization are welcomed and appreciated. Nevertheless, the Flores villagers criticize and are cynical of this government program. In their point of view, the government modernization programs are insincere and untruthful. In 1980 the government promised to launch wet-rice agricultural modern methods, such as developing irrigation system, introducing new rice seed strains, reducing fertilizers and pesticides price. In fact, the government promises of such programs were not fully kept. The irrigation project only focused on Manggarai region, the new rice seed strains were not properly distributed and the price of fertilizers and pesticides are increased each year. It is also important to note, that Florenese as clove farmers also suffered from Tomy Suharto’s monopolization of the state clove trading. From 1989 to 1998 Tomy enterprise bought cloves from Florenese farmers a half of normal cloves prize and sold these commodity to the karekak cigarette industries at five times the prize paid to the Florenese farmers (Vickers, 2005:186). Thus the Florenese discontent increased during the New Order, particularly to the way in which the state rules access to resources and the oppression from economic benefit of nation-state development.

While Flores ethnic groups were oppressed and lowered to a marginal and sub-ordinate society, the recent wave of Javanese self-motivated migration to Flores escalated rapidly around 1990. These Javanese migrants, not only added more Moslem population but also started to gain economic benefit in Flores. To some extent, the Javanese Moslem migrant economic domination increased the Florenese frustration and hatred. In this case, the Florenese thought the Javanese migrant as a group who had benefited under New Order government policies. As such, the Javanese became the prime objective of social jealousy and Florenese anger. Much the same thing could be said about the effort of Flores migrant Moslems to desecrate and insult Christian Flores ritual religion. Several riots in many Flores cities—Bajawa, Ende, Maumere and Larantuka— from 1992 to 1995 provided further evidence of social violence and religious conflict (Tule, 2000:95; Banda, 2001:5).

Recently, Florenese become more mobile than a decade before, their migrations also represent broader spatial pattern. Being guided by their families, who had previously migrated to Indonesian neighboring countries, the Florenese joined their abroad families and worked as unskilled laborer. Since Indonesian government is notorious in corruption, collusion and nepotism matters, exploitation and oppression of Florenese migrant occurs from the beginning to the end of the migration process. In addition, the Indonesian officials also fail in the support system—free training skill, temporary shelter and appropriate regulation- and migrant worker protection (Hugo, 2008:61-66; Tirtosudarmo, 2006:141-144). Once again, Flores migrants were neglected and ignored by the Indonesian state. As a result, Florenese unskilled migrants prefer to enter their country destiny as an illegal migrant. Indeed, they realize that the way they migrate breaks the law, but it is cheaper, faster and safer while operating through kinship relation.

As the Indonesian state “Keterbukaan” Reformasi paradigm to a great length reach the Flores, such state efforts to bring democratization, good governance, decentralization and globalization are welcomed and appreciated. However, at the same time the Flores people retain a sense of desperation, hopelessness and unworthy since they feel, the Indonesian nation state is classified them as second class citizen, ignoring them and they are suffering from Indonesian state inequality. At the heart, the Florenese have a cynical view of government programs. They portray government rhetoric policy ‘We know what is good for them’ and the significance ‘top-down’ approach as a way to marginalize the Florenese from national plans and reaps few benefits from state policy. Indeed, up to now, the Indonesian government rhetorically stated that the Florenese, in fact were ‘Daerah Tertinggal’ left behind by other Indonesian Provinces. Thus, their predicate of being ‘backward’ of other Indonesian ethnic groups was still reiterated.
THE FLORENESE STRUGGLE IN THE
INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PROJECT
OF NATION UNITY

The Indonesian government project of nation unity need collective memory to share imagined past and to offer a future dream. In modern nation state, collective memory is invented, established, transmitted, maintained and renew through tangible and intangible heritage (Byrne, 2008:154-157, 162-163; Lowenthal, 1998:31; Harrison, et. All, 2008:4-5). Thus, the establishment and control of national heritage has long been a prime responsibility of Indonesian state officials, and the practice of many aspects of cultural heritage has become closely related to a monopoly of national governments.

As a system which was typically state-run, the heritage reflects the government point of view concern its time and spatial context. These assumption and co-ordinates of power centralized by the state, are inhabited as natural – given, timeless, true and inevitably (Graham et.al., 2000a; Graham et. al., 2000b; Hall, 2008:219-221). In such point of view, heritage was seen as a thing, an entity that can be lost and was available to preservation, just such as monuments, old places and objects - a property that belonged to the nation – The implication was that the accumulation of the heritage and the preservation of labor in acquiring it came to be seen as a form of cultural capital of the nation. In that respect the nation state seems to regard the heritage it possesses in the form of cultural capital as god given (Anderson, 1991; Byrne, 2008:158-159).

It should not be surprising that in 1992, the Indonesian Cultural Objects Heritage Act was passed by Indonesian government to replace the 'Monumenten Ordonansi' from the Dutch Indies government. By launching this act, the authority of Indonesian Archaeology Service research and preservation had played a significant role in establishing the Indonesian heritage objects of nation cultural pride (Atmosudiro and Nugrahan, 2002:51; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1992).

As a result, the elite state has the right and power to control the nation past representation and institutionalizes collective memory (Natzmer, 2002:161-179). Indeed, it is their duty to select whose cultural heritage will be included or excluded from the nation state project of nation unity. For such reason, cultural heritage must be dedicated to expose national identity and to raise national dignity. It is no wonder that primary aim of Indonesian government cultural heritage management is to construct homogeneity among ethnic groups and to create illusion of the Indonesian nation glorious past.

Such Indonesian nation pride illusion policy was clearly seen in the New Order era, especially when Indonesian state supported Suharto's wife 'Siti Hartinah' to launch an ambitious project Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Miniature of Indonesia). This project was finished on 20th April 1975 and occupied approximately 100 hectare (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah Profil 2009). As a small-scale representation of Indonesian region, this park consisted of 26 traditional houses from 26 Indonesian Provinces (Taman Mini Indonesian Indah Anjungan Daerah 2009), and 8 hectare artificial lake, in which a small-scale Indonesian archipelago were depicted, 15 museums, hotels, and recreation facilities (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah Fasilitas, 2009).

Indonesian Ministry of Education also played a key role in producing historically rooted narrative about the Indonesian nation state and effectively used public schools to broadcast such narratives. The six volumes, Education Ministry-commissioned 'Sejarah Nasional Indonesia' (Indonesian Nation History), -launched in 1980s- provided a detailed description of the Indonesian nation-state history from the prehistory time to present day. In this project Indonesian state worked hard to mobilize its resources and to forge a strong shared imagined national identity.

Further, I also noted that the Indonesian state uses Javanese cultural heritage to transmit nation cultural core. The reasoning goes like this. First, the state use Majapahit kingdom -Javanese kingdom- to represent Indonesian nation greatest history sequence, particularly 'proto-Indonesian' nation period. Second, this kingdom narrative functions as a reminder that the Indonesian ancestor -Javanese ethnic- in the past time is capable to organize central power control over
vast region. Indeed, this delineation offers a straight relation between an Indonesian nations shared identity in the present and one in the past, which is constructed to meet recent needs rather than to mirror historical reality. It also attempts to legitimate Javanese ethnic domination over the Indonesia marginal ethnic groups.

Indeed, this cultural heritage practice supports the development of Indonesian nation collective memory to weld national identity. However, when this collective memory is associated with the cultural heritage of major ethnic group, it marginalizes, subordinates, denies and oppressing ethnic cultural heritage diversity (Lindholm, 1993:21-25; Cattel and Climo, 2002:35-36; Colombijn, 2003:338; Graham, Asworth, and Tunbridge, 2005:27).

While collective memory of major ethnic group resists in the nation glorious past by manipulating its cultural heritage representation, minor ethnic groups struggle to attach their collective memory into the nation state cultural heritage main stream. Such inclusion and exclusion of ethnic cultural group on cultural heritage representation can be observed in the Indonesian state cultural heritage management.

Certainly, Flores ethnic group cultural heritage management is a good example of this phenomenon. While Flores cultural heritage has received professional recognition as one of the high significance of Indonesian nation cultural heritage (Lewis, 1988; Cole, 1997; Moorwood et. al, 1998; Erb, 1999; Sudarmadi, 2000; Molnar, 2000), the Indonesian National Archaeological Research Centre research in Flores (Sukendar, 1984; Nanik, Ambary and Awe, 1984) described Flores cultural heritage as the product of prehistory people. Thus, Indonesian state archaeology placed Florenese cultural heritage in primitive stage, ancient traditional life style and might not act as a stimulus for creating ‘the Indonesian nation modernity’.

The subordination and Florenese denigration is also rhetorically stated by Indonesian government and it is historically referred to the ancient lontar text ‘Negarakertagama’ from Majapahit kingdom. According to this ancient text, Flores was conquered by Majapahit and became a Majapahit’s vassal since then. Considered as hinterland ethnic group and in an attempt to avoid exclusion, the Florenese used their myth of origin to attach to Indonesian state project of nation unity. The son of the last local king of Ngadha region narrated the migration of the Ngadha from the west to Ngadha land. Their ancestor started the journey from Sina and crossed Selo, when they arrived at Jawa One –the present Java Island--; they stayed and married the women from Jawa One. Then the offspring of the former ancestor migrated to Raba, and from this place they moved to Sumba. After that, the Jawa meze their founding ancestor lineage continued the migration to Flores (Sudarmadi, 1999:60-61).

Throughout Indonesia government project of ‘Sejarah Nasional Indonesia’ text book, Indonesia nation state formation appears to be a representation of Java as a center of Indonesian state authority and also as dominance ethnic group. To counter such critique, Indonesian government launches a project of regional-history writing, in which minority ethnic groups can recount and add their contribution in the Indonesian nationhood history (Atkinson, 2003:135-137). While Florenese are positioned as primitive ethnic groups –prehistory period- in Sejarah Nasional Indonesia- official government text book-, this state project of regional-history offers the Flores people to include their contribution in the nation culture core, particularly in the modern history of Indonesian Independence. ‘Sejarah Perlawan terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme di Nusa Tenggara Timur’ (Kopong, 1983) and ‘Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasional Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur’ (Widyyatmika et. all., 1979) are resulted from government project of regional history. However, these text book publications are not published for purchase reason, they are only used for local Flores public school education. As a result, Indonesians learn about the world’s great Borobudur cultural heritage, Sriwijaya kingdom and Majapahit kingdom, but less often their teachers in early schooling give lesson on Flores mega-
liths, Flores local history and marginal Flores ethnic groups local kingdom.

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian Republic nation state was founded in 1945. It consists of many islands, various ethnic groups, multiple languages and religious diversity. In order to consider itself a nation, the Indonesian founding fathers and state elites imagine a shared past, which may function as a myth of national unity for the heterogeneous Indonesian nation. This myth refers to a starting point in the glorious past of Sriwijaya and Majapahit kingdom. Following this myth of Indonesian imagined community, the Indonesian state launched the Pancasila ideology and the motto ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ or unity in diversity. Actually, the mainstream nation building can be termed 'Nation State Project' and it is aimed to transform its heterogeneous population into a homogeneous Indonesia nation.

Establishing an Indonesian nation state on the basis of an imagined glorious past has lent legitimacy to shape an Indonesian nation state boundary. Furthermore, such a boundary defines the Indonesian nation state territory with a specific geographical region, ethnic group affiliation, the right to access natural and cultural resources, to guarantee justice and equality for its citizen, and to maintain religious practices. In fact, such boundaries acts as the Indonesian government mechanism of 'included or excluded' on the Indonesian nation state status.

To create clear-cut conceptual boundaries between inside and outside Indonesian nation state, the Indonesian government develops project of ‘Nation Unity’. This project works on collective memory of Indonesian nation imagined past. Using tangible and intangible heritage to invent, transmit, manipulate the past in the present, then the Indonesian state maintain to weld Indonesian nation unity. However, because the Indonesian nation state project whose main purpose is to justify its boundary claim and to homogenize its citizen is built on a glorious past and cultural heritage of major ethnic groups, minor ethnic groups feel themselves to be marginalized by the Indonesian nation state. In such a case where minor ethnic groups are treated as subordinate, they may struggle to attach in the Indonesian nation government project of nation unity.

Finally, in this article I delineate the Flores people, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) Province, struggle on the Indonesian state project of a single unity nation. With considerable insight, the Florenese might accept the fact, that the Indonesian nation state categorizes them as a second class Indonesian citizen and also as isolated traditional and living 'prehistory' ethnic groups. This is also clear from the Indonesian government unwillingness to assert the Florenese cultural heritage on the Indonesian state project of Indonesian nation imagined community. However, the Florenese participation in the transnational migration—migrants who moving back and forth between at least two countries—might challenge their identity and social existence in the Indonesian nation state project of nation unity.

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